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Fascist and extreme right-wing political movements in Britain have been the subject 
of enduring interest to historians since 1945, with the majority of works centring on 
the British Union of Fascists (BUF), a political party founded and led by Sir Oswald 
Mosley between 1932 and 1940. Despite the BUF’s failure to achieve levels of 
support on par with many fascist movements in continental Europe, there is now a 
sizeable body of historiography dealing with the party as a minor case within the 
study of European fascism and as a unique phenomenon of radical politics in 
interwar Britain.  By comparison, little interest has been devoted to aspects of British 
fascism not connected to Mosley or the BUF. Moreover, extreme right movements 
operating in Britain since 1945 have largely been characterized as either a direct 
legacy of the interwar movement or an attempt to reform British fascism under a 
different guise.  
This thesis re-examines the continuity between the interwar and the post-war 
iterations of the extreme right in Britain by focusing on the ideas and activism of 
Arthur Kenneth (A.K) Chesterton. A high-ranking member of the BUF who made 
substantial contributions to the party’s propaganda, Chesterton split with Mosley in 
1938 to pursue an independent career in extreme right-wing politics that persisted 
until his death in 1973. Outside of his role in the BUF, Chesterton is best known as a 
prolific author of conspiratorial nationalist literature, as the head of the League of 
Empire Loyalists (a small right-wing pressure group active from 1954 to 1967), and 




focal point, this study examines the problems encountered by Britain’s extreme right 
in attempting to reconcile the nature and methods of fascism with the prevailing  
conditions of British politics across seven decades of the twentieth century. While 
the primary contribution is to the historiography of extreme right-wing movements 
in Britain, it also expands ongoing theoretical debates regarding the nature and 
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More than any other movement of the 20
th
 century, fascism defined itself in terms of 
action, disdaining theory and principle in favour of a violent struggle for national 
redemption. It has thus proven a vexing subject for historians and political theorists, 
who have struggled to extract meaning from its bloody, chaotic and contradictory 
legacy.
1
 Richard Bosworth, a distinguished figure in the study of Italian Fascism, 
aptly summarized the problems of trying to draw a static definition of fascism from 
the ‘moving parts’ of its history: ‘If theorists stop the machine, they may be able to 
see fascism more clearly and paint it more strikingly. But they simultaneously lose 
the context in which fascism lived and upon which, despite itself, it was dependent’.
2
 
Analysing the experience of individual fascists provides a useful starting point for 
understanding fascism, not merely as a set of abstract principles, but as a living 
movement driven by the actions, ideas and ‘mobilizing passions’ of its adherents.
3
 In 
the case of British fascism, studies centred on individual activists are of particular 
importance, since the movement was sustained through much of its existence by a 
small coterie of dedicated radicals, who imagined themselves the vanguard of a 
revolution that never arrived.  
Arthur Kenneth (hereafter A.K.) Chesterton was an outstanding figure within 
Britain’s extreme right, whose life has already served as the basis for David Baker’s 
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 Throughout the course of this thesis, ‘fascism’ is used to denote the generic term, while 
‘Fascism’ refers to the Italian or ‘classical’ variety from which the term was originally 
derived. For an example of this convention elsewhere, see Roger Griffin, The Nature of 
Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 1.   
2 R. J. B. Bosworth, ‘Introduction’, The Oxford Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 5-6.  
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acclaimed political biography, a work focused primarily on the interwar period. 
Although there is some inherent value in supplementing Baker’s work with the 
details of Chesterton’s post-war career, this study seeks to move beyond the realm of 
a biographical inquiry, adopting a broader and more critical approach to the history 
and definition of British fascism as a whole. Chesterton, for the purposes of this 
study, serves as a lens for an exploration of the problems that confronted the extreme 
right in Britain, a nation ill-disposed to the revolutionary ideas and violent methods 
that were integral to interwar fascism, as well as the esoteric racism and anti-
Semitism that buoyed the post-war movements.  
Chesterton was never as prominent or influential as Oswald Mosley, the 
undisputed leader of Britain’s interwar fascist movement and the man who has 
received the most interest from scholars and the general public. Chesterton also 
failed to acquire the personal notoriety of William Joyce, a British fascist whose 
transformation into a Nazi propagandist led to a sensational trial that culminated in 
his execution for treason. Chesterton is notable among British fascists, not for his 
political stature or infamy, but for his persistence. The length and breadth of his 
career on the extreme right saw him play a crucial part in two of the most prominent 
organizations to be classified under the banner of British fascism: Mosley’s British 
Union of Fascists (BUF), of which Chesterton was an active member between 1933 
and 1938, and the National Front, which he helped found and oversaw as chairman 
between 1967 and 1971. 
Chesterton’s life prior to joining Mosley and the ethos he espoused as a 
member of the BUF made him an exemplar of a distinctively British variant of 




impressed upon him a form of patriotism centred on 19
th
 century ideals of imperial 
Britain. The suffering Chesterton endured as a soldier in the First World War left 
him preoccupied with military discipline and comradery, which he contrasted with 
the hollow commercialism of the civilian world. Eventually, Chesterton’s radical 
nationalism and cultural pessimism led him to a movement that claimed to embody 
the spirit and sacrifices of the front generation. From 1933 onwards, he embraced the 
most radical tendencies of interwar fascism, decrying Britain’s decadent state and 
calling for a national revolution to overhaul all aspects of society. He contributed 
with enthusiasm to the BUF’s anti-Semitic campaigns, and his written propaganda 
was marked by constant references to a global Jewish conspiracy. Influenced by the 
likes of Rudyard Kipling and Thomas Carlyle, Chesterton looked to Mosley as a 
heroic figure destined to lead a ‘drive against the largest and most strongly 
entrenched social conspiracies the world has ever known’.
4
 
On occasion, Chesterton’s writing formed a purer expression of the fascist 
ethos than official BUF doctrine, which encompassed detailed plans for a corporatist 
state and an autarchic ‘empire economy’. Leaving aside the details of these 
programs, Chesterton’s fascist creed demanded an immediate and drastic response to 
the decay brought about by a ‘putrescent’ democracy, and foreshadowed a militant 
struggle to wrest Britain from its internal enemies. Despite his fiery rhetoric, 
Chesterton was discomfited by the brutality that accompanied the BUF’s public 
demonstrations. He became embroiled in the internal struggles that ran beneath the 
surface of Mosley’s party, a predecessor to the chaotic factionalism that defined the 
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extreme right in Britain after 1940. After he resigned from the BUF in 1938, 
Chesterton denounced Mosley for his ‘inertia’ in the face of legal and political 
challenges to fascism in Britain. In truth, however, Chesterton was subject to the 
same constraints as his former leader, and the social and political circumstances that 
rendered British fascism politically impotent. 
Chesterton’s dogged commitment to the nationalistic principles underpinning 
fascism, and his concomitant attachment to conspiratorial anti-Semitism, earned him 
a just reputation for obsessiveness and inflexibility. But it was this same ‘ideology of 
obsession’ that allowed Chesterton to survive the collapse of the BUF, and move 
forward into a new era of extreme right wing activism. His lower profile and steady 
patriotism, along with a certain amount of luck, spared him from Joyce’s dramatic 
end, as well as the more banal fate of Mosley and many ex-fascists who fell by 
wayside as the post-war era progressed. Chesterton’s search for an alternative to the 
‘bluff and favouritism’ of Mosley’s endeavours brought him into contact with a 
wider range of political alliances, and showed the fragmentation and growing 
ideological diversity of the extreme right. He found financial and political support 
from the fringes of British conservatism, especially when he turned his attentions to 
the declining status of the British empire, but the legacies of fascism continued in his 
unwaveringly radical ideology and his prolific output of conspiratorial literature. 
Chesterton tried, with little success, to pursue the ideals of national revival while 
putting aside the violence and populist demagoguery of the ‘fascist epoch’. 
As a figure straddling the divide between two different eras, Chesterton was 
able to carry forth the ideological traditions of the interwar period, and pass on his 




immigration became central to extreme right politics in the 1950s, Chesterton was 
also able to synthesize the pseudo-scientific bigotry of racial nationalism into his 
overarching conspiracy theories, which envisioned a Jewish plot to destabilize the 
British empire and flood the nations of the commonwealth with non-white migrants. 
Chesterton was also an early and vigorous opponent of Britain’s integration with 
Europe, and his arguments against ‘Common Market Suicide’ resonated into 
subsequent generations of the British nationalists. While these causes offered a 
pathway to legitimacy for the extreme right, neither Chesterton nor the young 
radicals whom he nurtured in the National Front were able to overcome the internal 
conflicts and external obstacles that kept the movement on the fringes in previous 
decades. To the end of his life, Chesterton fought, without success, to escape the 
long shadow cast by Mosley and the dire reputation of British fascism. At the same 
time, inspired by the violent racialism and faux-sophistication of their Western 
European counterparts, the new generation turned towards neo-fascism, coming face 
to face with the same political, legal, and ideological conflicts that had led 
Chesterton in search of an alternative.  
 
A.K. Chesterton: a biographical overview 
 
A.K. Chesterton was a British soldier, journalist, political activist and a cousin of the 
famed English writer Gilbert Keith (G.K.) Chesterton. Born in Krugersdorp, South 
Africa in 1899, Chesterton’s first brush with politics came in 1930 when he founded 
a ratepayers’ organization in Torquay while working as a newspaper editor. It was 




joined Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF). Having turned to 
journalism and theatrical criticism after serving in the First World War between 1915 
and 1918, Chesterton’s literary capabilities and considerable work ethic made him a 
valuable asset to the BUF’s intensive propaganda campaigns. Initially assigned to 
the Midlands as an administrative officer, Chesterton returned to London in 1934 
and was installed as editor of the BUF’s newspaper Blackshirt. In 1937, he was 
appointed Director of Publications by Mosley and put in charge of a second paper, 
Action, which he oversaw until leaving the BUF the following year. During his five 
years with Mosley, Chesterton penned a number of articles and pamphlets that 
provided great insight into the ideology of British fascism. Notable examples of his 
work included Creed of a Fascist Revolutionary, a series of short manifestos calling 
for a patriotic revolution under Mosley, and The Apotheosis of the Jew, a notorious 
anti-Semitic essay that was distributed as a pamphlet during the BUF’s campaigns 
throughout East London.
5
 Chesterton’s Portrait of a Leader, a book published in 
1937, served as Mosley’s official biography, detailing his righteous struggle against 
the inertia of British party politics and his triumphant ascent as leader of the BUF.
6
 
Not long after the book was released, Chesterton became disillusioned with 
Mosley’s leadership and the direction of the party. He resigned in 1938 and shortly 
afterward published a pamphlet detailing his grievances with the party leadership, 
though he remained broadly supportive of Mosley’s political aims.
7
  
                                                             
5
 A.K. Chesterton, ‘The Apotheosis of the Jew’, British Union Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 2, 
(1937), pp. 45-54.  
6
 A.K. Chesterton, Oswald Mosley: Portrait of a Leader (London: Action Press, 1937). 
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After the BUF, Chesterton was involved with a number of small fascist and 
anti-Semitic organizations that emerged just before the Second World War. He 
associated with but refrained from joining with the National Socialist League, a 
group overseen by two of his former colleagues in the BUF, John Beckett and 
William Joyce. Chesterton also became a regular speaker at meetings of the Nordic 
League and the Militant Christian Patriots, two primarily middle-class anti-Semitic 
organizations, and a contributor to Lord Lymington’s New Pioneer. Chesterton’s 
name also appeared on the membership list of Archibald Ramsay’s Right Club, a 
secretive group of fascists and upper-class anti-Semites in operation between 1939 
and 1940, which was later implicated in a plot to overthrow the British government. 
Frustrated by the lack of progress by many of his affiliates on the extreme right, 
Chesterton made a brief attempt to establish a new organization known as British 
Vigil in June 1939.
8
 He abandoned this effort on the outbreak of war in September 
1939, however, and volunteered to return to the armed forces. Chesterton was among 
the few high ranking members of the BUF who avoided being imprisoned along with 
Mosley under the provisions of Security Regulation 18b, a piece of legislation that 
targeted seditious activity among the fascist movement from May 1940.
9
 
Chesterton’s record of service in the First World War, coupled with his open 
criticism of Hitler’s foreign policy and pro-German figures in the fascist movement, 
helped him overcome suspicions of disloyalty that lingered after his return to 
uniform. He went on to serve as an officer in the campaigns through East Africa and 
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 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, London, hereafter TNA, 
KV2/1345/1k, Chronological list of activities of Chesterton, 26 January 1940.  
9





Somaliland until 1943, when he was invalidated from active duty suffering from 
malaria and colitis. After recovering and returning to civilian life, he joined an 
unsuccessful attempt to revive Britain’s fascist movement as part of the After 
Victory Group, a committee that planned to establish a new party immediately after 
the end of the war. Despite early hopes that the movement would gain momentum 
from a wave of post-war patriotism and anti-Semitism, the resulting party (by then 
known as the National Front) dissipated in 1946, having been thoroughly 
compromised by infighting, financial woes and government surveillance.
10
  
In the wake of the first National Front’s dissolution, Chesterton turned his 
energies back towards journalism and freelance writing. In an effort to avoid further 
controversy, he wrote pseudonymously for radical publications while contributing 
more circumspect work to sympathetic right-wing papers like Truth and The Weekly 
Review. The editor of Truth, Collin Brooks, was also involved with plans for the 
National Front and provided Chesterton with a steady position as sub-editor of the 
paper between 1944 and 1953. Disillusioned with party politics after the failure of 
the National Front, Chesterton refrained from fully joining any other extreme right 
organizations but maintained a personal affiliation with the Duke of Bedford’s 
British People’s Party. Chesterton’s tenure with Truth ended acrimoniously in 1953 
when the paper underwent a change of ownership, resulting in his and Brooks’ 
dismissal from the editorial staff.
11
 In response, Chesterton appealed for public 
support and received a generous donation from Robert Key Jeffrey, a British 
millionaire residing in Chile. These funds allowed Chesterton to begin publishing 
                                                             
10 TNA KV2/1348/307, Cross reference to report from F.3./1907 to F.3. re the National 
Front, 26 May 1946. 
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Candour, a ‘news and views-letter’ which he would continue to produce for the 
remainder of his life. In 1954, with further support from Jeffrey, Chesterton founded 
the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL), a non-party organization dedicated to a 




Though it retained some ideological connections to fascism, in practice the 
LEL operated mainly as an extreme right advocacy group that aimed to raise public 
awareness and influence Conservative policy relating to the empire, national security 
and immigration. The LEL gained a reputation for unconventional protest tactics, 
which consisted mainly of heckling politicians and public gatherings, painting 
slogans and engaging in theatrical stunts that attracted bemused attention from the 
media. The LEL (along with Candour’s readership) spread beyond England, with 
local chapters and supporters as far afield as Australia, Rhodesia and New Zealand. 
Despite its fairly stolid and conservative orientation, the LEL served as a 
springboard for younger activists who would propel Britain’s extreme right after 
Chesterton’s death. These included the future National Front leader and British 
National Party founder John Tyndall, as well as Colin Jordan, a central figure within 
British neo-Nazism.
13
 Chesterton’s writing also attracted a small international 
following via The New Unhappy Lords, a book-length expose of ‘international 
power politics’ which he first published in 1965. 
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 ‘Constitution of the League of Empire Loyalists’, Hugh McNeile and Rob Black, The 
History of the League of Empire Loyalists and Candour (London: BM Candour, 2014), 
Appendix 3,  pp. 133-141.  
13
 See: John Bean, Many Shades of Black (Burlington: Ostara, 2011) pp. 93-120; John 
Tyndall, The Eleventh Hour (Welling: Albion Press, 1998) pp. 51-54, 176-177. On the life 
and influence of Colin Jordan, see Paul Jackson, Colin Jordan and Britain’s Neo-Nazi 




In 1967, Chesterton was appointed as the first Chairman of the National 
Front, a party formed through a merger of the LEL, the British National Party and 
the Racial Preservation Society.
 14
 Despite his experience and seniority, Chesterton 
was a controversial figure in the National Front, becoming embroiled in a legal battle 
with another party leader, Andrew Fountaine, and coming under criticism for his 
long absences spent overseas in South Africa. In 1971, facing pressure from an 
internal faction within the party, Chesterton resigned from the National Front and 
was followed out of the organization by many of his followers from the LEL.
15
 The 
majority of Chesterton’s final years were spent writing his memoirs, producing 
monthly issues of Candour and completing a second book, which would be 
published posthumously under the title Facing the Abyss. Despite his failing health, 
Chesterton also maintained an active correspondence with extreme right wing groups 
in Britain, South Africa and Rhodesia. Throughout 1973, he was involved in 
negotiations for a new umbrella organization to campaign against Britain’s 
involvement with the European Common Market. In August that same year, 
Chesterton was also in talks to return to the National Front and adopt a symbolic role 
as the party’s president. Before this could be finalized, however, he succumbed to 
pancreatic cancer on 16 August 1973, survived by his wife of forty years, Doris 
Terry. After Chesterton’s death, the editorship of Candour passed to his friend and 
long-time supporter Rosine de Bounevialle, who maintained the position until her 
death in 1999. To date Candour continues to be published and overseen by the A.K. 
                                                             
14
 This iteration of the National Front bore no connection to the one formed by the After 
Victory Group in 1945, aside from Chesterton’s involvement. The British National Party 
referred to in this instance was an organization borne from the 1960 merger of John Bean’s 
National Labour Party and Colin Jordan’s White Defence League, not be confused with the 
contemporary British National Party founded by John Tyndall in 1982.  
15




Chesterton Trust, a small independent publisher operating from Liss Forest in 
Hampshire.  
The most extensive study of Chesterton’s involvement with British fascism is 
David Baker’s Ideology of Obsession, an analytical biography adapted from the 
author’s 1980 doctoral thesis.
16
 Aside from providing a thorough biographical record 
of Chesterton’s early life, Baker’s study also provided an in-depth analysis of the 
intellectual and social-psychological aspects of his path towards fascism. Expanding 
upon a profile of Chesterton by Richard Thurlow in 1974, Baker’s study considered 
Chesterton as an example of the archetypal British fascist, for whom the appeal of 
fascism and anti-Semitism was exacerbated by his early experiences of wartime 
suffering and disillusionment.
17
 ‘Cultural despair’, a term coined by the German 
historian Fritz Stern, featured prominently in Baker’s work as an explanation for 
Chesterton’s transition from theatrical criticism and journalism to radical politics. 
Stern’s original study focused on the cultural pessimism which took hold in parts of 
German society in the decades prior to the emergence of Nazism, marked by the 
belief that modern culture was becoming progressively more corrupt and decadent as 
it receded from the glory of an idealized past.
18
 
Baker traced the final stages of Chesterton’s path towards fascism through his 
correspondence with G. Wilson Knight, a Shakespearean scholar with whom he 
became friends during his time at Stratford-Upon-Avon in the 1920s.
19
 From this 
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 David L. Baker, ‘A.K. Chesterton: The Making of a British Fascist’, PhD Diss., 
University of Sheffield, 1982.  
17
 Richard Thurlow, ‘Ideology of Obsession: On the Model of A.K. Chesterton’, Patterns of 
Prejudice, Vol. 8, No. 6 (1974), pp. 23-29. 
18 Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1963).  
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correspondence and Chesterton’s work as a critic, Baker traced a connection between 
literary and theatrical notions and key aspects in Chesterton’s understanding of 
fascism. In particular, he observed that Chesterton’s idealized vision of 
Shakespearean England was used as a standard by which he judged modern Britain 
to be succumbing to decadence.
20
 Baker argued that this notion of decadence grew 
from Chesterton’s aesthetic ideas to become an all-encompassing facet of his 
political worldview, which in turn led him to support fascism as a revolutionary cure 
for Britain’s national decline. Like Mosley, Chesterton drew political influence from 
the works of Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw, which explored the themes of 
human evolution and the Nietzchean idea of the ‘superman’. Along with the ‘great 
man’ view of history promulgated by Irish historian Thomas Carlyle, Shaw’s work 
fed into the notions of heroic leadership and the fascist ‘new man’ that would compel 
Chesterton during his time with the BUF. Another element of comparison used in 
Baker’s study was the ideas of Oswald Spengler, the German historian and 
philosopher whose Decline of the West offered a ‘heady nationalist optimism’ in 
response to Western cultural malaise.
21
 Baker contrasted Chesterton’s ‘Spenglerian’ 
ethnocentric anti-Semitism with the ‘brutal mixture of social Darwinism and crude 
biological racism’ that characterized Hitler’s anti-Semitic ideas.
22
  
In Ideology of Obsession, Baker updated his work on Chesterton in reference 
to the ideal-typical definition of generic fascism proposed by Roger Griffin: ‘a genus 
of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic 
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 Baker, ‘A.K. Chesterton: The Making of a British Fascist’, p. 344.  
21
 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, p. 92. Griffin noted that outside of Germany, Spengler’s 
work was mistaken for as an expression of ‘morbid pessimism’ rather than a call for a 
patriotic revolution.  
22




form of populist ultra-nationalism’.
23
 The prevalence of decadence, transcendence 
and rebirth as themes in Chesterton’s writing for the BUF pointed to the same 
mythic core identified by Griffin’s definition of fascism.
24
 In his conclusions, Baker 
also stressed the extent to which Chesterton’s fascism was marked by a spiritual 
utopianism that ‘represented a desire to transcend the banality of the bourgeoisie 
world, and to give life a new meaning based upon an almost religious mysticism’.
25
 
Returning to the question of ‘nature versus nurture’ that had preoccupied his earlier 
inquiries into why Chesterton turned to fascism, Baker once again concluded that 
circumstances, not pathology, lay at the heart of his radical turn:  
 
The lesson he teaches us, therefore, is that fascists can be made as well as 
born, and that fascism is a broad church containing a wide variety of 
palingenetic mythologies… here we have a relatively ‘normal’ individual, of 
some talent, opened to irrational ideas and dangerous prejudices by virtue of 




This thesis does not seek to dramatically revise Baker’s conclusions regarding 
the process by which A.K. Chesterton became a British fascist. It accepts and indeed 
reinforces the notion that Chesterton’s attraction to fascism was a product of 
experience and misguided intellectual conviction, rather than some innate 
psychological defect. Whereas Baker’s work dealt at length with Chesterton’s 
upbringing and pre-political career, this study is concerned exclusively with his 
political experience and leaves aside the more granular biographical details of his 
life. The aim of Chapter 2, which discusses the period between Chesterton’s service 
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 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 8-14. 
24 David Baker, Ideology of Obsession (London: I.B. Tauris , 1996), pp. 210-211.  
25
 Baker, Ideology of Obsession, p. 208.  
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in World War I and his initial encounter with Mosley in 1933, is to identify which 
elements of Chesterton’s worldview were distinctively fascist in nature, and examine 
how these ideas compared to the wider emergence of extreme right politics in the 
aftermath of World War I. This will serve to illustrate how Chesterton could be 
intellectually linked with fascism, even prior to his actual encounter with a fascist 
movement, due to the prevalence of militaristic nationalism, cultural pessimism and 
heroic essentialism as themes within his writing. The second half of Chapter 2 deals 
with Chesterton’s involvement with the BUF, providing an in-depth consideration of 
his ideology as expressed primarily through written propaganda, and considering 
how his idealistic conception of revolutionary fascism conflicted with the actual 
experience of the BUF in interwar Britain.  
The immediate aftermath of Chesterton’s break with Mosley, which Baker 
characterized as his growing disillusionment with fascism as a whole, is treated in 
this study as a transition between conventional interwar fascism and the murkier 
‘post-fascist’ era of the British extreme right. One of the key differences between 
this thesis and Baker’s study is the amount of space dedicated to analysing 
Chesterton’s ‘post-fascist creed’, which received only a concise summary in 
Ideology of Obsession: 
 
a mixture of right-wing Tory Empire loyalism and conspiratorial anti-
Semitism. To which, in the wake of mass immigration into Britain, and black 
nationalist guerrilla actions against British colonialism, he added the anti-
‘coloured’ biological racism which he had carried with him from his 
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Baker noted all the key elements of Chesterton’s ideology after 1945 but provided 
little analysis, and offered only partial insight into how this ‘post-fascist creed’ 
distinguished itself from the revolutionary fascism of the 1930s. One area 
particularly worth expanding upon is Chesterton’s relationship with conservatism, 
alluded to by Baker as a brief flirtation with ‘Tory Empire Loyalism’ in the 1950s. 
Chesterton’s affiliations in the post-war period included a number of notable 
conservatives, such as Lord Beaverbrook and Collin Brooks, both of whom 
facilitated his journalistic career prior to Candour. Three of the political 
organizations which Chesterton oversaw after leaving Mosley – the After Victory 
Group, the League of Empire Loyalists and the National Front – drew on elements of 
both conservatism and fascism, and attracted supporters from across the spectrum of 
extreme right ideology. Chapter 2 of this thesis deals at some length with 
Chesterton’s unsuccessful attempts to reconcile his commitment to national rebirth 
and spiritual regeneration with the changed circumstances of post-war Britain – a 
political landscape that contained varying strains of radical conservatism, anti-
immigrant populism and semi-clandestine neo-fascism.  
Since the publication of Ideology of Obsession, Chesterton has received only 
a fraction of the individual attention given to Mosley, due to his comparatively low 
profile in the history of the BUF. At the same time, Baker’s study has been 
acknowledged as a seminal contribution to the study of British fascism, with a recent 
literature review describing it as ‘one of the most accomplished works on the BUF 
ever written’.
28
  Richard Thurlow, whose initial study served as the impetus for 
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Baker’s thesis, provided further consideration of Chesterton’s post-war career, 
depicting his influence on the National Front as part of the ‘grand synthesis’ between 
conspiratorial anti-Semitism, reactionary nationalism, racial fascism and neo-
Nazism.
29
 Though acknowledging his role in nurturing a new generation of extreme 
right activists, Thurlow was generally dismissive of Chesterton’s ideological 
contributions after 1945, viewing his ideology in this period as a pale reiteration of 
Mosley’s corporatist doctrine. By contrast, Thurlow depicted Mosley’s evolution 
after the BUF as a rare example of intellectual growth on the extreme right, which 




Mosley’s career and ideology after 1945 have now been subject to an 
intensive study by Graham Macklin, whose 2007 work Very Deeply Died In Black 
explored the history of the Union Movement, a successor to the BUF founded in 
1947.
31
 Two articles recently published by Macklin have also brought to light 
Chesterton’s role in the post-war extreme right, focusing on how his influence 
extended beyond domestic British politics. The first of Macklin’s articles examined 
Chesterton’s relationship and correspondence with Henrik Ven Der Bergh, head of 
the South African Bureau of State Security. Macklin’s article raised the troubling 
extent to which Chesterton’s racist and conspiratorial ideas influenced  Ven Der 
Bergh, whose organization played a direct role in the enforcement of South Africa’s 
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 The second article concerned the influence of Chesterton’s New 
Unhappy Lords on the extreme right in the United States. Though noting the pre-
existence of many ‘native’ anti-Semitic ideas in America, the article made a further 
case for how Chesterton’s anti-Semitic conspiracy theories were disseminated 
among a wider audience of political fringe groups abroad.
33
 The international 
dimensions of Chesterton’s activism, particularly throughout Britain’s former 
colonies and dominions, is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The fourth and final chapter of this thesis deals with Chesterton’s relationship 
with anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories and racism. In order to properly situate 
Chesterton within a longer tradition of anti-Semitic thought and practice, this chapter 
begins by considering the range of prejudice and conspiracy centred around the 
notion of Jewish ‘aliens’ and international finance. It also explores the historical 
precedent for the style of pseudo-intellectual or “rational” anti-Semitism that 
Chesterton practiced during the latter half of his career, and how this influenced his 
contributions to the revisionist literature of the post-war extreme right. Finally, the 
latter part of this chapter explores how anti-Semitic conspiracies became 
intermingled with Chesterton’s responses to immigration and the ‘race issue’ which 
came to dominate the politics of the extreme right from the 1950s onward. A 
recurring theme of this chapter, and indeed the discussion of Chesterton’s 
conspiratorial thinking throughout this thesis as a whole, is the conflicting manner in 
                                                             
32
 Graham Macklin, ‘The British Far Right’s South African Connection: A.K. Chesterton, 
Hendrik van den Bergh, and the South African Intelligence Services’, Intelligence and 
National Security, Vol.  25, No. 6 (2010), pp. 823-842. 
33
 Graham Macklin, ‘Transatlantic Connections and Conspiracies: A.K. Chesterton and The 
New Unhappy Lords’, Journal of Contemporary History,  Vol. 47, No. 2 (2012), pp. 270-
290. For a broader perspective on the relationship between the British and American 
extreme right, see Paul Jackson, Post-War Anglo-American Far Right: A Special 




which it affected his political career – providing continuity and ideological 
reinforcement on some occasions, but broadly limiting his capacity to adapt and take 
advantage of political opportunities.  
Despite the volume and quality of research directed at British fascism, neither 
Baker’s study nor the subsequent work of Thurlow and Macklin has yet accounted 
for the full scope of Chesterton’s career, nor the significance of his role as a living 
link between two distinct eras of extreme right activity in Britain. Rather than treat 
Chesterton solely as a subject of biographical inquiry, this study aims to utilize his 
work and experiences as a lens into the nature of British fascism, and the changes 
that took place in Britain’s extreme right in the decades after 1945. In general, this 
thesis takes a critical view of two assumptions that underpin much of the literature 
surrounding Britain’s extreme right. First, that the emergence of extreme right 
movements in Britain after the Second World War was primarily an attempt to 
repackage the fascism of the BUF, and second, that the nature  and development of 
fascism in post-war Britain is best understood through the ‘ideal typical’ model of 
generic fascism proposed by Roger Griffin.  
Since both of these assumptions hinge on the definition and interpretation of 
fascism, the theoretical problems of the extreme right and the specific historiography 
of British fascism, the first chapter of this thesis acts as an extended literature 
review. The purpose of this review is partly to provide context and historiographical 
grounding for the forthcoming discussion of Chesterton’s political career between 
1933 and 1973. More importantly, however, it offers an introduction to the debates 
over the categorization and significance of British fascism, to which this thesis aims 




should incorporate the distinctive methods and political goals of fascist movements 
alongside their mythical and ideological precepts. Second, that the attempts by 
British fascists to incorporate fascism into a predominantly liberal, parliamentary 
tradition of politics resulted in a movement that was both politically unstable and 
ideologically conflicted. Third, that the transition between the interwar and post-war 
eras should be understood as a genuine period of ideological and structural 
diversification within Britain’s extreme right, rather than merely a reincarnation of 




The biographical details of A.K. Chesterton’s life before the Second World War are 
drawn from three main sources: his own memoirs, written (but never published) 
under the title ‘Blame Not My Lute’, his wife Doris Terry’s notes and recollections 
(provided to David Baker during his doctoral research between 1978 and 1982) and 
the work produced by Chesterton during his early career as a journalist in South 
Africa and England. A large portion of this material is now housed in the Chesterton 
Collection at Bath University, a collection of primary documents and 
correspondence donated by David Baker.
34
 The most obvious shortcoming of the 
biographical material in this collection is its reliance on individual reminiscences 
rather than concrete records. Doris Chesterton’s notes and correspondence with 
Baker were produced in the period between 1973 and 1982, and in some cases it is 
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impossible to verify the accuracy of her recollection of key events, such as 
Chesterton’s reaction to the Olympia meeting in 1934. Doris Chesterton did not 
share her husband’s political beliefs and did not shy away from detailing his role in 
the BUF, nor his anti-Semitism and racial paternalism. At the same time, however, 
she displayed an understandable tendency to sympathize with her husband’s motives, 
downplaying or qualifying his affiliation with the violent and hateful aspects of 
British fascism.  
Chesterton’s autobiography, Blame Not My Lute, presents a similar problem 
of bias, having naturally been influenced by the author’s memory and self-interest. 
Although he was professionally capable of producing an accurate journalistic record, 
Chesterton wrote his memoirs with a view towards humorous anecdotes and 
interesting personalities rather than historical precision. As a result, dates and 
contextual details are frequently lacking in what is otherwise a rare and valuable 
account of Chesterton’s early life.
35
 For the most part, Chesterton’s memoirs avoid 
discussing his political career, making only passing reference to controversies that 
accompanied various parts of his life. While this is unfortunate, given the dearth of 
sources relating to Chesterton’s interwar career, the resulting account is less inclined 
towards the self-serving revisionism that characterized much of Mosley’s 
autobiography. There is still a degree of bias to be accounted for in Chesterton’s 
recollection of certain events, such as the Rand Revolt, or his relationship with 
prominent figures like Lord Beaverbrook.
36
 In some cases, it is possible to bolster 
                                                             
35
 Chesterton Collection B. 3-B. 7, 139 pp. typescript entitled ‘Blame Not My Lute’, nd. ca. 
1973. Hereafter BNML.  
36 A good example of this is in Chesterton’s record of interactions with Lord Beaverbrook, 
which he recounted anecdotally in his unpublished memoir. Although Chesterton suggested 




the anecdotal accounts of Chesterton and his wife with reference to more concrete 
information. For example, Chesterton’s discussion of his service in the First World 
War can be matched by War Office records, the official history of his regiment on 
the Western Front, and secondary accounts of the war in East Africa. 
The Chesterton Collection at Bath contains no examples of his journalistic 
work prior to the 1930s. A series of articles from the Johannesburg Star written 
between 1921 and 1923 have instead been sourced from a series of cuttings that 
reside among the papers of A.K. Chesterton’s cousin, G.K. Chesterton, which are 
stored among the manuscript collections of the British Library.
37
  Only a handful of 
Chesterton’s personal papers from his time with the BUF remain in existence, with 
the majority having been destroyed in a fire at his flat in the 1950s. There is, 
however, an abundance of written material produced by Chesterton in his capacity as 
a writer and propagandist for the BUF between 1934 and 1938. Several of 
Chesterton’s most notable and infamous works from the interwar period can be 
found within the collection at Bath, including the pamphlet Creed of a Fascist 
Revolutionary and an annotated copy of Portrait of a Leader. 
All of the material produced by Chesterton during his tenure with Mosley can 
be classed as propaganda, and thus needs to be approached carefully as a historical 
source. There is ample reason, for example, to doubt the factual claims made within 
Chesterton’s newspaper articles and his biography of Mosley, particularly when 
concerning controversial or disputed events involving the Blackshirts. Chesterton 
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himself would lament after leaving the party in 1938 that the fascist press was 
generally prone to exaggeration.
38
 Due to the number of authoritative secondary texts 
dealing with British fascism in the interwar period, this study has little need to rely 
on Chesterton’s propaganda as a source for the expository details surrounding the 
history of the BUF. Instead, the value of these sources lies in their capacity to 
demonstrate the nature of Chesterton’s ideology, and the manner in which he 
conceived of a fascist state in Britain.  
The primary sources concerning Chesterton’s life between leaving the BUF 
in 1938 and re-enlisting in the army are varied. Prior to the start of the Second World 
War, Chesterton contributed to extreme right-wing publications alongside more 
mainstream outlets like the Weekly Review, a paper which printed his denunciation 
of Hitler following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. As a prominent 
and controversial speaker for organizations like the Nordic League, Chesterton was 
the subject of reports by the Jewish Chronicle, which documented some of his most 
drastic expressions of anti-Semitism outside of the BUF. Chesterton’s involvement 
with the Right Club is briefly recorded in the ‘Little Red Book’, a leather bound 
volume kept by Archibald Ramsay containing a membership list and plans for a 
forthcoming political campaign. The most significant source relating to Chesterton’s 
reenlistment are the files of the Security Service, now residing in the National 
Archives at Kew, which offer some insight into why he was spared from internment. 
The state scrutiny incurred by Chesterton as a result of his interwar activity is 
described in ‘Blame Not My Lute’, and briefly mentioned in an unpublished account 
of his wartime experience in East Africa, titled ‘All Aboard For Addis’. This 
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additional memoir, which resides as an incomplete manuscript in the Bath archive, 
offers important details regarding Chesterton’s motivations for returning to the 
military in 1939. 
39
 
The observation of Chesterton by the Security Service resumed after his 
return from East Africa in 1943, and continued in varying degrees of intensity until 
1953. The details of this surveillance are now housed within the National Archives at 
Kew, offering a valuable insight into the resumption of Chesterton’s political activity 
in the wake of the BUF’s collapse. In the period between 1943 and 1945, these 
records contain information about Chesterton’s life and ideology in a period where 
he was reticent to discuss politics openly, for fear of attracting state censure or 
jeopardizing Britain’s war effort. The outlook of the Security Service itself needs to 
be taken into account when evaluating the surveillance of Chesterton and other 
extreme right activists. Agents of the Security Service were primarily concerned with 
the danger posed by fascist activity during and after the war with Germany. As a 
consequence, activity or correspondence that hinted at violence or subversion was 
given the greatest prominence within surveillance reports . The ‘spy scare’ that 
prevailed in Britain between 1939 and 1940 had diminished by the time that 
Chesterton returned from the war in 1943. As such, the reports from this period do 
not overestimate the extent of his political influence or danger to the state, as was the 
case with some of the surveillance carried out on BUF regional organizers in 1940.
40
 
Although there are occasional errors and inconsistencies in the accounts of security 
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service informants, the files provide a comprehensive and detailed record of 
Chesterton’s role in the After Victory Group and the ill-fated National Front. To 
supplement these sources, there is also a considerable amount of journalistic material 
published by Chesterton in the decade following his return from overseas. An 
editorial position at the weekly newspaper Truth and regular columns for the Weekly 
Review gave Chesterton a consistent outlet for political expression to a mainstream 
audience. His more unabashedly radical work appeared under a nom de plume in a 
range of extreme right publications, a number of which are catalogued in the 
Chesterton Collection. A small amount of material relating to Chesterton resides in 
the John Beckett collection at Sheffield University, including his notes and draft 
work for an extended profile of William Joyce, eventually condensed into a single 
article for the Sunday Express  in 1953.
41
  Chesterton’s brief and tempestuous 
involvement with Lord Beaverbrook, which began shortly after his dismissal from 
Truth in 1953, is lightly documented through correspondence in the Beaverbrook 
Papers at the UK Parliamentary Archives.
42
 
The most abundant source of material relating to Chesterton after 1953 is 
Candour, the independent publication he launched in October 1953 and oversaw for 
the remainder of his life. Issues of Chesterton’s ‘news and views letter’ appeared 
weekly until March 1962, when a dispute over the will of R.K Jeffery, the financial 
patron of both Candour and the League of Empire Loyalists, forced it to scale back 
publication. After March 1962, Candour appeared bi-monthly as a series of ‘interim 
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reports’, until reader donations allowed Chesterton to resume a monthly publication 
schedule in May 1965. Both the interim reports and the monthly editions of Candour 
published after 1965 are catalogued in the Chesterton Collection, which also 
provides a number of issues produced after Chesterton’s death in August 1973.
43
 
Since Candour provided Chesterton with an unprecedented level of editorial 
independence, it provides one of the most valuable sources of insight into his 
political ideology and assessment of world events after 1945, such as decolonization, 
immigration and the prospect of European integration.  
Notwithstanding its inherent bias, Candour provides a consistent record of 
Chesterton’s political activism between 1953 and 1973, including the international 
campaigns of the League of Empire Loyalists and the formation of the National 
Front. Along with a substantial collection of newspaper clippings relating to the 
LEL’s stunts and electoral campaigns, the Chesterton Collection features a 
transcribed interview between Baker and Rosine De Bounevialle, which describes 
the background to Chesterton’s campaigns after 1956. Another interview conducted 
with John Tyndall offers a view into Chesterton’s influence on a younger generation 
of extreme right activists in the National Front.
44
 Although the Chesterton Collection 
includes a substantial amount of correspondence from Chesterton’s later life, much 
of the material after 1961 relates to the protracted legal battles surrounding the will 
and inheritance of R.K. Jeffery. Other letters of note relate to the negotiations 
leading to the formation of the National Front, the subsequent conflicts arising 
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between Chesterton and other members of the party, and his eventual resignation in 
1971. Thereafter, the letters contained in the collection at Bath provide the sole 
documentation of Chesterton’s last two years of activism, including his international 
correspondence, his continuing negotiation with the National Front, and his attempts 
to rally opposition to the European Common Market.  
Much of Chesterton’s written work, including numerous pamphlets issued by 
the League of Empire Loyalists, has been reissued through the independent 
publishing efforts of the A.K. Chesterton Trust. Most recently, the trust has issued an 
official history of the League of Empire Loyalists, written in part by a former 
member, Kevan Bleach. Copies of Chesterton’s New Unhappy Lords also remain in 
circulation, with a fifth edition featuring a foreword by Andrew Brons, formerly a 
leading figure in the British National Party who served as a Member of the European 
Parliament in 2009.
45
 The sources surrounding Chesterton and the history of 
Britain’s extreme right after 1945 are incomplete, with significant documents either 
lost, classified or in private hands. This inconsistency is partly a reflection of the 
British extreme right itself, comprised of small movements and individuals 
disinclined to share records of their activity with potential critics or enemies. Using 
Chesterton as the basis for a wider inquiry provides a relative abundance of sources, 
therefore, due to his continuous activism and prolific literary output between 1921 
and 1973.  Treated with appropriate scepticism, and supported by other empirical 
records, his body of work provides sufficient material for the forthcoming study.
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The introductory chapter to this thesis provides a brief overview of A.K. 
Chesterton’s life between 1915 and 1973, along with a review of the literature and 
primary material relating to his political career. This section also contains an 
explanation of how this study distinguishes itself from previous work conducted 
around Chesterton and the history of British fascism, in terms of scope and 
methodology. Thereafter, this thesis is broken down into four chapters. Chapter 1 
provides an extended literature review pertaining to the historical interpretation of 
fascism, contemporary understandings of the extreme right, and the specific 
historiography surrounding British fascism. Chapter 2 concerns Chesterton’s early 
adulthood spanning from 1915 to 1933, and his involvement with the British fascist 
movement between 1933 and 1940. Chapter 3 concerns the period from 1940 to 
1973, beginning with Chesterton’s service in the Second World War, encompassing 
his political activism in the three decades after 1943, and ending with his death in 
1973. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of Chesterton’s activism and ideology 
in relation to anti-Semitism, racism and political conspiracy theories. The concluding 
chapter of this thesis provides a discussion of A.K. Chesterton’s impact on the post-
war extreme right, and the insight his experiences provide into the character and 




Chapter 1: Situating and interpreting fascism 
Fascism 
 
The number of texts dealing with fascism is substantial enough that, in Robert 
Paxton’s words, ‘no lone scholar, however diligent, could possibly master all the 
literature of all the fascisms’.
1
 What follows is therefore a selective overview of the 
major studies and interpretations, encompassing three broad phases of scholarship to 
emerge since the interwar period. The first phase includes the earliest attempts to 
understand fascism either as a contemporary phenomenon in the lead-up to the 
Second World War, or as a subject of recent history in the years between 1945 and 
1960. The second phase, otherwise known as the first wave of fascist studies, covers 
many of the major debates over the history and interpretation of European fascism to 
emerge since the 1960s. The third and final phase, the second wave of fascist studies, 
comprises the recent debates over the nature of generic fascism to emerge since the 
1990s. For the most part, this thesis relies upon understandings of historical and 
generic fascism drawn from this most recent group of texts, especially the influential 
English-language works produced by Stanley Payne, Roger Griffin, Robert Paxton 
and Michael Mann. It is nonetheless worth considering the longer arc of fascist 
historiography, which highlights many of the themes, perspectives and 
methodological problems associated with trying to define fascism or encapsulate its 
historical meaning. A chronological approach reveals the extent to which wider 
political and academic trends have influenced how fascism is defined at any given 
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point. In addition, it demonstrates that the study of fascism has proven to be cyclical, 
with themes or modes of interpretation falling in and out of favour over time. Both 
of these tendencies are illustrated by the case of totalitarianism. Once the dominant 
interpretation of fascism among liberal or conservative thinkers, the concept fell into 
disrepute after the 1960s, only to slowly re-emerge as a more limited conceptual tool 
in the comparative study of fascism and dictatorship. 
Marxist-Leninist interpretations of fascism first emerged in the 1920s as the 
European left responded to the movements emerging in Italy and Germany. An 
official Soviet interpretation of fascism was established at the Seventh World 
Congress in August 1935, where party chairman Georgi Dimitrov argued that 
‘fascism in power is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most 
chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital’.
2
 Daniel Guérin’s 
Fascism and Big Business (1939) echoed Dimitrov’s attack on the revolutionary and 
anti-capitalist bonafid es of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, which 
he described as ‘petty bourgeois “anti-capitalism”’ leveraged in service of a 
‘political religion’ of the disaffected middle classes and funded by big business.
3
 
Guérin, like many other left-wing critics, rejected the notion that fascism was a 
revolutionary movement, and instead emphasized its role as an agent of reactionary 
capitalism. This view of fascism, subsequently termed ‘agent theory’, would persist 
after 1945 in both official communist doctrine and (to a lesser extent) scholarship 
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emanating from the ‘New Left’.
4
 The characterization of fascism as ‘bourgeois 
radicalism’ was also shared by a number of scholars outside the Soviet orthodoxy, 
who noted the prevalence of the middle-class supporters in the Italian and German 
fascist movements. American economist and historian David Saposs depicted 
fascism as ‘the extreme expression of middle-classism or populism’ in 1935, a view 




Studies of fascism produced in the decades after 1939 were, for obvious 
reasons, shaped by the violent cataclysm of the war and the subsequent revelation of 
atrocities carried out by the Nazi regime. Their focus reflected an interest in fascism 
not as an ideology or coherent philosophy but as an outburst of large-scale moral or 
psychological delinquency. Peter Drucker, a Jewish-American author and 
management consultant, was among the first Western authors to depict fascism as a 
response to a moral crisis. Drucker’s The End of Economic Man (1939) criticized the 
inadequacies of ‘agent theory’ and presented fascism as a nihilistic, quasi-religious 
response by Europeans to the failure of Marxism’s social revolution.
6
 Theodore 
Adorno’s Authoritarian Personality (1950) was among the most influential works to 
interpret fascism on a psychological basis, drawing its conclusions from a survey of 
adults conducted in the post-war United States. Adorno posited that support for 
fascism could be tied to a series of traits that comprised the ‘authoritarian 
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personality’, marked by an individual’s deference to authority figures, rigid sense of 
moral judgment and propensity towards ethnic and racial prejudice.  
The most prominent interpretation of fascism to emerge against the backdrop 
of the early Cold War focused on its functional similarities to communism. The term 
‘totalitarianism’, embraced by Mussolini in the early stages of the Italian regime, 
was used to encompass both fascism and communism as variants of a unique form of 
20
th
 century despotism. Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism (1950) was the 
most influential text to explore totalitarianism as a concept, though it afforded the 
label only to Germany under National Socialism and not to Mussolini’s Italy.
7
 
Arendt’s specific treatment of fascism was similar Drucker’s, emphasizing moral 
breakdown and the role of Europe’s irrational ‘amorphous masses’ in bringing Hitler 
and Mussolini to power.
 8
 Carl Joachim Friedrich, a German-American political 
theorist, made a more prosaic attempt to define totalitarianism by identifying five 
common characteristics of fascist and communist societies: the presence of an 
official ideology, a single mass party, ‘a system of terroristic police control’ along 




Many of the early interpretations of fascism produced either before or 
immediately after the Second World War have declined in popularity since the 
growth of fascist studies in the 1960s. Economic or materialist interpretations have 
fared the worst of all, falling from favour even among left-wing or Marxist scholars. 
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Few major texts dealing with the history or ideology of fascism rely exclusively on 
psychological models and have instead tended to treat the ‘psycho-historical’ 
dimension of fascism as one of several factors driving its emergence in interwar 
Europe.
10
  Other scholars have found psycho-social models a useful point of 
comparison, as in David Baker’s study of A.K. Chesterton, which depicted his path 
to fascism as determined by experiences and historical context rather than 
‘psychological predisposition’.
11
 Totalitarianism has likewise receded as an all-
encompassing interpretation of fascism, but remains a popular analytical tool for 




The 1960s saw the first serious attempts to establish a definition of generic 
fascism, suitable for use by historians and social scientists as a political category 
equivalent to liberalism, socialism or conservatism. Ernst Nolte’s Three Faces of 
Fascism (1963) began by noting that the literature surrounding fascism was 
dominated by memoirs and anti-fascist critiques, rather than historical or 
philosophical inquiries. In an intentional departure from the scholarship of the post-
war era, therefore, Nolte attempted a study of fascism on its own terms: ‘one which 
does not impose a definition of the phenomenon from the outside but allows that 
phenomenon to speak for itself in the fullest possible terms and takes its self-image 
seriously’.
13
 He thus interpreted fascism, not as a manifestation of capitalism, 
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totalitarianism or mass delusion, but as a unique ‘metapolitical’ phenomenon that 
emerged in response to the First World War and the spread of Bolshevik 
communism in Europe.
14
 In practice, this amounted to a radical form of politics that 
varied according to its national context but shared common characteristics: ‘the 
“principle of leadership” and the desire for a “new world”, the love of power and the 
dramatic appeal of youth, elite-consciousness and mass influence, revolutionary 
ardour and veneration of tradition’.
15
 In a later work entitled The Crisis of the 
Liberal Systems and the Fascist Movements (1968), Nolte refined this survey into a 
six-point definition of the ‘fascist minimum’, a set of basic characteristics used to set 
fascism apart from other political types.
16
  
The more abstruse elements of Nolte’s multilayered analysis of 
‘metapolitical’ fascism have largely fallen from favour in recent decades, with much 
criticism emanating from left-wing perspectives.
17
 Nevertheless, Nolte’s 
characterization of fascism as an ‘epochal revolutionary movement’ has been subject 
to enduring interest and controversy. Some scholars continue to dispute the notion of 
fascism as a revolutionary movement, while others have sought to focus on the 
interaction between revolutionary and reactionary (or counterrevolutionary) elements 
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 There is also much debate over the epochal European nature 
of fascism, with many contemporary scholars positing the existence of fascist 
movements beyond the temporal and geographical confines of interwar Europe. 
Despite the shortcomings of Nolte’s conclusions, two aspects of his methodology 
have proven influential in the work of contemporary theorists: the use of fascists’ 
texts and programs as a basis for determining their ideology, a method the historical 
sociologist Michael Mann described as ‘taking fascists’ values seriously’, and the 
search for a fascist minimum.
19
 
Eugen Weber’s Varieties of Fascism (1964) elaborated on many of Nolte’s 
ideas while attempting a more accessible and wide ranging analysis of fascist 
movements throughout Europe. Weber proposed that the varieties of fascism could 
be divided into two broad categories: classical Fascism of the Italian variety, which 
showed pragmatic or conservative tendencies, and National Socialism of the German 
variety, distinguished by radicalism and a greater emphasis on ideology.
20
 In tracing 
the origins of these two forms, Weber highlighted the role of proto-fascist 
intellectuals like Georges Sorel, to whom Mussolini attributed his views on the 
necessity and virtue of violence.
21
  Anticipating the work of scholars like Fritz Stern, 
who traced the growth of Nazism to ‘cultural despair’ in Germany, Weber identified 
the fear of decline and crisis as a defining characteristic of the fascist worldview: 
‘justified or not, Fascism lives and thrives in an atmosphere of crisis. All Fascisms 
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see themselves as a last recourse; all are menaced by a hostile world, in a state of 
siege where self-sufficiency – material and ideological – is the only hope’.
22
 Like 
Nolte, Weber accepted fascism as an ideology with genuine revolutionary aims, and 
even suggested that both the National Socialist and Fascist varieties shared a 
‘hostility to capitalism’. Unlike left-wing revolutionaries, however, Weber observed 
that fascist leaders felt little compunction to define the exact shape or trajectory of 
society after their uprising: ‘the Fascists offered an alternative, however vain – “a 




Nolte and Weber’s works served as the major predecessors to the first wave 
of ‘fascist studies’ conducted by non-Marxist historians and political theorists, which 
began in earnest following the first published issue of the  Journal of Contemporary 
History (JCH) in 1966. George L. Mosse’s introduction to the inaugural JCH, later 
published in book form as International Fascism, provided something of a mission 
statement for the scholars seeking an understanding of generic fascism: 
 
if we want to get closer to the essence of the fascist revolution we must 
analyse it in a European-wide scale, taking into account important variations, 
but first trying to establish what they had in common. Fascism lacked a 
common founder, but all over Europe it sprang out of a common set of 




The common problems to which Mosse referred arose from the conditions of 
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the fin de siècle (or the beginning of the 20
th
 century): a collapse in traditional 
structures caused by industrialization and urbanization, the growth of mass politics 
and cultural alienation that drove European citizens away from liberal modernism 
towards irrational or ‘instinctual’ philosophies. Fascism emerged from this period as 
a ‘revolt of the youth’, offering a sense of spiritual redemption and a return to 
tradition, while simultaneously giving leaders a means to control the crowd and 
direct it to political effect.
25
 The revolution itself was cultural rather than economic 
or political, a revolution of the spirit envisioned as overriding class divisions through 
the creation of a ‘new man’ and a new society governed by ‘hierarchy, not in terms 
of class but in terms of service to the Volk or nation as exemplified by the leader’.
26
 
Mosse’s approach emphasized the romantic, irrational and even quasi-religious 
nature of fascism, which manifested in public displays of worship: ‘the techniques 
which went into the taming of the revolution and which made fascism, even that 
which leaned on a Christian tradition, a new religion with rites long familiar in 
traditional religious observance’.
27
 Mosse’s analysis of fascism as a cultural 
revolution has fared the best of all “first wave” interpretations, having been 
recognized by Roger Griffin as one of the major groundings for his own ‘ideal-




Weber’s contribution to the JCH symposium considered the Iron Guard, a 
Romanian fascist movement originally founded by Corneliu Codreanu as the Legion 
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of the Archangel Michael in 1927. Though much of the article dealt with the 
distinctive circumstances surrounding the Romanian movement, particularly the 
absence of an organized Left wing opposition, Weber’s article also noted the extent 
to which fascist regimes came to differ from the movements that drove them into 
power: 
 
Success, it seems, is the worst enemy of fascism… This is not because, as has 
been said, the only aim of fascism is power, but because the true aim of 
fascists which, in one guise or another, is to effect a national revival and 
regeneration, contradicts not the means they use to get power but those they 
use once they are in power. The ruthlessness, the passion, the fierce resolve 





Another notable figure to emerge in the first wave of fascist studies, A. James 
Gregor, also stressed that fascism was a coherent ideology defined by its radical or 
revolutionary nature. Unlike Weber or Mosse, however, Gregor showed little interest 
in developing a generic or universal theory of fascism and instead focused on the 
‘paradigmatic Fascism’ of interwar Italy: ‘the only, fully matured ideological 
rationale for the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century… self-characterized as 
antiparliamentarian, antimajoritiarian, and explicitly totalitarian’.
30
 Gregor contested 
the notion that fascist intellectuals had been driven purely by a tradition of nihilism 
or cultural despair, arguing that its ideology drew upon a new sociological tradition 
that shared the revolutionary, anti-parliamentarian ideals of Marxism.
31
 This 
tradition resulted in what Gregor termed a ‘developmental dictatorship’: a form of 
                                                             
29
 Eugen Weber, ‘The Men of the Archangel’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No. 
1 (1966), pp. 125-126.  
30
 A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 7.  
31




totalitarian government that sought to advance society by synthesizing nationalist 
myths with the class-conscious economics of socialism.
32
  
As the popularity of totalitarian explanations declined after the 1960s, many 
non-Marxist historians sought to develop an understanding of generic fascism based 
on its intellectual roots in early 20
th
 century Europe. Alastair Hamilton’s The Appeal 
of Fascism offered a survey of intellectuals who were drawn to fascism throughout 
Italy, Germany, France and England.
33
 Though it served to further dispel the notion 
that fascism was a movement devoid of ideas, Hamilton’s work offered no definitive 
argument as to why such a diverse range of literary figures and public intellectuals 
were drawn to support a seemingly anti-intellectual movement. An introduction 
written by English author Stephen Spender suggested that the subjects of Hamilton’s 
study were driven by opportunism, aesthetic idealism and the nebulousness of 
fascism itself: ‘The ambiguity of the ideology allowed those who supported it to read 
into it what they pleased’.
34
 The most influential study of fascism’s intellectual roots 
was undertaken by Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell who looked to the syndicalist 
movements of pre-war France as a predecessor to the fascist movements in Italy and 
other parts of Europe. Like Gregor, Sternhell saw fascists as  the product of a 
synthesis between right and left: ‘a synthesis that only became possible in the 
aftermath of the war, and of course, after the success of the Soviet revolution… it 
was a politics of fear and crisis, inseparably bound up with the new difficulties 
                                                             
32
 A. James Gregor, The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), pp. 194-195.  
33
 Alistair Hamilton, The Appeal of Fascism (London: Anthony Blond, 1971). 
34




liberal democracy was encountering’.
35
 Borrowing its revolutionary ideas from the 
left, fascism offered its adherents a ‘comprehensive alternative to liberal bourgeois 
civilization’ that abolished individualism in favour of nationalistic collectivism.
36
 
Sternhell observed that fascism’s ties to the revolutionary traditions of the left were 
in many cases a source of conflict with conservatives, right-wing authoritarians and 
reactionaries, who had no desire to overthrow the existing order and replace it with 
an entirely new system. In some countries, such as France, this conflict ultimately 
led to fascists being marginalized or repressed by their non-revolutionary 
counterparts on the right.
37
  
Responding to the growing specialization of fascist studies, the 1970s and 
1980s saw the publication of numerous general works, which attempted to survey 
‘international fascism’ and offer a condensed guide to the competing scholarly 
interpretations.
38
 An edited volume overseen by American historian Walter Lacquer 
included essays from Weber, Sternhell and Mosse, along with an extensive 
introduction to the comparative study of fascism by political scientist Juan Linz, who 
dedicated much of his attention to the social bases of European fascist movements.
39
 
The most lucid and comprehensive general study to emerge prior to the 1990s was 
Stanley Payne’s Fascism: Comparison and Definition (1980). Alongside an 
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inventory of the existing theories of fascism, Payne  presented his own ‘typological’ 
definition of the term based around three sets of characteristics: the negations of 
fascism (anti-liberalism, anti-communism and anti-conservatism); a common 
ideology geared towards ‘the creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state based 
not merely on traditional principles or models’; and a style and organization that 
included mysticism, ritual, masculism, charismatic leadership and the ‘positive 
evaluation of violence’.
40
 To place his definition in context, Payne grouped fascism 
alongside two other derivations of authoritarian nationalism that emerged from the 
same conditions of interwar Europe: the radical right, comprising movements such as 
Action Française or the German Stahlhelm, and the conservative right, 
encompassing the likes of the Vichy regime in France or Antonio Salazar’s Estado 
Novo in Portugal after 1933.
41
 In a concluding chapter, Payne stressed that the 
nationalistic roots of fascist movements made it difficult to establish a singular, all-
encompassing definition of generic fascism. Instead, he proposed that historical 
fascism could be divided into six sub-categories: Alongside paradigmatic Italian 
Fascism and National Socialism, Payne listed the Spanish, Hungarian and Romanian 
variants, along with a cluster of ‘abortive fascisms’ that emerged from authoritarian 
systems in the 1930s.
42
 
While Payne’s Comparison and Definition reflected the progress in 
understandings of fascism since 1945, along with the many productive debates over 
its origins, ideology, dynamics and legacy, it also revealed the growing complexity 
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and unwieldiness of fascist studies. Robert Paxton would later describe the survey of 
fascism’s manifold incarnations as resembling  ‘a medieval bestiary, with its 
woodcut of each creature, classified by external appearances, fixed against a stylized 
background of branch or rock’.
43
 On the other hand, critics of the drive towards 
generic fascism after 1960 lamented that the search for a universal definition had 
diluted the concept beyond any usefulness. In 1979, the Canadian historian Gilbert 
Allardyce called for fascism to be ‘de-modelled, de-ideologized, de-mystified and, 
above all, de-escalated… Fascism must become a foreign word again, untranslatable 
outside of a limited period of history’. Likening the conceptual status of fascism to 
that of romanticism in the 19
th
 century, Allardyce further predicted that the trajectory 
of historical research was ‘leading toward the disintegration of what remains of 
“universal fascism” as a generic or ideological concept’.
 44
  
Allardyce’s pessimistic view prevailed until the 1990s, when a new 
generation of scholarship emerged to reinvigorate the debate over generic fascism. 
The first and most influential of these works was Roger Griffin’s The Nature of 
Fascism, whose publication effectively marked the beginning of the ‘second wave’ 
of fascist studies. Griffin began his analysis by positing that the competing 
definitions of fascism that had emerged from the 1920s onward were best understood 
as ‘ideal types’,  a term coined by German sociologist Max Weber to describe the 
broad categories drawn by social scientists in order to ‘exercise conceptual control 
over aspects of external reality’.
45
 Acknowledging that no definition could perfectly 
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encompass every permutation of fascism, Griffin thus proposed his own ‘consciously 
constructed’ ideal type: ‘Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core 
in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism’.
46
 
Like most of his predecessors, Griffin recognized fascist ideology as predominantly 
nationalistic, but made a specific effort to delineate the qualities that distinguished it 
from the many other variants of nationalism that emerged from the 19
th
 century 
onwards. Fascist nationalism, according to Griffin was both ‘populist and 
‘intolerant’; its adherents sought to gather the masses under a charismatic elite, while 
placing themselves in opposition to the various external and internal forces 
threatening to undermine the ‘natural order’.
47
 The more novel component of 
Griffin’s ideal type was the ‘palingenetic myth’, a narrative of crisis and rebirth that 
could be discerned at the heart of fascism’s ideological core. Though earlier scholars, 
particularly Mosse and Weber, had noted the prevalence of myths in fascist ideology 
Griffin identified palingenesis as the theme underlying all other aspects of the fascist 
worldview: ‘one whose mobilizing vision is that of the national community rising 
phoenix-like after a period of encroaching decadence which all but destroyed it’.
48
 
Griffin’s new fascist minimum was lauded by a number of established 
theorists, including  Mosse and Sternhell, along with specialists like Richard 
Thurlow, who welcomed the heuristic value of a concise, encapsulated definition of 
fascist ideology. Payne’s comprehensive history of fascism (published in 1995) 
recommended Griffin’s text as ‘one of those most worth a complete reading’ among 
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the many theoretical works on fascism.
49
 A more critical response was elicited by 
Griffin’s assertion in 1998 that fascist studies were finally approaching a consensus 
regarding the revolutionary, ultra-nationalist character of generic fascism.
50
 
Revisiting this idea in an article for the Journal of Contemporary History in 2002, 
Griffin argued that the ‘cultural turn’ of this new consensus served to vindicate the 
once controversial views of George Mosse, the first scholar to interpret fascism as a 
revolutionary movement driven by culture rather than politics or economics.
51
 
Between 2002 and 2005, a ‘forum debate’ initiated by German historian Werner Loh 
invited both critics and supporters to address Griffin’s proposed consensus and the 
conceptual value of generic fascism in the study of the interwar and post-war 
extreme right. The most strident critic among the English-speaking contributors was 
A. James Gregor, who objected to Griffin’s ‘postmodernist’ appropriation of social 
scientific terms and the ‘heuristic futility’ of palingenetic-ultra-nationalism, a 
characteristic which could see both the Khmer Rouge and the Russian Communist 
movements classified as generically fascist.
52
 A more constructive line of criticism 
came from Roger Eatwell, who highlighted the methodological problems raised by 
the many competing strains of fascist ideology:  
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in practice, fascism was highly opportunistic, varying both between countries 
and through time even in the inter-war era: how do we discern the ‘true’ 
fascism which lay behind this protean flux? An even more fundamental 
difficulty stems from the fact that key themes could be understood in different 




Rather than do away with Griffin’s fascist minimum altogether, Eatwell 
proposed to supplement it with a set of additional characteristics (a ‘fascist matrix’) 
that would take into account how fascists interpreted their own ideals and goals. In 
addition, Eatwell argued that a ‘full theory of fascism’ could be expanded to 
incorporate the rational aspects of its ideology, such as the pursuit of ‘third way’ 
alternative to capitalism and communism, alongside the irrational, mythic and quasi-
religious aspects emphasized by Mosse, Griffin and Gentile.
54
 In general, Griffin’s 
critics (both within and without the forum debate) have tended to echo the concerns 
of Gilbert Allardyce some years prior that fascism was being simultaneously reduced 
to an abstraction and inflated beyond its original proportions.  
Robert Paxton’s Anatomy of Fascism addressed this problem by retracing the 
history of ‘fascism in action, from its beginnings to its final cataclysm, within the 
complex web of interaction it forms with society’.
55
 Paxton presented his account 
chronologically, proceeding in stages from the inception and entrenchment of fascist 
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movements parties throughout Europe, to the acquisition and exercise of power by 
the two successful movements in Germany and Italy.
56
 The fifth and final stage of 
this chronology dealt with the long term fate of fascist movements that did not 
succumb to irrelevance or state repression: the co-option of Spanish and Portuguese 
fascists by other forms of authoritarianism, the alternating radicalization and 
normalization of Mussolini’s Italy, and the violent ‘paroxysm’ of extreme 
radicalization in Nazi Germany.
57
 Paxton’s approach to the definition and 
interpretation of fascism marked his greatest departure from the new consensus. 
From the beginning, he expressed scepticism toward the notion that fascism could be 
easily identified as an ideology, given that many of its adherents seemed to 
vehemently oppose any form of set doctrine. Along with the ‘brutal anti-
intellectualism’ displayed in fascist movements, Paxton pointed to the behaviour of 
fascist leaders who ‘made no secret of having no program’ and the absence of 
‘casuistical literature’ written to justify the many abrupt changes in policy.
58
 In light 
of fascists’ ‘contempt for reason and intellect’, Paxton argued that their underlying 
ideals were better thought of as ‘mobilizing passions’ discerned from actions rather 
than words. Alongside a list of these motivating passions, Paxton concluded by 
offering a definition of fascism that encompassed both ideals and methods: 
 
Fascism may be defined as a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive 
preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by 
compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party 
of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective 
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collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and 
pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals 




Michael Mann’s Fascists adopted a similar posture toward the problems of 
abstraction or idealism associated with Griffin’s fascist minimum. Following in the 
tradition of Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan Linz, Mann’s study was primarily 
concerned with the composition and social bases of fascist movements across 
Europe. Like Paxton, Mann considered fascists not only in terms of their beliefs but 
in the ways they sought and exercised power. His attempt to define fascism therefore 
introduced an emphasis on the distinctive methods employed by its followers to 
defeat opposing factions, gain the support of the masses and pursue their primary 
goal of ‘a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism’.
60
 Rather than depict 
paramilitarism as a coincidental feature of interwar European politics, Mann 
identified violent militancy as ‘key to the radicalism of fascism… Fascism was 
always uniformed, marching, armed, dangerous, and radically destabilizing of the 
existing order’.
61
 The other features of Mann’s five point definition were likewise 
chosen to reflect both the goals and organizational methods of fascism: nationalism, 
statism, transcendence and cleansing. In a similar fashion to Eatwell’s ‘fascist 
matrix’, Mann’s five-point definition allowed for the variance between movements 
that could be ‘could be more or less fascist’ depending on the degree to which each 
characteristic was on display.
62
 
Within the last five years, a number of attempts to reappraise fascism have 
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called for an embrace of complexity rather than a search for consensus or a universal 
definition. Michel Dobry, a political scientist concerned with early French fascism , 
echoed many of Gilbert Allardyce’s criticisms in the ‘classificatory research posture’ 
of generic fascism. Rather than call for the concept to be deflated as Allardyce did, 
however, Dobry recommended that scholars simply ‘accept the element of fluidity or 
vagueness in the word “fascism”’ and adopt a ‘relational approach’ focused on the 
interaction between different movements of the interwar Right.
63
 David D. Roberts, a 
historian of Italian Fascism, made a similar criticism of the ‘teleological thinking’ 
inherent in the search for lines of distinction between fascism and other branches of 
the authoritarian or conservative right. ‘The standard approach [also] shades into a 
quest for clear distinctions, precluding the openness to rough edges, blurring, and 
uncertainty that may be necessary if we are to make sense of the universe of 
responses on the new Right’.
64
 The recent push to reconsider fascism’s boundaries 
and interaction with the wider political right has been led, not coincidentally, by 
scholars of France, Greece, Hungary, Spain and Portugal – countries that fell under 
the control of semi-fascist or right-authoritarian regimes before 1945.
65
  
Despite the resurgence of criticism against the ‘new consensus’ in recent 
years, this thesis accepts the basic proposition that fascism was a generic 
phenomenon of 20
th
 century politics, whose emergence was not limited to interwar 
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Italy. Moreover, it accepts that a working definition of the term ‘fascism’ is 
necessary when  examining the history of fascist and extreme right movements in 
Britain. Neither of these positions is controversial, and both fall more or less within 
the consensus proposed by Griffin in 1998. There are lessons to be drawn, however, 
from various critiques offered against generic fascism, the cultural turn in fascist 
studies and the post-1990 consensus. Of particular importance are Renton, Paxton 
and Mann’s observations that fascism was defined as much by its methods − political 
violence, paramilitarism and mass politics -- as its ideology. The most 
comprehensive definition of fascism to balance both methods and ideology is still 
the typography proposed by Stanley Payne in 1980.
66
 Paxton provides a more 
concise definition that encompasses the same themes, along with some useful advice 
on how to navigate between nihilism and idealism in the study of fascist movements: 
‘One can steer between two extremes: fascism consisted neither of the 
uncomplicated application of its program, nor of freewheeling opportunism’.
67
 
Although they represent different approaches to fascism, Griffin and Mann offer 
overlapping insights into the most important tenets of the fascist worldview: extreme 
nationalism, vitalism, the leadership principle, an obsession with decline or 
decadence and the desire to transcend political and social problems by building a 
dynamic, reinvigorated nation state and a fascist ‘new man’.
68
 A final point that 
bears consideration is whether or not fascism should be classified as  revolutionary, 
reactionary, counter-revolutionary, or something else altogether. While 
acknowledging the ongoing controversy over this point, this thesis will proceed 
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under the view put forward by Philip Morgan that ‘by any reasonable definition of 
‘revolution’, the usually violent attempt to transform, that is, change fundamentally, 





The Extreme Right and Neo-Fascism 
 
Up until the late 1960s, contemporary political movements that showed either 
organizational or ideological affinity with fascism were broadly identified with the 
radical right. This classification became confusing after 1970, however, with the 
growth of radical conservatism in Britain, the United States and parts of Western 
Europe. This incarnation of the radical right, represented most prominently in Britain 
by the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher, embraced nationalism and even 
showed ‘a willingness to dabble in racist politics’ but bore only a superficial 
resemblance to the fascist parties of interwar Europe.
70
 The trend in academic studies 
since 1970 has thus been to substitute extreme right for radical right, though there is 
an ongoing tendency for these terms to be used interchangeably alongside far right, 
ultra-right, fascist and neo-fascist.
71
 This taxonomical confusion reflects the 
complex, amorphous character of the extreme right itself, which has grown to 
encompass a wide range of movements, parties and ideological sub-groups since the 
collapse of European fascism in 1945.  
                                                             
69
 Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe 1919-1945 (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 197.  
70 Roger Eatwell, ‘The Rebirth of the “Extreme Right” in Western Europe’, Parliamentary 
Affairs Vol. 53, No. 3 (2002), pp. 407-425, at p. 411.  
71




Roger Eatwell noted in 2002 that the extreme right resembled ‘more of an 
extended family’ than a discrete political category, and that as a consequence, many 
scholars had eschewed ‘the quest for an essentialist core of extreme right values’ in 
favour of identifying the general features of the extreme right-wing political 
family.
72
 In an example of this approach, political scientist Paul Hainsworth 
identified xenophobia, nationalism and anti-Marxism (or anti-communism) as the 
most prominent characteristic of extreme right-wing parties throughout Europe and 
the United States.
73
 He later appended this description in to account for the evolution 
of extreme right parties in the decade since the Soviet Union’s collapse: 
‘nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy, and support for a strong state. 
Welfare chauvinism and a strong emphasis upon law and order or security and upon 
ethnic identification and exclusion are part and parcel of the extreme right’s 
ideological personality’.
74
 Most recently, Hainsworth noted the increasing tendency 
of extreme right movements to position themselves as ‘populist’ uprisings against a 
political mainstream seen as ‘elitist’ or ‘out-of-touch’.
75
 Several parties in Western 
Europe formerly identified with the extreme right, such as the French National Front 
or the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), are now referred to by many commentators as 
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A specific definitional problem associated with the extreme right is the 
tendency for many of its constituents to actively resist classification, by either 
claiming to exist outside the left-right spectrum altogether, or by obscuring their core 
ideology in the interests of political expediency. As Eatwell observed, ‘many of the 
parties, especially those with fascist factions, have good reasons to hide their exact 
paternity’.
77
 In light of this problem, German political scientist Peter Merkl proposed 
a straightforward, ‘situational’ approach to defining the extreme right: ‘Given a 
particular issue of importance to them, for example immigration, or the rights of 
asylum, a radical right position is likely to be more hostile or punitive than those 
advanced by all the other parties, movements, or persons’.
78
 Contrary to this 
approach, Elizabeth Carter’s 2005 study of parties in Western Europe argued against 
classifying movements as belonging to the extreme right based on their position on 
the left-right spectrum and instead proposed a ‘dividing line’ between the moderate 
and extreme right consisting of two core values: 
 
[1] a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the 
democratic state (a feature that makes right-wing extremism extremist); [2] a 
rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (a feature that makes 
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In a more complex typology drawn from this definition, Carter identified 
‘neo-fascism’ and ‘neo-Nazism’ as sub-categories within an extreme right family 
that also encompassed authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal xenophobic and neo-
liberal populist parties.
80
 This approach reflected the broad consensus among 
scholars since the late 1980s that the extreme right could no longer be understood 
simply as a legacy or attempted parody of interwar fascism. Despite this general 
agreement regarding the contemporary extreme right, however, there is still 
considerable debate surrounding the continuation of fascism after 1945 and the 
parameters of genuine neo-fascism. During the first wave of fascist studies, few texts 
sought to investigate the period after 1945. Ernst Nolte, for example, was 
unequivocal in his view that fascism had been an ‘epochal’ phenomenon, 
irreproducible outside the unique cultural and historical conditions of early 20
th
 
century Europe. Even those theorists and historians who took a more expansive view 
of ‘universal’ fascism were ill inclined to see fascism as resurgent in the West, where 
it had been so thoroughly defeated and discredited in 1945. Alongside the many 
parallels between Nazi totalitarianism and the Soviet Union, those seeking to identify 
modern reflections of fascism looked either toward the legacy dictatorships in Spain 
and Portugal, or newer forms of authoritarian rule emerging in the “third world”. 
Closing the inaugural JCH discussion of fascism in 1966, Hugh Seton-Watson 
identified the self-proclaimed ‘socialist’ dictatorships in post-colonial Africa and 
Gamel Abdel Nasser’s Egypt as states showing ‘similarities with fascist 
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 Though he saw few prospects for a revival in Europe or the United 
Kingdom, Seton-Watson also identified several currents of fascist potential lurking 
farther afield in black-nationalist movements of the Northern United states, 
Quebecois separatists in Canada and the white population of South Africa.
82
 Later 
considerations of post-war fascism showed a similar tendency to look beyond 
Western Europe and the Anglosphere, with South or Central America and the Middle 
East yielding the greatest interest. Stanley Payne’s 1980 study included a brief 
overview of the proposed instances of contemporary fascism to have emerged since 
1945, including the ethno-nationalist movements in Israel and various populist or 
dictatorial regimes in Africa, Asia and the Middle-East. Payne found Muammar el 
Qaddafi’s ‘quasi-revolutionary’ Libya and Juan Peron’s military dictatorship in 
Argentina to be ripe for comparison the regimes in interwar Europe, but concluded 




The beginning of the second wave of fascist studies in the 1990s, coincident 
with a resurgence of extreme right movements throughout Europe, led to a greater 
interest in neo-fascism (or contemporary fascism) as a subject of comparative study. 
Insulated from the cultural and political developments of Western Europe, many of 
the new nations that emerged from the break up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc 
were seen to possess characteristics consistent with the emergence of fascism in 
interwar Europe – including strong currents of ethno-nationalism, anti-Semitism and 
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economic instability, as well as weak traditions of pluralism and democracy.
84
 
Walter Lacquer’s Black Hundred, first published in 1993, was one of the earliest 
studies to raise the spectre of a Russian neo-fascism that could be traced back to 




From a theoretical perspective, the renewed debate over generic fascism in 
the second wave has also grown to encompass fascism after 1945. Griffin’s Nature 
of Fascism included an extensive treatment of the post-war era outlining three sub-
types of fascist movement to have emerged since 1945. Under the heading of 
‘nostalgic fascism’, Griffin grouped post-war organizations (such as Mosley’s Union 
Movement) alongside various German neo-Nazi movements seeking to resume their 
activity from the interwar period. Also included under the ‘nostalgic’ banner was the 
Italian Social Movement (MSI), which Griffin described as a ‘unique example of the 
resuscitation of an inter-war movement in an electoral party sufficiently durable 
(though consistently marginalized and now declining) to become a  permanent 
fixture in national life’.
86
 Griffin’s second heading encompassed a broad range of 
‘mimetic’ fascist movements, most of whom turned to the Nazi movement for 
ideological (as opposed to purely aesthetic) inspiration. Examples in this category 
ranged from minor parties operating in Western democracies, such as the British 
National Party, to clandestine paramilitary organizations and survivalist 
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organizations operating throughout Europe and the United States.
87
 Finally, Griffin 
concluded his taxonomy by outlining four variants of genuine ‘neo-fascism’, a term 
he used specifically to delineate movements ‘offering something new’ from those 
merely seeking to resurrect interwar fascism.
88
 Alongside ‘crypto fascist’ or ‘third 
position’ political groups (including the ‘Strasserite’ wing of the British National 
Front), Griffin identified several strains of neo-fascism embedded within the 
intellectual (or pseudo-intellectual) currents of contemporary Europe. These included 
historical revisionists in the vein of British holocaust-denier David Irving, as well as 
more sophisticated proponents of ‘conservative revolution’ such as the French 
Nouvelle Droite or ‘New Right’.
89
 
In recognition of the wide-range of disparate parties, movements and 
individuals encompassed by his taxonomy, Griffin noted that post-war fascism was 
defined by both ‘ideological heterogeneity and organizational complexity’. Despite 
these symptoms of ‘structural weakness’, however, Griffin argued that a ‘neo-fascist 
minimum’, comprised of the same palingenetic ultra-nationalist core underpinning 
interwar fascism, could be used to distinguish contemporary fascists from other 
members of the extreme right family. In addition, Griffin noted an increased 
tendency among neo-fascist groups to pursue international cooperation with like-
minded organizations abroad under the ideological banner of European identity or 
pan-European nationalism.
90
 In the opening to the 2002-2005 forum debate overseen 
by Werner Loh, Griffin further articulated his view that palingenetic ultra-
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nationalism had re-emerged in the ‘post-fascist epoch’ after 1945 as a series of 
‘groupuscular entities’ akin to a biological organism capable of mutating to survive 
in hostile conditions.
91
 Even more so than his wider call for consensus, Griffin’s 
attempt to link so many political, cultural and social groups under his definition of 
post-war fascism was received with cautious scepticism by many of the forum 
contributors. Stanley Payne gave an apt summary of the problems raised by 
including a ‘broad and dangerous neo-fascism’ in the broader conceptualization of 
generic fascism:  
 
Once some of the key values and goals of fascism – such as the most extreme 
ultra-nationalism, the primacy of vitalist philosophy, and the special 
valorization of war and violence – have to be renounced in a post-fascist 
epoch… the resulting political formulations that become candidates for a 
concept of neofascism can only be included in an historical generic concept at 




Fears of overinflating the concept of generic fascism to include the post-war 
era have led several scholars, even those generally supportive of the ‘new consensus’ 
like Payne, to retain Nolte’s view of fascism as an epochal phenomenon of interwar 
Europe. Nevertheless, many of the most recent and influential studies of fascism 
have seen fit to include some consideration of neo-fascism or ideological continuities 
in the contemporary extreme right. Payne’s 1995 history took a decidedly critical 
view of fascism after 1945, extending the ‘tripartite taxonomy of fascist, radical 
right, and moderate authoritarian right’ to conclude that ‘few groups which have 
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achieved any real electoral success will fit more into a right-ist than into a true 
neofascist category.
93
 Roger Eatwell’s brief overview of fascism, published in the 
same year, linked the pre and post-war movements of Germany, Italy, France and 
Germany through their common pursuit of a ‘holistic, radical-nationalist third 
way’.
94
 Michael Mann concluded that fascism had largely been quashed by liberal-
democratic institutions after 1945 but gestured toward the possibility of ‘fascist-
leaning’ movements emerging in a global South beset by economic instability and 
foreign military intervention.
95
 Robert Paxton found ‘the possibilities for a non-
European fascism [are] no less great than in the 1930s, and indeed probably greater 
because of the increase since 1945 of failed experiments with democracy and 
representative government’.
96
 Referring back to his five-stage model of fascism, 
Paxton warned that ‘something very close to classical fascism has reached Stage 
Two in a few deeply troubled societies’.  
Looking over the last two decades, one can identify two broad trends 
influencing the literature surrounding fascism and the extreme right. On the one 
hand, studies of the contemporary extreme right have consciously shifted away from 
comparisons to the interwar period, in recognition of the fact that many parties 
operating successfully in Western Europe bear little ideological or organizational 
connection to fascism. On the other hand, the growing concerns over populist-
nationalism fed by the 2008 economic crisis and continuing disputes over 
immigration have put fascism and neo-fascism back in the Western cultural zeitgeist. 
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This is reflected to some extent by a blurring of the lines between studies of fascism, 
once a purely historical phenomenon, and the extreme right, which has now become 
a permanent and in some cases growing subset of contemporary politics. Some 
scholars have also sought to apply understandings of the post-1945 extreme right to 
the interwar years, noting the extent to which that period also saw the proliferation of 
numerous ideologically and organizationally diverse grouplets with varying degrees 
of proximity to fascism.
97
  
The term extreme right is used throughout the remainder of this thesis to 
encompass both the interwar and post-war era, in recognition of the fact that fascism 
was and remains only one specific subset of a wider political family to have emerged 
in the early 20
th
 century. One obvious pitfall to this approach is that it risks 
obscuring the nature of fascism, a political movement which has both self-identified 
and been categorized by historians as belonging to neither left nor right. It is 
relatively easy, however, to identify the commonalities between fascism and other 
right-wing movements before and after the Second World War. In terms of ideology, 
the anti-materialist, nationalist character of fascism places it in closer proximity to 
conservatism and other parts of the right than left-wing movements orientated 
around internationalism, Marxism and class solidarity. The violent opposition to 
socialist, communist and labour movements by many interwar fascist parties does 
not itself define fascism, as Renton and other Marxist historians have suggested, 
since there was also significant conflict between fascists and less radical forms of the 
authoritarian right.  As Paxton argued most forcefully, however, the successful 
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fascist parties of the interwar period needed allies to secure power, and found their 
most ready allies amongst the conservative elite. In the post-war period, Roger 
Eatwell noted that fascist groups have appeared as a factional subset within broader 
parties or coalitions of the nationalist or populist right. Despite the ‘ideological 
heterogeneity and organizational complexity’ associated with fascism in both its 
interwar and post-war manifestations, therefore, there is sufficient reason to consider 
it an offshoot of the extreme (or non-conservative) right rather than an entirely 
separate phenomenon. Likewise, there is little historical insight or definitional clarity 
to be gained from considering fascism a movement of the left or radical centre, 




In a 1976 overview of Western European fascism, Stanley Payne observed that ‘only 
the Doriot and Mosley movements [had] been adequately investigated’ in 
monographic studies.
98
 Some years later, while reviewing the ‘minor movements’ of 
interwar fascism, he more pointedly described the historiography surrounding the 
BUF as ‘inversely proportionate to the group’s significance’.
99
 Since Payne made 
this assessment in 1995, the number of works dealing with Mosley, the BUF and the 
various offshoots of interwar British fascism has only increased. While the 
historiography of this topic is neither as vast nor contested as that concerning 
Nazism or Italian Fascism, this review will not seek to offer a comprehensive 
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overview of the many organizational, biographical, ideological and demographic 
studies conducted on many different facets of British fascism.
100
 Instead, it will 
provide an overview of the major themes and interpretations that have emerged from 
the study of Britain’s fascist and post-war extreme right movements.  
As with the earliest examinations of fascism in continental Europe, the first 
texts to address fascism in Britain emerged contemporaneously with the movement 
itself. An account of the BUF’s early existence was published in 1934 by W.E.D. 
Allen, a former Ulster Unionist MP who wrote under the pseudonym ‘James 
Drennan’. Described by Richard Thurlow as ‘by far the best contemporary account 
of the movement’, Allen’s work was also the first to publicly suggest that Mussolini 
was a major financial supporter of Mosley’s party.
101
 The BUF’s prolific publishing 
arm made its own attempts to establish a narrative of the movement’s origins, with 
A.K. Chesterton’s 1937 biography Portrait of a Leader offering a sensational 
retelling of Mosley’s early career. Though not entirely devoid of factual accuracy, 
Chesterton’s account is most relevant to this study as a primary source revealing the 
author’s preoccupation with heroic leadership and other precepts of fascism. 
Mosley’s 1968 autobiography My Life is likewise of little value as an objective 
account, but offers some insight into how Mosley sought to rationalize his 
involvement with fascism after the fact.
102
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The evaluation of British fascism began in earnest in the 1960s, with Colin 
Cross’ The Fascists In Britain (1966) marking the first published account of the 
BUF’s history. Though written more as a journalistic account than an academic 
study, Cross’s book marked one of the earliest attempts to fully document the BUF’s 
history, drawing on the author’s interviews and correspondence with surviving 
former members. Two monographs on the BUF appeared in print shortly after Cross’ 
narrative history: W.F. Mandle’s Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists 
(1968) and Robert Benewick’s Political Violence and Public Order (1969), later 
republished in a revised form as The Fascist Movement in Britain (1972).
103
 Both 
Mandle and Benewick characterized the BUF as having failed to adapt fascism to the 
unique conditions of British politics and civil society, highlighting anti-Semitism and 
political violence as features that limited the party’s appeal. Benewick also drew 
attention to Mosley’s personal culpability for the BUF’s failure, noting that despite 
being ‘a leader of many qualities’, he had failed to recognize the ‘strength of 
institutions and resistance to change’ among Britain’s establishment and proven 
incapable of managing the turbulent internal politics of his own party.
104
 Mandle 
likewise pointed to Mosley’s personal qualities as having fatally drawn the 
movement towards anti-Semitism after the BUF’s campaigns faltered in 1934: 
‘Rather than blame himself… he acted in his customary fashion by inflating a minor 
opponent into a major cause of failure’.
105
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In contrast to characterizations offered by Mandle and Benewick, Robert 
Skidelsky’s expansive biography of Mosley, first published in 1973, depicted a 
flawed but politically gifted idealist drawn to fascism by its romantic and intellectual 
appeal rather than opportunism or personal vanity.
106
 Unprecedented among texts on 
British fascism in its scope and detail, Skidelsky’s account was undermined 
somewhat by his close collaboration with Mosley, which resulted in a sympathetic 
and in some cases revisionist treatment of fascist violence and anti-Semitism. 
107
 
Despite his work’s controversial reputation, however, Skidelsky made a number of 
important and highly influential observations regarding the nature and development 
of an organically British variant of fascist ideology. Tracing the path to fascism back 
to Mosley’s experiences in the First World War, Skidelsky highlighted the extent to 
which fictional (or metaphysical) notions of heroism, vitalism and collective action 
shaped his view of political struggle in the war’s aftermath. According to Skidelsky, 
Mosley’s career in politics after 1918 was driven by a moral conviction that a new 
world was needed to honour and reflect the sacrifices made during the war.
108
  
Harkening back to his previous analysis of British politicians responses to the 
‘slump’ of the 1930s, Skidelsky also emphasized the rational aspects of Mosley’s 
plans for a corporate state, which he depicted as a radical outgrowth of the 
Keynesian economic interventionism he advocated as a Labour MP during the 
1920s.
109
 The would-be leader of Britain’s fascist revolution was thus neither an 
opportunistic playboy nor a power-hungry demagogue: ‘Mosley wanted power but 
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for a definite purpose: to solve the economic problem’.
110
 Subsequent reappraisals of 
Mosley shifted the balance back to a more critical treatment of his character and 
motivations, particularly in regards to the violent, anti-Semitic and authoritarian 
aspects of the British fascism. The most recent biography of Mosley is Stephen 
Dorril’s Blackshirt (2006), a work with greater narrative flair than many of the 
denser analytical works concerning British fascism. Dorril’s treatment of Mosley 
was another valuable corrective to Skidelsky’s ‘revisionist’ tendencies, placing an 
emphasis on Mosley’s skills as a political operator who made a considerable effort to 
solicit support from fascists in Germany and Italy. While affirming Skidelsky’s 
positive appraisal of Mosley’s capabilities as a leader, Dorril’s portrayal of the man 
himself was considerably more critical, drawing parallels between his promiscuity 
and haphazard political career.
111
  
Despite the controversy associated with Skidelsky’s biography, his analysis 
of Mosley’s development prior to joining the BUF laid the groundwork for further 
inquiries into the ideology and significance of British fascism. D.S. Lewis’ Illusions 
of Grandeur (1987) argued against Benewick’s view that fascism was ‘alien’ to 
British values and instead saw Mosley’s party as advancing an organic form of 
radical centrism in response to the crisis of interwar politics: 
 
Both as a movement and as an ideology fascism incorporated aspects of its 
style from abroad but as a whole it was not a foreign import. It developed 
from British roots to fulfill British needs. In some areas, notably in its 
economic theory, its analysis went far beyond that of the fascist parties of 
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Europe. Its foreign policy was based not upon subservience to foreign fascist 
nations but upon the maintenance of a strong, independent and autarchic 





Like Benewick, Lewis saw the BUF’s failure as a product of both internal and 
external factors. In addition to Mosley’s errors of judgment, he cited the BUF’s 
inability to shed its middle class image as a key internal factor that undermined its 
attempt to form a ‘classless’ movement. Economically, Lewis echoed Skidelsky by 
highlighting the timing and speed of Britain’s recovery from the depression as an 
inhibiting factor for fascism’s radical appeal: ‘In short, the BUF had been launched 
much too late to take advantage of the slump in Britain’.
113
 This conclusion matched 
the general consensus among historians that the interwar Britain was ill suited to the 
development of a revolutionary fascist movement. Lewis rebuked the notion that 
Britain’s liberal-democratic ethos had immunized it from fascism entirely, however, 
crediting anti-fascists on the left for recognizing and opposing the BUF as a genuine 
threat to democracy. 
As Stuart Rawnsley observed in 1980, early studies of the BUF paid little 
attention to the ‘rank and file’ of the party and were instead preoccupied with 
Mosley and his inner circle. W.F. Mandle’s  study of the BUF leadership, an early 
foray into social surveys of the party, found a prevalence of ex-officers and young, 
middle-class within its upper ranks.
114
 Rawnsley’s critique of the ‘top down’ 
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approach to British fascism included a brief overview of the BUF’s social 
composition, arguing that the party provided ‘a convenient outlet for many people 
experiencing the frustration and despair of economic disorder and political 
bankruptcy, and who would have preferred all that the BUF offered rather than the 
ideals of communism’.
115
 A more detailed study by G.C. Webber published in 1984 
found that prior accounts of the BUF had misrepresented both the numbers and 
distribution of its membership, with numerical estimates and class analysis reliant on 
the fallible observations of Special Branch officers. Citing a peak membership of 
around 40,000, Webber concluded that the fascists were able to recover partly from 
the decline experienced after 1934 without sole reliance on Northern England or the 
East End.
116
 Webber also highlighted a resurgence in the BUF’s membership that 
took place following Mosley’s ‘peace campaigns’ in 1938 and 1939. This period of 
growth marked another change in the BUF’s class structure, driving away working 
class followers who ‘disliked the Germans almost as much as they hated the Jews’ 
while drawing in members of a ‘predominantly middle class peace movement’.
117
  
Inspired by the sociological surveys of continental fascist parties that emerged 
in the 1980s, a number of scholars also undertook ‘locality based studies’ of the 
BUF’s recruitment, class composition and impact in specific areas of interwar 
Britain.
118
 Notable examples include Rawnsley’s 1984 study of the BUF in Northern 
England, as well as  J.D. Brewer’s study of the party’s activity in the Midlands. Most 
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recently, Thomas Linehan’s East London For Mosley (1997) provided an in-depth 
analysis of the British fascism’s most sizeable and controversial base of support 
between 1935 and 1939.
119
 Supplementing the focus on class and locality, a small 
but significant group of texts has also sought to consider the distinctive gender 
dynamics of Britain’s fascist movement. Rotha Linton Orman, a former army nurse, 
was responsible for establishing the British Fascisti, an early predecessor to the 
BUF. Mosley’s organization also attracted a considerable number of active female 
members who modelled themselves on an idealized ‘fascist woman’, a feminine 
counterpart to the fascist new man.
120
  
The most authoritative and widely cited work to emerge on British fascism 
since Skidelsky’s biography is Richard Thurlow’s Fascism in Britain, an account 
reaching from the early inception of Britain’s extreme right movements to 
contemporary parties such as the National Front and the British National Party.
121
 
Relying on a composite of governmental records, surveillance documents and fascist 
literature, Thurlow’s study traced the organizational traditions of fascism in Britain 
to early 20
th
 century radical Right associations, such as the British Brothers League, 
as well as anti-Semitic groups like Henry Beamish’s Britons.
122
 Like Skidelsky, 
Thurlow noted that the First World War served as the defining cultural and historical 
moment in the mythology of British fascists. Citing the examples of Chesterton, 
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Mosley and another BUF member Henry Williamson, he argued that the war ‘bred a 
contempt for civilian society and those without direct contact with the nature of 
modern warfare’.
123
 In this regard, as in many others, Thurlow found ready 
comparison with the ideology of fascists in other parts of Europe, with Mosley’s 
ethos showing the same preoccupations with heroism, destiny and radical 
nationalism. The updated 1998 edition of Thurlow’s study made reference to 
Griffin’s fascist minimum to establish the importance of revolution and modernity as 
themes within the BUF’s ideology. Mosley’s vision of national resurgence sprung, in 
Thurlow’s depiction, from a response to Spenglerian predictions of Western decline, 
and drew inspiration from the writing of George Bernard Shaw and Friedrich 
Nietzsche  to imagine ‘[a] heroic elite who would guide and educate the rest of a 
society to a higher stage of evolution… each Blackshirt was to become an individual 
cell of a collective Caesarism’.
124
  
In Thurlow’s account, as in those that preceded it, British fascism was a 
political failure despite the intrinsic talents and advantages of its leadership.  
Thurlow marked the beginning of the movement’s decline in 1934, only two years 
after its founding and long prior to the party’s formal dissolution in 1941, citing a 
combination of financial trouble and organizational mismanagement that undermined 
Mosley’s ability to draw supporters and open up space for his movement. Like 
Benewick, Thurlow also identified the BUF’s tactics and aesthetics as deeply 
incompatible with British society: uniforms, paramilitary spectacle, violence and 
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anti-Semitism served to alienate the fascists from potential supporters and eventually 
drew them into conflict with state authorities.
125
 Roger Griffin further argued that, in 
addition to its internal weaknesses and state opposition, British fascists were subject 
to ‘the structural forces which make fascism a born loser in modern societies, 
whether hegemony belongs to conservatism, liberalism or communism’.
126
 Griffin 
offered an important reminder that the impotency of fascism in Britain was not 
unique: the majority of fascist movements throughout Europe were politically 
unsuccessful, and only the German and Italian parties were able to form government 
without the assistance of a foreign power.  
Putting aside the wider conditions that limited fascism’s success in Britain, 
political violence and anti-Semitism have been widely acknowledged as the two 
characteristics of Mosley’s movement that most hindered its growth and popularity, 
and have in turn attracted a number of specialist inquiries. An in-depth discussion of 
literature pertaining to British anti-Semitism is provided in the final chapter of this 
thesis, which deals at length with the subject in relation to A.K. Chesterton’s writing 
and activism. In brief, however, the most influential works are Colin Holmes’ Anti-
Semitism in Britain and Gisela Lebzelter’s Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-
1939, both of which cast doubt on the political utility of anti-Semitism in interwar 
Britain. Richard Griffith’s Patriotism Perverted (1998) offered a detailed overview 
of the various anti-Semitic organizations operating just prior to the internment of 
British fascists in May 1940, while Tony Kushner’s The Persistence of Prejudice  
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noted the surprising extent to which anti-Semitic attitudes manifested themselves in 
Britain during an anti-Nazi war.
127
  
The most recent and comprehensive account of anti-Semitism in the BUF is 
Daniel Tilles’ 2015 work British Fascist Anti-Semitism and Jewish Responses 1932-
40. Tilles study sought to revaluate the nature and prevalence of anti-Semitism 
within Mosley’s campaigns, employing quantitative methods alongside more 
traditional forms of historical research. From an analysis of BUF publications 
between 1932 and 1934, Tilles found that ‘the outline of anti-Jewish-policy was in 
place at the party’s formation’, well prior to the public clashes at Olympia that were 
used by Mosley to justify his turn towards anti-Semitism. Tilles’ subsequently 
identified five distinct phases of anti-Semitism that characterized the BUF’s internal 
discourse and propaganda: hostility against the Jews became ‘localized’ during the 
East End campaigns, before reorientating itself around culture and conspiracies 
during Chesterton’s tenure as the editor of Blackshirt in 1937, and finally becoming 
‘internationalized’ after 1938 in concert with Mosley’s lobbying against war with 
Germany. This analysis called into question the ‘interactionist’ view of BUF anti-
Semitism, which held (in concert with Benewick’s original thesis) that the party 
adopted a radical stance towards the Jews in response to the political atrophy and 
public opposition it faced after 1934.
128
 In contrast, Tilles study presented anti-
Semitism as an aspect of the BUF’s ideology and rhetoric that was present from the 
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party’s inception, but one that could be downplayed or presented in a different 
fashion to suit the political needs of the moment.
129
 
Compared with most other fascist movements of the interwar period, violence 
and paramilitarism played a relatively minor role in the BUF’s campaigns. The 
party’s paramilitary contingent, Mosley’s ‘Defence Force’, comprised only a small 
portion of its overall membership, and the Blackshirts’ encounters with their 
communist opponents were neither as frequent nor deadly as the street-fighting that 
took place throughout continental Europe.
130
 Nevertheless, the nature and extent of 
the violence associated with the BUF was significant in the context of British politics 
and civil society during the 1930s. Most importantly, as Benewick first argued in 
1969, highly publicized incidents of violence involving the BUF were a defining 
factor in the political and legal marginalization of the movement as a whole. Much 
of the historiographical discussion relating to political violence and the BUF has 
revolved around the Olympia rally of 4 June 1934, where fascist stewards beat and 
violently ejected hecklers seeking to disrupt Mosley’s speech. Though he concluded 
that it was ‘impossible to ascertain either the degree of violence or the apportionment 
of blame’ from records of the meeting, Benewick saw Olympia as the ‘watershed of 
British fascism’ which ‘signalled a change from defensive to offensive violence’.
131
  
Skidelsky’s account of Olympia was characteristically sympathetic to 
Mosley, attributing much of the violence to organized anti-fascist demonstrators and 
ill-disciplined stewards rather than any preordained strategy of ‘maximum violence 
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 Despite their differing interpretations, however, both 
Benewick and Skidelsky saw the public debate sparked by Olympia as of greater 
significance than the meeting itself, with prominent figures and press outlets seeking 
to either condemn or defend Mosley and his stewards. Many recent accounts of 
British fascism have concluded that, whether premeditated or not, the violence at 
Olympia marked the beginning of the end for Mosley’s party. Roger Eatwell 
observed that public opinion began to turn against British fascism rapidly in mid-
1934, under the combined influence of Olympia and the “Night of the Long Knives”, 
an internal purge carried out by the Nazi regime on 30 June.
133
 Thurlow likewise saw 
the BUF as having ‘lost the propaganda war’ in the wake of Olympia and in turn the 
support of Lord Rothermere’s Daily Mail, its most valuable source of ‘free 
publicity’.
134
 The main voice of dissent in the interpretation of Olympia is Martin 
Pugh, whose study of the meeting’s aftermath concluded that Mosley was able to 
successfully weather the controversy surrounding the event and even exploit the laws 
surrounding public order to his advantage.
 135
 Contrary to the prevailing narrative, 
therefore, he argued that the BUF had not been restrained by the laws or political 
intervention but rather from a mass mobilization that ‘checked the momentum of the 
movement, especially in London’.
136
  
Pugh’s contention that the violence at Olympia had failed to diminish 
Mosley’s popularity attracted some criticism: Jon Lawrence argued, in a rebuttal to 
Pugh’s ‘revisionist’ assessment, that public opinion had already set against the 
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BUF’s tactics prior to the meeting and that Mosley’s efforts at reform after June 
1934 ‘suggest that Mosley saw the meeting for what it was: a propaganda disaster of 
the first order’.
137
 Despite the critiques offered against his treatment of Olympia, 
Pugh expanded upon his revision of the BUF’s history in Hurrah For the 
Blackshirts, another extensive account of interwar fascism in Britain. Placing a 
particular emphasis upon Mosley’s efforts to adapt his party to changing 
circumstances between 1934 and 1938, Pugh again challenged the narrative of 
terminal decline following Olympia:  
 
The picture of the British Union of Fascists abandoning its ‘respectable’ 
phase in 1934 and thereafter marooning itself hopelessly on the lunatic fringe 
of British politics is a compelling but misleading one… [Mosley] never lost 
sight of the need to keep in touch with mainstream opinion if he were to have 




With Pugh as a notable exception, much of the historiography surrounding 
British fascism still echoes the description given by Roger Eatwell of a movement 
running ‘from farce to failure’.
139
 There are, however, a number of works that 
confirm Robert Paxton’s observation that it amounted to ‘one of the most interesting 
failures’ among the numerous iterations of fascism throughout interwar Europe.  
There is broad consensus that British fascists advanced a distinctly cogent form of 
political doctrine and philosophy, which appealed to a varied portion of British 
society including those of an intellectual bent.
140
 Even those sceptical of British 
                                                             
137
 Jon Lawrence, ‘Fascist violence and public order in inter-war Britain’, Historical 
Research, Vol. 76, No. 192 (2003), pp. 238-267, at p. 266.  
138
 Martin Pugh, Hurrah for the Blackshirts! (London: Pimlico, 2006), p. 261.  
139 Eatwell, Fascism: A History, pp. 175-191. 
140
 Eatwell, Fascism: A History, p. 182; Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p. 114. On intellectuals 




fascism’s overall impact have noted its leaders’ peculiar tendency towards advancing 
the ‘doctrine and theory’ of fascism.
141
 Aside from Mosley, many leading members 
of the BUF were instrumental in developing and promoting fascism in Britain. 
Chesterton, William Joyce, John Beckett and Alexander Raven-Thomson each 




In the wider context of fascist studies, historians of the British movement 
have been especially receptive to Griffin’s new fascist minimum and the increasing 
emphasis upon fascism as a cultural phenomenon.
143
  Commenting on Griffin’s 
renewed call for a culturally orientated definition in 2002 , Thomas Linehan argued 
that British fascists were a distinct embodiment of a revolutionary political 
movement grounded in a ‘cultural revolt’: 
 
Culture was at the heart of the BUF's mature fascist ideology and doctrine and 
permeated its rebirth project. It was integral to its revolutionary agenda and 
provided it with much of its ideological potency and destructive energy. 
Culture was never a secondary phenomenon, a pale accessory to the BUF's 
main agenda that supposedly lay elsewhere…  Mosleyite fascism was to a 
large degree a cultural revolt, and culture was so significant because, to the 
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Following in the wake of the cultural turn in fascist studies, British fascism 
has been subject to a range of new inquires centred on its visual, auditory and literary 
expressions, as well as its sporting culture and the BUF’s conception of an the 
idealized human physique.
145
 The proliferation of studies concerned with these more 
esoteric aspects of British fascism, or with the less prominent groups that preceded 
or shadowed the BUF, does little to dispel Payne’s criticism of a historiography 
grown beyond its subject’s significance. On the other hand, the continuing interest in 
British fascism can be seen as merely a reflection of the continued, widespread 
interest in fascism as a whole. As the debate surrounding the definition, limits and 
historical dynamics of fascist movements continues to churn, it is reasonable to 
expect the ongoing reappraisal of the movement in Britain. Bearing in mind David 
D. Roberts call to engage with the ‘edges, blurring, and uncertainty’ surrounding 
fascism, the ‘oxymoronic’ quality of the movement in Britain which Payne identified 
seems to warrant further attention.  
Post-war fascism and the extreme right in Britain 
 
The historiography of Britain’s post-war extreme right is neither as extensive nor 
contentious as that dealing with the interwar movement. This can be attributed in 
part to the general disparity between pre and post-1945 studies of fascism and the 
extreme right; as with many accounts of fascism in Europe, the emergence of 
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extreme right movements in Britain is treated broadly as either an ‘aftermath’ of the 
interwar phenomenon, or a direct attempt by fascists to revive their movement under 
a different guise.
146
 In the most direct example of the second approach, Thurlow’s 
account cast doubt on the pronouncements of Chesterton, Mosley and other ex-BUF 
members who claimed to have shed their connection with fascism upon re-entering 
politics.  
 
Both Mosley and Chesterton vehemently denied they were fascists after 
1945… Yet their politics, although they developed in radically different 
directions, were both rooted in separate aspects of the inter-war tradition, and 
both reflected developments in the attempt to revive the phenomenon on the 




The most distinctively ‘neo-fascist’ party prior to the National Front, 
Mosley’s Union Movement, was notable for its rejection of interwar nationalism in 
favour of its leader’s aspirations for a pan-European federation.
148
 Likening this 
evolution to a broader trend of ‘fascist internationalism’, Thurlow drew a parallel 
between Mosley’s European-fascist ideas and those pursued by Mussolini in the 
Republic di Salo shortly before his death.
149
 A more recent work concerning the 
immediate post-war period is Dave Renton’s Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Britain in 
the 1940s (2000). Renton’s treatment of the post-war era reflected his critical, self-
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consciously Marxist approach to fascism, emphasizing the role of political violence 
and the shared reactionary posture of conservatives and fascists.
150
 Particularly 
pertinent to this study was Renton’s observation that Chesterton, in his work 
alongside Collin Brooks at Truth, ‘merged the concerns of fascists and capitalist 
Tories’.
151
 Renton also took a critical view of the police tactics adopted towards 
public meetings in the late 1940s, suggesting that law enforcement acted primarily as 
stewards on behalf of the fascists rather than as deterrents to violence.
152
 These 
assertions recalled a longer history of criticism directed at British law enforcement 
for its response to fascist militancy, as well as Pugh’s suggestion that Mosley was 
able to exploit the laws relating to public order in the 1930s.
153
 
Graham Macklin’s 2011 study of Mosley and British Fascism after 1945 
adopted a different theoretical approach to the one underpinning Renton’s study, but 
drew similar conclusions regarding the unbroken link between interwar fascism and 
the post-war extreme right. Macklin was critical of Skidelsky, in particular, for 
having credulously accepted Mosley’s claim to that he had moved beyond fascism in 




Roger Griffin’s ‘ideal type’, as well as recent elucidation of ‘political 
religion’, allows for a more sophisticated conception of manifestations of 
fascism after 1945, not as products of violent historical disjuncture (though 
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the Second World War was certainly that) but as part of a seamless 
ideological and historical continuity, which anchors British fascism firmly 




Evoking Griffin’s notion of fascism as a kind of political organism, capable 
of evolving and adapting to new conditions, Macklin saw Mosley’s main 
achievements in the post-war eras as ideological rather than organizational. Though 
the Union Movement itself proved a failure, Mosley’s activism shaped the 
‘internationalization, meta-politicization and intellectualization’ of British fascism, 
ensuring its survival in the hostile conditions of the post-war era and facilitating its 
transition into the ‘racialized’ immigration politics of the 1970s.
156
 Aside from the 
ideological continuities within post-war fascism, Macklin also noted the many 
incidents of violence that accompanied Union Movement activity during the late 
1940s, a reprisal of the confrontations between fascists and anti-fascists during the 
interwar period. While Macklin stressed the continuities of British fascism in terms 
of Griffin’s ideal-type, therefore, the activities of Mosley’s supporters after 1947 
suggest a less abstract connection between the BUF and the Union Movement. Both 
parties sought to recruit a mass base of militant followers, particularly from the East 
End of London, and the Union Movement made overt attempts to recapture the 
violent, revolutionary momentum that characterized the BUF in its early stages.
157
  
Chesterton’s main independent venture after 1945, the League of Empire 
Loyalists (LEL), has been subject to less focused attention than Mosley’s party and 
appears more as a novelty in many accounts of the post-war extreme right. Roger 
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Eatwell described the LEL’s membership as being ‘Colonel Blimpish’, an apt 
description of the older, more conservative and anti-communist membership, most of 
whom did not represent fascists in any meaningful sense.
158
 Several accounts have 
noted, however, that the LEL played host to individuals who would later become 
engaged in white nationalism and neo-Nazism.
159
 Due to its moderate success in 
attracting conservatives, the LEL was covered from a different perspective in Mark 
Pitchford’s The Conservative Party and the Extreme right 1945-1975 (2011). 
Pitchford’s study gave a number of insights into how the mainstream right thwarted 
the LEL (and other extreme right groups) in their attempts to co-opt the fringes of 
conservatism. It also notes correctly that, despite its Tory-loyalists trappings, the 
LEL was still underpinned by Chesterton’s more esoteric, anti-Semitic ideas, which 
provided ample reason for the Conservative Party to caution its members against 
joining.
160
 Pitchford’s book also gave considerable attention to the history of the 
radical right-wing ‘Monday Club’, an internal Conservative Party faction that 
considerably hindered the LEL’s progress among disaffected Tories.
161
 
As the National Front represented the most unified and politically effective 
party of Britain’s extreme right to emerge since the BUF, the literature addressing it 
is more substantial, though still minor in comparison to the interwar movements. 
Thurlow provided a sceptical yet incisive account of the National Front’s emergence, 
portraying the union between Chesterton’s LEL and the younger British National 
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Party activists as a new chapter in Britain’s fascist tradition:  
 
an attempt to synthesize the mass politics and economic and political 
programme of the BUF with the ferocious anti-Semitism and racial populism 
of Arnold Leese which, however, was presented in the more respectable and 





A more recent account of the National Front came courtesy of Alan Sykes’ The 
Radical Right in Britain (2005). In a conscious deviation from many other texts on 
the subject, Sykes’ condensed account made a stated effort to avoid reference to 
fascism, focusing instead on a distinct tradition of right-wing radicalism spanning 
from the early twentieth century onwards:  
 
The emphasis is on the radical component of the ‘Radical Right’ because its 
‘right-wing’ or ‘conservative’ aspects, seeking to preserve the British empire, 
the British nation and/or race, and more recently in the context of American 




Like Thurlow, Sykes saw the formation of the National Front as the coming together 
of two mutually hostile factions: moderates, drawn primarily from the fringes of 
conservatism, and militants, derived from the ranks of Britain’s neo-fascist and racial 
nationalist movements. The conflict between these two groups over the National 
Front’s goals, tactics and orientation served to hinder its early progress, as the party 
failed to exploit the aftermath of Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 
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 Sykes’ discussion of Chesterton’s exit from the National Front identified a 
peculiar aspect of his orientation between the moderate (or conservative) and 
militant factions: despite his ideological alignment with John Tyndall, the most 
prominent voice among the militants, Chesterton broke with the party ‘over far more 
fundamental issues. The elitist style of the LEL clashed with the rowdiness and 
scarcely veiled violence of the BNP and GBM’. Despite Chesterton’s role in 
carrying forward some of the ideological traditions of British fascism, therefore, his 
reticence to condone violence and pursue militants’ vision for a ‘dynamic 




Much of the other literature surrounding the National Front is comprised of 
contemporary accounts written by social scientists and journalists surrounding the 
party’s heyday from 1972 to 1979. Martin Walker’s The National Front provided a 
thorough journalistic account of the National Front that detailed its origins and 
internal politics throughout the 1970s. Unfortunately, though the lack of citations 
makes Walker’s account difficult to verify, it remains the sole source of information 
regarding some parts of the National Front’s history.
166
 Stan Taylor’s The National 
Front in English Politics provided a more rigorously academic study that focused on 
the party’s electoral experience. Taylor argued that during the 1970s, the National 
Front was temporarily able to attract voters who felt their interests had been 
abandoned by conservatives.
167
 Although he attributed its success primarily to the 
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immigration and white identity politics, Taylor believed that the party’s internal, 
‘esoteric’ ideology was essentially fascistic: 
 
The full ideology of the NF was, in a large number of respects, identical to 
that of the German Nazi party before it achieved power. This was not denied 
by the NF’s leaders, whose defence against the charge of Nazism was that 
these doctrines did not imply that the NF, once installed in power, would 




Taylor’s study, along with many produced after the party’s electoral failure in 
1979, drew on the conclusions of Michael Billig’s Fascists: A Social-Psychological 
View of the National Front (1978). Based on interviews with the party’s general 
membership and analysis of its published material, Billig’s study concluded that the 
National Front’s membership tended towards the classical authoritarian and anti-
Semitic type associated with fascism and Nazism, despite their protestations to the 
contrary.
169
 Nigel Fielding’s The National Front was another sociological study that 
provided comprehensive overviews of the party’s ideology, policy and membership 
during the 1970s.
170
 Fielding’s final chapter also made an attempt to evaluate the 
National Front in terms of ‘deviance’, the sociological description of action and 
thought that violates societal norms, as a part of the party’s appeal to those people 
alienated by conventional politics:  
 
The redemptions of one’s race, the resistance of international conspiracy, the 
purging of permissiveness are essentially provinces of behavior outside the 
normal control of democratic government. This partly accounts for the 
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Rounding out the triumvirate of major sociological works on the National 
Front was Christopher T. Husbands’ Racial Exclusionism and the City (1983), which 
investigated the party’s appeals to racial animus within Britain’s urban areas.
172
 
Having considered the impacts of both ideology and experience on how individuals 
responded to the National Front’s appeal, Husbands argued that deviance alone did 
not account for the party’s success. Instead, his conclusions emphasized the 
existence of a voting block within Britain whose views on race could not easily be 
subsumed into the mainstream parties. As such, Husbands contended that a party 
capable of overcoming the political incompetence that had thwarted many of the 
National Front’s aspirations could potentially gain a sizeable following in Britain.
173
  
From a contemporary perspective, Husbands’ conclusions appear somewhat 
prescient given the revival of the British National Party during the 1990s. Due to the 
National Front’s poor performance in the 1979 general elections, an event followed 
by numerous internal fractures, the history surrounding Britain’s extreme right in the 
1980s is divided between several disparate factions: the remnants of the National 
Front, the New National Front (rebranded as the British National Party in 1982), and 
an array of clandestine or unaffiliated groups tied to the violent skinhead culture of 
working class England or esoteric ‘Strasserite’ neo-fascism.
174
 As the most 
successful and politically sophisticated group to emerge from the contemporary 
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extreme right, the British National Party has been subject to a number of studies 
placing it within an ongoing tradition of British fascism. Matthew Goodwin’s New 
British Fascism and Nigel Copsey’s Contemporary British Fascism each noted the 
continuity between earlier iterations of the extreme right and BNP leader Nick 
Griffin’s attempt at respectable politics as a cover for ‘esoteric fascism’.
175
 In 
general, the characterization of the BNP has been very similar to that of its 
immediate antecedent, the National Front. This has not been due merely to the 
organizational links between the two parties but to the sheer similarity of their 
political experience: both underwent a surge of popularity under a semi-respectable 
leader figure before subsequently falling back into relative obscurity. Adopting a 
more moderate posture, the BNP experienced an unsteady growth in electoral 
performance after 1994 which culminated in Griffin’s election to the European 
Parliament in 2009. As of 2012, however, the BNP faces an uncertain future. Having 
failed to progress in the 2010 general elections, it now faces additional competition 
from the right-populist United Kingdom Independence Party and an array of smaller 
extreme right parties.
176
   
There are limitations to how the historical experience of the post-war extreme 
right can be related to the more recent fortunes of the BNP and the new generation of 
right-wing populism in Britain. As Sykes observed, the decade following 
Chesterton’s departure from the National Front saw the decline of several enduring 
aspects of Britain’s extreme right tradition, most notably anti-Semitism and the 
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veneration of an imperial past.
177
 Since 2001, the perceived threat of Islamic 
terrorism and the effects of Muslim immigration have become dominant themes in 
the politics of Britain’s extreme right, alongside more general appeals to voter 
disenfranchisement, ‘law and order’ and economic revival.
178
 There are nevertheless 
a number of thematic continuities that can be found between the extreme right during 
Chesterton’s lifetime and recent developments. Nationalism, racism and hostility 
towards European integration each remain prominent aspects of the extreme right’s 
political platform. The major obstacles to the success of contemporary extreme right 
parties in Britain are also consistent with those encountered by the post-war 
movement, particularly the absence of political space and the challenge from 
mainstream conservatism. Finally, as evidenced by the continued reference to 
fascism within studies of the National Front and the British National Party, Britain’s 
extreme right continues to suffer from association with its forebears.  
Given the poor record of the extreme right in Britain since 1945, the clearest 
link between interwar fascism and parties like the BUF may be the common 
experience of instability, failure and marginalization.
179
 The political impotence of 
British fascism in the 1930s partly accounts for why scholars of the BUF have 
embraced the more inclusive interpretations of fascism offered by Griffin, Eatwell 
and Mosse. These interpretations place a greater emphasis on the idealistic, mythic 
and culturally revolutionary aspects of fascism, and thus lend themselves more 
readily to a movement like the BUF, which failed to attain political power despite its 
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ideological sophistication. In contrast, studies and interpretations of fascism 
concerned primarily with the acquisition and exercise of political power have found 
less value in the case of British fascism, relegating it to the cluster of minor fascist 
parties that emerged fruitlessly from the interwar period. A. James Gregor went so 
far as to doubt the notion of British fascism altogether, declaring in 2002 that ‘Long 
study of the literature of Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists and National 
Socialists, together with extensive conversations with some of its principal 




Using Chesterton as a centre point allows us to steer between the outright 
dismissal of groups like the BUF on one hand, and the uncritical treatment (or over-
inflation) of British fascism on the other. Gregor’s position, for example, appears 
overly reductive when comparing Chesterton’s experiences and ideology to fascism 
on the European continent. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, Chesterton belonged to 
the same war-generation that spearheaded fascism in Italy and Germany, and he 
experienced the same combination of cultural disillusionment, intense nationalism 
and anti-democratic essentialism that underpinned those movements. Chesterton’s 
case also supports the idea that the BUF was a genuine upsurge of political 
radicalism, rather than just an extension of Mosley’s ego, and that the resulting 
movement contained multiple strands of fascist thought just like its counterparts in 
the rest of Europe. Even putting aside the idea of generic fascism, it is hard to 
dispute that the BUF was at least representative of what Payne termed paradigmatic 
                                                             
180
 A. James Gregor, ‘Once again on Roger Griffin and the study of “fascism”’, Griffin, Loh 








Comparing the BUF with similar movements throughout continental Europe 
tends to highlight the distinct and even contradictory aspects of British fascism: its 
uniquely detailed proposals for economic reform, its uncertain relationship with 
paramilitarism and political violence, and its conflicted attempts to marry British 
traditions with a state-worshipping corporatism adapted from overseas. These 
features do not necessarily imply, as Gregor suggests, that the BUF was not a 
genuine fascist party. From a heuristic perspective, at least, it is difficult to grasp the 
ideology and motivation of figures like Chesterton and Mosley without reference to a 
broader notion of fascist politics. At the same time, categorizing the BUF purely on 
the basis of its ideas sets too low a bar for the definition of fascism, failing to 
account for what truly set fascists apart from the rest of the British polity. As 
Michael Mann argued: 
 
If fascism had concerned only “palingenetic myths of rebirth,” what would be 
the harm in that? If fascism had been only extreme nationalism, it would have 
been only unpleasantly xenophobic. But by embracing paramilitarism, 
fascists coerced each other into extreme action, they destroyed their 
opponents, and they convinced many bystanders that they could finally bring 




Under Griffin’s formulation, and thus in the general characterization of 
Britain’s extreme right, paramilitarism, statism and mass party politics were merely a 
reflection of the context in which parties like the BUF operated, or the result of 
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specific decisions by Mosley to emulate the fascists in continental Europe. Hence, 
after the interwar movement collapsed and figures like Chesterton resumed their 
political activities, they merely shed the appearance and methods of their early 
endeavours while perpetuating the same fascist ‘essence’ of palingenetic ultra-
nationalism under a new guise. Given the wholehearted attempts to rekindle the 
interwar movement in Britain after the Second World War, such as the one 
undertaken by Mosley and his followers in 1947, there is good reason to be sceptical 
of the claim made by many ex-BUF members (and some outside observers) that 
British fascism ceased to exist after the Second World War. We need also consider 
the possibility that post-war fascism in Britain was not solely the product of 
nostalgia for a bygone era, despite the fact that some of the overtly fascistic groups 
that emerged on the extreme right were fixated on the language and symbolism of 
the 1930s.  
Macklin posited the Union Movement as a ‘nodal point’ that allowed fascism 
to be transferred between these two epochs, and with the aid of Griffin’s ideal type, 
found a ‘seamless ideological and historical continuity’. In a comparable fashion, 
this thesis treats Chesterton as a kind of living link, whose experiences can be used 
to shed light on the shift between the interwar and post-war eras. Where it departs 
from Macklin’s approach, however, is in its theoretical approach to Britain’s fascism 
and in the conclusions that it draws about the post-1945 transition. Griffin’s ideal 
typical approach becomes unwieldy  in dealing with organizations like the League of 
Empire Loyalists, which came to incorporate multiple strands of extreme right-wing 
ideology and bore no tactical or structural resemblance to a fascist party. To interpret 




it bore a connection to palingenetic ultra-nationalism, is to risk the kind of 
‘unacceptable conflation and dilution’ warned against by Stanley Payne. Treating the 
extreme right after 1945 as comprising a broad family of overlapping factions, rather 
than just a series of fascist ‘groupuscules’, gives a more realistic picture of how the 
movement re-emerged in Britain after the collapse of the BUF, and how 
organizations like the LEL related to British fascism, both old and ‘new’.  
One of the objections raised against contemporary studies of the extreme 
right, particularly those concerned with the populist parties of Western Europe, is a 
failure to properly engage with the realm of fascist studies.
183
 Criticism has also 
flown in the opposite direction, with scholars of post-war fascism expressing 
frustration at the unwillingness of traditional fascist scholars to consider the extreme 
right after 1945 .
184
 This thesis makes a conscious attempt to draw on the theoretical 
and historical work conducted in both of these fields, which remain somewhat 
isolated from one another despite their clearly overlapping interests. Far from 
ignoring or marginalizing the work of fascist studies, the term extreme right is used 
throughout the subsequent chapters to preserve the distinctive meaning of fascism: a 
concept representing more than the ideas and myths encompassed by Griffin’s ideal 
type, and incorporating the ‘programs, actions and organizations’ highlighted in the 
work of Payne, Paxton and Mann.
185
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Chapter 2: A.K. Chesterton and British fascism, 1918-1940. 
 
A.K. Chesterton’s life prior to joining the British Union of Fascists was not deeply 
concerned with politics. Despite a lack of traditional political engagement, his 
experiences as a young man were to influence the ideas and principles that shaped 
his understanding of fascism and the political struggle that consumed the remainder 
of his life. The key events that can be traced to his political ideology began with his 
involvement in the First World War. His first expressions of political, social and 
cultural critique came while working as a journalist in Johannesburg until 1924 and 
then as a critic in Stratford-Upon-Avon until 1928. In the five years between leaving 
Stratford and joining Mosley, Chesterton pursued an interest in playwriting while 
working as a newspaper editor in Devon. This was to be the last period of 
Chesterton’s life spent outside the realm of radical politics. From 1933 onward, 
Chesterton’s historical profile became intertwined with the story of the British Union 
of Fascists. Even after denouncing Mosley’s party in 1938, he remained an active 
and controversial figure within the fascist and anti-Semitic extreme right up until the 
beginning of the Second World War. Chesterton suspended his political activity 
voluntarily in September 1939 and, unlike many of his former colleagues, was not 
subject to imprisonment the following year. The end of Chesterton’s career in 
interwar politics did not mark the end to his ideological involvement with fascism. 
As was the case for many of his generation, the ideas underpinning Chesterton’s 
political radicalism were planted early; the remarkable factor in Chesterton’s case, 




to carry the struggle borne from the First World War into the next half of the 
century.  
 
World War I and Life on the Rand, 1915-1924 
 
Chesterton joined the army in South Africa in 1915 at the age of 16, having returned 
to his place of birth with his mother and stepfather following a brief, unhappy stint at 
a boarding school in England. His reasons for enlistment were not in themselves 
remarkable: he had grown bored and restless in his life as a schoolboy and the war 
offered a unique opportunity for adventure.
1
 Aside from the excitement and physical 
challenge that military life offered, Chesterton was also drawn by the war’s romantic 
aspects. He subscribed to an earnest but unreflective patriotism that viewed military 
service as an act of valour and an expression of Imperial pride.
2
 Though his mother 
initially reprimanded him for enlisting, Chesterton’s decision to embark upon a 
military career was broadly encouraged by his family and a surrounding culture 
which held soldiers in high regard.
3
 In many respects, Chesterton fits the stereotype 
of the naïve underage recruit commonly associated with the First World War. The 
reasons he gave for his enlistment were similar to those that drove thousands of other 
volunteers for Britain’s armies in the early years of the war: personal circumstances 
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that made military service attractive, a thirst for adventure, and a patriotic sense of 
obligation to ‘King and country’.
4
 His first deployment was in German East Africa 
as a member of the 5
th
 South African Infantry. This exposed him to a different set of 
conditions than those commonly associated with the war in Europe. Fighting took 
place between mobile bands rather than static trench positions, requiring forced 
marches between encounters with the enemy. ‘By the time I was seventeen’, 
Chesterton wrote, ‘I had been in the thick of three battles in which men shot to kill’.
5
 
Two of the engagements named in Chesterton’s unpublished memoirs took place in 
early 1916, as part of the South African Army’s push southward into German 
territory: Salaita Hill on 12 February, and Latema Nek on 11 and 12 March.
6
 Jungle 
diseases, including malaria and dysentery, were responsible for most of the 
casualties incurred by British forces throughout the campaign. Chesterton suffered 
from the side-effects of the quinine administered to stave off malaria, and endured a 
period of starvation when his regiment was cut off from supplies by a swollen river 
during the rainy season.
7
 His campaign ended when he collapsed from fever on a 
march and was left behind by the rest of the battalion, only to be saved by the 
intervention of two local porters who carried him over the Kipengere mountain range 
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  Although the timeline of this event was not made clear in Chesterton’s 
memoirs, a series of notes written by his wife in 1973 averred that he was able to 
return to his family’s house near Johannesburg shortly prior to his 17
th
 birthday and 
given permission to recuperate there before returning to active duty. 
9
  
By the time that he recovered, Chesterton was of sufficient age and 
experience to train as an officer. He undertook this training as part of an Officer 
Cadet Battalion in Ireland before transferring to the Western Front as a Lieutenant in 
the Second/Second London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers.
10
 Despite the violence and 
physical duress he had encountered as a teenager in East Africa, the recollections of 
the campaign from Chesterton’s memoirs avoided ‘grim reminiscences of battle’ in 
favour of light-hearted anecdotes. He was more explicit as to the nature of his 
experiences in France.  
 
The Western Front was no nursery or hot-house for the cultivation of 
eccentrics, and, even had it been, my memories of its battles are too poignant 
for me to have sought them out to describe them in this book. When a boy of 
nineteen, for instance, leads an assault on the outer defences of the 
Hindenburg line and for the last fifty yards or so reaches his objective 
scarcely once touching the ground because of a vast carpet of dead German 
bodies and of British bodies killed in previous attacks, then and in later life he 
has no urge to dig in his mind for recollections of humorous interludes – of 




In this passage, Chesterton alluded to his experiences during the Battle of 
Épehy, fought over 18 and 19 September 1918 as part of the final effort to break the 
German defensive line across the Western Front. On the morning of the 19
th
, 
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Chesterton was put in command of a platoon sent to reinforce an assault on a 
German position known as the ‘Poplar Trench’. For his part in the successful eight-
hour assault, conducted at close range with hand-bombs and bayonets, Chesterton 
was awarded a Military Cross for bravery.
12
 Years after the battle took place, he 
recalled suffering from nightmares that reinforced the image of casualties incurred 
by both sides at Épehy: ‘a carpet of dead bodies stretching to infinity’.
13
 Many of 
Chesterton’s more poignant reflections on the war would not emerge till years after 
the conflict ended, couched within the context of his theatrical criticism or political 
writing. One of Chesterton’s most candid descriptions of his time at the Western 
Front appeared in Candour a year before his death in August 1973:  
  
The pessimism was not explicit and it was not morbid. Life welled up in me 
too strongly for that. Nor was the gaiety forced. No, the pessimism, born in 
the circumstances of the time, was implicit. Not a single one of my war-time 
friends survived the war. I never thought I would survive it. Death, its 
grotesque attitudes and sickly-sweet odours, was familiar to me. I was very 
far from being in love with it. But I assumed that the next day, or the day 




The sense of constant, impending death that Chesterton described was a 
defining experience for many of the soldiers who fought during the Great War.
15
 
Beyond the raw psychological impacts of wartime trauma, long stretches spent under 
‘the all-pervasive atmosphere of death’ altered the way in which Chesterton saw the 
world in peacetime. In the years before and during his time as a fascist, this 
worldview often manifested itself in negative terms as Chesterton grew alienated 
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from a politics, culture and civilian society that failed to acknowledge or reflect the 
sacrifices of those who ensured Britain’s national survival. Yet the experience of 
having survived the war also left Chesterton with a kind of fatalistic optimism that 
compelled him to persist in the face of unfavourable odds. Alongside the sense of 
‘cultural despair’ which pervaded his thinking after the war and the militaristic 
themes that manifested themselves in his concept of fascism,  this sentiment can be 
regarded as the most enduring impact of the war on Chesterton’s political career. His 
lifelong persistence in what would prove to be a marginalized and personally fraught 
form of politics could thus be attributed to some of the values imparted by the war: 
‘pride in the power of the human spirit to endure the unendurable’.
16
 
After the armistice on 11 November 1918, Chesterton remained in Europe as 
part of the occupying force on the Rhine until he was released from service in 1919. 
Having survived the war and risen to the rank of 2
nd
 Lieutenant by age 19, 
Chesterton’s military career was, in many respects, a successful one. Nevertheless, 
the physical and psychological impacts of the war would mark the remainder of his 
life. In addition to the effects of illness incurred in East Africa, Chesterton developed 
emphysema and bronchitis as a result of exposure to a gas attack while fighting in 
France. Many years later, when he was engaged in political activism with the 
National Front during the 1960s, lingering respiratory problems forced Chesterton to 
spend winters in South Africa. Chesterton’s mental state also reflected the 
experience of combat years after the war ended: though he was reluctant to engage in 
deep psychological introspection, Chesterton admitted that his decades-long struggle 
with alcoholism was a direct consequence of ‘taut-strung nerves and a system shaken 
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by dysentery and malaria incurred in the war.
17
 The reoccurrence and severity of 
Chesterton’s bouts of psychological illness in later decades, referred to by outside 
observers as either ‘suicidal alcoholism’, ‘neurasthenia’ or (in his own description) 
‘jags’ of compulsive drinking, did lead to some later speculation that he was 
mentally unsound or had been ejected from the BUF due to drunkenness rather than 
leaving on his own accord.
18
 There is no evidence to suggest, however, that 
Chesterton suffered from any permanent psychological illness, or that his political 
activism after 1918 was driven by mental illness as opposed to ideology.
19
    
As he readjusted to civilian life following 1919, the impact of the war on 
Chesterton’s ideology and worldview became more apparent. Before returning to 
South Africa, Chesterton visited relatives in England, where he was struck by the 
contrast between his wartime experience and the banality of civilian life. While 
writing for the BUF in 1937, he gave a third-person account of ‘wandering through 
the infinite labyrinths and waste spaces of the war’s aftermath’, where a former 
soldier (presumably Chesterton as a young man) encountered a society unable to 
comprehend his experience.  
 
Back in London he was dragged, bored almost beyond endurance, to see 
where a bomb had dropped in a neighbouring park and to listen to a 
dissertation on the privations and dangers suffered by the civilian 
population… Next day a stockbroker friend of the family called rejoicing at 
the prospects of the future. ‘You must settle down, young fellow me-lad, and 
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As his wife later recalled, ‘the lack of comprehension, even among kindly people, of 
what he and the whole army in France endured daily left him bitter’.
21
 Many of those 
unable to comprehend Chesterton’s experiences had been civilians, isolated from the 
war altogether, like the elderly uncle who had dragged him to the neighbouring park. 
Yet the most galling sentiment that Chesterton encountered came from a former 
army chaplain brought to speak with him ‘one soldier to another’: 
 
‘It is up to you and I,’ he [the chaplain] said, ‘to do what we can to help this 
country settle down into the good old ways before the war’. He was aghast at 





The difficulty Chesterton faced in reconciling the memory of war with civilian 
existence put him in company with many of the other men belonging to the ‘front 
generation’, a cohort of ex-soldiers whose coming-of-age during the Great War drew 
them towards radical ideas and movements that rejected traditional notions of order 
and societal progress.
23
 In contrast to those members of the front generation who 
turned to pacifism or socialism in the wake of the war, Chesterton’s experiences did 
not drive him to a radical critique of the ideas affiliated with the war itself: 
militarism, imperialism, or nationalism.
24
 On the contrary, memories of the war 
seemed only to strengthen his belief in the legitimacy of the Empire, the primacy of 
nationalism and the virtues of the ‘military ethos’ that had emerged on both sides of 
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the conflict. The ideological impacts of the war upon Chesterton became more 
evident as he found an outlet for his views in writing after leaving the army.  After 
returning to Johannesburg in April 1920, Chesterton travelled east to Tlaping to 
work as a diamond prospector.
25
 When this venture quickly proved unsuccessful, he 
returned to the capital and took another job as a mine supervisor, but was forced to 
resign due to respiratory problems he encountered while working underground.
26
 
Finally, in 1921, Chesterton secured a position as a reporter for the Johannesburg 
Star. Though most of Chesterton’s columns for the newspaper were not concerned 
with politics in the traditional sense, his work explored several of the themes that 
would later emerge as overt parts of his political agenda as a fascist. In a column 
published in 1921, for example, Chesterton mounted a defence of ‘war and warriors’ 
that criticized the ‘petty’ concerns that had arisen in the world since the armistice: 
 
Gone was the infinite camaraderie of the trenches, gone was the glamour of a 
heroism that was real, gone was the peace and the wide visions of the 
battlefield – all gone into the dark abyss of the past. The voices of united 
empires and nations were silenced and in their place arose the babble of the 
disunified League of Nations. The sanity and straight-issues of the armies 
ceased to exist, and the world was plunged upon the nightmare laps of the 
futurists and their raving affiliates. Single steadfast principle stopped dead 
and handed over to countless legions of poor weak little principles. The 
thunder of a great dispute was silent, and instead arose the shrill voices of a 




This was an argument that would reoccur throughout Chesterton’s 
propaganda for the BUF. The brutal simplicity of war had produced ‘a real unity, a 
real brotherhood’ that exalted virtues of bravery, sacrifice and selflessness. 
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Peacetime demanded none of these virtues, encouraging pettiness and complacency, 
and leaving society to decay into a state of dreary commercialism. ‘The ledger book 
and the shop counter utter but commonplace melodies’, Chesterton wrote, ‘but the 
guns of war thunder out the music of the spheres’.
28
 While this attitude seemed to 
suggest an enthusiasm for battle, Chesterton otherwise displayed little interest in 
military adventurism. Though he briefly resumed a fighting role in the Rand Revolt 
in 1922, he recalled no desire to return to the army on a permanent basis: ‘It was not 
that it inspired in me any desire for further military adventures: I had had enough 
fighting to last a life-time’.
29
 Many years later, when justifying his pre-1939 stance 
against a war with Nazi Germany, Chesterton pointed to his time on the Western 
Front and a desire to prevent another generation from experiencing the horrors of 
modern warfare.
30
 He was thus drawn to fascism as an ideology that offered to 
synthesize the heroism, camaraderie and ‘steadfast principles’ of war with the 
functions of politics and daily life in peacetime.
31
 
Several of the movements and ideas that fascism sought to negate also 
appeared as subjects of criticism in Chesterton’s work during the 1920s. He mocked 
the pacifist movements that had emerged since 1918 for their naivety in pursuing 
‘the obliteration of everything on the face of the earth in any way connected with, or 
even vaguely reminiscent of the waging of war’. In a precursor to his derision of 
socialists and liberals during the 1930s, Chesterton cautioned against the wave of 
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‘pacifist fanaticism’ that threatened to abolish the virtues learned during the war.
32
 
Unsurprisingly given his nationalist and Empire-loyalist views, Chesterton was also 
critical of the attempts to secure peace through the League of Nations, or any other 
internationalist body that might usurp the British Empire.
33
 The other recurring 
target of Chesterton’s columns for the Star was ‘rationalism’, a philosophy he saw as 
underpinning the various efforts to constrain human nature in the name of 
modernizing the world and securing peace. Chesterton’s attacks on rationalism 
reflected his commitment to those ‘splendid and indispensable’ parts of human 
society that liberals and communists alike sought to bypass. In some instances, his 
work revealed a concern that scientific progress and encroaching modernity marked 
the onset of a particularly dangerous form of ‘despotism’:  
 
Religious despotism, as an example, did in some way strive to make a man 
feel god-like, military despotism as another example, did at least seek to make 
a man feel heroic, but this despotism of science, instead of giving to man a 
feeling that he is the king of creation with an inherent sense of the poetry of 




Criticisms of ‘theory’ and other manifestations of rationalism did not 
necessarily put Chesterton on an unswerving path towards fascism. The cultural and 
intellectual currents that fed into European fascism were wide-ranging, and not 
necessarily appealing to Chesterton’s tastes: in the early 1920s, for example, he 
expressed contempt for futurism, a movement that had considerable influence on the 
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development of Italian Fascism.
35
 There was, however, a clear link between 
Chesterton’s early rejection of rationalism and his gravitation towards the extreme 
right, a sphere of political thought which emphasized action and passion rather than 
pure reason.
36
 By rejecting the idea that human nature was subject to purely rational 
explanation, Chesterton also rejected the assumptions of liberalism and Marxism, 
which regarded human nature as essentially materialistic and subject to change 
through the application of reason. For all their benefits to humankind, Chesterton 
argued, scientific and technological progress needed to be cultivated carefully and 
balanced with a concern for ‘the soul of man’.
37
 Rationalism’s failure in this regard 
was its tendency to marginalize or negate the aspects of culture and society that 
Chesterton saw as transcending the essence of human life: ‘the thing that liberates 
our souls and leads us into the realm of the infinite’.
38
  
Chesterton’s suspicion of rationalism and other prominent forms of 
intellectualism also recalled an education which, apart from a brief stint at a 
preparatory college in London, was marred by boredom and disruption. In England, 
Chesterton found meaning and enjoyment on the sporting field rather than in the 
classroom. Likewise, as a child on the Witwatersrand, many of his formative 
experiences had taken place around the mines or the surrounding wilderness far 
outside the confines of traditional schooling. It is not surprising, therefore, that he 
showed disinterest and even contempt towards intellectuals who seemed intent on 
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reducing life to the ‘volumes of pedantry’ that had driven him from school at age 15. 
In one telling example of this attitude, Chesterton’s column in The Star admonished 
a South African professor of philosophy whose work explored the psychology of 
humour: 
  
is this a fair specimen of the twentieth century wisdom which our pedants are 
serving out to twentieth century youth? If so, it were better to abandon our 
Chair of Philosophy and send the students out into the fields to enjoy the 




The same preoccupation with physical and spiritual (rather than purely 
intellectual) development appeared prominently a decade later in Chesterton’s 
propaganda for the BUF, where he counselled young fascists to ‘keep fit, physical 
and mentally… Fascism is the doctrine, not of talk, but of action’.
40
 Youthful vigour 
and vitality were also prominent features of the new social order in Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany which British fascists sought to emulate. While travelling through 
Germany in 1937, Chesterton approvingly described the advances in education that 
emphasized ‘character’ over pure intellect and cultivated ‘sun-tanned vigorous 
young men getting down to the tasks of the day with efficiency and joy of life’.
41
  
Despite his suspicions of intellectualism and the limits of his formal 
education, Chesterton maintained an avid interest in culture and aesthetics, with 
many of his literary, dramatic and artistic partialities appearing in his writing prior to 
joining the BUF. References to the romantic poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley, 
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Homer’s Iliad and Shakespeare’s plays appeared throughout his columns for The 
Star, a prelude to his stint as a theatrical critic later in the decade.
42
 Besides 
demonstrating Chesterton’s deep interest in classical Western (particularly English) 
culture, these articles also showed glimpses of the broader sense of impending crisis 
and cultural pessimism that would come to dominate his thought prior to joining 
Mosley. As early as 1921, Chesterton expressed growing concern over the cultural 
malaise that appeared to have settled over the world since the end of the First World 
War: 
 
If it is true that the war with Germany and her allies is the greatest in history, 
it is probably equally true that the reactionary period in which we are living at 
the present day is the most miserable, the most despondent and the most 
confused age through which humanity has ever had to pass. Never before 
perhaps has such a dreary ennui closed over the soul of man, probably never 




In search of an adequate response to the post-war cultural crisis, Chesterton 
began exploring many of the positive themes that informed his cultural and political 
thought as a fascist: romanticism, vitalism, a triumphant belief in human destiny and 
the veneration of individual heroism or artistic genius. He defended Shelley against 
his modern critics, arguing that ‘we possess no poet living with such a genius’.
44
 
Chesterton also devoted a number of articles to criticizing the professional critic, a 
figure he regarded as having become ‘obsessed with the knowledge that he has, 
metaphorically, to pull everything to pieces’.
45
 These attacks seem ironic when 
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viewed in light of Chesterton’s own subsequent career as a professional critic, which 
commenced only a couple of years later, but their substance revealed something of 
his approach to art and criticism. The critic, Chesterton argued, too often privileged 
their own intellect and interpretation over the inherent meaning of the work under 
consideration. He contrasted these faults with the approach of a layperson: 
 
The ordinary man… is different. He knows nothing of technique, nothing of 
criticism. His impulse – a simple, beautiful impulse – is to appreciate, not to 
find fault… It cannot be denied that the average man has a lot to learn before 
he will be admitted into the very empyrean of Beauty, and his study of the 
technique of art must be accompanied, therefore by a profound study of 
human life, so that his perspective is maintained. But only the great men are 




By mounting a defence of the masses’ cultural tastes, Chesterton echoed the 
ideas of his elder relative G.K. Chesterton, whose work exalted the wisdom of 
everyday existence and the English ‘common man’.
47
 He also evoked some of the 
disdain for intellectual or avant-garde culture that would appear in his theatrical 
criticism during the late 1920s, and carry over into his fascist polemic during the 
1930s.
48
 In light of his later preoccupation with dynamic leadership under fascism, 
however, the most significant aspect of this passage was Chesterton’s reference to 
‘great men’, which he drew from another of his classical influences, the Irish 
historian Thomas Carlyle.  In 1840 Carlyle published a work detailing six historical 
archetypes of Great Men which included the ‘Hero as Poet’, giving as examples 
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William Shakespeare and the Italian poet Dante Alighieri.
49
 Following this 
interpretation of history, Chesterton viewed great men as uniquely equipped to guide 
the masses where ‘little men with vast pretensions’ could not. The political 
ramifications of this worldview would become clearer when Chesterton became fully 
invested in fascism and embraced Oswald Mosley as a leader who, in Carlyle’s 
terms, represented ‘the indispensable saviour of his epoch’.
50
  
In the early 1920s, Chesterton did not necessarily envision the decline in 
cultural standards as originating from malice or conspiracy but rather a lack of 
imagination: ‘There is nothing inherently vulgar in commerce and if the word 
“popular” has begun to suggest itself as a synonym for “cheap” or “nasty” it is 
because the masses are insufficiently educated, and not because they have any 
fundamental desire for bad things’.
51
 By the following decade, Chesterton’s views on 
popular culture had become far more pessimistic, equating commercial entertainment 
with the broader assault of Jewish cosmopolitanism upon British society.
52
 Rather 
than attribute cultural decline to technology or modernism in general, Chesterton 
sought  a synthesis between the power of industrial modernity and the ideals of 
classical British culture: ‘it is difficult to see why a compromise should not be 
reached between the idealist and the materialist, difficult to realize why they should 
not come together and agree that both “Paradise Lost” and wireless telegraphy are 
triumphs of human endeavour’.
53
 He remained open to the prospect that that a new 
system could arise which preserved cultural and spiritual integrity from 
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commercialism while still taking advantage of the technical capabilities of the 20
th
 
century. The vision of fascist corporatism offered by Mosley in 1933 appeared to 
satisfy these technical requirements, while also fulfilling Chesterton’s desire for an 
epoch-defining ‘Great Man’ to lead the new order.  
Unlike many of those drawn to the early fascist parties in continental Europe, 
Chesterton had little involvement in the militant street politics of the interwar period 
prior to 1933.
54
 In one exceptional instance in 1922, however, his work as a reporter 
resulted in his becoming directly involved in revolutionary politics in South Africa 
through the events of the ‘Rand Revolt’ – a political uprising that grew from 
industrial action by white mine workers on the Rand between December 1921 and 
March 1922. The rebellion itself was preceded by a long history of racial and 
industrial unrest surrounding the lucrative gold mining industry on South Africa’s 
Witwatersrand. As a child, Chesterton had been witness to one of the early strikes by 
white miners that prompted the intervention of the military to defend the mine where 
his step-father worked. This was an early precursor to violent unrest that began in 
1920, following a week-long strike by African workers that ended with forceful 
intervention by the military and police.
55
 Discontent among the white trade unions 
was compounded by a drop in the price of gold, which led the Chamber of Mines to 
propose a reduction in wages and a loosening of the ‘colour bar’ that prevented 
African workers from assuming other roles reserved for white miners. This was the 
initial impetus for a strike by white workers on 28 December 1921, which stopped 
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all work on the mines by January the following year. The graduation from industrial 
action to full-blown rebellion came about as a result of increasingly militant tactics 
by the strikers, who formed groups of armed resisters known as ‘commandos’.
56
 This 
was met by correspondingly aggressive measures by police and local volunteer 
regiments, who attempted to stave-off the uprising until a proper military response 
could be launched.   
In his memoirs, Chesterton pointed to March 1922 as the start of a ‘terror’ 
carried out by the rebels against the local population. This claim bore some truth, as 
the lead-up to that month had seen an ‘eruption of racial killings across the Rand’, 
carried out by white miners against their African counterparts.
57
 On 6 March, the 
miners called for a general strike. The declaration was followed by an outbreak of 
rioting that prompted the implementation of martial law on 10 March and the arrival 
of Prime Minister Jan Smuts on the evening of Saturday 11 March. Smuts’ 
appearance coincided with that of the Durban Light Infantry, the military force 
deployed to quell the rebellion. In a condensed form, the story Chesterton told of his 
role in crushing the rebellion was as follows: Instructed by the Star to cover the 
military’s attack on the rebels’ position, Chesterton encountered a contingent of the 
Durban Light Infantry whose commander (a ‘colonel Molyneaux’)
 
recognized 
Chesterton from his time as an officer in the First World War. The commander 
informed him of the need for experienced officers and requested Chesterton’s 
assistance in the fight against the rebels. Chesterton agreed and took command of a 
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platoon after acquiring a uniform from a local theatre.
58
 On March 14, Chesterton 
and his platoon carried out an ambush on the rebels’ position, deploying a machine 
gun in a nearby building and then charging the rebellion’s headquarters, the 
Fordsburg Trades Hall, with rifles and bayonets. 
It is hard to verify whether Chesterton was as deeply involved in the events of 
14 March 1922 as he claimed. His name does not appear in contemporary studies of 
the uprising, such as Jeremy Krikler’s The Rand Revolt (2005), which provides a 
detailed account of how the rebellion was crushed by Smuts’ intervention. 
Nevertheless, the sequence of events described in Chesterton’s memoirs is roughly 
corroborated by Krikler’s account, which notes that many white professionals were 
mobilized as ‘civic guards’ during the course of the revolt. Chesterton’s account is 
plausible, therefore, even if he played only a small role in the large military effort 
directed at suppressing the rebellion.
59
 In any case, the most important aspect of 
Chesterton’s experiences in 1922 is the way in which he interpreted the rebellion, 
and how this influenced his attitude towards the revolutionary left. During his time 
as a propagandist for the BUF, Chesterton would invoke his experience on the Rand 
as a kind of cautionary tale for those who sympathized with the ideas of class 
warfare advanced by British socialists. In September 1936, he gave a sensationalistic 
account of the ‘Red Methods’ employed by the rebels, comparing them to the 
methods employed by anti-fascists in their encounters with the BUF:  ‘The same Red 
types who bathed the Rand in blood are to be found in Britain. They throng 
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Blackshirt meetings to try to break them up, knowing that on no condition will 
Fascist power tolerate their foulness’.
60
  
 While writing for the Weekly Review in 1943, Chesterton once again alluded 
to his experience on the Rand while criticizing Richard Acland, an English MP who 
warned of a possible revolution if the government failed to adopt socialist policies: 
‘For my part, having seen something of an attempted revolution, I can only salute Sir 
Richard’s high courage in pledging himself to the barricades. Especially in these 
days of dive-bombers and sixty-ton tanks’.
 61
 There was a consistent narrative that 
ran through Chesterton’s memories of the ‘attempted revolution’. He was 
sympathetic to the striking workers’ initial grievances, ‘a very proper step to take, 
since white standards of life in Africa must be safeguarded’,  but withdrew his 
support once the strike evolved into a revolt. Writing for the BUF in 1936, he took 
pains to distinguish the bulk of the aggrieved workers’ from the ‘gibbering sub-
humans’ drawn to the strike by the ‘pathology of Communism’.
62
 He gave a similar 
impression of the strikers in his memoirs:  
 
The miners were well paid and had no manual labour to perform, but it can be 
no fun spending one’s working life underground, anything up to three miles 
below the fresh air of the surface, and this may be part of the reason for the 
outbreaks. But it did not explain the support they invariably received from the 
thousands of riff-raff who emerged from the White slums around 
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Robert Skidelsky remarked upon the irony of Chesterton, a man later 
obsessed with the machinations of Jewish international finance, fighting on behalf of 
mine owners which included J.P. Morgan and Ernest Oppenheimer.
64
 It is important 
to note, however, that at no point did Chesterton’s anti-capitalism derive from a left 
wing perspective despite his basic agreement with the objections to capitalist excess 
offered by the left. On a philosophical level, he could never abide the materialistic 
precepts of Marxism, which called into question his romanticized beliefs in heroism 
and national destiny, nor could he abide the class conflict demanded by socialism 
and communism. Rather than class solidarity, Chesterton cherished the idea of 
solidarity on the basis of patriotism or, in the case of the Rand strike, racial 
identity.
65
 His work as a propagandist for the BUF contained some of his most 
pointed attacks on capitalism and big business, particularly as the movement sought 
to attract working-class supporters after 1934. Yet even those articles which were 
written to appeal to a broad audience made clear the limitations of Chesterton’s anti-
capitalism:   
 
Fascism believes in private enterprise and private property. It sees in the first, 
when properly coordinated and controlled, a vital stimulus to our national 
economic life and in the second, when properly distributed, the means of 




After leaving the BUF, Chesterton maintained the same argument regarding 
the need to balance the ‘honourable traditions’ of private property and enterprise 
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with the national interest, while avoiding the unnecessary bureaucratic 
entanglements of socialism.
67
 The overall understanding of class, capitalism and the 
role of government which Chesterton exhibited at this point might readily have 
drawn him towards conservatism, were it not for his hostility towards the laissez-
faire economic posture adopted by many Conservatives. While the actual 
relationship between lasses-faire capitalism and British conservatism was more 
complex than Chesterton was able to recognize, specific policies (particularly those 
relating to trade and finance) fed his perception that many Tories had become 
‘smeared with the manifold disgraces of Capitalist misrule’.
68
 His attachment to the 
revolutionary aspects of fascist ‘national regeneration’ also made him wary of 
reactionary or ‘traditionalist’ conservatives, whose main concern appeared to be the 
preservation of political traditions that were easily corrupted by international 
finance.
69
  In short, Chesterton’s sympathies lay with neither the anti-capitalist left 
nor the pro-capitalist right; he was thus readily inclined towards the ‘third way’ of 
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Journalism and Theatrical Criticism, 1924-1933 
 
After the Rand Revolt, Chesterton worked as a reporter for the Johanessburg Star for 
a further year before he resigned over an unspecified quarrel with his editors that 
arose during one of his alcoholic episodes. He later wrote that the events of March 
1922 had ‘unsettled him’ and fed a growing dissatisfaction with Johannesburg, a city 
that offered little in the way of cultural or artistic interest. After a brief stint on a 
government work relief program, he travelled to a farm on the Sundays River where 
his mother and half-sister raised poultry. Chesterton worked on the farm for six 
months, maintaining a side-career as a freelance journalist until he departed from 
South Africa and returned to England in 1924. On the advice of his cousin, the poet 
and author G.K. Chesterton, he then moved from London to Stratford-Upon-Avon 
where he found work as a reporter for the local newspaper. This position in turn 
introduced Chesterton to Archibald (or ‘Archie’) Flower, a prominent figure in local 
politics and Chairman of the Council of the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre. Life at 
the heart of the Stratfordian theatre industry proved gratifying for Chesterton who, 
besides his general craving for literary and artistic stimulation, regarded Shakespeare 
as unsurpassed in his contribution to English culture: ‘Shakespeare and Shelley, as it 
happens, had long been my outstanding literary heroes… Nothing in Shakespeare’s 
poetry has ever become stale for me’.
70
 With Flower’s assistance, Chesterton was 
able to parley this enthusiasm into professional criticism published in the Stratford-
Upon-Avon Herald and the Shakespeare Review, a journal he ran from 1926 to 1928.  
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As noted in the introductory chapter, the historiography surrounding 
Chesterton’s involvement with the BUF has placed much emphasis on the 
connection between his cultural criticism and its connection to fascism. David 
Baker’s biographical work noted the importance of Chesterton’s relationship with 
the Shakespearean scholar  G. Wilson Knight, with correspondence between the two 
men providing insight into the development of Chesterton’s cultural pessimism and 
subsequent radicalization.
71
 There were indeed many aspects of Chesterton’s 
theatrical criticism that hinted at his political development, just as his earlier work as 
a journalist showed that he was far from ‘apolitical’ before 1930, despite his lack of 
formal engagement with the political process. Chesterton’s approach to Shakespeare 
revealed many of the same opinions on culture that he had begun to explore while 
working for the Star. Where production was concerned Chesterton favoured a 
traditional approach, and was critical of those who attempted to modernize 
Shakespeare’s plays in a way that obscured their cultural roots; in the case of 
Macbeth, for example, he strongly disapproved of any production that removed the 
play from its Celtic roots.
72
 Chesterton also held strong ideas as to the nature of 
individual characters, often constructed in terms of heroism or weakness. His ideal 
performance of Hamlet was ‘a man bursting at the seams with lust for action, and yet 
restrained by the still more powerful forces of Destiny… a great man with 
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tremendous force of personality’.
73
 Brutus from Julius Caesar, on the other hand, he 
viewed as a ‘blatant prig and humbug and [a] run-to-seed liberal decadent’.
74
 
The Shakespeare Review ceased publication in 1928 due to a lack of reliable 
funding, motivating Chesterton to leave Stratford-Upon-Avon and seek work 
elsewhere. After two years freelancing in London, he found a permanent position in 
Devon as editor of the Torquay Times. In 1932, with encouragement from Wilson-
Knight, he published Adventures in Dramatic Appreciation, a collection of essays 
adapted from his work in Stratford. The volume included rare examples of 
Chesterton reflecting openly on his experiences as a soldier, through a series of 
essays that considered three literary and theatrical interpretations of the war: R.C. 
Sherriff’s Journey’s End, Lawrence du Garde Peach’s Home Fires and Erich Maria 
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, a novel adapted to film by Lewis 
Milestone in 1930. In contrast to some of the allusions to war made in Chesterton’s 
columns for the Star, his reflections in this volume made no effort to romanticise or 
soften the events of 1914 to 1918. As Doris Chesterton would later attest, her 
husband’s review of Journey’s End featured many personal recollections of the war, 




Three years voyaging under a sky sick with horror, studded with innumerable 
streaks and stabs of paralyzing fear… Stanhope, like thousands of others, trod 
every inch of it with dauntless feet, superbly efficient, sacrificing himself 
utterly, and drinking whisky so that he could go on journeying long after his 
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Alongside its many descriptions of the physical and psychological horrors of 
trench warfare, Chesterton’s laudatory review of Sherriff’s work concluded with a 
recrimination of the civilian world that had so quickly forgotten the sacrifices of its 
defenders: ‘the soaring faiths and heroisms were interred with the corpses on the 
battlefield, and the civilian world settled down smugly to forget all about them… 
Advertisement and pretence counted for everything, manhood for very little’. This 
passage recalled Chesterton’s earlier allusions to the ‘dreary ennui’ of post-war 
society. His depiction of the crisis afflicting England in peacetime now appeared 
explicitly political, however, with reference to the ‘self-seekers and skunks’ that had 
risen to power while former soldiers struggled through ‘long years of suffering’.
77
 
These sentiments demonstrated the full extent to which proto-fascist sentiment had 
permeated Chesterton’s thinking since the end of the war, replete with the notion that 
the men in the trenches had, through their suffering, achieved a kind of unity and 
transcendence that could never be matched by the existing order of British politics 
and society. 
Though Adventures in Dramatic Appreciation was not commercially 
successful, the book was praised by Wilson Knight, who lauded Chesterton’s writing 
style and capacity to engage with both ‘high’ and ‘low’ brow aspects of dramatic 
criticism.
78
 The talent for writing and criticism that Chesterton displayed prior to his 
time in the BUF led some friends and family to reflect that his life had been derailed 
into politics: Doris Chesterton recalled surprise and disappointment at her husband’s 
decision to join Mosley rather than resume work for Archie Flower in 1933. Even 
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Rosine De Bounevialle, a friend and committed follower of Chesterton’s post-war 
campaigns, found it ‘astonishing’ that he did not retire from politics after the BUF to 
pursue a career in journalism or playwriting.
79
 Thurlow’s analysis of Chesterton 
concluded that his cultural and aesthetic ideas became inseparable from his political 
analysis, resulting in a worldview that was fundamentally detached from political 
reality.
80
 Culture was an indisputably important aspect of Chesterton’s ideology, 
which rejected materialism from both left and right-wing perspectives. Like many 
fascist and conservative thinkers, Chesterton saw cultural forms like art, literature 
and theatre as indicative of the moral and spiritual values of society as a whole. 
81
 
At the same time, it is important to note that Chesterton did not stumble into 
fascism without a pre-existing interest in politics or world affairs. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by how he considered the legacy of his cousins, Gilbert (G.K.). and 
Cecil Chesterton. G.K’s success as an author and poet far eclipsed that of Cecil, with 
a body of work that included a series of popular mystery novels (the ‘Father Brown’ 
books) as well as non-fiction centered around philosophy, theology and Christian 
apologetics. Cecil’s career was less illustrious but more invested in the sphere of 
current affairs, a fact that drew the admiration of A.K. Chesterton as a child: 
 
Gilbert, I reflected, was the genius filled with splendid dreams… but Cecil 
was the man with his eye on the ball. Soon afterwards, when Cecil’s name 
became headline news because of his being prosecuted on a charge of 
criminal libel against Godfrey Isaacs, I became convinced that he was the 
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Chesterton referred in this passage to the ‘Marconi scandal’ that emerged in 1912 
after allegations of insider trading between the Marconi telecommunications 
company and members of Herbert Henry Asquith’s Liberal government.
83
 Cecil 
Chesterton’s investigations into the matter, published in The New Witness, 
implicated several high profile figures, including then Chancellor of the Exchequer 
David Lloyd George. In a court case the following year, Cecil Chesterton was sued 
for libel by Godfrey Isaacs, the managing director of the Marconi company. Though 
he lost the case, Cecil maintained that the allegations were a genuine example of 
conspiracy between figures in government and big business. Later interpretations of 
the scandal suggested that the Chestertons and Hilaire Belloc, editor of The New 
Witness, pursued the case on the basis of anti-Semitic stereotypes.
84
 Although the 
events of the scandal took place while A.K. Chesterton was still young, his career in 
journalism and politics followed many of the examples set by Cecil Chesterton’s 
aggressive and sometimes conspiratorial approach to current affairs. The fact that 
Gilbert did not pursue his brother’s political cause was a great disappointment to 
A.K. Chesterton: 
 
I was in the Army of the Rhine when I heard of Cecil’s death in a military 
hospital in France. Presumptuously, perhaps, I wrote a letter to Gilbert 
expressing the hope that his brother’s fight against contemporary evils, 
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Whether or not A.K. Chesterton’s concern with financial conspiracies began 
as early as 1919, it is evident that he had begun to emulate Cecil’s interrogatory 
approach to world affairs prior to his full envelopment in the conspiracy theories of 
British fascism. While working in Stratford-Upon-Avon, Chesterton took pride in 
the idea that his views were independent and ‘not for sale’, gaining a reputation 
within Stratford-Upon-Avon for his strident and argumentative approach to theatrical 
criticism.
86
 He maintained this sensibility after leaving Stratford for Torquay in 
1928, where he became involved in local politics while working as a newspaper 
editor. A dispute over a Town Council measure relating to public transportation led 
Chesterton to found the Torquay Citizens Defence League, an organization to 
‘safeguard the interests of the ratepayers’ that contested the issue through three years 
of ‘municipal battles’. Though of little significance compared to his involvement 
with the BUF, this was the first time that Chesterton had formally engaged with the 
world of political activism and a minor introduction to the controversy that would 




Aside from his brief foray into local politics, the most significant part of 
Chesterton’s time in Torquay was the beginning of his relationship with Doris Terry, 
a schoolteacher and member of the local theatre group whom he would marry in 
September 1933.
88
 Doris’s recollections of the couple’s early relationship provide 
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some further hints as to Chesterton’s political direction in the years just prior to 
joining the BUF. Shortly after meeting his wife, Chesterton referred to himself as a 
‘socialist’ who had voted for Labour in the 1929 general election, voicing his 
approval that Doris (a Fabian socialist) had done the same.
89
 The fact that Chesterton 
cast a vote for a left-wing party in 1929 serves as a reminder that his path to fascism 
was not simply a linear drift towards the right. Many members of the BUF found 
their way to fascism via the left, including Mosley and ex-Labour MP John Beckett, 
and left-wing notions of social and economic upheaval were incorporated within the 
party’s ideology. Chesterton had less formal interaction with left-wing politics but 
expressed a desire for social reform, showed concern for the working class, and 
strongly identified with the wartime ideals of collective struggle and sacrifice, 
otherwise known as ‘blood socialism’.
90
 It is thus not remarkable that, faced with the 
choice of parties contesting the 1929 election, Chesterton cast his vote for Labour. 
Against a backdrop of ‘conservative hegemony’ in the early interwar period, Ramsay 
MacDonald’s party represented the most radical of the three major factions 
contesting the election. He was thus an understandable choice for Chesterton, whose 
grievances against the status quo had grown steadily since 1918.
91
  Whether he gave 
it thoughtfully or on impulse, Chesterton’s vote in 1929 marked the last time that he 
would lend his support to any of the major political parties operating in Britain. His 
sympathy for the ‘Old Gangs’ of British politics evaporated completely upon joining 
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Mosley in 1933, to be replaced with contempt for the ‘dodderers’ in British 
parliament and a lasting disdain for the electoral system as a whole.  
Doris admitted that her husband’s deeper political leanings were not readily 
apparent to her prior the time they lived together prior to their marrying in late 1933. 
While Chesterton was working at the newspapers in Torquay, Doris was employed at 
a school in Kingston-Upon-Thames and it was not until the early stages of their 
married life that he demonstrated any interest in fascism. On their honeymoon in 
October 1933, the couple met with Archie Flower to discuss the possibility of 
Chesterton returning to work as editor of the Stratford Herald.
92
 During the course 
of his conversation with Flower, Chesterton made ‘a brief defence of Hitler’s record 
in Germany’, the NSDAP leader having been appointed as Chancellor in January 
that year.
93
 Chesterton did not read Italian or German and, unlike Mosley or John 
Beckett, had no opportunity to see fascism in practice before encountering the BUF 
at its headquarters in London. Whatever familiarity he had with fascism overseas 
was therefore likely to have been acquired in a general fashion through the news 
media. That Chesterton felt compelled to offer a defence of Hitler’s record in 1933 
would suggest that he was aware of the uneasy responses to fascism, Nazism in 
particular, among the press and political establishment in Britain. At the same time, 
it is worth noting that Chesterton and others drawn directly into movements like the 
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There were a number of factors that drove Chesterton to regard fascism in Europe as 
a potential role model for British nationalists. Chief among them was his sense of 
identification with other members of the ‘Front Generation’, which made him 
sympathetic to the displays of militaristic, resurgent nationalism that were emanating 
from the continent. In his review of All Quiet on the Western Front, for example, 
Chesterton had mused that his own memories seemed to match those of the German 
soldiers depicted in Erich Remarque’s story:  ‘We did not know the war from the 
German side; we did not guess, even, how pathetically close it was to our own 
experience’. He was likewise inclined to see the response to the ‘dreary old cupidity 
and stupidity of civil life’ that emerged from Weimar Germany and as parallel to his 
own feelings of alienation from interwar Britain, albeit without the same echoes of 
‘fundamental emotionalism’ that drove the German military ethos.
95
 Although 
Chesterton’s life after the war made him sympathetic to the generic ideals of fascism, 
his worldview was always rooted in British nationalism, and did not arise from an 
infatuation with Italian Fascism or German National Socialism. It thus required the 
emergence of an authentic British movement, as well as a plausible leader in the 
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The British Union of Fascists, 1933-1938 
  
Reviewing Chesterton’s life between 1918 and 1933 there is a definite sense of 
direction in his ideological progression towards fascism, with many proto-fascist 
ideas and sentiments emerging from the immediate aftermath of World War I. Yet 
his actual involvement with the British Union of Fascists came about through sheer 
coincidence.  In late 1933 he moved with his wife into an apartment in Chelsea next 
door to ‘Black House’, a property that had served as headquarters for the BUF since 
its founding in October 1932.
96
 Chesterton’s visits to the house introduced him to 
many of the men who would serve as his cohorts both during and after his time 
under Mosley. According to his wife, Chesterton was at first sceptical of the young 
Blackshirts he encountered, who appeared to lack experience to match their 
enthusiasm.
97
 His attitude changed, however, upon meeting members of the group 
whose experience and capabilities matched his own. A key figure in his decision to 
join the party was Rex Tremlett, editor of the Fascist Week and a man with whom 
Chesterton had much in common. Tremlett also hailed from South Africa, having 
worked as a prospector and then a newspaper editor in Johannesburg before 
travelling to England and joining Mosley in early 1933.
98
 Early meetings with the 
Blackshirts also brought Chesterton in touch with John Beckett, a former Labour 
M.P. who served as Mosley’s director of propaganda.
99
 Unsurprisingly given his 
background, Chesterton was drawn to others in the fascist movement with a flair for 
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journalism and political oratory, as well as those with a military background. Aside 
from his general observations of ‘naivety’ among the young members at BUF 
headquarters, there is no exact record of what Chesterton’s early impressions of 
Mosley were, nor under what circumstances the two men first met. It did not take 
long, however, for Chesterton’s commitment to the ‘Leader’ to solidify. By 
November 1933 he had become a fully-fledged member of the BUF and, in a gesture 
that demonstrated the extent of his commitment, turned down a more lucrative 
position with the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre in Stratford to join Mosley at the 
comparatively meagre salary of £5 per week.
 100
 
Like Chesterton, Oswald Mosley had begun his path towards fascism after the 
First World War. Enrolled as a cadet at Sandhurst Academy in August 1914, Mosley 
was initially commissioned as part of a cavalry regiment before applying for the 
Royal Flying Corps. After suffering an ankle injury from a plane crash, he was 
recalled to his original regiment, the 16
th
 Lancers, and served from October 1915 
when he was removed from active duty in March 1916 due to an injury. 
101
 Mosley 
spent the remainder of the war in administrative roles, an experience that biographer 
Robert Skidelsky noted as a major influence on his enthusiasm for centralized 
control of the national economy. 
102
 Although his time spent as a front line soldier 
was relatively brief, these experiences had notable impact on his attraction to 
fascism. Like his German and Italian counterparts, Mosley was impressed by the 
immense potential of collective action and the capacity for the shared struggle of war 
                                                             
100
 Chesterton Collection A. 12, Text of an interview with Mrs Doris Chesterton, 9 May 
1978.  
101
 Skidelsky, pp. 62-63. A concise discussion of Mosley’s war service is also provided by 
Dorril, pp. 20-35, who notes some of the contrasts between his actual experience of the war 
and its depiction in BUF propaganda. 
102




to override divisions of class. He later claimed, in a similar fashion to Chesterton, to 
have experienced a bitter reaction to the war’s end: ‘Smooth, smug people who had 
never fought or suffered, seemed to the eyes of youth – at that moment age-old with 
sadness, weariness and bitterness – to be eating, drinking, laughing on the graves of 
our companions’.
103
 In the years between the end of the war and the founding of the 
BUF, Mosley moved through a rapid series of political alignments: first as member 
of the Conservative Party in 1918, then as a Labour MP in 1926, and finally as the 
leader of his own New Party in 1931. When the New Party electoral efforts 
floundered, in part due to the opposition of Mosley’s former allies in the Labour 
party, he grew disillusioned with the ‘Old Gangs’ of the parliamentary system that 
had stymied his attempts at radical reform. After a final failed attempt to form a 
cross-party opposition with several other backbenchers, including Winston Churchill 
and David Lloyd George, Mosley travelled to Italy in 1932 and became convinced of 
fascism’s potential to be implemented in Britain.
104
 On 3 October 1932, he founded 
the British Union of Fascists and released his manifesto, The Greater Britain, which 
served as the party’s statement of policy.
105
 
Chesterton’s decision to join Mosley coincided with what would prove to be 
the BUF’s brief zenith of popularity. Even at that early stage, there was evidence that 
fascism in Britain would have limited chances of gaining influence as it had in 
continental Europe. Many of Mosley’s political efforts prior to establishing the BUF 
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had been geared towards radical social programs designed as a response to economic 
downturn. By 1933, however, Britain had begun to recover from the ‘Slump’ and 
British fascists could not, like their counterparts in Germany, point to military defeat 
as the cause of the nation’s economic woes.
106
 Earlier attempts to promote fascism in 
Britain had also proved unsuccessful during periods of economic and social 
upheaval. During the General Strike in 1926, members of an early fascist party, 
Rotha Linton-Orman’s British Fascists (BF), sought to ingratiate themselves with 
authorities as part of a bid for greater influence.
107
 While members did lend some 
assistance in running essential services, their offers to supplement police services 
were rebuffed, denying them any space for paramilitary tactics practiced by the 
Italian squadrismo or German Friekorps.
108
 Another problem highlighted by the BF 
that confronted Mosley in the 1930s was fascism’s reputation among the British 
public. At the very least, fascism represented a foreign concept with ideas and 
symbolism that bore little relation to British culture; at worst, members of the public 
already had reason to fear the outcome of fascists coming to power. As the economic 
journalist Paul Einzig observed in 1933, the philosophical or economic aspects of 
fascism were easily overshadowed by its violent and despotic character: ‘To millions 
of men and women of average intelligence, Fascism means castor oil, violence, 
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political persecution, aggressive nationalism, and rampant reactionary despotism’.
109
 
Finally, the late arrival of Mosley’s party placed it at a tactical disadvantage to its 
left-wing opponents, which had worked to establish an organized anti-fascist 
movement since the 1920s.
110
 While in retrospect these factors would suggest a 
movement doomed by circumstances from the beginning, Mosley’s party did possess 
some momentum in its early stages and attracted an array of capable personnel, 
along with financial backing from Mussolini’s regime.
111
 Most important, when 
considering Chesterton individually, was the fact that none of the BUF’s structural 
disadvantages were obvious enough to dissuade him from throwing his considerable 
energies behind the fascist cause. Mosley’s personal charisma was such that, in the 
early years, Chesterton was willing to overlook the flaws and internal divisions that 
would later drive him from the party.  
For his first major assignment, Chesterton was sent to Birmingham to 
organize and oversee the BUF’s operations in the Midlands. Here he was introduced 
to William Joyce, an enthusiastic supporter of Nazism and Italian Fascism who also 
served as a speaker and propagandist for the BUF.
112
 Joyce was something of a 
parallel figure to Chesterton, whose skill and energy as a public speaker matched 
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Chesterton’s capabilities in written propaganda. Despite their similarities, Chesterton 
held no great personal affection for the volatile and violently anti-Semitic Joyce, 
whose infamous flight to Germany in 1939 would nevertheless haunt him by 
association for decades after the dissolution of the BUF.
113
  While working in the 
Midlands, Chesterton was responsible for leading a large number of Blackshirts to 
hear Mosley’s address at the Olympia meeting on the evening of 10 July 1934. What 
was intended to be a triumphant display of fascist discipline before the public 
quickly descended into chaos, as Blackshirt stewards dealt ruthlessly with hecklers 
attempting to drown out Mosley’s speech.
114
 Collin Brooks, a conservative 
newspaper editor who would work alongside Chesterton after the war, described the 
resulting melee as a ‘Roman Circus’ that only served to highlight the violent excess 
of the fascists’ attempts to maintain order. Though not entirely unsympathetic to 
Mosley’s ideas, Brooks’ diary entry from the night of the rally captured some of its 
significance in speeding the downfall of the BUF:  
 
Whatever the press may say… the whole thing was a fiasco and has probably 
done more to rally opinion to the National Government than anything since 
1931. As far as the 6000 or 10,000 eye witnesses were concerned the personal 





Chesterton’s private reaction to Olympia showed a similar sense of alarm at 
the violence he had witnessed while attending. In an interview with David Baker in 
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1980, Doris Chesterton described her husband arriving home from the rally in the 
early hours of Monday, 11 June:  
 
He returned in the early hours of the morning exhausted, extremely angry and 
with his right fist bruised. But it was against the fascists he was fuming. It 
seems that at one point he had witnessed two fascists holding down a 
communist while another kicked the prostrate figure. ‘So I hit one of them’ he 
told me. He would not stop talking about the unnecessary violence until he 




By the next day, Chesterton had reevaluated what had taken place and made 
the decision to remain in the BUF, maintaining that the two Blackshirts he 
intercepted had been engaged in a ‘clear breach of fascist discipline’.
117
 He made no 
mention of whether this assessment of disciplinary failure also applied to the other 
publicized incidents of brutality at Olympia, such as the ‘mass assaults’ described by 
Brooks, the widely reported use of stage lighting to target hecklers for assault, or the 
‘humiliation’ of female hecklers ejected by Blackshirt stewards.
118
 His article 
describing the Blackshirts’ ‘triumph’ at Olympia gave no indication of his unease 
regarding what had taken place, theatrically detailing how the ‘organized 
hooliganism had been smashed’ by Mosley’s disciplined ‘Defence Forces’.
119
 In the 
years after 1934, Chesterton’s memory of the violence at Olympia became blurred 
with the mixture of propaganda and conflicting media narratives that surrounded the 
event. Aided somewhat by the contingent of genuinely militant anti-fascists within 
the British left that targeted BUF meetings, he would later insist that self-defence 
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and the protection of free speech was the sole purpose of the Blackshirts’ martial 
style of preserving order.
120
 Many years after distancing himself from the BUF, he 
reiterated this argument as a criticism of Colin Cross’ Fascists in Britain, a book that 




There has been some argument among historians as to how Olympia was 
perceived by the British public and the political establishment.
 122
 Even if certain 
spheres of the press and British conservatism were sympathetic to the Blackshirt’s 
protestations of self-defence, as Martin Pugh contended, Olympia prompted 
noticeable changes within the BUF itself. D.S. Lewis observed that 1934 marked a 
shift towards more serious political strategy on Mosley’s part, as he faced the 
realization that ‘enthusiasm was sufficient to lead to power’.
123
 At the same time, 
however, the party experienced a degree of internal radicalization after Olympia that 
made its progress to legitimate political growth more difficult. Chesterton would 
write in 1937 that after the meeting, Mosley had called for an ‘investigation’ into the 
connection between Jewish influence and opposition to the BUF. Already leaning 
towards anti-Semitism in its membership and internal ideology, the party 
subsequently declared Jews to be the unifying presence behind all of the forces 
undermining its progress. ‘Mosley thereupon took up the challenge’, Chesterton 
declared, ‘and as a result of the Jew daring to come between a great British leader 
and the great British people Fascism has gained more than it has lost, while the Jew 
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has lost both on the roundabouts and the swings’.
124
 In truth, Mosley and the BUF’s 
turn toward unabashed anti-Semitism after 1934 served to further alienate the party 
from its potential supporters.
125
 Behind the scenes, the British government grew 
alarmed by the BUF’s aping of the violent tactics of fascism on the continent. After 
Hitler carried out an internal purge (dubbed the Night of Long Knives) in June 1934, 
British authorities privately requested that the media refrain from positive coverage 
of the Blackshirts.
126
 The following month, the Daily Mail owner Lord Rothermere 
publicly withdrew his support for Mosley, having previously lauded the BUF as a 
movement of energetic conservatism. For Chesterton, the most significant change 
came between July and August 1934 following the resignation of Rex Tremlett, who 
left his position as editor of the BUF weekly Blackshirt (formerly Fascist Week) 
describing the party as ‘cads, thieves and swine’.
127
 Chesterton was appointed as 
editor in his stead, beginning in earnest his role as one of the BUF’s leading 
propagandists.  
By this time, surveillance of Mosley and the BUF by the Security Service was 
well underway. Chesterton first came to the attention of authorities in November 
1934, described in an informant’s report as a journalist with ‘deep knowledge of the 
BUF’ and ‘a fine speaker’.
128
 Another report from the following month described his 
address to a BUF gathering: ‘At the meeting Mr. Chesterton dealt with the idealistic 
aims of the movement. He said that the chief cause of our moral decadence was the 
Jewish race. He spoke of the hold the Jews had in South Africa which was being 
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strengthened by Herzog and Smutts [sic]’.
129
 As was the case with his commitment 
to fascism, no single point marked the start of Chesterton’s commitment to anti-
Semitism. Its overall prominence within his ideology is substantial enough to 
warrant focused consideration in Chapter 4. For now, it is important to note the 
extent to which anti-Semitism came to permeate Chesterton’s ideology and inform 
his work as a political activist after 1934. From Olympia onwards, international 
financiers and other permutations of the ‘Jewish menace’ became dominant themes 
in Chesterton’s propaganda, along with that of other prominent writers within the 
BUF like Joyce, Beckett and Alexander Raven-Thomson.
130
 Jewish influence served 
as a versatile scapegoat for what Chesterton saw as the pervasive rot eating away at 
Britain and the wholesale decline of Western civilization. Corruption and cultural 
decadence, themes which Chesterton used as a justification for the BUF’s impending 
revolution, played a similar role in fascist movements throughout continental 
Europe. Eugen Weber described a general tendency among fascists to imagine their 
doctrine as a ‘last resort’ in the face of insurmountable odds, while Fritz Stern traced 
the phenomenon of ‘cultural despair’ to Germany prior to the emergence of National 
Socialism.
131
 By way of explaining an increased fixation upon ‘cultural decline’ 
during the fascist heyday, Roger Griffin noted the extent to which literature and 
other forms of popular culture made cultural pessimism and narratives of Western 
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decline accessible to the public at large.
132
 The combined upheavals of the First 
World War, Bolshevik revolution and the Great Depression lent further plausibility 
to the notion that civilization itself was in a state of crisis.  
Chesterton’s attempts to draw attention to this crisis built upon themes of 
societal malaise and cultural decline that had been refined throughout his journalism 
and literary criticism. In a series of articles titled ‘Creed of a Fascist Revolutionary’ 
published in 1935, Chesterton argued that the dire situation facing Britain was a 
rebuke to the liberal optimism that had prevailed in the early 20
th
 century:  
 
The price to be paid for the revolution entails the sacrifice of many cherished 
illusions, not least among them the smug notion that progress is inherent in 
the social scheme of things. We have to face a truth which to many will not 





Although evidence for this disintegration could be found anywhere, according to 
Chesterton, he drew particular attention to the debasement of history and cultural 
traditions as a symptom of the ‘spiritual typhus’
134
 afflicting Britain. In the realm of 
British theatre, for example, he lamented that the works of Shakespeare were being 
stripped of their meaning and distorted from their original form in modern 
adaptations.
135
 He similarly accused ‘high brow authors’ like James Joyce and D.H. 
Lawrence of peddling ‘defeatism and disease’ that reflected their own ‘mental 
spiritual disorders’.
136
 As the most cosmopolitan form of popular entertainment, 
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cinema appeared as a recurring subject of Chesterton’s screeds against cultural 
degradation. He was especially perturbed by the influx of films from the United 
States, which he derided as escapist entertainment produced and marketed at the 
behest of Jewish finance.
137
 Chesterton’s preoccupation with cultural decadence was 
rooted in a belief that culture was to be taken seriously as a reflection of deeper 
values, an assumption shared by fascists both within and beyond the BUF.
138
 His 
diagnosis of Britain’s ills was not limited to culture, however, as more concrete 
examples of decline were evident in her political institutions.  The British Empire, 
both a symbol of Britain’s national achievement and the source of its economic and 
national security, faced dissolution at the hands of ‘politicians in consultation with 
their financial advisors’.
139
 Even the people of Britain, a once proud imperial race, 
had been physically and spiritually depressed by the ‘submergence of a masculine 
spirit’ and a crisis amidst the nation’s youth: 
 
A world of mental weaklings, cut off from contact with reality lest they 
should think to learn about that reality… A world of spiritual degenerates 
seeking annihilation in democratic fantasies because the facts of waking life 




In keeping with the programmatic thrust of Mosley’s fascist-corporatist 
vision, Chesterton tied the spiritual illness of the British populace to the material 
crises of mass industrialization and the failures of laissez-faire capitalism: ‘the 
perilous economic situation in which Britain is placed – a crisis of the system, as 
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Mussolini long ago perceived’.
141
 The nature of this crisis was explained in great 
detail throughout The Greater Britain as an imbalance between the capacity of 
industrial society to produce goods and the availability of markets to consume them:  
 
science, invention, technique have recently increased the power to produce 
out of the range of all previous experience. In the meantime, our machinery of 
distribution and of government has remained practically unchanged with the 




Although Chesterton did not contribute greatly to the theoretical aspects of 
BUF economics, he proved capable of articulating the concept of economic crisis on 
Mosley’s behalf. Britain’s economic troubles during the 1930s served as a tangible 
aspect of a deeper spiritual malaise that, to Chesterton’s frustration, was easily 
ignored or rationalized by many members of the public.  Though he often struggled 
to comprehend why others did not share his enthusiasm for fascism on its basic 
merits, Chesterton was acutely aware a revolutionary doctrine could only succeed if 
the public were made aware of a fundamental crisis within the status quo. Unlike 
Marxists, however, fascists could not merely attribute this crisis to the internal 
malfunctions of capitalism or the ruling class, and instead required a crisis that could 
be tied to the ineptness of democratic government and betrayal by internal 
enemies.
143
  British fascists were thus driven into conflict not only with their 
revolutionary counterparts on the left but with conservative and liberal ideology as 
well. Reflecting this, much of Chesterton’s propaganda revolved around the three 
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Despite the many irrational or essentialist ideas contained within fascism, it is 
important to note that Chesterton’s work on behalf of the BUF reflected an 
assumption that both reason and emotion could play a part in converting the masses 
to fascism. The aim of his attempts to negate other political ideas, therefore, was to 
persuade the public that fascism was a rational alternative to both the ‘jungle law’ of 
liberal-capitalism and communism’s ‘Red menace’.
145
 In practice, he argued, both of 
these systems yielded class inequality, with communism offering only to replace the 
supremacy of the capitalists with a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.  They were also 
prone to indecisiveness and internal debate, a problem that Chesterton saw evident in 
both liberal parliaments and leftist trade unions: ‘Talk is one of the curses of national 
life; it paralyses the will to action. The will to action must be asserted above the 
desire to talk before any control over the destinies of a nation be made effective’.
146
  
While making his early forays into BUF propaganda throughout 1934, Chesterton’s 
approach towards conservatives, liberals and socialists was fairly conciliatory, as he 
mounted the positive case for fascism as a political alternative. At least in theory, the 
fascist worldview shared ideas in common with each of the groups which Chesterton 
hoped to persuade. Conservatives shared the fascists’ desire for order and national 
unity, while socialists and liberals shared the drive for a more equitable and 
collective society. Mosley’s plans for a managed corporatist economy were designed 
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to integrate each of these principles and remove the need for class antagonism, thus 
negating the contest between left and right altogether. 
The effort to communicate the virtues of fascism to an audience from across 
the political spectrum was part of a wider strategy by Mosley to build up a mass 
movement with a broad social base, emulating the method through which fascists 
gained power in Italy and Germany. Unlike their counterparts in central and Eastern 
Europe, however, British fascists emerged in a stable nation-state with a long 
tradition of parliamentary democracy and civil society. This was reflected, to some 
degree, in Mosley’s original proposals for the Greater Britain, which promised an 
orderly fascist revolution suited to a British context. There was a limit to how liberal 
norms and traditions could be reconciled with fascism’s radical project, however, as 
Chesterton made clear in his polemics against ‘lovers of democracy’. His criticisms 
rested on the idea that freedom, like so many of the ‘cherished notions’ fascism 
sought to dispel, was an ideal rendered meaningless by the conditions of the real 
world:  
 
This is the freedom of the people. Freed from their landscape and their soil, 
from their tradition and their heritage, from personality and from life. And in 
return for this freedom, they serve as slaves the high priests of commerce and 




The fatal flaw of democracy was its inability to navigate a path between the 
perils of predatory finance on one hand and class conflict on the other. Though 
Chesterton granted the theoretical virtue of a democratic society, he viewed its 
practical application as destined to fail in the face of deliberate sabotage and inherent 
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structural problems and thus concluded that the deeper principles of democracy and 
liberty would be best achieved under the corporate state. He contrasted this vision of 
corporate freedom with the bureaucratic order under communism: ‘Human beings 
are too implacably regimented to lose their initiative, and with their initiative, all 
sense of the adventure of life. Britons would find this intolerable’.
148
 As much as 
Chesterton and other BUF members were derisive of liberal notions of freedom and 
individual autonomy, their propaganda appeals contained the tacit admission that 
these concepts were bound up with British national identity and thus needed to be 
integrated somehow into the framework of British fascism.
149
 The resulting appeals 
to ‘fascist freedom’ were hardly convincing but provided another example of the 
contradictions that emerged between the BUF’s ideology, aspirations and political 
context. For British fascism to make the positive case for a truly ‘British’ movement, 
it either needed to incorporate traditions from this context, which included notions of 
liberty, representation and rationalism, or somehow undermine their value in the 
eyes of the public. 
As the fortunes of the BUF declined after mid-1934 and fascists came under 
attack from opponents across the political spectrum, Chesterton’s work became 
increasingly focused on the latter approach, launching a series of polemics that 
attempted to highlight the failures of democracy in action. Underneath Chesterton’s 
individual articles addressing corrupt politicians and political affairs lay a general 
attack on democracy and materialism:  
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The charge which Fascism brings against democracy is that it neglects and 
thereby tends to destroy, real values. Its mind is appeased by beautiful words, 
irrespective of the underlying realities. That is why the poets, and prophets, 
and sages have always been confounded. Their words have been treasured, 




The key argument running throughout Chesterton’s writing on parliamentary 
politics was that the system itself had the effect of corrupting those who partook of 
it. Labour politicians, for example, may have run for office with the intention of 
bringing about reform but ended up running for the sake of power alone.
151
 
Chesterton’s writing also showed concern that this corrupting influence was capable 
of spreading to parts of society that would otherwise have remained pure. In an 
Action article attacking the ‘League of Ex-Servicemen against Fascism’, for 
example, he warned that ‘no one with its [the British Legion] best interests at heart 
wishes to see it take the political ring’ 
152
 This aversion to the politicization of 
everyday life also manifested itself in his hostility to the Marxist approach of 
dialectical-materialism, through which ‘every manifestation of vitality and health 
appears as decadence’.
153
 Once again, there was blunt logic in Chesterton’s attacks 
on establishment politics, which effectively stood in the way of fascism’s success. 
By relentlessly highlighting the corruption of politics, he not only discredited the 
idea of democracy but also reinforced the leadership principle underpinning fascism. 
Mosley was presented as the sole exception to an otherwise corrupt system; a unique, 
epochal figure that had emerged from a struggle against the Old Gangs capable of 
leading a movement that would transcend democracy altogether.   
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The clearest examples of how Chesterton embodied a commitment to 
fascism’s ‘leadership principle’ lay in his biography of Mosley, published in 1936 as 
Portrait of a Leader. Throughout the book, Chesterton extolled the many virtues of 
Mosley and his path towards ‘restoring to the land the heroic and historic principle of 
leadership’.
154
 In the book’s final chapter, titled ‘Leader of Men’, he detailed the 
qualities fitting for the figure that would herald over Britain: ‘his tall athletic frame, 
with its dynamic force and immense reserves of strength, his unconquerable spirit, 
with its grandeur of courage and resolve’.
155
 The chapter concluded in triumphalist 
fashion with a gesture towards Mosley’s future at the head of Britain’s revolutionary 
ascent:  
 
Now he moves forward to a still greater destiny, an implacable figure 
looming ever more immense against the background of his times; through his 
own eager spirit, so full of aspiration and boldness, symbolizing the immortal 




Chesterton’s concept of Mosley as the leader of British fascism extended to 
him many of the qualities of Carlyle’s ‘Great Men’, individuals whose personal 
aptitude and charisma allowed them to change the course of history.
157
 Given 
Chesterton’s view of parliamentary politics as an intrinsically corrupting 
environment, one of the heroic traits he ascribed to Mosley most prominently was 
his unique capacity to resist the temptation to use politics as a means of furthering 
his own interests. ‘Alone of all the leaders of the age Oswald Mosley has scorned to 
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take personal advantage of the system of political chicanery and opportunism’.
158
 
Alongside integrity, Chesterton argued that Mosley also possessed an inherent 
genius that allowed him to embody the will of the people. For a time at least, he 
envisioned the BUF leader as a man capable of leading not through coercion or 
manipulation but through his ability to command loyalty from those who served 
under him: a dictator with ‘no need to dictate’.
159
 
The model of governance which Chesterton endorsed was Mosley’s idea of 
the corporate state, a system whereby the various forms of industry would be 
organized into corporations headed by a representative. This system was based in 
part on the theory that the problems of post-1918 Britain, such as unemployment and 
poverty, were solvable by the application of ‘scientific principles’ to economic 
management. For his part, Chesterton appears to have made few original or complex 
contributions to the theory of corporatism. Rather, he lent his propaganda efforts to 
the promotion of a Britain wherein the various branches of industry would be 
organized into corporate entities, each serving the needs of a balanced economy and 
controlling supply and demand through directives issued by the state. These 
directives of the state would hypothetically be subject to review by a National 
Council of Corporations, consisting of representatives from each industry. 
Corporatist principles held that economic planning, being a technical matter, sought 
input only from those with the technical expertise in specific fields.
160
 A special 
corporation would also be established to handle finance and the maintenance of a 
central bank, whose interests would be solely directed to domestic concerns.  
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As fascism held that such a program of economic planning would be 
impossible under the existing system of parliamentary governance, Chesterton also 
favoured a turn towards dictatorship. This entailed the appointment of Mosley as the 
leader of a fascist government (with the Monarch serving as head of state), the 
abolition of political parties and a shift towards representation based on industry in 
the place of local councils.
161
 Cognisant of the fact that many Britons would be 
discomfited by the dangerous and foreign implications of such an autocratic system, 
Chesterton assured an audience in March 1935 that ‘Fascism was a British 
movement legislating for a British people and it was anticipated that the fascists 
would obtain power by constitutional means and then keep their place in the same 
manner’.
162
 Regarding the manner in which the system would operate once in power, 
Chesterton reiterated the abstruse notion of ‘true freedom’ under dictatorship: ‘the 
true representation of the people by the people for the general welfare and prosperity 
of the nation’.
163
 Mosley offered a somewhat more direct explanation of how 
freedom of expression and representation would be preserved under the system of 
corporations. ‘Real freedom of speech’, he contended, would be provided through 
the ability of the populace to provide ‘constructive criticism’ in their own areas of 
expertise while voting to appoint or dismiss the government.  ‘The Fascist 
Movement represents Leadership, not tyranny… Leadership voluntarily accepted 
and chosen, but armed by the people with power to do what they want done’.
164
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As was the case with Chesterton’s attempts to persuade socialists and 
conservatives to the fascist cause, the BUF’s policies on rights and representation 
were neither convincing nor particularly coherent. Their most interesting feature was 
not their substance but their presentation, which tacitly acknowledged that even a 
revolutionary fascist movement in Britain could ill afford to completely disregard 
notions such as ‘freedom of speech’ from its platform. The clearest indication of how 
liberty and freedom of expression were actually to be curtailed under the system 
envisioned by Chesterton appeared as a brief passage in Portrait of a Leader: 
 
No liberty will be held forfeit which advances the cause of national well-
being and happiness. Liberty that fails to come within this scope will be 
regarded as license and destroyed. The press will have every freedom except 





While it is difficult to form a complete picture of how Chesterton envisioned 
the day-to-day function of a fascist state in Britain, his approval of the Italian and 
German dictatorships in the mid-1930s gives some idea of the manner in which he 
imagined such a society would operate. While working as a propagandist for the 
BUF, Chesterton either dismissed or downplayed the stories of political repression 
and racial persecution filtering in from Europe.  Even when he admitted the extent of 
Hitler’s dictatorial methods after leaving the BUF, Chesterton continued to insist that 
such practices were never an intended consequence of fascism in Britain.
166
 In a 
philosophical sense, however, the ‘national interest’ took primacy over all other 
factors in Chesterton’s political worldview. Presumably, therefore, he favoured 
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whatever extent of state control was necessary to achieve that interest. Given his 
general disregard for individual rights and the democratic process it seems unlikely 
that Chesterton would have objected to a dictatorship in Britain provided that it was 
on the country’s own terms rather than imposed by a foreign power.
167
 As he was to 
discover throughout the BUF’s campaigns, however, the notion of a ‘voluntary 
dictatorship’ was absurd in the eyes of many Britons. In an anecdote recounted 
second hand by his wife, Chesterton described an interaction between ‘the Leader’ 
and a member of the public in Yorkshire that encapsulated this problem: 
 
a hefty chap… rose to ask a question. He raised an accusing finger. ‘Sir Osley 
Mosley, if Fascism comes to power, what’ll thou be lad? Dictator or 
summat?’ There was a brief uncomfortable silence. Then Mosley pulled 





From late 1934 onward, Mosley faced the prospect of a decline in both 
membership and funding. Opinions within the higher-ranking membership of the 
party diverged over how to regain momentum.
 169
 Chesterton, along with Beckett and 
Joyce, called for a greater emphasis on advocacy and propaganda to draw the public 
towards fascism. An opposing faction from the BUF’s administrative wing 
meanwhile argued that a combination of electoral campaigning and orderly public 
demonstrations would be most likely to garner mass support. In the short run, Joyce 
and Chesterton’s faction gained the upper hand by forcing the administrative leader 
F.M. Box to resign. In the long term, however, Box’s successor Neil Francis-
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Chesterton’s alignment with the radical wing of the party reflected the depths 
of his devotion to fascism, as well as his militant and idealistic approach to politics 
as a whole. His articles for the BUF frequently invoked military values as a model 
for political life, demanding an outright rejection of ‘pagan individualism’ which 
prevented collective progress on the nation’s behalf and encouraged ‘egoism, 
treachery and greed’.
171
 Like Mosley, Chesterton fondly recalled the sense of 
purpose and comradery that had defined his experience in the war, and he hoped to 
transfer these values to peacetime: 
 
One of our many discoveries during the war was that in battalions where the 
discipline was firmest the men were happiest and their morals most sure. 
There is solid enjoyment in forming part of a community wherein every 
individual knows his job and does it to the best of his ability; ultimately it is 




Self-sacrifice played a large part Chesterton’s model of the fascist creed. 
Much as the war had required men to make sacrifices to the greater good, Chesterton 
argued that the task of political, economic and social reform facing a ‘decadent’ 
British democracy in peacetime required fascists to make sacrifices and aspire to the 
ideals of the fascist ‘new man’.
173
 Achieving this ideal required the foregoing of 
material comforts and ‘diversions’, as well as the cultivation of physical, mental and 
spiritual virtues. Both men and women were required to develop their physical health 
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in order to ‘make themselves superbly fit for life’s purposes’. Where mental virtues 
were concerned, Chesterton implored fascists to reject intellectualism, which he saw 
as unwilling to face reality, and instead adopt a ‘stark realism’ that rendered the 
world in terms of black and white. Above all else, he called for commitment to the 
spiritual principles of fascism: a ‘faith in life’ that embraced the challenges of 
modernity while rejecting ‘catchphrases and mere wish fulfilment in the flabby 
democratic fashion’.
174
 True to his words, Chesterton readily enforced the high-
standards to which he held members of the fascist movement. While inspecting local 
BUF branches throughout the Midlands in 1935, he closed down several branches 
and dismissed 300 members of the party for lack of discipline.
175
   
Chesterton’s appeals for fascism sought to emphasize the movement’s 
embrace of youth, another factor which fed his intolerance for inactive members. 
Whereas he lambasted politicians as ‘dodderers’ and ‘old women’, Chesterton saw 
young Britons as having the potential to learn the values that had deserted many of 
their elders. To this end, he encouraged young men and women to become engaged 
in politics and local affairs, since fascism’s arrival would offer them the opportunity 
to spearhead Britain’s regeneration: ‘The plunderer, the coward, the blatherer is 
being hurled from the field. Henceforth, you will take his place: your cleanness, like 
a white flame, will scorch out the graft and corruption which he leaves behind 
him’.
176
 At the same time he counselled youth to avoid those cultural diversions like 
popular music and cinema, which threatened to distract their attention away from 
‘public life’. The veneration of youth throughout Chesterton’s work was in part a 
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reflection of Mosley’s platform and the general emphasis which fascism placed upon 
vitality and renewal. On a more personal level, however, his concerns with British 
youth were driven by the belief that his own generation, those who fought and 
suffered in the Great War, had been led astray by ‘Old men’ who had sent them off 
to die under the false promise of a better world.
177
 Though he lamented the losses 
incurred by the Front Generation, he also recognized that the existential struggle of 
the war had left the survivors with a unique opportunity to redeem the world: 
 
I think that in 1914 most men and women of sensibility were conscious that 
all was not well with Western civilization… there was everywhere a sense of 
dishonour – of false values and of an omnipresent spiritual taint, as though 
some vast conspiracy of black magic had placed the world in a thrall. This 
was the spell that the marching battalions believed to have been brought to an 




Like Mosley, Chesterton regarded his experiences as a soldier as having 
revealed the practical and spiritual superiority of collective action, ‘the one real 
value created by the war’.  He therefore envisioned the society emerging from the 
fascist revolution as applying aspects of the military ethos to civilian society, 
following the example of the regimes under Hitler and Mussolini. The difficulty of 
communicating this idea to the British public was that many assumed, with good 
reason, that the militarism of fascists overseas represented a prelude to violent 
despotism at home and further war overseas. Where the former problem was 
concerned, Chesterton argued that stories of persecution and violence emanating 
from the continent as the 1930s progressed were lies or exaggerations peddled by a 
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corrupt press. In August 1935, for example, he ventured that the number of political 
detainees in Germany amounted to ‘at most a few thousand people detained in 
custody’, leaving the rest of the nation as enthusiastic supporters of Hitler’s 
regime.
179
 As to whether British fascism would follow the same violent route to 
power trod by other nations, he offered the assurance (in concert with Mosley’s 
official stance) that such methods would be unnecessary to secure the people’s 
support. Though he called openly for the British people to abandon tolerance and 
embrace a ‘disciplined anger’ in pursuit of revolution, he fell short of calling openly 
for violence: ‘Not that the streets of Merrie England shall flow red with blood: not 
that heads will roll in the sand. The fascist revolutionary refuses to regard the lives of 
the quacks and jugglers as sufficiently valuable to destroy’.
180
 This concession was 
not altogether a reassurance, given that Chesterton’s later, more explicit anti-Semitic 
propaganda hinted at a ‘reckoning’ for the Jews in Britain, ‘a flash swallowing up 
the Yiddish St. George’.
181
 
Even if Mosley and his supporters did not intend to create a forceful 
revolution, the subversive message and violence associated with the BUF’s 
campaigns in the East End eventually drew further censure from the authorities. 
After a particularly violent clash between the Blackshirts, anti-fascist demonstrators 
and police at Cable Street in October 1936, the government passed the Public Order 
Act which prohibited political groups from assembling in uniform and gave police 
the ability to suspend or redirect demonstrations.
182
 Events outside of Britain 
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compounded the problems of the BUF as both public opinion and the nation’s 
foreign policy became increasingly concerned with the actions of Fascists and 
National Socialists abroad. Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia on 3 October 1935 was 
the ‘first aggressive act by any European state in more than a decade’ that coincided 
with an internal drive to radicalize the Italian state towards totalitarian rule.
183
 
Despite condemnation from the British and French governments, further signs of an 
aggressive and expansionist tendency amongst the fascist powers emerged in the 
following year. In March 1936 Nazi Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, once 
again testing the limits of the Western powers’ desire to preserve peace. Three 
months later, in July 1936, civil war broke out in Spain between republican 
supporters of the ‘Popular Front’ and a right-wing coalition led by Francisco 
Franco.
184
 Following Mosley’s line that Britain should ‘mind its business’, 
Chesterton lent his propaganda efforts to condemning sanctions on Italy and calling 
for Britain to embrace friendship with Nazi Germany.
185
 
Chesterton’s personal attitudes toward German and Italian policy were more 
nuanced than those evinced through his propaganda. Regarding Italy’s invasion of 
Abyssinia, his views reflected a mindset that was imperialist as much as it was 
fascistic. He was unfazed by the prospect of a European nation holding dominion 
over part of Africa, so long as this expansion did not threaten Britain’s own colonial 
enterprise. Imperialism also provided a justification, up to a point, for Germany’s 
expansion into territory that had previously belonged to it prior to 1918. Even if the 
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actions of fascist powers’ abroad showed signs of aggression, Chesterton shared his 
fellow fascists’ aversions to embarking on another war that appeared driven by 
abstract international commitments; which he inevitably attributed to the designs of 
‘international financiers’. Chesterton was given opportunity to view the progress of 
the Nazi state first hand after he was sent to Germany in order to receive treatment 
for alcoholism in early 1937.
186
 The series of articles he produced from the visit 
describing ‘aspects of the German revolution’ were, for obvious reasons, deeply 
sanitized and took great pains to dispel the ‘myths’ of a repressive and expansionist 
Nazi regime. In private, however, Chesterton’s wife described the visit as having 
‘raised doubts in his mind about Nazism’: 
 
He was particularly disturbed by listening to one of Goebbels’ speeches in 
which he attacked the Catholic church and Catholics in general.. he saw 
through Hitler also.. He was against the death camps and disagreed with the 




Some of these reflections, particularly those relating to the persecution of 
Jews, most likely originated after Chesterton’s break with Mosley. For example, 
Jewish citizens were only required to wear a Star of David after September 1939, by 
which time Chesterton had already denounced Hitler for invading Czechoslovakia. 
188
 While he was still involved in the fascist movement, Chesterton showed little sign 
of sympathy for those who had suffered as a consequence of fascism either abroad or 
internally. The only factor that might have excused his failure to acknowledge the 
dangers arising from Germany and Italy was his role as a propagandist, which 
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necessitated writing on behalf of Mosley and the BUF’s policy rather than 
expressing his own opinions. He was appointed Director of Publicity Propaganda 
and made the editor of Blackshirt in August 1937 following the departure of Beckett 
and Joyce, both of whom resigned in the wake of financial downsizing in March the 
same year.
189
 This left Chesterton responsible for a large proportion of the total 
publishing output of the BUF’s news organs, a factor that likely contributed to his 




Fascism after Mosley, 1938-1940 
 
Beckett and Joyce’s departure from the BUF was part of a wider reduction in the 
movement’s capacity brought about by financial pressures. In effect, the weakening 
of the ‘propaganda’ faction within the party and the rise in influence of the opposing 
faction led by Francis-Hawkins marked the beginning of the end for Chesterton’s 
loyalty to Mosley. Despite his misgivings over the BUF’s direction, which combined 
Mosley’s moderately successful peace movement with a series of ill fated electoral 
attempts, Chesterton persisted as editor of Action and Blackshirt for a year following 
Beckett and Joyce’s exit. He finally submitted his own letter of resignation on 18 
March 1938, promising to work out his notice with ‘complete professional 
integrity’.
191
 Though Chesterton’s initial departure raised little fanfare, in June 1938 
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he published a pamphlet explaining his reasons for resignation that amounted to a 
total denunciation of Mosley and the remaining BUF leadership: 
 
I left because I became convinced that the BUF was playing about with a 
great idea and producing in its own organization a parody of Fascist thought 
and principle. I might have continued trying to galvanize the unhappy corpse 
into a semblance of life had I not come to the conclusion that it was not so 
much any particular coterie that stood in the way of revolutionary advance as 




This comment regarding Mosley’s ‘blindspots’ extended into a broader attack 
on his failure to harness the talents of ‘men who could have seen it through to 
victory’ while Francis-Hawkins – the ‘ringmaster of the whole circus’— had been 
given free rein to expand his power through appealing to the leader’s ego.
193
 Beyond 
the personal recriminations directed at Mosley and the party’s internal politics, 
Chesterton’s pamphlet also offered insight into the state of his own fascist ideals. In 
a rare admission of the movement’s general lack of progress, he noted the frustration 
of having had to produce propaganda on behalf of the BUF that distorted its failures 
into success to ‘give the impression of strength where there is weakness; of growth 
when there is only decline; of influence where there is only indifference’.
194
 In spite 
of this, however, Chesterton showed no sign of having abandoned his ideological 
commitment to fascism, which he continued to pursue through other means after 
leaving the BUF.  
The emergence in Britain of a multitude of small fascist, nationalist and anti-
Semitic organizations between 1938 and 1940 was in many ways a prelude to the 
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numerous small and ideologically diverse parties grouped under the post-1945 
extreme right.
195
 In the period leading up to the war, as in the years after 
Chesterton’s return from overseas in 1943, anti-Semitism proved to be the unifying 
force that brought some of the small, squabbling factions of Britain’s extreme right 
together. In April 1938, shortly after his resignation from the BUF, Chesterton 
attended a meeting of Joyce and Beckett’s National Socialist League but expressed 
his desire to remain, for the time being, independent of the various competing groups 
in existence.
196
 The following month he was among the speakers at a meeting of the 
Nordic League, an organization of mainly upper-middle class anti-Semites.
197
 One of 
the more pathetic incidents of Chesterton’s post-Mosley activism took place in 
December 1938 at an event announcing the launch of Lord Lymington’s New 
Pioneer, an anti-Semitic journal that appointed Beckett as its assistant managing 
editor. As reported in the Jewish Chronicle, Chesterton’s speech declared the 
discomfited Lymington – ‘a shortish man in the early forties, with a mildly 
pugnacious expression’ – to be ‘the man that England needed as a “national 
saviour”’.
198
 As it transpired, neither Lymington nor the New Pioneer would have a 
discernible impact on the progress of Chesterton’s cause. His decision to contribute 
articles to the journal would prove fateful, however, when excerpts were broadcast 
(without Chesterton’s knowledge) over German airwaves.  
Chesterton’s half-hearted support for Lymington suggested that he had yet to 
abandon the principle of heroic leadership that had driven him towards fascism in the 
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first place. As he would be forced to realize in the years to come, however, the 
charismatic qualities of the former BUF were uncommon; for all his flaws and 
missteps, Mosley had provided a rallying point for different activists and a plausible 
embodiment of the new man needed to take charge of Britain’s national destiny. 
Now operating outside the auspices of the BUF, Chesterton found that such figures 
were in short supply. One of the more hopeful candidates for leadership of Britain’s 
non-Mosleyite factions was Archibald Ramsay, a Conservative MP who had 
overseen meetings of the Nordic League and the Militant Christian Patriots. More 
than individual charisma or political acumen, Ramsay possessed a broad array of 
contacts, ranging from radicals like Chesterton and Arnold Leese to sympathetic 
conservative politicians, businessmen, aristocrats and eccentric fellow-travellers of 
Britain’s extreme right. In May 1939, Ramsay gathered these disparate elements 
together in a secretive anti-Semitic organization known as the Right Club, whose 
membership he recorded in a leather bound journal known as the ‘Red Book’. The 
immediate aims of the club were to prevent Jewish infiltration of the Conservative 
Party and to campaign against a war with Germany, but the contents of Ramsay’s 




Shortly after his name appeared in Ramsay’s journal, in June 1939, 
Chesterton also took steps to form his own organization known as ‘British Vigil’. 
While it is uncertain how Chesterton actually intended the organization to function, a 
security service report suggested that it would seek to ‘counter the propaganda for a 
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Federal Union of Democratic countries which is now being conducted in certain 
quarters’.
200
 Since the Federal Union represented an early campaign to draw Britain 
into cooperation with Europe, this foreshadowed many of Chesterton’s 
preoccupations with European integration after 1945. Like most of the extreme right 
organizations that branched off from the BUF, however, British Vigil made no 
discernible impact and languished due to a lack of financial support. The prospect of 
a war with Germany presented many members of Britain’s extreme right with a stark 
choice between loyalty to their own country and their ideological attachment to 
fascism, anti-Semitism or National Socialism. Based on his ready involvement with 
Ramsay, Lymington and others campaigning against British involvement, it is clear 
that Chesterton was not enthusiastic about the war. Unlike some of his 
contemporaries in the fascist movement, however, Chesterton was unerring in his 
nationalism; dalliances with pacifism or other forms of conscientious objection were 
unacceptable, as was any attempt to undermine the war effort or aid the enemy. 
When German forces occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he penned an article 
condemning Hitler’s violation of national sovereignty which appeared in the Weekly 
Review. Although Chesterton’s wife observed that this denunciation of Hitler was 




There is no fully satisfying explanation for why Chesterton was able to avoid 
the initial wave of arrests that marked the beginning of internment on 23 May 1940. 
Despite the fact that he had already been commissioned as an officer in March that 
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year, Chesterton still faced the liability of his recent involvement with groups that 
the authorities viewed as a potentially dangerous ‘fifth column’ within Britain.
 202
 
His recent association with Joyce, who had since travelled to Germany to work as a 
radio propagandist, was also potentially damaging; though the Security Service did 
intercept a letter written by Chesterton to his former BUF colleague Archie Findlay 
that recorded his ‘surprise, disappointment and anger’ at Joyce’s having become the 
voice of ‘Lord Haw Haw’.
203
 In his memoirs, Chesterton suggested that his anti-war 
articles for the New Pioneer, which were broadcast without his permission on 
German radio, were the main reason that he came under suspicion despite having 
distanced himself from Mosley.
204
 He made no mention of having been contacted by 
German sources offering work as a propagandist like Joyce, nor his response 
(intercepted by the British authorities) which utterly rejected any possibility of 
working against his own country.
205
 The fact that Chesterton was not arrested simply 
for having held a high position in the BUF may ultimately have hinged on luck: 
A.W. Brian Simpson noted in his study of wartime internment that some of MI5’s 
intelligence on the BUF was outdated and erroneously described Chesterton as 
having been expelled from the party, while other members of the fascist movement 
were simply overlooked.
206
 Chesterton’s decision to reenlist in the army did not 
necessarily guarantee his freedom from government scrutiny, as active military 
personnel were still subject to internment under 18b. He bitterly recalled that his 
return to uniform took place under a cloud of suspicion:  
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Orders were evidently given for me to be treated with reserve. Secret 
documents which had come to me in the normal course of my duties as 
training officer were diverted. When pip-squeak subalterns, who had never 
heard a shot fired in anger, were discussing troop movements or suchlike 
matters my appearance would lead to nudges and the drying up of the 
conversation. I had the feeling of being in the Army but not of it – an 




By June 1940, the internment of Mosley and other remaining BUF members had 
served its intended purpose in disabling the party and compelling former members to 
sever their ties with fascism.
208
 Chesterton was ultimately cleared of suspicion as a 
result of testimony from both police and military personnel regarding his political 
loyalties and capability as a soldier.
209
 Reflecting upon the end of Chesterton’s 
interwar activism, it is important to note the distinction between his attitude to 
British Fascism as a movement and fascism as a concept. In the former sense, the 
intelligence reports concerning his loyalty were correct in noting that his opinion on 
the ‘Fascist party’ had been altered completely since the mid-1930s. Nevertheless, it 
was never the case that Chesterton abandoned the crucial principles underpinning his 
support for fascism. He remained a committed nationalist and retained his belief that 
radical change would be necessary to reverse Britain’s declining status. Themes of 
cultural decadence would persist in his work for the remainder of his life, along with 
an abiding hostility towards liberalism, communism and an implicitly Jewish form of 
international capitalism. The decline of Oswald Mosley’s party was enough to cause 
                                                             
207
 BNML, Ch. XV, p. 6.  
208
 TNA KV2/1345/10B, Letter to C.G. Maby Esq., 16 June 1940. A.W. Brian Simpsons’ 
study of internment under Security Regulation 18b concluded that the law’s primary purpose 
was to break up Mosley’s organization. See Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious, pp. 
172-174.  
209




Chesterton’s disillusionment  with the man himself, but not enough to dissuade him 
of the need for national revolution. 
Chesterton saw the interwar movement as an ideological success but a 
political failure, whose high ideals and sound policies had been corrupted by 
egotism, incompetence and the conspiratorial forces arrayed against it. He, along 
with many other members of the BUF, underestimated the breadth of opposition to 
fascism in Britain, which extended beyond the active anti-fascist and Labour 
movements and into a wider segment of the general population.
210
 Due to the depth 
and intensity of his idealism, which traced its roots to the life-altering experiences of 
the Great War, Chesterton struggled to grasp why many Britons were unswayed by 
the utopian patriotism and sophisticated corporatism of British fascism: ‘He was so 
convinced that the message of British Fascism was correct’, Doris Chesterton 
recalled, ‘that he came away from his first speeches given as a BUF propagandist 
completely unable to understand why those who had listened to his brave words had 
not immediately rallied to the cause’.
211
 Even when his faith in Mosley was broken 
in 1938, and he began to recognize the fragility of the BUF as a political enterprise, 
Chesterton refused to see fascism as grounded in anything other than honest 
patriotism and sound economic principles. With the partial exception of Robert 
Skideslky, historians have not shared this naïve view of the BUF, treating it as an ill-
fated but serious attempt to implement a radically authoritarian state and overhaul 
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British society according to fascist principles. Some recent interpretations of the 
BUF have been guilty of overselling British fascism, however, by placing too great 
an emphasis on the sophisticated ‘palingenetic mythologies’ espoused by its 
followers, and too little emphasis on the qualities that put fascism beyond the pale of 
ordinary nationalism – a potent combination of semi-disciplined paramilitary 
violence, heroic demagoguery and mass mobilization.
212
  
By the time he first met with Mosley in 1933, Chesterton was well on the way 
to developing an ethos that was both ‘authentically British’, relying primarily on 
British themes and experiences, and ‘authentically fascist’, in that it satisfied the 
fascist minimum proposed by Roger Griffin. Had it not been for the party structure 
he encountered at Black House in 1933, however, it is doubtful whether or not 
Chesterton could have been considered a genuine fascist, rather than simply an 
intellectual fellow traveller. As discussed in Chapter 1, expanding the definitional 
parameters of fascism beyond myths and cultural iconography does not lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that British fascism did not exist, or that figures like 
Chesterton were irrelevant. It does, however, bring us back to Payne’s observation 
that interwar Britain ‘had neither the space nor need for revolutionary nationalism’, 
and that the BUF was the product of a contradiction between the relatively peaceful, 
programmatic traditions of British society and the drastic, invariably violent 
militancy of fascism. Even more so than its counterparts on the European continent, 
therefore, British fascism was unstable and prone to internal divisions. Chesterton’s 
experiences with British fascism after 1938 would attest to the fact that the 
movement in Britain relied to a considerable extent on Mosley as a unifying figure, 
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and the overarching sense of purpose provided by the ‘success’ of fascism in Italy, 
Germany and Spain. When these factors were destroyed (or diminished in Mosley’s 
case) after 1945, British fascism ceased to be ‘the creed of the age’ and instead 
became a radical and often subversive strain within the broader swathe of Britain’s 
extreme right.
213
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Chapter 3: A.K. Chesterton and the British extreme right, 
1940-1973 
World War II, 1940-1943 
 
By avoiding internment, Chesterton was spared from the most direct and personally 
damaging repercussions that faced British fascists and Nazi-sympathizers during the 
Second World War. Nevertheless, he suffered a number of consequences from his 
prolonged and public affiliation with fascism, which ‘threatened to become a private 
and personal hoodoo’ even after he chose to reenlist in September 1939.
1
 In March 
1940, Chesterton was assigned as an officer to the Royal Army Service Corps 
(RASC) in Liverpool to oversee rail and shipping transport.
2
 He retained this 
position throughout the process of investigation surrounding internment, which 
reached its height between June and August when the bulk of arrests were made.
3
 
Far from eroding Chesterton’s political commitment, the time he spent under 
investigation served only to further his conviction that the governing authorities that 
had led Britain into war were rife with hypocrisy and corruption. Although he had 
campaigned against the war-mongering of political and financial elites in the 1930s, 
Chesterton had nonetheless remained a strident critic of pacifists and those unwilling 
to keep Britain ‘spiritually and materially’ prepared for war. In his eyes, many of the 
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same men who had preached pacifism or internationalism since 1918 now appeared 
to be leading the country ill prepared into another war: 
 
Had my sense of humour been more robust it might have enabled me to enjoy 
a situation wherein I, who had wanted Britain strongly armed and 
economically organized to take effective part in any struggle that might arise, 
should be hounded at the insistence of men who had clamoured for war and at 




The menial nature of Chesterton’s role with the RASC added to his sense of 
alienation with the war as it was being fought on England’s home front, a setting that 
offered neither the danger nor the masculine romanticism he associated with the 
jungles of East Africa and the battlefields of the Western Front. ‘Having, in the pride 
of my youth been trumpeted to battle by Rupert Brooke, it went ill with my 
disposition to march to the pipings of Beverly Nicholls, or Godfrey Winn, or the 
many apparent eunuchs of the B.B.C. In other words, I aspired to do my own share 
of the war in a male world’.
5
 An opportunity to meet this aspiration arose in 
September 1940, when Chesterton responded to a request for officers with 
experience in a tropical climate. Having previously been deemed ineligible for 
overseas service by the War Office due to his advanced age, Chesterton nonetheless 
proved an ideal candidate for Britain’s campaign against Italy in East Africa. In 
January 1941 he set sail for South Africa aboard the Winchester Castle, a converted 
mail ship which arrived at Cape Town in mid-February.
6
 From there, the unit was 
transferred to a smaller vessel to travel to Mombasa where he boarded a troop train 
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 Upon arrival, he was assigned work as a Motor Transport 
storekeeper; a safe and relatively sedentary role considered suitable for one who had 
already conducted his share of front-line fighting in the previous war. In his 
incomplete memoir of the campaign, Chesterton described a conversation with his 
commanding officer, asking that he be transferred ‘up the line’ so as not to miss out 
on active service. Whether or not this anecdote was truthful, it sheds further light on 
Chesterton’s masculine ideal of military service. Only those roles that exposed a man 
to danger could truly be considered a ‘man’s job’ and fulfil the ambition of a true 
soldier: ‘The others were happy, as I suppose they had a right to be, if their ambition 
was to serve as storemen. Besides they became Majors and Captains and prospered 
exceedingly in the land’.
8
 An officer himself, Chesterton did not harbor resentment 
for the upper-ranks as a general principle, yet he expressed dissatisfaction with the 
unequal conditions that the soldiers were forced to endure compared to their 
superiors: 
 
Some difference in the lot of officers and men is doubtless inevitable: to herd 
them together hugger-mugger would merely be to cause acute embarrassment 
to both. But it always seems to me that the dissimilarity of their living 
conditions is out of all true proportion, indeed it harks back to the mediaeval 
world of privilege. An officer is superior only in his military function; why, 
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As he had argued throughout his publications for the BUF, Chesterton saw 
the structure of military ranks and discipline as a means of overriding class division 
and providing men with a unified sense of purpose that stripped away more petty 
political and social concerns. Even while witnessing the extent of militarization in 
German society in the 1930s, Chesterton had insisted that ‘a love of the warrior 
virtues need not (and in the present instance does not) embrace a love of war’.
10
 
Having returned to war in order to reclaim some of that virtue, perhaps seeking some 
form of redemption or renewal in the wake of fascism’s failure in Britain, he was 
therefore disturbed by the lapses in discipline and comradeship among other officers 
that seemed to undermine his military ideals: ‘the man who is willing to accept all 
the privileges of commissioned rank (and they are many and real) while being 
unwilling to shoulder its obligations constitutes a menace to any army and ought not 
to be tolerated therein’.
11
  
After his request for a more active role was granted, Chesterton was sent 
toward Thika, the city that served as the British forces’ advanced headquarters facing 
Italian Somaliland. From here, he was tasked with transporting materials to support 
the King’s African Rifles in preparation for the invasion of Italian territory. Based on 
his own recollections of time spent in Kenya and Abyssinia, it is not clear whether or 
not Chesterton took part in combat while working on behalf of the RASC. His 
memoirs of the campaign made ample reference to the environmental and physical 
challenges facing his fellow soldiers but only passing references to combat of the 
sort he had encountered as a young man. By his own admission, ‘the hardships of the 
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Somaliland and Abyssinian campaigns were not one tenth as severe as the German 
East African campaign had been a quarter of a century earlier’. The most striking 
feature of this war was its distinctively colonial setting. Though it took place in the 
context of a global conflict against the Axis powers, the war in Somaliland was also 
a war to defend the Empire against an imperial rival. Furthermore, Chesterton’s 
recollections of the campaign echoed aspects of 19
th
 century colonial ventures into 
the ‘dark continent’: long ventures through harsh and inhospitable landscapes 
(‘safaris sixteen thousand miles in length’), interactions with friendly but culturally 
exotic native tribespeople, and even time spent trekking with the ‘Camel Corps’, a 




After-Victory and the National Front, 1943-1945 
 
Chesterton’s second campaign through Africa came to an end when his health 
collapsed as a result of malaria and gastric illness, forcing his return to England in 
early 1943.
13
 The time spent overseas proved insufficient to clear Chesterton of any 
connection to Mosley, who had been imprisoned alongside his wife Diana since May 
1940, or William Joyce, who was now busily engaged as a German radio 
propagandist.
14
 In March 1943, Chesterton applied for a position as a sub-editor for 
the British Broadcasting Corporation but was rejected when a background check 
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revealed his associations with fascism.
15
 As a result, Chesterton was forced to seek 
work outside London and in May 1943 he left his wife in Croydon to take up a 
position at a newspaper company in Sheffield.
16
 Chesterton’s correspondence with 
Alfred Norris, an active serviceman and ex-BUF member, gave the earliest 
indication of political aspirations after returning from the war. The fragmentary 
conditions of the British extreme right in 1943 were not dissimilar from those he had 
encountered after leaving the BUF in 1938, consisting of a small cluster of groups 
largely devoid of a cogent political program or support base. In a letter to Norris on 
26 June 1943, Chesterton described his lack of enthusiasm for this state of affairs:  
 
I have a great dislike of crankery and a greater dislike of political futility and 
I think it best to plough a lone furrow until something emerges which has at 
least a dog’s chance of doing some good. In any case we have got to win the 




Chesterton’s capacity to act alone was already limited by the nature of his 
employment in Sheffield, where editorial restrictions made no allowance for 
independent political work. Even when he found a more amenable position in 
August 1943, as an assistant-editor at the Southport Guardian, his political writing 
was confined to other nationalist and right-wing publications. In some instances 
Chesterton’s work proved too contentious even for sympathetic publications: an 
open letter addressed to Winston Churchill criticizing the internment of British 
fascists was rejected by The Patriot, an anti-communist right-wing journal, for its 
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potentially libellous attacks on Herbert Morrison.
18
 Despite having expressed 
scepticism about a fascist revival during wartime, Chesterton met with a group of ex-
BUF members on 12 August 1943 to discuss the formation of ‘a militant 
organization for preserving British culture against the Jewish menace’.
19
 The 
meeting itself was not of great significance but marked the first step towards 
Chesterton’s direct involvement in the attempted revival of British fascism after 
internment. Besides their stated desire to promote anti-Semitism, the attendees had 
all been involved with Mosley. It appeared likely, therefore, that any movement 
likely to arise from further organizing would be advancing the BUF’s ideology in a 
different guise. Chesterton’s admission that he had begun re-editing old BUF 
pamphlets for redistribution after the war lent further credence to this notion, 
although it did not confirm whether the envisioned ‘militant’ organization would 
comprise a political party along traditional lines.
20
  
Several important questions hung above the heads of Chesterton and the 
others attempting a fascist revival in 1943. Would the movement dare operate in the 
open in the context of ongoing war? Would it seek to promote a negotiated peace 
with Germany? What role (if any) would be played by Mosley himself and those 
fascists still interned by the government? Consistent with his earlier statements to 
Alfred Norris, Chesterton was strongly opposed to any movement that would 
undermine public morale or otherwise affect Britain’s war effort. Though he shared 
the view, popular among Britain’s fascist and anti-Semitic circles, that the 
‘catastrophe’ of global war had been encouraged by Jewish interests, he was  
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nevertheless convinced of the war’s necessity and Hitler’s ‘sovereign responsibility’ 
for the invasion of central Europe. He rebuked any idea of a peace agreement with 
Germany as not only politically suicidal but detrimental to British interests. Japan 
now occupied British colonies in South East Asia and could only be removed 
through a total allied victory.
21
  A Security Service report from September 1943 
quoted his blunt assessment of ex-BUF members who opposed the war: ‘Anybody 
who is pro-German is a spiritual traitor, and I won’t touch them with a barge-pole 
after the war is over’. The same report noted his dim view of the prospects for 
Mosley’s return and that he ‘[appeared] to visualize a Fascist Movement after the 
war, but not in the same form as before’.
22
 This proved to be consistent with 
Chesterton’s view of Mosley after 1938 as having exercised bad judgment despite 
his patriotism and good intentions:  
 
it is one of his [Mosley’s] weaknesses that he habitually exaggerates his own 
influence and imagines himself to be swaying the thoughts of millions where 
only a few thousand are listening to him… he firmly believed he could carry 
the people with him along the only road that appeared to offer them the 
chance of survival. As events have turned, he was mistaken both as to his 





These views put Chesterton at odds with other fascist sympathizers who hoped for a 
full-blown revival of the BUF, or a movement that would anticipate Mosley’s return. 
Several figures came to the attention of the authorities in 1943 for planning along 
these lines: ex-BUF member George Greene held a private meeting on 29 August to 
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discuss forming a committee to ‘reorganize the whole of the British Union elements’ 
and organize a committee to oversee the movement, i.e. ‘Until such time as Sir 
Oswald Mosley could resume the leadership’.
24
 Greene’s lofty aspirations for a 
revived BUF belied both the material and political difficulties facing British fascists 
in 1943. Besides the ever-looming problems of funding and internal unity, the 
potential membership of such a group faced the personal stigma of ideological 
sympathy with England’s mortal enemies, along with intense scrutiny from both the 
press and the Security Service. On 20 August, an article in the Daily Worker drew 
attention to Chesterton’s contributions to Truth and the Weekly Review as evidence 
of a fascist revival.
25
 In response to the article’s depiction of him as the ‘late crony 
and confederate of “Haw Haw” William Joyce, the traitor broadcaster’, Chesterton 
threatened to sue the paper for libel and received a statement of apology in 
response.
26
 Although he was relatively successful in defending his political 
reputation through litigation after 1940, Chesterton did encounter difficulty when 
seeking testimony from his former colleagues, who were fearful of exposing 
themselves to further scrutiny. Correspondence between Chesterton and another ex-
BUF member, John Clarke Goldthorpe, highlighted the precarious personal 
circumstances for those connected to the pre-war extreme right. Goldthorpe, who in 
1943 was enrolled as a medical student, flatly declined a request to testify in 
Chesterton’s case against the Daily Worker, citing its likely impact on his family and 
career: ‘To do as you request would be to take a 90% chance of smashing something 
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I have built up; and would ruin, perhaps irretrievably, my own future and that of my 
wife and children. I would require a mighty cause indeed for me to risk that’.
27
  
Despite its misleading description of Chesterton, the Daily Worker was not 
entirely off base in alleging a current of fascist sympathy within certain Fleet Street 
publications. Rex Tremlett served as editor for the Weekly Review, a publication that 
traced its origins to Cecil Chesterton’s Eye-Witness.
28
 Throughout the interwar 
period, the paper was officially geared towards advocating distributism and had no 
formal ties to the fascist movement in Britain. Nevertheless, the Weekly Review’s 
editorial line was markedly more sympathetic to fascist, anti-Semitic and 
authoritarian-right movements than many other British publications shortly before 
the war. Besides Belloc’s own considerations of the ‘Jewish question’, the journal 
had featured advertisements for Lord Lymington’s New Pioneer, mounted a defence 
of the Franco regime in Spain and attributed the outbreak of the war to ‘international 
finance’.
29
 Chesterton’s relatively stable career in journalism in the decade after he 
returned from the war owed a considerable amount to his skill in refining radical 
nationalist or anti-Semitic ideas into more palatable fare, a process he explained to 
another Weekly Review contributor in March 1944: 
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The great secret of writing for such a journal, I find, is always to remember 
that they only come a part of the way with people like you and me… This 
means that one has to keep within fairly narrow limits, besides toning down 




The tumultuous state of world affairs in 1943 gave Chesterton ample material 
for political criticism, relating to the war and its impact on British interests. In 
particular, the growing importance of the United States fed Chesterton’s concern that 
a shift was taking place in international politics, at the expense of Britain’s status as 
a world power. In July 1943, he criticized government plans for Anglo-American 
cooperation in colonial affairs, arguing that Britain’s foreign territories in Africa and 
South East Asia were to be effectively handed over to the United States: 
 
…it does not require explicit statements such as this to enable one to read the 
writing on the wall. The Empire is to be handed over on the installment plan, 
and the promise that we shall retain administrative control will be no more 




Aside from the alarming prospect of America usurping Britain’s strategic 
possessions, Chesterton was also concerned about  the more subtle economic 
ramifications of a U.S. expansion: ‘The administrative details will be ours, but the 
effective masterdom will be vested in the hands of the greatest money-lending 
power, and the colonies will very soon learn to recognize and obey their master’s 
voice’. 
32
 As it had before the war, Chesterton’s fear of political domination by 
Jewish finance fed his concerns about international trade. Amidst calls for Britain to 
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revive its export trade, which had suffered as a result of the war effort, Chesterton 
argued that the country should instead pursue self sufficiency to avoid the ‘deluge’ 
of competition threatened by the growing industrial might of the United States and 
China.
33
 In advocating an autarchic model for Britain’s economy, Chesterton was 
essentially restating the policies laid out by Mosley in The Greater Britain: this 
model contended that British production could be geared towards the material 
resources of its ‘Empire Economy’, balancing supply and demand as well as 
insulating the country from the political and economic instability of an open market. 
While most of Chesterton’s campaigns after 1943 appealed implicitly to a right-wing 
audience, his consistently anti-capitalist, anti-American sentiments put him at odds 
with the greater part of the British right. The largest common ground between the 
extreme right and conservatives was fear of a communist uprising, a prospect that 
remained threatening during the war despite the temporary alliance with Soviet 
Russia. Responding to the by-election victories of two socialist candidates in January 
1944, Chesterton warned that a genuine ‘bolshevist’ element was rekindling itself in 
Britain. ‘Let us boldly square up to the truth, which is that revolution is in the air’, he 
declared to Weekly Review readers in 1944, further warning that British 
conservatives were ill equipped to meet this new challenge from the radical left: 
 
since the chief motive of Conservatives is still its dedication to big-scale 
capitalism and the financial rampage, it is manifestly incapable of putting 
forward what the age demands – an honest alternative to the existing system. 
There must be new men, new machinery and, above all, a new social concept 
which will embody and bring up-to-date the old social truths. In other words, 
the counter-revolution must be itself revolutionary.
34
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In both its rhetoric and implications, this passage bore a striking similarity to 
fascist propaganda from the 1930s, invoking the same notions of national revolution 
and transcendent social reorganization that had been used by the BUF.  Despite this, 
Chesterton’s proposals for an ‘honourable solution along distributist-corporative-
money reform lines’ bore only a vague resemblance to his outright calls for 
revolution and dictatorship in the previous decade. Chesterton also acknowledged 
that Britain’s survival in the post-war era would depend on its ability to counter the 
‘stampede to the Left’ that would inevitably lead to the loss of its empire. Despite his 
ongoing dispute with conservative capitalists, and his ongoing affinity for fascism’s 
transcendence of conventional politics, Chesterton’s practical hopes for a new 
campaign for national survival lay with the British right. His first concerted effort to 
form such a movement came about through cooperation with Collin Brooks, a man 
whose political interests rested on the intersection of conservatism and the extreme 
right. Though he never committed himself to the cause of British fascism between 
the wars, Brooks had met with Mosley on two occasions, in 1935 and 1939, to 
discuss matters pertaining to national leadership and the right in Britain. In 1939, 
while working as a journalist Brooks had also briefly entertained the prospect of 
creating a right-wing newspaper, before his appointment as editor of the weekly 
journal Truth the following year.
35
 Brooks’ conservative and nationalistic leanings 
put him in agreement with Chesterton, with whom he began a correspondence in 
October 1943.
36
 By late 1943, the two men’s correspondence moved to the subject of 
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fascism and the possibilities of a new movement to bring about ‘national 
regeneration’. Although he had privately expressed admiration for the BUF’s leader 
in the past, Brooks shared Chesterton’s belief that Mosley was not suited to oversee 
such a project: 
 
My own emotion towards ‘O.M.’ whose hospitality I occaisionally [sic] 
enjoyed, was always coloured by the political instability of his early career. 
The swing from Toryism to Labour, from Labour to the New Party, from the 
New Party to an English Plagiarism of Fascism never seemed to me to imply 
a right psychology for a great National regenerator. I always consider that he 




Brooks’ depiction of the BUF as an ‘English plagiarism’ of Mussolini’s 
doctrine echoed his criticisms of the party in the 1930s. Upon learning of his 
employer Lord Rothermere’s expression of support for Mosley in January 1934, 
Brooks had remarked in his diary that he was ‘too much of a democrat to be a 
Fascist, though too much of a disciplinarian to be a democrat in any but the vague 
Walt Whitman sense’.
38
 The ‘Un-English’ displays of paramilitary violence and 
demagoguery at Olympia confirmed his suspicion that fascist methods were 
irreconcilable with the British national character. Despite this aversion to fascism in 
practice, however, Brooks was sympathetic to many of the ideas underpinning 
Mosley’s party. In another diary entry from 1938, written in anticipation of another 
conflict with Germany, he expressed hope that if Britain survived the war, ‘she may 
at long last adopt a sane standard of life and be herself properly led. The reign of the 
road house and the cocktail bar and the cheap American cinema may be ended. We 
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may return to real values, and the Faith that was once in us’.
39
 Aside from a 
preoccupation with cultural degeneracy and national decline, Brooks shared 
Chesterton’s commitment to the leadership principle, anticipating the organic 
emergence of a figure to oversee Britain’s cultural and spiritual regeneration. In 
combining aspects of radical conservatism, nationalism and authoritarianism, Brooks 
embodied one plausible alternative to British fascism as it was practiced during the 
1930s — a form of British authoritarian conservatism, comparable in a broad sense 
to the non-fascist authoritarian right of interwar Europe.
40
 
Throughout the early part of 1944, Chesterton’s political activity was limited 
while he oversaw the production of Leopard Valley, a play he wrote based on his 
experiences in Africa, which was staged in Southport in February 1944. In June 
1944, he was offered a position as Assistant London Editor of the Birmingham Post 
but was shortly after denied the post due to his prior affiliation with the BUF. Unable 
to rejoin his wife in London, Chesterton left Southport for Liverpool to take up a 
position as sub-editor for the Evening Express.
41
 Alongside his search for more 
suitable employment, Chesterton continued his freelance work for the Weekly 
Review, putting forward a refined version of the conspiratorial ‘Money Power’ thesis 
that had underpinned his work before the war: ‘the courtship and impending union of 
finance-capitalism and socialism in the bonds of unholy matrimony’.
42
 Chesterton’s 
employment woes were ended by Brooks, who offered him a job as an Editorial 
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Assistant for Truth on 31 July 1944.
43
 Much to the gratification of his wife, the 
position allowed Chesterton to return to London and pursue a ‘9 to 5’ existence that 
had been absent throughout much of his married life.
44
 In addition to a steady 
income, the posting also offered Chesterton another outlet for political journalism 
and placed minimal restrictions on his freelance work, thus serving as an ideal 
foundation for his political activity.  
By mid-September 1944, Chesterton had transferred to London and 
commenced work for Truth. Almost immediately upon returning to the capital, he 
began meeting with Brooks and a group of ex-BUF members to discuss the 
formation of a political movement that would in due course come to be known as the 
National Front.
45
 As it never moved significantly beyond the planning stage, 
historical accounts of Britain’s fascist and extreme right movements have largely 
dismissed this iteration of the National Front (not to be confused with the 1967 party 
of the same name) as insignificant and easily compromised by informants. While this 
reputation is understandable given the group’s abortive nature, its significance in 
Chesterton’s career is still notable, as it represented his only real attempt to pursue 
mass politics between his return from the war in 1943 and the union of extreme right 
parties that took place in 1967. The initial impetus for the National Front came from 
Brooks, who claimed to have been contacted by unnamed figures within British 
industry promising financial support if he could build a viable movement.
46
 For this 
reason, the planning of the National Front attracted immediate interest from the 
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Security Service, whose reports noted the importance of stable financial backing to a 
potential fascist movement’s success after the war.
47
  
Chesterton discussed his initial plans for the group at a meeting on 21 
September between himself, Brooks, Ben Greene (formerly of the BUF and the 
English National Association) and Barney Seale, whose studio provided the venue.
48
 
Although the attendees were broadly committed to establishing some form of 
nationalistic, anti-Semitic movement within Britain, it was not yet clear what 
methods this movement would pursue, and whether it would constitute a formal 
party along the lines of the BUF. In keeping with his earlier views while working for 
Mosley, Chesterton seemed to place an inordinate faith in the public’s receptiveness 
to anti-Semitic messaging and the potential for well-timed propaganda to arouse 
supporters. His proposed campaign in this instance was the mass-distribution of 
leaflets and chalked slogans to be commenced on the day that Britain’s victory over 
Hitler was declared. As an example of such a slogan, Chesterton offered the 
following ‘NOW GERMANY IS DEFEATED, HANG CHURCHILL AND DEAL 
WITH THE JEWS’.
49
 He later refined this slogan to the more pointed ‘NOW FOR 
THE JEWS’, while attending a second meeting on 9 October 1944. Besides 
Chesterton’s ongoing enthusiasm for ‘chalking and whitewashing campaigns’, more 
concrete ideas arose from Greene’s suggestion that Archibald Ramsay (who had 
been imprisoned for his involvement with the Right Club in 1940) should be brought 
into the fold as a potential leader for the movement. Precise questions of leadership 
                                                             
47
 TNA KV2/1348/296ab, Note on the history of the National Front, 1 November 1945.  
48 TNA KV2/1347/227a, P.3. source report re meeting of Chesterton, Greene, Seale, Brooks, 
26 September 1944.  
49
 TNA KV2/1347/227a, P.3. source report. 
 
 176 
remained open at this stage, although the ideological importance placed on a leader-
figure gave some indication of group’s fascist or authoritarian leanings, as did the 
consensus among the meeting attendees that the country was waiting for a figure like 
Ramsay to harness an underlying strain of anti-Semitic, nationalistic fervour that 
would be unleashed after the war.
50
 The first official meeting of the National Front 
was held on 24 November 1944, bolstering the group’s potential membership with 
an array of former BUF members and sympathetic figures. Notable new arrivals 
included Lord Portsmouth (formerly Lord Lymington of the New Pioneer), G.F. 
Green and Ian Waverly Girvan. As the circle of extreme right activists involved with 
the National Front expanded, the challenge of unifying different strains within 
Britain’s extreme right became more pressing. New additions to the movement 
suggested that Chesterton viewed the immediate task of forming a unified front as 
more important than ideological consensus. Having expressed a strong aversion to 
dealing with peace activists the previous year, he was now resolved to work 
alongside the likes of Green and Girvan, both of whom were resolutely ‘pro-
German’ in their attitude to the war.
51
     
The movement’s security was also a matter of growing concern for Brooks 
and Chesterton, who were wary of drawing renewed attention from the Home 
Office.
52
 Unbeknownst to both men, the ongoing surveillance of ex-BUF members 
made the group’s exposure a foregone conclusion: the After Victory group had 
already been compromised by informants and intercepted correspondence between 
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committee members. In addition to preserving the group’s privacy, Brooks hoped to 
avoid the failures in leadership that, in his view, were responsible for the BUF’s 
collapse. Rather than appoint a leader from their own ranks, several members of the 
National Front hoped that the question of leadership would resolve itself naturally 
after the war. A letter from Rex Tremlett to Chesterton in December 1943 expressed 
hope that a new leader would arise from the ranks of ex-servicemen: 
 
I feel with you that not only is a large popular movement after the war most 
necessary but that it will inevitably rise, led we will hope, by some as yet 
unknown ex-serviceman with the spark that O.M. [Mosley] once had before it 




This idea held currency among several members of the National Front 
including Brooks, who speculated that the group’s leader would most likely be 
drawn from the armed forces.
54
 Chesterton similarly envisioned a candidate 
emerging from ‘the 8
th
 Army or the 14
th
… someone like a General of the 
Commandos’. Contrary to Brooks’ earlier turn of phrase, he also stressed that the 
movement would need to avoid a leader in the vein of Mosley, Hitler or Mussolini, 
as such a figurehead ‘would never go down in this country’.
55
 Another ex-BUF 
figure attending the group’s meetings, Major Harry Edmonds, expressed hope that 
returning servicemen would be driven into patriotic National Socialist movements 
when they became disillusioned by government policy after the war.
56
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There was a certain logic to Chesterton’s assumption that an Allied victory 
would be fertile ground for national revolution: armed conflict and the subsequent 
disillusionment with civilian life had been the catalysts for his own radicalization 
after 1918. It therefore stood to reason, at least within Chesterton’s idealistic 
interpretation of patriotism and military values, that a sizeable portion of the new 
‘front generation’ would be driven towards radical nationalism. As Chesterton 
argued in the Weekly Review in September 1944, the growing likelihood of Britain’s 
victory presented the nation with a ‘second chance’ to avoid the ‘decay of national 
pride’ that followed its triumph in the First World War. 
57
 This concept played an 
integral part in Chesterton’s plans for the National Front’s policy, which he began 
drafting along with G.F. Green and Ian Waverly Girvan on 4 December 1944. The 
initial meetings resulted in a ten-point statement of policy that a Security Service 
informant described as ‘looking like a watered down British Union statement of 
policy’ that carefully avoided references to corporatism or dictatorship.
58
 Chesterton 
was able to persuade Green that the issue of a negotiated peace was politically 
untenable and it was agreed the movement should focus exclusively on matters after 
the war. Reflecting this decision, the National Front’s planning committee later 
dubbed itself the ‘After-Victory Group’.
59
 Chesterton was able to refine the policy 
document from 4 December into a simplified seven points to minimize the risk of 
further disagreement among the planning committee.  
                                                             
57
 ‘Britain’s Second Chance’, The Weekly Review, 14 September 1944. 
58
 TNA KV2/1348/243a, F.3./1270 Source report re meeting of initial session of the National 
Front, 4 December 1944.  
59




A number of the included policies did bear a close resemblance to those 
adopted by the BUF, including proposals to secure Britain’s economic independence 
through the Empire, to ‘uphold distinctive British traditions’ and ‘promote the 
national interest above all sectional interests, thus destroying class-warfare’.  Despite 
echoes of fascist thought and policy, the seven points also contained what appeared 
to be a direct repudiation of corporatism and dictatorship, calling specifically to 
reduce ‘to a minimum all forms of bureaucratic interference and to restore the 
dignity of the individual and the rule of law’.
60
 Taken at face value, the inclusion of 
such a clause seemed to suggest a party geared more towards Brooks’ vaguely 
authoritarian conservatism, a hopeful alternative to the revolutionary fascism of 
Mosley or the racial fascism of Arnold Leese’s Imperial Fascist League.
61
 As 
demonstrated by the After-Victory group’s rapid dissolution after 1945, however, the 
seven-points drafted by Chesterton were the product of an uneasy compromise rather 
than a true ideological synthesis been fascists and conservatives. Since it retained 
several elements of fascist organization and policy that had proved anathema to 
many interwar conservatives, especially anti-Semitism, Chesterton and Brooks’ new 
movement was liable to encounter the same problems of political space that had 
stymied fascism in Britain after 1934. Moreover, without a charismatic leader 
equivalent to Mosley, the National Front was poorly equipped to weather the 
ideological divisions that were liable to emerge between its conservative and radical 
elements. After resigning from the BUF in 1938, Chesterton had blamed the inertia 
of British fascism on the ‘circus’ surrounding Mosley. Yet the BUF’s longevity 
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owed much to Mosley, if not in his abilities as a leader, then in his mere presence as 
an authority figure that could override the competing ideas and contentious 
personalities that were invariably drawn into revolutionary nationalist politics.
62
  
Mosley’s release from prison in 1943 raised another problem for Chesterton, 
who (with good reason) feared that a majority of National Front supporters, 
particularly those he hoped to draw from London’s East End, would abandon the 
movement and rejoin the ‘Leader’ as soon as he re-entered politics.
63
 Besides the 
ideological divisions, a general mood of suspicion and competition prevailed 
throughout smaller factions overlapping with the National Front, including 
Edmonds’ Constitutional Research Association and Green’s Independent 
Nationalists.
64
 In theory, Brooks argued that the National Front did not require its 
members to refrain from joining or forming other organizations. In practice and as 
far as Chesterton was concerned, however, these offshoots served to undermine the 
party’s goal of producing a unified front that would be capable of drawing a wider 
membership and resisting its political enemies.
65
  
Even looking past the ideological and organizational fractures facing the 
National Front, its proponents faced a deeper-seated question of how it would 
actually achieve or exercise political influence. In a column for the Weekly Review, 
Chesterton claimed to have accepted the failure of British fascists to restrain their 
doctrine’s anti-democratic nature. 
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Many of us in Britain who were attracted to the movement had many qualms 
on this score, and in so far as we were able to influence its policy we 
endeavoured to establish safeguards to ensure that suitable checks were 
forthcoming… At the time most of us, I fancy, persuaded ourselves that these 
guarantees had been secured but in retrospect it is more than likely we were 





 This was an early example of the revisionism that appeared throughout the 
literature of Britain’s extreme right after 1945. As Chesterton’s reaction to the 
Olympia rally suggested, he was disturbed by some aspects of the BUF’s campaigns 
during the 1930s. He was never a voice of democratic restraint among British 
fascists, however, having asserted plainly in 1935 that ‘Fascism tolerates no whining 
about “rights”’.
67
 Pleading with readers of the Weekly Review that British fascists 
had also made an effort ‘to expand and purify and even restore the traditional 
constitution’, Chesterton conceded that the Italian and German dictatorships had now 
‘established what some of us before had questioned – the truth that absolute power 
corrupts’.
68
 While there is little doubt that he regretted much of his association with 
the BUF, Chesterton’s claim to have renounced authoritarianism in all forms was 
questionable. Apart from his continuing disdain for many aspects of the liberal 
system, Chesterton was an unabashed admirer of authoritarian regimes in Spain and 
Portugal; his hard-line support for Britain’s imperial status was another sign that 
Chesterton was still far from embracing democracy. Genuine or not, Chesterton’s 
reflections on the failures of fascism touched on a question confronting the post-war 
extreme right in Britain and elsewhere: Could a movement advancing the ‘national 
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interest’ replicate the ideals of fascism without replicating its methods of achieving 
and exercising power? 
 
Both the corporate and the occupational franchise are Fascist concepts but in 
condemning Fascist method, with its ballyhoo and its repressions, it is not 
necessary to condemn all Fascist policy as well… such advocacy does not 
become suspect because some of us were once humourless enough to preach 




Based on his plans for a new movement after the war, it was doubtful whether 
Chesterton had truly put aside ‘fascist methods’ altogether since 1940. Some of his 
proposed tactics for the National Front carried an implicit connection to subversion, 
social upheaval and violence. Anticipating the onset of anti-Semitic feeling in the 
wake of Britain’s victory, he expressed on one occasion a willingness to 
‘countenance rioting of a violent nature’ and on another stated his willingness to 
‘face up to barricades’ in pursuing the movement’s goals.
70
 While these comments 
suggested that the National Front would replicate the violent dynamism of the BUF, 
Chesterton’s other proposals were more restrained. Along with his continued 
suggestions for chalking and leafleting campaigns, Chesterton suggested that the 
movement should attempt to gain the support of a sympathetic but unaffiliated 
politician, a strategy that Tremlett described as analogous to that of the Ku Klux 
Klan.
71
 Chesterton’s aspirations for the National Front rested on the assumption that 
a relatively small number of committed and influential members could leverage 
enough support to bring about a change in national policy. The problem with this 
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view was that the After Victory movement showed little sign of evolving from a 
coterie of radicals into a platform for mass recruitment, as a Security Service 
informant observed in December 1944,   
 
If [the] National Front ever comes to anything at all it will be anything but a 
revolutionary party; it will be on the contrary a perfect example of drawing-




Chesterton and Brooks continued with their plans for the movement into 
April 1945 and succeeded in drawing a conservative donor, Captain Granville 
Soames, to act as its chairman and provide the funds necessary to establish an 
office.
73
 One month later, however, their plans unravelled when Soames resigned, 
declaring that his fears about the fascist tendencies of the movement had been 
confirmed and that he would be cancelling his financial contribution. Soames’ 
departure left the group with barely enough funds to cover its expenses and, on 21 
May 1945, Brooks expressed a belief that the movement had been ‘completely 
wrecked’ and should be put to rest.
74
 With hopes for support from unnamed 
industrialists now slim and Armistice Day passed, Chesterton’s attempts to salvage 
the group were stymied by a series of internal crises and suspicions that it had been 
infiltrated by one or more spies operating on behalf of the government or a rival 
organization. Although these fears were justified, given the activities of the Security 
Service, his attempts to uncover the leaker resulted in further discord and two 
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members resigning from the group.
75
 In November 1945, a surveillance report 
summarized the grim future prospects for the National Front: ‘the optimism and 
enthusiasm which characterized the movement in its early stages have given place to 
a sense of frustration… Even the few faithful adherents recognize that the movement 




Truth and the Crisis of Empire, 1945-1953 
 
The National Front technically remained in existence into the following year, when 
the group was identified as one of several incipient fascist groups in a House of 
Lords debate on 12 March 1946.
77
 Having confirmed his fears that the movement 
had been infiltrated, Chesterton called for a three-month hiatus before formally 
resigning in August 1946.
78
 Since the end of the war, the most hopeful prospect for 
the National Front had been a merger with one of the other extreme right groups now 
active: either Jeffery Hamm’s League of Ex-Servicemen and Women or John 
Beckett’s British People’s Party, which had the advantage of ongoing funding from 
the Duke of Bedford. Despite meeting with both men over the course of 1946, 
Chesterton was never able to negotiate any form of alliance but his personal 
relationship with Beckett and the Duke of Bedford remained amicable. His articles 
appeared regularly in the People’s Post, a newspaper distributed by the British 
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People’s Party, writing under a pseudonym to avoid jeopardizing his position with 
Truth.  
Even had he wished to revive the National Front or found a new party after 
1946, Chesterton’s efforts during this period would likely have been overshadowed 
by the reemergence of Oswald Mosley. As Chesterton and other members of the 
After-Victory group had anticipated, Mosley’s return to politics made an immediate 
impact on Britain’s extreme-right. In light of his personal notoriety, Mosley 
refrained from entering politics immediately after his release in 1943, endorsing his 
supporters’ reorganization efforts through a newsletter and a series of book clubs.
79
 
The most dramatic change heralded by Mosley’s return was his renunciation of 
nationalism and the Empire-centric politics that had underpinned The Greater 
Britain. In a new work titled The Alternative published in 1947, Mosley called for 
Britain to unite itself with its continental allies and pursue a kind of pan-European 
nationalism that would provide an economic, strategic and cultural bulwark against 
external and internal threats.
80
 On 8 February 1948 he launched the Union 
Movement, a new party intended to promote his new doctrine and draw together the 
fragments of the BUF that remained following the war.
81
 
Mosley’s European centric policy placed him at the opposite pole to 
Chesterton, who remained loyal to the idea of Britain’s complete national and 
imperial independence. The time spent overseas between 1940 and 1941 had allowed 
Chesterton to reacquaint himself with Africa, the land of his birth and the source of 
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his Empire loyalism. In spite of his outspoken commitment to British nationalism, a 
banner which many parts of Britain’s extreme right adopted in lieu of fascism, 
Chesterton’s own outlook was more aptly described as  ‘imperial nationalism’, an 
ideology that considered every colony and dominion as representative of the Greater 
Britain and England’s achievement in spreading civilization to the wider world.
82
 
Chesterton’s time in the BUF gave a more radical and consciously political shape to 
his view of the Empire, due to the prominence of the Empire in Mosley’s fascist 
program. As described in The Greater Britain, an economic revival would entail the 
creation of an ‘Autarchic Empire’: Britain would export manufactured goods to its 
colonies and in turn be supplied with raw materials from the colonies. Such a 
program required strong imperial governance that made no concessions for colonial 
independence, which Mosley predicted would have dire consequences for both the 
colonies themselves and the world at large.
83
  
Whereas Mosley turned away from the Empire in his attempt to revive the 
movement after the 1945, Chesterton’s Second World War reaffirmed his 
commitment to a ‘Greater Britain’. His personal connection to the Imperial project, 
which derived from an ongoing relationship to the white dominions in South Africa, 
further contributed to his belief that British identity spread far beyond the United 
Kingdom. He praised the ‘Excellent people of Cape Town and Durban’ for their 
hospitality during the war: ‘Yours is the Imperial outlook at its best, for not only are 
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you loyal Britons, but good South Africans’.
84
 Chesterton’s admiration of the 
colonial mindset was political as well as sentimental, since his Empire loyalist 
campaigns after the war would come to rely on the support of whites living abroad. 
That these ‘loyal Britons’ living abroad would count among Chesterton’s most 
ardent supporters reflected the colonial origins of his own political outlook on race 
and nationalism, which arguably appealed more to those living in settler populations, 
colonies or dominions than those in the more insular political framework of the 
United Kingdom.   
Though Chesterton’s politics had long been grounded in a concept of 
impending national and imperial crisis, the end of the Second World War accelerated 
many of the forces threatening to dismantle Britain’s overseas empire. By the time 
peace had been declared with Germany, Britain was overshadowed militarily by the 
United States and faced looming financial problems, which were exacerbated by the 
costs of maintaining an overseas empire.
85
 The onset of the Cold War provided 
another strategic threat in the form of the Soviet Union, although for Chesterton and 
others seeking to preserve Britain’s international position, this was not altogether 
negative: fear of the Soviet menace and communist expansion outside Europe 
temporarily dampened the United States’ anti-imperialist drive, while giving the 
British extreme right another platform for popular support.
86
 A third threat to the 
Empire, which proved uniquely alarming for nationalists like Chesterton, was the 
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expansion of post-war internationalism in the form of the United Nations or through 
proposals for an integrated Europe. The prospect of the United Nations acting as a 
successor to the League of Nations was in itself a concern for Chesterton, who 
regarded all such bodies as tools of international finance. In a more concrete sense, 
however, the United Nations posed a threat due to its political goal of replacing 
imperial hegemony with a more egalitarian community of nations.  
The ‘crisis of empire’ between 1945 and 1948 served as the impetus for 
Chesterton’s turn towards empire loyalism, an ethos that stressed the preservation 
and reassertion of Britain’s imperial prestige. Over a period of three years Britain 
suffered successive losses to its overseas empire: February 1947 marked the 
beginning of Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine and shortly thereafter the 
independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947.
87
 The following year saw two 
additional departures from the Empire, with Burma declaring independence in 
January 1948 and Ceylon in February 1948.  The speed with which decolonization 
proceeded following the war served to justify Chesterton’s conviction that politicians 
were incapable of holding the Empire together. Pointing to the 1941 Atlantic Charter 
as the beginning of the United States’ bid for dominance, he castigated Winston 
Churchill for having reneged on his promise not to oversee the Empire’s dissolution: 
 
what are we to say of your subsequent attitude once Roosevelt had made clear 
to you that the British Empire was to be overthrown… Did you not say at 
Fulton that you would not stop the tide of American conquest if you could? 
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Despite his repeated denunciations of Churchill, Chesterton appeared to 
regard Britain’s wartime leader as a misguided figure, a talented leader who showed 
‘something of the swell of destiny, something of authentic greatness’.
89
 Ultimately, 
however, Churchill and his fellow conservatives held a fundamentally different view 
of the international situation than that possessed by much of Britain’s extreme right. 
Whereas Chesterton and his conspiratorial ilk viewed Moscow and Wall Street as 
two manifestations of the same enemy, Britain’s conservatives saw the post-1945 
world as an ideological and geopolitical contest between two superpowers, the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. They thus viewed Britain’s special relationship with 
the United States as a matter of strategic and economic necessity.
90
 To Chesterton, 
the turn to America by many conservatives was a craven betrayal of British interests, 
and indisputable evidence of conspiratorial forces at work. Viewing finance as the 
key mechanism of the conspirators’ power, he pointed to Britain’s war debt to the 
United States as a sign this new phase of Anglo-American relations was a barely 
concealed bid for power by international finance. In a 1946 pamphlet he elaborated 
on his theory by tracing the conspiracy to the aftermath of the First World War:  
 
First fruits of the great victory, for the Wall Street financiers, was the 
extension of their power to Britain and the Dominions, forcing us to surrender 
our command of the seas, to break our alliance with Japan, and, in a very 
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The subsequent changes in the global order that Chesterton attributed to the 
‘Money Power’ equated America’s growth with Britain’s decline,  placing him 
further at odds with those in the Conservative Party who hoped a transatlantic 
alliance might preserve the country’s status as a world power: 
 
If Conservatives are so bewildered and intimidated that their only hope lies in 
the good-will of the Americans to conserve their own country for them, and 
are prepared to pay the price of surrendering their Empire to achieve this 
favour, it is small wonder that in the realm of domestic affairs they have no 





The ratification of the Bretton-Woods agreement (which Chesterton viewed as a key 
obstacle to an insulated ‘Empire economy’) tied international currency transfers to 
the U.S. dollar, a measure based on that currency’s relative strength and stability at 
the time. This role had previously fallen to the British pound but a slump in British 
economic performance, coupled with the debts incurred through two world wars, 




The Soviet Union’s emergence as a major power provided the only 
counterbalance to the seemingly unstoppable rise of international finance, which, by 
Chesterton’s own estimate, would otherwise have demolished the Empire only years 
after the Second World War. The emergence of a global communist superpower 
added an additional layer of complexity to the way in which Chesterton perceived 
communism. During the interwar period, communism appeared primarily as an 
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internal threat of revolution that could be supported through Soviet assistance. In the 
early stages of the BUF, Mosley had attempted unsuccessfully to position his 
movement as an extra-governmental line of defence against this threat. In the end, 
fascism was regarded in Britain as an essentially foreign ideology, just as liable to 
bring about violence and dictatorship as communism. At the war’s conclusion, 
however, Chesterton and other members of the extreme right recognized that the fear 
of the Soviet Union as a military threat would take centre stage following the defeat 
of Germany and Japan, providing a new opportunity for nationalists to position 
themselves as a bulwark against encroaching left-wing tyranny.
94
  
From a pragmatic point of view, the rise of the Soviet Union was a boon to 
Britain’s extreme right. While fears of communism and the overarching sense of 
crisis associated with the Soviet ‘menace’ were unlikely to foment a revival of 
fascism, they did provide opportunities for a new movement capable of attracting 
both conservatives and radical nationalists under a common cause. Chesterton’s 
understanding of the global order after 1945 was realistic enough to acknowledge the 
immediate danger posed to British interests by the USSR. In particular, he 
recognized the potential for a communist superpower to foment and exploit 
revolutionary movements throughout Britain’s colonies.
95
  Under the influence of the 
conspiratorial worldview he had adopted during the 1930s, however, Chesterton saw 
the greatest threat to British interests in the ‘master revolutionaries’ acting through 
American finance, rather than their puppets in the Soviet bureaucracy. In some cases, 
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he even acknowledged Russia’s hostility to Western capitalism as an inadvertent 
hindrance to the spread of the ‘Money Power’. With the proposal of the Marshall 
Plan in 1947, Chesterton noted with approval that Stalin was likely to reject an influx 




Even though anti-Americanism put Chesterton ideologically at odds with 
British conservatives, he was equally reticent to embrace their left wing opposition. 
During the 1930s accounts of the ‘Red Terror’ overseas had been a staple of BUF 
propaganda, a theme which carried into Chesterton’s post-war journalism. In 1946, 
he penned an article addressing ‘The Problem with the Left’ that criticized ongoing 
sympathies with the Russian experiment among British socialists: ‘When the red star 
dawned in the East you were jubilant: even to this day you cannot bear to tell your 
followers the truth, which is that the Red Star ushered in the blackest modern 
tyranny ever to engulf the working man’. 
97
 Chesterton gave a more detailed insight 
into his attitude to the left in No Shelter For Morrison, a short work of fiction he 
published under a pseudonym in 1947. As its title suggested, the book served mainly 
as an attack on former Home-Secretary Herbert Morrison (represented as a ‘Mr 
Hackney’) but branched into a wider criticism of Labour politicians in the lead-up to 
the war. Many of Chesterton’s critiques of socialism, delivered by way of an author 
surrogate named the ‘Chairman’, were recognizable from his work in the BUF. 
Britain’s socialists had fomented ‘class warfare’ and industrial action, while the 
capitalist power wielded by international finance went unchecked. Labour politicians 
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had weakened Britain’s national defence while calling for an escalation of conflict 
with Italy, Germany and Japan – all the while pursuing a doomed project of global 
pacifism through the League of Nations. Alongside these old grievances, Chesterton 
made a renewed attack on Morrison’s role in overseeing the internment of ex-
servicemen under 18b.
98
 The book’s penultimate chapter concluded with an 
exchange of dialogue between two characters (‘Tom’ and ‘Dick’) arguing over why 
fascism had attracted supporters in the first place: 
 
DICK: I detest and abominate Fascism with all the strength of my soul. But in 
a country where democracy has broken down, and where the people as a 
whole do not want communism, I see that a problem exists and that there is at 
least a prima facie case for subordinating sectional interests to the national 
interest. Thank Heaven there is no such problem in Britain.  
 
TOM: What if there were? 
 
DICK: In that case I should indeed fight at the barricades. 
 
TOM: On whose side? 
 
DICK: On the Communist side of course. Though after a spell of 
Communism I should doubtless again find myself at the barricades, this time 




In David Baker’s Ideology of Obsession, this passage served as an epitaph of 
sorts to Chesterton’s involvement with fascism after 1940 – a ‘comfortable fiction’ 
that allowed him to retain the prospect of fascist revival as a ‘last ditch defence 
against British collapse in the face of a militant international finance-capitalism’.
100
 
‘For the rest of his life’, Baker thus concluded, ‘Chesterton was able to persuade 
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himself that the point had not been reached where such radical action was 
necessary’.
101
 In a superficial sense, this was correct, as Chesterton showed no 
further inclination towards the style of mass-party fascism that he had pursued under 
Mosley. Yet there is little indication that Chesterton’s understanding of the crisis 
precipitating fascism in the 1930s had changed significantly by 1945. Cultural 
decadence, class conflict and the twin perils of international finance and international 
Bolshevism were still dominant themes in his ideology. A snippet of dialogue 
between ‘Tom and Dick’ suggested that Chesterton’s critique of liberalism also 
remained in place: ‘democracy will only work so long as there are no dissident 
elements sufficiently strong and lawless to prevent it from working’.
102
 His proposed 
solution to the economic and social problems caused by ‘lawless’ capitalism was still 
essentially corporatist, entailing a system of private enterprise under ‘corporate 
control by employer, employee and consumer, with the court of law as referees’.
103
 
While the After-Victory movement was in many respects a failed attempt to rekindle 
the interwar movement, Chesterton’s tentative efforts to reconcile his views with 
conservatism showed a greater willingness to work within the existing scope of the 
British right. In the wake of the National Front’s capitulation, he turned to the empire 
as the institution capable of resolving Britain’s material and spiritual crises without a 
full scale revolution.   
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The League of Empire Loyalists, 1953-1965 
 
With his prominence in the British extreme right overshadowed by Mosley’s return, 
Chesterton might well have faded from political activism altogether had his position 
at Truth remained steady. In March 1952, however, Brooks resigned his position as 
chairman and sold his stake in the paper to Staples Press. As a result, Truth 
underwent an overhaul under the supervision of its new owner, Ronald Staples, who 
sought to rehabilitate the paper from the radical and anti-Semitic reputation it had 
garnered in the preceding decade. This naturally brought him into conflict with 
Chesterton who was dismissed from his position in February 1953 after a series of 
disputes with Staples and the other editorial staff. In the following month, Chesterton 
distributed a pamphlet expressing outrage over the paper’s change in policy and 
appealed to readers for assistance in founding an independent outlet for nationalist 
news and criticism: 
 
The old TRUTH was not anti-Semitic when on occasion it criticized certain 
Jews, any more than it was anti-French when it criticized Frenchmen, or anti-
German when it criticized Germans, or anti-Scottish when it criticized 
extreme Scottish Nationalism. It was pro-British, un-wearingly defending the 




Following his departure, Chesterton took up a temporary post in London as 
the ‘Information and Public Relations Officer’ for the United Central Africa 
Association – an organization representing Southern Rhodesians who wished to 
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amalgamate with the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia.
105
 As Chesterton 
took the position shortly prior to Central African Federation being formed in August 
1953, he was soon forced to seek employment yet again. In January 1953, Chesterton 
sent a letter to Lord Beaverbrook explaining his circumstances at Truth and 
indicating that his departure from the periodical was imminent and expressing 
frustration at the ‘Mosley aberration’ that dogged his search for employment.
106
 
Following Beaverbrook’s return from overseas in April 1953, Chesterton was able to 
secure an interview – the outcome of which saw him appointed by Beaverbrook ‘to 
engage in such work as he may designate for you’ on a salary of £100 per month.
107
 
The precise nature of Chesterton’s role was later described as that of a ‘literary 
advisor’, drawing on his earlier experience as an author and critic. He also served as 
a ghost writer for the Beaverbrook’s Don’t Trust To Luck, a book of business advice, 
and contributed feature articles for  the Sunday Express and the Evening Standard.   
During the course of his work with Beaverbrook , Chesterton was 
commissioned to write a piece for the Sunday Express investigating William Joyce, 
whose trial and execution had recently been documented in Rebecca West’s The 
Meaning of Treason. 
108
 In order to supplement his own memories of the late ‘Lord 
Haw Haw’, Chesterton travelled to Germany to interview Joyce’s widow, as well as 
Spain, where he drew on the recollections of another ex-BUF member, J.A. Macnab. 
Hoping to parlay this research into a book, Chesterton compiled an extensive set of 
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notes and produced three draft articles examining Joyce’s character and detailing his 
involvement with the fascist movement in Britain.
109
 To his immense frustration, 
however, Chesterton was forced by Beaverbrook to condense his work into a single 
piece that appeared in the Sunday Express in July 1953. Despite the severe editing 
imposed by Beaverbrook, Chesterton’s article was cautiously sympathetic towards 
Joyce, implying that he and his wife had effectively been stranded in Germany at the 
outbreak of the war after a contact failed to secure them German citizenship. It 
concluded by imploring readers to consider Joyce’s character in the face of 
execution: ‘Professing to be British of the British, Joyce left us at the first great crisis 
and joined our enemies. We owe him no honour. But we not dishonour ourselves by 
acknowledging that he died as a brave man’.
110
 
With memories of the war still fresh, the sympathetic posture of Chesterton’s 
article aroused controversy. He faced accusations from the public of trying to 
whitewash Joyce’s reputation, while at the same time drawing the ire of a member of 
the Union Movement, Lawrence Flockhart, who alleged that Chesterton’s article was 
an attempt to curry favour with his employers at Joyce’s expense.
111
 In the long term, 
some of the dubious claims in Chesterton’s article found their way into biographies 
and historical studies of Joyce. Colin Holmes’ Searching for Lord Haw-Haw, the 
most authoritative work on Joyce to date, dismissed Chesterton’s piece as a ‘hack 
enterprise’ and suggested that prior accounts had been ‘insufficiently alert to his bias 
and special pleading’.
112
 While Chesterton did make a conscious attempt to soften 
                                                             
109
 Chesterton Collection A. 13, Baker interview with D. Chesterton, 9 May 1978. 
110
 ‘How men who play high stakes trip over trifles’, Sunday Express, 12 July 1953.  
111 TNA KV2/1350/44b, Letter from A.K. Chesterton to Oswald Mosley, 17 July 1953; TNA 
KV2/1350/44b, Letter from Lawrence Flockhart to Angus Macnab, 12 July 1953.  
112
 Holmes, Searching for Lord Haw-Haw, pp. 444-447.  
 
 198 
Joyce’s reputation, he was not driven to do so by affection for the man himself, or 
out of sympathy for his actions after 1939. The special pleading that Chesterton 
undertook was rather indicative of an attempt to rehabilitate the reputation of British 
fascism, and specifically the party to which he and Joyce had belonged. In the first of 
his unpublished articles regarding Joyce, Chesterton offered a defence of British 
fascism similar to the one he had presented to readers of the Weekly Review in 1945: 
‘[the] Mosley Fascists had been driven foremost by patriotism’, he implored, ‘and 
had no thought other than to serve Britain’.
113
 In the same article, Chesterton  
suggested that the events of interwar period could now be considered ‘with historical 
objectivity because, controversial though the cause was at the time, it is now dead 
beyond the possibility of resurrection’. Only by properly understanding the patriotic 
roots of British fascism, Chesterton argued, could one come to grips with ‘how 
grossly out of character [Joyce’s] defection appeared’.
114
 
 As he had in the immediate aftermath of the war, Chesterton misjudged the 
public’s receptiveness to apologia on behalf of fascism. In December 1953, his 
arrangement with the Express was terminated following repeated disputes with 
editorial staff, which Chesterton believed to have been exacerbated by ‘political 
prejudice’. Appealing to Beaverbrook to intervene on his behalf, Chesterton 
lamented his inability to shed the notoriety he had acquired during his time with 
Mosley: 
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Many years ago when I found that I was going the pace I gave up drinking, 
and since then have never been troubled by alcohol. Several years ago, when I 
found that I was smoking too much, I gave up tobacco and since then have 
never been troubled by nicotine. Fifteen years ago, when I found I was having 
too much of Oswald Mosley I gave up the habit, but instead of being rid of it 




Beaverbrook was not altogether unsympathetic to Chesterton’s politics, 
having conducted a crusade on behalf of the Empire some years prior. He also 
appeared to harbour some form of respect for Chesterton’s literary acumen, though 
their relationship was brief, contentious and lopsided. Chesterton was insignificant in 
the life and historical profile of Beaverbrook, a man he acknowledged in his 
memoirs (alongside Bernard Montgomery and George Bernard Shaw) as ‘one of the 
three authentic men of genius I have known’.
116
 Nevertheless, Chesterton’s 
encounters with the ‘Beaver’ were another good illustration of the gulf that emerged 
between the mainstream conservative variant of British nationalism and his own. To 
conservatives, the loss of national prestige associated with the rise of the United 
States and Britain’s retreat from empire was balanced by political realities after 
1945; chiefly, the need to ensure Britain’s economic and national security against the 
backdrop of the Cold War while meeting the domestic challenge of populist social-
democracy. These considerations were largely irrelevant to Chesterton, who viewed 
the United States’ financial hegemony as equally (if not more) threatening than 
communist subversion or military aggression. With nationalism at the heart of his 
political ideology, Chesterton viewed national prestige as an end unto itself, rather 
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than something to be managed alongside the more banal aspects of economic and 
social policy.  
Chesterton’s ongoing qualms with conservatism and the moderate right made 
it unlikely that he would secure funding for an independent movement from wealthy 
industrialists, as Brooks had attempted to do in the 1940s. In a stroke of tremendous 
fortune, however, another wealthy figure responded out of the blue to Chesterton’s 
appeal following his departure from Truth. Robert Key Jeffery was an eccentric 
British millionaire residing in Chile whose fortune had been amassed through copper 
mining. The precise nature of Jeffery’s political views were unclear but his 
ideological affinity with Chesterton’s ‘pro-British’ appeal was sufficient to prompt a 
generous donation to support the founding of an independent journal.  Jeffery thus 
became the patron and ‘financial founder’ of Candour, a weekly ‘news and views-
letter’ that began publication in October 1953 and would continue, in one form or 
another, until after Chesterton’s death in 1973. The leading article of Candour’s 
debut issue detailed the journal’s mission in drawing attention to the forces acting 
against the British Empire: 
 
The British Empire is disintegrating. Whoever denies that fact is a fool or a 
knave… In place of the British Empire, there arises the Empire of the United 
States. We have no quarrel on that account with the American people, who 
are entitled to what their dollars can buy. Our quarrel is with our own abject 
leadership, of whatever party, which has supinely allowed the Dollar Empire 




As its title suggested, Candour drew stylistic inspiration from Truth, 
positioning itself as a mixture of political editorials and investigative journalism 
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offered as an alternative to mainstream reporting of world affairs. Jeffery’s patronage 
made no demands on the content of the journal, outside the broad direction that it 
advance British interests. Chesterton was thus left with complete editorial 
independence, allowing the forthright discussion of matters he had been unable to 
address in Truth, including the role of Jewish conspiracy in global affairs.
118
  
In an effort to quell the concern among parts of his audience that the journal 
was flatly anti-American, Chesterton assured readers that his concern lay with the 
forces conspiring within the United States government rather than the people 
themselves, ‘but that a nation and its government cannot always be tidily 
separated’.
119
 Chesterton’s insistence on the interchangeable function of U.S. 
capitalism and Russian communism put him outside the realm of traditional 
conservatism, but Candour served as a consistent outlet for anti-communist 
literature, opening it up to an audience beyond the die-hard adherents to the ‘Money 
Power’ conspiracy.  Several of the journal’s early issues gave coverage to Joseph 
McCarthy’s investigation into alleged Communist espionage throughout the United 
States, promising to bring the U.S. senator’s ‘case’ to a British audience.
120
 The 
journal also lent its attention to racial politics both in Britain and abroad. Intersecting 
with Chesterton’s concern over the Empire in Africa was the issue of apartheid in 
South Africa, which he firmly defended as a necessary measure to prevent social 
disorder. In an early example of how Candour’s racialist, imperialist and 
conspiratorial elements would become intertwined in the following decades, 
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Chesterton argued for a reassertion of British control to prevent further 
disintegration: 
 
A strong British Empire is the only protection of hundreds of millions of 
people against the wholesale putrefaction of their social organisms, the only 
possible guarantee, indeed, that the world will not become a sort of global 




Ongoing funding from Jeffery ensured Candour’s independent existence for 
the foreseeable future but made no specifications as to a further political program. 
Having undertaken a number of unsuccessful attempts at party activism in the past, 
Chesterton was initially reticent to commit his journal to any particular venture. In 
considering the possibility for a new party, Chesterton gave an account of the 
‘common fate’ of such ventures, offering a thinly veiled allusion to his experiences 
with Mosley and the After-Victory Group:  
 
Three things are clearly essential. The first, in the special conditions of the 
day, is a combination of gifts in the leadership amounting to genius. And how 
rare is genius! The second is tireless dynamism and capacity for self-sacrifice 
in the led… The third, in one word, is cash. No party can survive the hostility 
of entrenched financial and political vested interests unless it can lay its hand 




Even if these elements could somehow be secured, Chesterton further 
explained that the trials of the political process would then begin in earnest: a 
struggle to overcome internal division and disputes over minor policy matters. 
‘Should some miracle occur to prevent that final disaster’, he concluded, the party 
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would be beset by opportunists from the ‘old gangs’ and careerists; ‘so that in the 
end there will be no spiritual distinction to be drawn between the old parties and the 
new’. While this assessment seemed to offer no prospect for a new party, Chesterton 
acknowledged that younger patriots would not be deterred from attempting to forge 
new movements. Allowing for this possibility, he proposed a new organization 
whose purpose would be to influence public opinion and advocate for British 
interests, rather than contest elections or build a mass party.
123
  
It was on this basis that Chesterton founded the League of Empire Loyalists 
(LEL), which began its formal existence on 13 April 1954, marked by a meeting at 
Caxton Hall in Westminster. An additional infusion of funds from Jeffery allowed 
the group to secure an office space in London and hire Leslie Greene, the daughter of 
Chesterton’s After-Victory colleague Ben Greene, to work full time on its behalf.
124
 
Per Chesterton’s discussion in Candour, the LEL was never intended as a political 
party in the traditional sense, but rather as a ‘pressure group’ that would engage 
public opinion and attempt to influence the existing political parties in Britain. A 
constitution drafted by Chesterton outlined four ‘objects’ of the LEL’s mission but 
made no prescriptions for policy or campaign tactics:  
 
i) The maintenance and, where necessary, the recovery of the sovereign 
independence of the British Peoples throughout the world.  ii) The 
strengthening of the spiritual and material bonds between the British Peoples 
throughout the world. iii) The conscientious development of the British 
Colonial Empire under British direction and local British leadership. iv) The 
resurgence at home and abroad of the British spirit.
125
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Aside from ratifying the group’s ultra-nationalist, imperialist orientation, the 
LEL’s objects also indicated a mission that expanded beyond domestic politics to 
draw support from Britons living overseas. In organizational terms, Chesterton 
hoped that the party would function on a decentralized, grass-roots basis: members 
of the League would establish branches throughout Britain and the empire, acting 
independently to raise public awareness and put pressure on figures in government 
that acted contrary to British interests. The formal governing structure of the LEL 
consisted of an executive committee, charged with appointing a chairman and 
approving applications for membership, along with a policy committee, comprised of 
the chairman, an organizing secretary and the editor of Candour – the position 
formally occupied by Chesterton. Membership of the LEL was not formally 
restricted by race or nationality, though applicants who did not hold British 
citizenship were subject to approval by the policy committee.
126
 A vote at the LEL’s 
inaugural meeting also agreed that all sitting members of parliament, ‘Independents 
as well as Party Men’, were to be excluded from membership to avoid diluting the 
group’s oppositional stance toward establishment politics.
127
  
In theory, were the LEL to achieve its initial goal of 20,000 members 
worldwide, it would operate without the need for the single, charismatic leader-
figure sought by previous iterations of the extreme right. In practice, however, the 
main activities of the LEL were reliant upon Chesterton’s leadership, aided by an 
inner-circle of dedicated activists. Apart from Greene, this circle consisted of Aiden 
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Mackey, a teacher who acted as the group’s public relations officer, and Austen 
Brooks, the son of Chesterton’s colleague from Truth and the After-Victory group. 
Brooks acted as Chesterton’s ‘right hand man’, directing and participating in the 
LEL’s campaigns while also serving as the deputy editor of Candour. The party’s 
initial chairman was Martin Burdett-Coutts, descended from the 19
th




Although Chesterton maintained that the LEL was aloof from partisan 
politics, its appeals to anti-communist, nationalist and pro-Empire sentiment were 
implicitly geared towards the right. In the first year of its existence, LEL picketing 
campaigns made an effort to lure disenfranchised members of the Conservative 
Party. These efforts showed promise in July 1954 when the LEL made contact with 
Harry Legg-Bourke, a Conservative backbencher who protested against his party’s 
policy in Suez. Chesterton’s initial optimism was quashed almost immediately, 
however, when Legg-Bourke reneged on his threat to resign from the party. In 
Candour, Chesterton reaffirmed his belief that ‘Party Men’ were unlikely to abandon 
their positions: ‘Mother’s wandering boy is restored to the fold and admitted once 
again to the radiance of the Churchillian smile, while the Tories, their ranks closed, 
march forward with beaming faces towards the further disasters and surrenders of 
Tomorrow’.
129
      As Chesterton anticipated, the Conservative Party establishment 
made a deliberate effort to undermine the appeal of the LEL, distributing information 
among its members that highlighted the movement’s anti-Semitism and anti-
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Americanism, as well as Chesterton’s personal connection to fascism.
130
 Frustrated 
by the intransigence of mainstream conservatives, he redirected the LEL’s efforts 
away from conventional activism and into more disruptive forms of political 
demonstration. The League’s activities subsequently became something of a novelty 
in Britain’s political scene, as members painted slogans on public property, 
interrupted Conservative Party meetings and verbally harangued foreign dignitaries 
or other public figures seen to be undermining British sovereignty.
131
 Although all of 
these tactics attracted some degree of attention from bemused onlookers, the most 
effective of the LEL’s demonstrations – insofar as they attracted the most attention 
from the media – were theatrical stunts that often involved considerable planning by 
Brooks and other members of the LEL’s dedicated inner-circle.  
Some of the LEL’s stunts reflected Chesterton’s penchant for symbolism, 
such as tearing down the United Nations flag or delivering a ‘scuttle’ to government 
figures held responsible for the loss of the Empire. In most cases, however, the 
LEL’s methods revolved around some form of heckling, directed either to the stage 
at political meetings or in public gatherings by way of a roaming loudspeaker van.
132
 
While many of the aforementioned methods brought party members in conflict with 
the law, inviting arrests and small fines, the LEL’s stunts were mostly non-violent 
and a far cry from the paramilitary violence of interwar fascism. The most serious 
incidents involving the group took place in 1956, when fighting broke out between 
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LEL activists and members of the Movement for Colonial Freedom.
133
 An 
interruption at Blackpool in October 1958 led the LEL to pursue legal action against 
the Conservative Party agents alleged to have assaulted two young interrupters.
134
 
Though the case was unsuccessful, the incident brought criticism from the media, 
with one columnist in the Spectator going so far as to suggest a latent undertone of 
fascism in the stewards’ rough treatment of hecklers.
135
 The forceful response to 
LEL interrupters was a strange inversion of the situation that Chesterton had faced 
while campaigning with Mosley. Having once declared the right of BUF stewards to 
maintain order at their meetings, Chesterton now found his movement on the 
receiving end of heavy-handed party stewards, while Brooks declared the Movement 
for Colonial Freedom’s response to LEL heckling an affront to freedom of speech.
136
 
The LEL’s confrontational approach proved alienating to some of its more 
conservative members. In April 1956, Burdett-Coutts resigned his position as 
chairman following a dispute over ‘the expediency of Candour’s approach to world 
affairs’ and anti-communist slogans used in LEL campaigns. He was replaced by 
D.S. Fraser Harris, a retired Liutentent-Colonel residing in Cornwall.
137
 Fraser-
Harris’ appointment furthered the ‘colonel Blimpish’ image associated with the LEL, 
whose governing council also included a number of elderly military men.
 138
 
Chesterton made no effort to dispel this reputation, which helped stave-off 
accusations that the LEL was a disguised attempt to rekindle British fascism. As 
reflected in the pages of Candour, much of the LEL’s membership was reactionary 
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rather than revolutionary. Brooks decried the ‘coloured invasion of Britain’ but made 
a point of also denouncing racial violence as a response to non-white immigration: 
‘The thugs may be serving their own questionable political ends, but they are 
certainly not helping to preserve British society’.
139
 While many of the LEL’s overt 
activities reflected Chesterton’s desire to tackle large-scale issues of domestic and 
international intrigue, its politics also included elements of social and economic 
conservatism; with contributors denouncing the excesses of government 
bureaucracy, the welfare state and the general trend of moral degradation among 
Britain’s youth.  
There were some notable exceptions to the conservative trend in the LEL’s 
membership. In November 1955, it incorporated the members of British Resurgence, 
a small group of young nationalists operating in the North of England under the 
leadership of John Bean.
140
 Before agreeing to join Chesterton as the LEL’s 
Northern organizer, Bean had been a member of Mosley’s Union Movement and 
briefly attempted to make headway in the Conservative Party. Bean brought with 
him a group of dedicated followers that, whilst providing a welcome boost to the 
LEL’s ranks, showed a greater willingness to engage in the kind of confrontational 
street politics that Chesterton hoped to avoid . Some of the LEL’s membership also 
maintained an interest in the esoteric trappings of neo-Nazism and the racial-fascist 
ideas promulgated in Britain by Arnold Leese. The most drastic proponent of these 
views to pass through the LEL’s ranks was Colin Jordan, a Cambridge history 
graduate who also served as a member of the RAF during the Second World War . 
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Jordan left the LEL in 1956 after unsuccessfully petitioning Chesterton to restrict 
membership to ‘white Gentile Britons’.
141
 In the same year, Jordan inherited a 
property in Notting Hill from Leese, which served as the headquarters for his newly 
formed White Defence League.
142
 
Several of the other activists drawn to the LEL were less overt in their 
radicalism, but would later graduate from the LEL towards the more overtly fascistic 
politics pursued by Jordan. John Tyndall joined the LEL in late 1956 shortly after 
completing a period of military service in West Germany. In his autobiography, 
Tyndall claimed to have considered membership in the Union Movement but 
refrained due to his disagreement with Mosley’s plans for a federated Europe. 
Though he was in hearty agreement with both the empire loyalist and conspiratorial 
aspects of Chesterton’s program, Tyndall quickly grew frustrated with the LEL’s 
elderly and middle-aged leadership, who seemed unwilling to pursue any form of 
actual political power. This sentiment was shared by Bean, who began organizing 
informal discussions among ‘radically-minded’ members of the LEL who hoped to 
either draw Chesterton’s organization in a more active direction, or branch off into a 
nationalist party of their own.
143
  
Facing competition from both the mainstream right and the remnants of 
Mosley’s Union Movement, the LEL struggled to attract a membership numerous or 
dedicated enough to support Chesterton’s vision of grass-roots British nationalism. A 
small ray of hope was presented by the escalation of the Suez Crisis, a long recurring 
subject of the LEL’s activism, which brought Britain’s retreat from empire to the 
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forefront of domestic politics. Throughout 1955 and 1956, Egyptian president 
Gamal-Abdel Nasser had stymied British efforts to secure its interests in the region 
through diplomacy, much to the frustration of Prime Minister Anthony Eden who, 
along with other parts of the British government and public opinion, came to regard 
Nasser as a dangerous, dictatorial figure akin to Benito Mussolini. Matters were 
further complicated by the overarching considerations of the Cold War: in contrast to 
Eden’s desire to reassert Britain’s imperial control, the United States feared 
alienating Nasser into the hands of the Soviet Union and viewed a nationalist 
government in Egypt as a preferable bulwark against communism in the Middle 
East.
144
 The apex of the crisis came after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on 30 
July 1956, thus setting the stage for an attempted military incursion by Britain acting 
in concert with French and Israeli Forces. The invasion of Suez launched on 30 
October was a military success but an immediate disaster in both domestic and 
international politics: there was widespread opposition to the war among the British 
population, with particular criticism originating from the left, as well as 
Conservatives who feared the blowback from Eden’s failed military adventurism. 
Diplomatically, the invasion was condemned sharply by the United States who, 
besides their own strategic aims in the Middle-East, feared that a Western imperial 
incursion would undermine criticism of the Soviet invasion of Hungary that took 
place on 4 November 1956. The United States led international condemnation of the 
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Suez invasion by way of the United Nations, an effort joined by other nations in the 
British Commonwealth.
145
   
From the LEL’s perspective, Suez represented the brazen culmination of the 
different forces acting to sabotage Britain. The coalition condemning Eden’s 
intervention was a real-world incarnation of the conspiracy that Chesterton attributed 
to Britain’s declining status:  American anti-Imperialists, U.N. internationalists, 
British liberals and ‘defeatists’ on the domestic front, as well as the ‘third world’ 
leaders who replaced British colonial rule. In light of Chesterton’s wider view of 
finance-capitalism, Suez was also a particularly galling example of how the United 
States leveraged its economic might against British interests: 
 
The results of the British Government's surrender to the Transatlantic 
blackmailers were catastrophic. Nasser took over the British bases, British 
property in Egypt was sequestrated and Britain has never recovered from the 





The Suez intervention was also a final reminder that, for all Chesterton’s notions of 
political cowardice and inaction as the root of imperial decline, there had still been 
concerted efforts by successive British governments to retain Imperial control 
through the 1950s. Though in many cases these efforts resulted in a ‘hand over’ to 
favoured local parties, interventions into Malaya and Kenya demonstrated that 
British government had hardly abandoned its commitment to a presence abroad.
147
 
The extent of U.S. and U.N. opposition to Britain’s feigned ‘diplomatic’ intervention 
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into Suez was in some way beneficial to Chesterton, since it gave credence to his 
belief that neither was a true ally of British interests. The LEL gained a small 
number of dedicated supporters drawn from those who viewed Suez as ‘proof’ of an 
anti-Empire conspiracy.
148
 On the whole, however, the events of 1956 were proof of 
the redundancy of ‘Empire Loyalism’ as a cause. Much as Mosley’s championing of 
an ‘Empire economy’ in the 1930s had been proven unrealistic by the limits of tariffs 
and imperial preference, Suez showed the political and social impracticality of an 
aggressive reassertion of British Imperial power.  
In February 1957, the LEL made its first attempt to engage in electoral 
politics, submitting Leslie Greene as an ‘Independent Loyalist’ candidate in the 
North Lewisham by-election. Despite the dismal results of the election itself, which 
garnered Greene less than five percent of the vote, the LEL’s membership was 
enthused by the prospect of further campaigns. Chesterton was reticent to engage the 
LEL in further electoral attempts, however, fearing that its resources would be 
squandered in attempting to ‘stand toe to toe and slog it out with the giants’. He 
called instead for a continued emphasis on protest tactics, envisioning the LEL as a 
kind of political ‘raiding party’.
149
 Chesterton’s intransigence on the LEL’s political 
orientation after Lewisham led to a number of core members resigning. Tyndall and 
Bean resigned from the movement in April 1958 to establish the National Labour 
Party, while another long-term supporter Sir Richard Hilton, left to pursue his own 
‘Patriotic Front’.
150
 The timing of Bean and Tyndall’s departure reflected another 
current of disagreement within the LEL over how the party should respond to the 
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growing public concern over immigration. Although Candour and the LEL placed 
increasing focus on the ‘coloured invasion’ in their campaigns, Chesterton was wary 
of tarnishing his movement’s reputation with accusations of violence or racial hatred 
following the riots at Notting Hill in April 1958. 
Other parties made an immediate effort to capitalize upon racial resentment in 
West London, which became contested territory for Britain’s extreme right: 
Mosley’s Union Movement held meetings and rented a headquarters in Kensington, 
while Colin Jordan’s ‘White Defence League’ was based nearby and joined Bean’s 
National Labour Party in public demonstrations calling for restricted immigration.
151
 
Notting Hill represented a microcosm of the problems that had beset Britain’s 
extreme right since the collapse of the BUF. While immigration offered a seemingly 
viable platform for mass recruitment, progress was hampered by a crowding of 
ideologically heterogeneous parties unable to resolve their personal and ideological 
differences. Some of these divisions were a holdover from the interwar period, with 
an ongoing divide between followers of Mosley, Chesterton and Arnold Leese, the 
latter of whom was responsible for promulgating neo-Nazism amongst the younger 
exiles from the LEL.
 152
 Another point of division, highlighted clearly by fractures in 
the LEL, was the generational divide between Chesterton’s “Blimpish” Empire 
Loyalists, Mosley’s aging inner circle and the younger, more politically aspirational 
generation represented by Bean and Tyndall.   
Even had it proved capable of resolving these ideological and generational 
fractures, Britain’s extreme right faced the ongoing problem of its connection to 
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fascism. As Chesterton could readily attest, the combined legacies of the war, 
internment and the Holocaust made the failure of any overt attempt to promote 
fascism in post-war Britain a foregone conclusion. Candour and the LEL were both 
beset by accusations of harbouring fascist tendencies despite Chesterton and his 
supporters’ efforts to cultivate a more respectable, conservative image. As he had 
lamented to Beaverbrook in 1953, Chesterton’s notoriety as a member of the BUF 
remained in spite of his efforts to combat the fascist label. Besides his aggressive 
pursuit of legal recourse against any accusation of disloyalty, Chesterton attempted 
to directly address the ‘fascist smear’ by defending his involvement with Mosley and 
pointing to the many ‘sincere men and women’ who had joined or otherwise 
supported the fascists in their heyday.
153
 As far as accusations that the LEL 
represented a form of neo-fascism in disguise, Chesterton assured his followers 
shortly after the movement’s founding in 1954 that the ‘ghost’ of fascism lay firmly 
in the past:  
 
neither through Candour nor the League, have or will I at any future time, 
espouse openly or covertly any Fascist or other authoritarian doctrine. This 
does not mean that I will foreswear myself by denying historical facts which I 
believe to be incontrovertible, whether they reflect well or ill on any such 
regime in the past, but it does mean that I have renounced those beliefs which, 




Though he held an obvious political incentive to relegate fascism to its 
interwar context, under Chesterton’s direction the LEL showed few signs of 
developing into a genuine neo-fascist enterprise. Its core concern lay with the 
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preservation of the British empire, or Chesterton and his followers’ idealistic 
conception of the empire, rather than the establishment of a radically new society. Its 
rhetoric and ideology contained overarching themes of cultural decadence and 
national regeneration, similar to those that permeated British and European fascism. 
These elements, coupled with the LEL’s general program of radical nationalism, 
anti-communism and conspiratorial anti-Semitism, made it appealing to those who 
did aspire to neo-fascist pursuits, as did the confrontational style of its public 
demonstrations.
155
 Those hoping that the LEL would transform itself into a mass 
party were inevitably disappointed, however, by Chesterton’s reluctance to wager the 
group’s reputation and scarce resources on what he dubbed an ‘electoral orgy’.
156
  
More so than the LEL itself, Candour invited accusations of fascism and even 
Nazism by virtue of its blatant expressions of anti-Semitism and racial prejudice. 
Chesterton’s favourable discussion of the authoritarian regimes in Spain and 
Portugal gave credence to the notion that he harboured an abstract sympathy for 
dictatorship, but he made no attempt to advocate such a system in Britain. He 
likewise made no attempt to rehabilitate the reputation of the European fascists since 
1939, though he continued to insist that they, along with movements in Britain, had 
been part of a general ‘revolt’ against international finance and class warfare in the 
1930s:  
 
Whether or not these were good ideas it would now be profitless to argue. 
The regimes which espoused them, turning criminally insane in their final 
amok-run, left as their memorials the foulness of Ravensbruck, the gas-ovens, 
and the vile doing to death of gallant British airmen… nobody recoiled with 
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more horror from such outrages than those of us who had been advocates of 
the Corporate state, nobody gained a clearer perception than we did of the 




Candour largely refrained from the crude forms of Nazi-apologia and 
‘nostalgic fascism’ that would become hallmarks of neo-fascist literature.  On some 
occasions, however, Chesterton’s conspiratorial analysis blurred into fascist 
revisionism, which in turn drew him into contact with the wider circles of the 
extreme right in Western Europe. Chesterton showed no interest in the pan-European 
ideals put forward by Mosley, but he retained an interest in Germany and political 
affairs throughout the continent.  This interest was encouraged by his relationship 
with Otto Strasser, the leader of the left-wing ‘Strasserite’ faction within the Nazi 
party who had fled Germany following Hitler’s rise to power. Shortly after Strasser 
was granted permission to return to Germany in April 1955, he met with Chesterton 
in Dublin. The following year, a series of interviews with Strasser appeared in 
Candour, allowing the ‘much persecuted German patriot’ to expound upon his plans 
for ‘Solidarism’, a new movement ‘equally opposed to Communism and 
Capitalism’.
158
 Strasser favourably compared his plans to another incipient ‘National 
Renaissance’ movement in the European extreme right, the French Poujadists, whose 
nationalist, anti-taxation campaigns drew noteworthy support from rural areas and 
small shopkeepers.
159
 Pierre Poujade’s movement in turn attracted support from 
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Chesterton and Strasser held much in common ideologically, sharing a vision 
of an alternative ‘social order’ to capitalism and communism that drew inspiration 
from medieval guild systems. In addition, Strasser echoed Chesterton’s frequent 
denunciations of the United States’ expanding influence in Europe through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
161
 This common ground never resulted in any kind of 
real cooperation or alliance between Chesterton and Strasser, however, with 
Candour and the LEL’s focus remaining primarily on the Empire and 
Commonwealth. By contrast, Mosley made an effort after 1947 to ally himself with 
European neo-fascist organizations: his journal The European served to promote his 
concept for ‘pan European nationalism’ but remained open to contributions from 
those, like Strasser, who opposed further European integration.
162
 Chesterton’s 
inflexible concept of nationalism made it difficult for him to move forward from the 
ideals of the interwar period, and brought him ridicule from Mosley’s followers: ‘He 
continues to repeat like a parrot the views he learned from Mosley in pre-war days, 
refusing to face the changed circumstances of the post-war world’.
163
  
There is no doubt that Chesterton’s views were slow to change, where they 
changed at all, on matters of international politics and British national identity. Yet 
his conception of nationalism and the issue of European integration proved to be 
among the most prescient and enduring aspects of his political thinking after 1945. 
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While the war was still in progress, Chesterton noted with alarm the ‘Fashionable 
Fifth Column’ in Britain that favoured the nation’s entry into a union with Europe. 
Even proposals that deigned to increase Britain’s sphere of influence, such as Jan 
Smuts’ proposal that the Empire be integrated with Western Europe, he viewed with 
suspicion: ‘though absurd, that dream is dangerous. The bait is admirably designed 
to tickle the British ego, but the hook is no other thing than Federal Union’.
164
 While 
the most pressing concern for Chesterton was the prospect of a union involving 
Britain, he retained a general hostility towards the idea of a federated Europe, like 
that proposed between West Germany and France: ‘Friendships can promote 
common institutions’, he argued, ‘but those institutions cannot promote friendships. 
If there is to be Franco-German accord upon which the European future depends, it 
will not be because European federation has paved the way’.
165
 
By 1956, renewed proposals for Britain’s entry into a European Common 
Market led Chesterton to denounce the plans as a form of communist takeover that 
would allow meddling in its members’ political and administrative affairs. Much as 
the Suez crisis had appeared as a real world manifestation of Chesterton’s conspiracy 
theories, so the Common Market served as evidence of the ‘Money Power’ at work: 
the European Commission would act as a conduit for the financial domination of 
sovereign nations, whose political direction could be influenced by the control of 
labour allocation and trade restrictions. The end goal of this ‘evil design’, Chesterton 
concluded, would be the merger of the Common Market with the Soviet Union and 
the formation of a world government, thus marking the ultimate abrogation of 
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 The urgency of the Common Market issue grew following 
the rise of Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister in 1957, with his government 
applying for membership of the community in 1961. In July 1962, the LEL 
distributed a pamphlet attacking Macmillan’s ‘treasonous’ attempts to enter the EEC, 
thus exposing Britain and her dominions to a gradual erosion of independence. 
Reiterating his earlier attacks on the politically hegemonic aspirations of the 
European Commission, Chesterton emphasized that Britain’s entry into the market 
would be an irreversible loss of independence:  
 
The intention, and let there be no doubt about this, is not merely to destroy 
British (and French and German and Italian) nationhood through the 
abrogation of national sovereignty, but also to effect so drastic a change in the 
pattern of world trade that, were a future British Government resolved to opt 




Despite its conspiratorial underpinnings, Chesterton’s attack on the EEC 
predicted many of the arguments used by contemporary movements calling for 
Britain’s exit from Europe.
168
 Ironically, given the Wall Street menace behind 
Chesterton’s conspiracy theories, it was suspicion of the United States’ drive for 
power that kept Britain out of Europe for a decade after Macmillan’s initial 
campaign. Fearing that Britain would serve as a conduit for American interests, 
French leader Charles De Gaulle placed a restriction on new applicants to the 
community in January 1963.
169
 The reprieve failed to deter Chesterton, who declared 
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De Gaulle’s obstruction to be another facet of the elaborate conspiracy at hand: ‘The 
grand strategy is to leave Britain bare and cringing, sufficiently softened-up for 
absorption in the European Economic Community without reservations of any 
kind’.
170
 De Gaulle’s purpose (either as a deliberate conspirator or merely a puppet) 
was to delay Britain’s entry until the last vestiges of the Empire had been destroyed. 
Had he been willing to embark on a more populist campaign against the Common 
Market, or entered into an alliance with the more conservative opponents of 
European integration, Chesterton might have leveraged the issue into a common 
cause with nationalists both within Britain and Europe. Ultimately, however, his 
campaigns against the Common Market remained embedded in a wider form of 
conspiratorial anti-Semitism that appealed only to a narrower sphere within Britain’s 
extreme right.  
The most hopeful signs of international support for the LEL appeared outside 
the European sphere altogether, as Chesterton appealed to the white-minority 
populations of former British colonies in South Africa, Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia. In June 1958, Chesterton embarked on a tour through Africa which 
yielded a number of new Loyalist branches throughout Southern Rhodesia, the 
Central African Federation and Kenya, which Chesterton described triumphantly as 
the ‘Land of Loyalists’.
171
 In the years following his affliction with bronchitis in 
October 1957, Chesterton would embark on further overseas tours in England’s 
winter months to avoid the effects of cold weather. The majority of these tours took 
place in Africa, in proximity to Chesterton’s winter residence in Cape Town, but on 
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occasion he ventured further afield. From February through April 1960 he embarked 
on a speaking tour of the southern hemisphere, visiting supporters in Australia and 
members of the LEL’s New Zealand branch in Auckland.
172
 
In the words of Rosine De Bounevialle, who took over the editorship of 
Candour following Chesterton’s death in 1973, the Candour-League movement 
benefited from a ‘wide but deep’ support base: a broadly distributed group of 
followers whose dedication to the cause was strong enough to bolster the movement 
despite an absence of wider popular support.
173
 The settler-colonial populations of 
Kenya and Southern Rhodesia were directly confronted by the upheavals of 
decolonization and racial integration. Chesterton was optimistic that, therefore, white 
populations in Britain’s former colonies would be more receptive to the LEL’s 
mission than domestic Britons. This proved true on some occasions, such as 
Chesterton’s tour of Kenya in 1957, which resulted in eight new branches being 
established. These advances amounted to little long term progress, however, as did 
the LEL’s campaigns in South Africa, where Chesterton’s anachronistic vision of a 
revitalized British empire met with apathy similar to that he encountered in 
England.
174
 A tentative figure offered by Chesterton in July 1957 put the overall 
strength of the LEL at between 8000 and 10,000 individuals spread throughout the 
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For most of its existence, but particularly during the 1960s, the LEL was 
beset by the problem of political space. Though the group’s reactionary and anti-
communist traits made it potentially attractive to disaffected conservatives, 
particularly following the Conservative Party’s progressive turn under Harold 
Macmillan, Chesterton’s ongoing ideological attachment to anti-Semitism, anti-
Americanism and esoteric conspiracies ran contrary to this purpose.
176
 Even those 
conservatives who were driven rightward by decolonization after 1960 sought more 
respectable confines, such as the Monday Club – a self-professed ‘radical right’ 
group within the Tory party that was established following Macmillan’s ‘Winds of 
Change’ speech in February 1960.
177
 The most severe setback for the LEL came in 
April 1961 with the death of its patron, Robert Key Jeffery, who succumbed to 
intestinal illness at the age of 91. Having relied on Jeffery for the vast majority of 
their funding prior to this point, Candour and the LEL stood to benefit greatly from 
his passing, with Chesterton named as the primary inheritor of his patron’s will.
178
 
Shortly prior to Jeffery’s death, however, a new will was produced naming a female 
relative as the recipient of the funds. Adding to the air of suspicion surrounding this 
turn of events, the new will was marked only with a finger print in lieu of Jeffery’s 
signature.
179
 Chesterton and his supporters’ immediately began an investigation 
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aimed at contesting the new will’s authenticity, marking the start of a protracted, 
expensive and ultimately futile legal battle that lasted for more than a decade.
180
  
With no other sources of funding beyond individual donations and 
subscriptions, Candour was forced to cease regular publication until it was able to 
secure enough donations to resume monthly publication in 1966.
181
 While the LEL 
was able to continue its public stunts and demonstrations, the fight over Jeffery’s 
will consumed money and time that might otherwise have helped the movement’s 
flagging domestic membership. Appeals for funding became a recurring aspect of the 
‘interim reports’ issued by Candour in lieu of a regular publishing schedule, while 
Chesterton was forced to meet many of the LEL’s expenses from his personal 
finances. A report from Brooks (the group’s acting treasurer) in November 1963 
complained that wealthy supporters of Candour and the LEL were more readily 
forthcoming with advice than financial support.
182
 In the absence of a large 
distribution or some other form of patronage, both ventures were forced to rely on 
the generosity of a shrinking support base whose idealism outstripped its means: 
‘There is hope’, Brooks wrote in conclusion to his report, ‘but if it is to be fulfilled 
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In February 1960, John Bean’s National Labour Party merged with Colin Jordan’s 
White Defence League to form the British National Party (BNP), under the slogan 
‘For Race and Nation’.
184
 The merger was mutually beneficial, insofar as neither 
party had experienced any major growth and faced competition from the more 
established Union Movement. Problems quickly arose, however, from the diverging 
political visions of the party leadership:  Bean was a committed white nationalist but 
felt that the only chance of such principles gaining political ground was through civil 
politics and the ballot box. By contrast, Colin Jordan and John Tyndall combined a 
distaste for democratic politics with a penchant for uniformed demonstrations and 
violence.
185
 Bean later claimed to have tolerated these tendencies on the grounds that 
a certain amount of ‘controlled muscle’ was necessary to fend off attacks from 
‘Reds’ who threatened the party’s public demonstrations.
186
 By 1961, however, 
Tyndall and Jordan’s militant aspirations had coalesced into a full-blown attempt at 
paramilitarism. The two men formed an internal faction known as the ‘Spearhead’ -- 
conceived as a physical means of defending the British National Party’s platform in 
a similar manner to Mosley’s Defence Force. During the same period, Jordan made 
contact with an array of right wing groups in Europe and the United States, including 
Neo-Nazi and neo-fascist groups, hoping to form a coalition of like-minded parties. 
In May 1961, a five day ‘Northern European’ camp was held in Norfolk with the 
BNP hosting delegates that Jordan had contacted in the European and North 
American extreme right.
187
 Bean jokingly recalled in his memoir that the attendees 
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of this camp broke into two factions: the committed ideologues of ‘Spearhead’ led 
by Jordan and the ‘Beerhead’, consisting of Bean and other members who attended 
mainly for relaxation and trips to the local pub.
188
  
Early in the following year, the activities of the ‘Spearhead’ had become 
disruptive to the point where Jordan and Tyndall were expelled from the BNP. On 20 
April 1962, the anniversary of Adolf Hitler’s birth, the two men formed the 
‘National Socialist Movement’ (NSM). The NSM took the opposite approach to 
other groups in the extreme right by embracing and even flaunting its sympathy to 
fascism and Nazism. At a public demonstration in July 1962, a handful of NSM 
supporters made the fascist salute and displayed banners bearing the ‘sun-wheel’ 
insignia and the slogan ‘Britain Awake’.
189
 For this display they were mobbed by 
thousands of anti-fascist demonstrators, a number that dwarfed the membership of 
the NSM itself, estimated to be only in the hundreds.
190
 The NSM might readily have 
fallen into obscurity had it not attracted attention from the authorities. In July 1962, 
Jordan organized a meeting of National Socialists in Gloucestershire, including the 
leader of the American Nazi Party Lincoln Rockwell, who had illegally entered the 
country through Ireland.
191
 By the end of August 1963, Rockwell had been deported 
back to the United States and four members of the NSM had been charged with 
violating the Public Order Act. A series of investigations by the police revealed that 
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members of the NSM had engaged in training exercises that involved military style 
drills in uniform. Evidence produced in the subsequent trial included a collection of 
Nazi memorabilia, as well as several tins of weed killer stored at NSM headquarters 
that the prosecution argued could be used as explosives.
192
 All four members of the 
Spearhead were imprisoned, with Jordan and Tyndall receiving sentences of nine and 
six months respectively.
193
 Not long after their release from prison, in the spring of 




Since the early days of the LEL, Chesterton had carefully avoided linking the 
LEL to political activity that could be construed as subversive or terrorist in nature.  
In 1955, he claimed that several ‘agent provocateurs’ had approached the 
organization with the aim of discrediting its cause, or bringing it into association 
with criminal activity. Among the various activities he linked to ‘enemy agents’, 
Chesterton described a form of paramilitary activity similar to that which saw Jordan 
and Tyndall imprisoned: ‘cloak and dagger groups, usually containing no more than 
half-a-dozen young men, all living in a world of fantasy in which they appear to 
themselves as great conspiratorial heroes dealing with profound affairs of state’.
195
 
Some years later, Chesterton launched an attack on the White Defence League and 
other neo-Nazi groups after Jordan interrupted an LEL protest by letting off 
firecrackers.  
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Up and down the country comes news of the proliferation of groups actuated 
by the same kind of impulse. From all I hear, most of them are re-living at 
second-hand a played-out (and by now decidedly malodorous) dream of the 
‘thirties. The music is by Wagner. The words, very often, are by kind 
permission of Horst Wessel… such lightweights, shut in their inane little 




Along with his rebuke of Jordan and other ‘thunder-flashers’, Chesterton 
responded to accusations that the restrained approach to direct action adopted by the 
LEL – whose members were instructed not to fight back against stewards or police – 
was evidence of ‘flabbyness’. On the contrary, Chesterton argued, LEL activists 
were required to show ‘steadfast discipline’ in refraining from violence, whereas 
more militant activity was likely to attract negative publicity, endanger the public 
and ultimately harm the cause being fought for.
 197
 As with the other disputes taking 
place in Britain’s extreme right at this time, arguments over violence reflected a mix 
of generational and ideological divisions in the movement. Few of the LEL’s mostly 
elderly and middle-aged membership was likely to support serious breaches of the 
law, let alone the kind of open brawling which followed other extreme right 
demonstrations. More importantly, Chesterton had long abandoned any interest in 
the fascist principles of paramilitary vanguardism or redemptive political violence.  
To a some younger members of the extreme right, physically and socially 
uninhibited like many members of the LEL, these notions were still valid – even if 
they had to be concealed or synthesized with more respectable forms of party 
activism. An interview with John Tyndall in 1978 captured some of the divide 
between Chesterton and the new generation of radicals. In addition to remarking 
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upon the LEL’s reticence to engage in traditional party activism, Tyndall expressed 
disagreement with Chesterton’s perception of fascism in the 1930s: 
 
[Chesterton] had a theory that the British Union of Fascists started on its 
downwards slide as a result of the riot at Olympia. I always thought that 
rubbish, with due respect to A.K. – absolute rubbish… from all the accounts 
I’ve had from people who were there, the reds got no more than they deserved 
and there would’ve been no other way to have dealt with it.
198
 
Given this difference in outlook between the LEL and the other factions, the 
prospects for a unified front of extreme right parties appeared unlikely in 1964. With 
the LEL now struggling to maintain its membership and public profile, however, 
there was pressure on Chesterton to seek some form of collaboration. At the LEL’s 
‘Council of War’ meeting in June 1964, Austen Brooks acknowledged that ‘the two 
questions that cropped up at every meeting were those of the League’s title and of 
co-operation with other organizations’. Brooks response was pessimistic, noting that 
past attempts at collaboration had proved troublesome and that members of the LEL 
were unable to agree on which organizations should be contacted.
199
 Nevertheless, 
Chesterton’s address to the council suggested the vague possibility of their cause 
receiving ‘reinforcements’ from British youth: 
 
We may look glumly at the youth of the nation, at any rate at its more 
flamboyant elements, but there is nothing there that a haircut, a bath, a boot 
on the backside and a parade-ground bashing could not put right… It is a 
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Over the next two years, the impetus for a united front grew even stronger, as 
Tyndall privately encouraged Bean and Chesterton to overcome their differences. By 
October 1966, negotiations between the LEL, John Bean’s British National Party and 
the Racial Preservation Society, a group founded to promote repatriation of non-
white migrants, had progressed to the point where an article in the Sunday Telegraph 
suggested that a merger of the three organizations was imminent.
201
 This report 
proved to be slightly premature. In a letter to Bean the following month, Chesterton 
expressed dissatisfaction with Bean’s comments on the LEL’s lack of progress and 
electoral success. Overall, however, Chesterton’s tone in the letter was conciliatory 
and he expressed to Bean the potential advantages of a merger between the two 
organizations: 
 
You also have what we do not have to any extent, an appeal to the working 
classes, which seemed to us another good reason for a merger. It is not always 
easy to achieve a blending of different elements of the community – it was a 
very real difficulty in the pre-war BUF – but given genuine goodwill in the 




Tyndall, who met successively with Chesterton and Bean in 1966, further 
encouraged plans for a unified nationalist organization.  Due to the notoriety of his 
recent activity, however, recently exacerbated by a conviction for possession of 
firearms in 1966, it was agreed that Tyndall would remain out of the National Front 
for the time being; members of the Greater Britain Movement were meanwhile 
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encouraged to join the National Front on an individual basis.
203
 Following further 
negotiations with Bean and the BNP’s leader Andrew Fountaine, Chesterton put 
forward plans for a merger at the LEL’s annual general meeting in October 1966. 
After the LEL membership approved the move, the merger was completed in 
January 1967 thus marking the formal beginning of the National Front, amalgamated 
from the membership and leadership of the British National Party, the League of 
Empire Loyalists and parts of the Racial Preservation Society. Chesterton was 
appointed Chairman of the National Front’s ‘Policy Directorate’, the committee 
responsible for overseeing policy and the party’s membership, while Fountaine took 
on a corresponding role as Chairman of the party’s ‘Executive Directorate’.
204
 
In terms of political potential, the formation of the National Front represented 
an important milestone for Britain’s extreme right, which had otherwise been unable 
to sustain a unified party of any significance since the collapse of the BUF. 
Particularly in relation to Chesterton, who had remained aloof from party politics for 
much of this intervening period, the new party also heralded a return to mass politics 
and, by extension, a more concerted attempt to revive or reinvent the cause of British 
fascism. In spite of the National Front’s importance in the broader history of 
Britain’s extreme right, Chesterton’s involvement – when viewed in the context of 
his entire political career – was relatively brief and ignominious. The same signs of 
personal and ideological fractiousness that had beset earlier movements were evident 
from the National Front’s inception, with the long and cautious negotiation process 
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giving an early indication of the tenuous relationship between the LEL and BNP 
factions. Chesterton assured LEL members that the merger had been carefully 
negotiated to avoid ‘linking the League with past swastika-daubing and similar 
activities’, a tacit reference to the neo-Nazi affiliation of Tyndall’s Greater Britain 
Movement. By the same token, he sought to dispel a view, commonly held among 




The most pressing issue, as Chesterton had alluded in his letter to Bean, was 
whether or not the different factions could be united under some form of effective, 
mutually respected leadership. Chesterton claimed that the LEL harboured no real 
interest in the debate over who should lead the new organization: ‘We have found in 
our talks with other bodies a disposition to manoeuvre for the position of leader, but 
the matter is not one which greatly interests us’. Given that he later assumed a sole 
position as Chairman of the National Front, it is questionable whether or not 
Chesterton was actually aloof from the question of leadership. By the time the 
National Front was being negotiated, he was accustomed to acting as the head of the 
LEL and the sole editorial voice in Candour.
206
 This experience, coupled with 
Chesterton’s idealistic view of individual leadership, meant that he was disinclined 
to relinquish control over the new movement to younger figures that had yet to prove 
their ‘capacity to lead’.
207
 It was not necessarily the case that Chesterton aspired to 
any kind of demagogic role at the head of the National Front: at an advanced age and 
with increasingly fragile health, he recognized that even serving as the head of the 
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‘Policy Committee’ would prove difficult – not least because of his health-mandated 
absences from England during the winter months. Despite Chesterton’s efforts to 
cultivate greater initiative within the LEL’s membership, many naturally assumed 
that he would assume a preeminent position within the new organization. Other 
participants in the merger like Tyndall ascertained the value in appointing Chesterton 
as a ‘father figure’ to unite the different factions.
208
 An unspoken advantage of this 
situation was that, in theory, a more mature, stately figurehead would bolster the 
party against accusations of neo-Nazism or violent extremism.  
Despite its structural weaknesses, the period in which the National Front was 
formed offered a number of tactical advantages to a party of the extreme right. While 
the circumstances in Britain did not match those prevalent in the ‘Slump’ of the early 
1930s, 1968 heralded greater political uncertainty than had prevailed through the 
prosperous post-war decades following the end of austerity.
209
 Internationally, the 
strikes and demonstrations held throughout Europe coupled with the emergence of a 
revitalized New Left movement gave additional impetus to those on the right who 
feared a new coalition of the extreme left: In France, this fear provided the initial 
impetus for formation of the group eventually known as the Front National, an 
approximate ideological counterpart to the British movement of the same name.
210
 In 
1968, the anti-immigration movement received a significant boost from Conservative 
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MP Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, an unprecedented public declaration 
against the influx of non-whites into Britain made by an otherwise respected member 
of the political establishment. Though the speech was something of a personal 
debacle for Powell, who was expelled from the Conservative Party, its foregrounding 
of the immigration debate was a boon to the recently formed National Front.
211
 
Along with boosting the party’s profile and membership, the positive reaction to 
Powell’s comments from parts of the public offered to resolve two of the major 
problems inhibiting Britain’s extreme right: the lack of an independent political 
space outside the purview of British conservatism, and the absence of a legitimate 
identity capable of outgrowing interwar fascism.   
The international issues that had preoccupied the LEL were of less immediate 
value to the National Front, but aligned with its overall stance on racial and national 
sovereignty. National Front policy (circa 1969) dictated that the party would ‘give 
unremitting support to British and other European communities overseas in their 
maintenance of civilization in lands threatened with a reversion to barbarism’.
212
  To 
this end, the party protested the boycott of apartheid South Africa and declared its 
support for Ian Smith’s white-minority government in Rhodesia.
213
 Rather than carry 
forward the LEL’s somewhat dated references to the maintenance of the British 
Empire, the National Front proposed that the Commonwealth be replaced with ‘ a 
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modern British world system’ based on a cooperation between the United Kingdom 
and the white dominions. Alongside Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Rhodesia, 
South Africa and Eire were offered ‘an honoured place’ in the new system, while 
association with ‘approved Afro-Asian countries’ would be decided ‘on terms 
acceptable to its foundation members’.
214
 Despite its concessions to recent events, 
the system proposed was effectively the same as that proposed by Chesterton since 
1945: a self-sufficient autarchy based on agricultural, economic and military 
independence from communism and international finance.  
There were additional parallels to be made to Mosley’s original plans for an 
empire economy, though the presentation of the National Front proposals could be 
credited in part to Tyndall, whose pamphlet Six Principles of British Nationalism 
described an updated system of British cooperation. Some of the National Front’s 
proposals bore an unmistakable similarity to Mosley’s corporatism, such as the call 
for the state to mediate relationships between employees and employers while 
‘maintaining the principle of private enterprise within a framework of national 
guidance’.
215
 Other elements of the National Front’s fourteen-point policy statement 
echoed the spirit, if not the letter, of fascist doctrine in the 1930s. A National Front 
government would create a movement ‘for the healthy mental and physical 
development of British youth’, a task which had also preoccupied the vitalist, youth-
obsessed Blackshirts. The party’s statements regarding its powers of governance 
were a mixture of fascist sentiment and hard-line conservatism, calling for  
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firm and democratic government, responsible for and to the British people, 
with the courage to cure the Nation of the spiritual  sickness that generates 
more sympathy for the murderer, thug and criminal than for their unfortunate 
victims, and fails to provide society the backing for protection necessary to 




Taken at face value, the National Front’s policy was mostly in line with the 
broadly authoritarian or ‘tough on crime’ stance adopted by many extreme right 
parties in Western Europe in lieu of outright fascism. The wording of the policy bore 
unmistakeable signs of fascist influence, however, with Chesterton’s oblique 
reference to an organic national body afflicted by some kind of spiritual ailment.
217
 If 
this suggested the covert or unconscious resumption of fascism within Chesterton’s 
political activism, then other parts of the National Front’s policy seemed to suggest a 
pivot towards radical conservatism. Point five of the party’s program called for 
constitutional reforms to combat ‘the disturbing trend towards over-centralization 
and irresponsible bureaucratic dictatorship’ and ‘reaffirming the basic Rights and 
Freedoms that are the prerogatives of the British people’.
218
 Although this could be 
viewed simply as pseudo-democratic posturing on the part of the National Front, 
policies of this kind were not without precedent in the recent history of Britain’s 
extreme right. Measures for constitutional reform had been proposed by members of 
the After-Victory group circa 1945, and more recently, Candour provided a regular 
platform for articles criticizing fiscal irresponsibility and other forms of 
governmental overreach. In a more immediate sense, following the passage of the 
Race Relations Act in 1965, the National Front and other political opponents of 
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racial integration had renewed incentive to rally behind the principles of free speech 
and the right to protest. To aid five members of the Racial Preservation Society, 
charged with violating the Act, Chesterton established a ‘Free Speech Defence 
Committee’ which raised some £4000 to cover the cost of the successful defence. 
This sum was, according to the committee’s honourary treasurer, ‘a small price to 




 During the first year of the National Front’s existence, Chesterton trained 
much of his attention on the affairs of Britain’s former colonies, a tendency 
encouraged the six months he spent wintering in South Africa for health reasons. His 
focus returned to domestic affairs in April 1969, with the resignation of French 
president Charles De Gaulle, which removed a major obstacle to Britain’s entry into 
European common market. With the Conservative Party under the direction of the 
pro-European Edward Heath, Chesterton’s dire prediction of a resurgent drive for 
European integration came true.  Not every member of the National Front shared 
Chesterton and his LEL cohorts’ determination to avoid European entanglements: 
John Bean had entertained the idea of a more continental focus in the foundation of 
the BNP and counselled the readers of Spearhead, John Tyndall’s nationalist 
magazine, on the potential benefits of closer cooperation with Europe. This was an 
exception to the party’s general preoccupation with a resurgent British nationalism, 
which in Tyndall’s view required a greater focus on the United Kingdom and the 
white nations of the Commonwealth.
220
 Following De Gaulle’s resignation, 
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therefore, Chesterton oversaw the launch of a National Front campaign against the 
Common Market in May 1969, rallying under the slogan of ‘Keep Britain Out’.
221
 
Although this campaign was of little immediate consequence for the National Front, 
opposition to European integration remained a permanent fixture of the party’s 
platform throughout the 1970s and a wider legacy of Chesterton’s influence on the 
British extreme right.    
The National Front’s dual-directorate system was envisioned as a means to 
prevent leadership disputes and avoid exacerbating the split between the LEL and 
BNP factions of the new party. Chesterton’s forced absences made the 
administration of the party difficult, however, and permitted infighting. Following 
his return from South Africa in the spring of 1968, Chesterton became embroiled in a 
factional dispute with the Executive Directorate led by Fountaine, who alleged that 
Chesterton had been incommunicative while overseeing National Front affairs via 
‘remote control’ from overseas. Fountaine and his supporters further alleged that 
Chesterton had invited extremism into the Front’s ranks by his efforts to make 
Tyndall a formal member, had demanded excessive displays of ‘loyalty’ from other 
members, and had failed to properly manage the party’s funds.
222
 In May 1968, 
Chesterton clashed with Fountaine again over a directive written by the latter in 
response to rioting in Paris – which included instructions for members in the event of 
a ‘revolution’ spreading to Britain.  After preventing the directive from being 
distributed, Chesterton attempted to consolidate the two directorates of the National 
Front leadership into a single council, prompting further protests from Fountaine and 
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others who resented the autocratic nature of their chairman’s leadership.  This 
dispute came to a head in June 1968 when Fountaine was expelled from the National 
Front on grounds of ‘insubordination’.
223
 Fountaine was reinstated to the party the 




Following the spat with Fountaine, Chesterton resolved to simplify the 
National Front’s governance by consolidating the two directorates into a single body 
with himself at the head. This temporarily resolved the leadership question but 
fostered resentment among the members of the party dissatisfied with the dominance 
of Chesterton and the LEL faction. Even Tyndall, a supporter of Chesterton’s 
leadership and later the party’s leader, acknowledged in retrospect that his position 
on the directorate was ‘in a way autocratic’, driving dissident members of the party 
to ‘plot against him behind the scenes’.
225
  An even deeper source of dissent against 
Chesterton was his unwillingness to capitalize more heavily on the backlash against 
immigration yielded by Powell’s speech. Besides his general reticence to engage in a 
broader campaign of anti-immigration populism, his attitude towards Powell 
precluded any notion of an alliance with the former-MP or his supporters. In the 
pages of Candour, Chesterton attacked Powell as a ‘fortunate gentleman’ whose late 
arrival to the immigration issue was a sign of political opportunism: ‘Never before 
has there been a heretic more prized and petted than this heretic’.
226
 Besides his 
bitter recrimination of Powell’s rapid rise to notoriety, Chesterton also expressed 
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concern over the now deposed minister’s other political views. Powell took a 
decidedly different view of Empire to loyalists like Chesterton, arguing that the 
‘myth’ of a lost golden age had limited rather than enabled England’s ability to 
flourish culturally and economically.
227
 
In the General Election of June 1970, the National Front ran 10 candidates but 
received disappointing returns, with all candidates failing to retrieve their deposit by 
exceeding 5 percent of votes cast. In the wake of these results, another rift emerged 
within the party leadership, this time in the form of an ‘Action Committee’ made up 
of members who regarded Chesterton as out of touch with contemporary politics. 
Although he enjoyed general support from prominent NF members like Tyndall and 
Bean, the challenge from the Action Committee served as the catalyst for 
Chesterton’s exit from the National Front. Following the distribution of a critical 
circular written by the Action Committee, Chesterton resigned from the National 
Front along with most of the remaining LEL members. In the December issue of 
Candour, Chesterton outlined the reasons for his departure: 
 
There is some fine material in the National Front but too many people of little 
minds and meaner souls have been allowed to rise into the higher echelons. 
Get rid of them and the movement has a future. Keep them where they are 
and so much time will be spent in petty intrigues that none will be left for 




Chesterton quickly made arrangements for a new, non-party entity known as 
the Candour League to support his publishing efforts and replace the now defunct 
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LEL. With recent events having confirmed his antipathy towards traditional political 
organizing, Chesterton determined that the new organization would ‘keep clear of 
the political market-place, squalid in-fighting’ and ‘do for the Right what the Fabian 
Society did for the Left’. In a somewhat belated acknowledgement of the LEL’s 
anachronistic posture, Chesterton also admitted that the new organization would 
avoid the ‘Empire’ moniker, which had long since ‘come to mean any big (and 
dubious) financial, commercial or industrial complex’.
229
 With Chesterton’s 
resignation, leadership in the National Front had been assumed by John O’Brien, a 
former Powellite who intended to draw the party towards a more restrained form of 
right-wing populism. O’Brien saw the National Front through a period of steady 
growth in 1971, with a report in The Times predicting that the party was poised to 
reach 15,000 members across the United Kingdom.
230
 In 1972, however, O’Brien 
and a number of other moderate leaders resigned following revelations that Tyndall, 
then vice-chairman of the party, had been in contact with neo-Nazi groups active on 
the European continent.
231
 Tyndall’s subsequent ascent to the party’s leadership 
roughly coincided with the event that would provide its most promising boost in 
membership and electoral performance to date: the arrival in Britain of thousands of 
Asian migrants who had been expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin.
232
  
Despite having been responsible for O’Brien’s entry into the National Front 
in 1970, Chesterton did not appear concerned by his departure and maintained a 
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friendly relationship with Tyndall after he assumed the party leadership.
233
 On 
occasions, Chesterton even lent practical support to Tyndall’s party: when a group of 
National Front members were arrested for protesting the arrival of Asian refugees 
from Uganda at Heathrow Airport in October 1972, Chesterton appealed for 
financial support on their behalf in Candour.
234
  In 1973, Chesterton was contacted 
by Tyndall regarding the possibility of his being appointed as the National Front’s 
President, a figurehead position that would facilitate further cooperation between the 
party and other nationalist organizations.
235
 Despite the opposition of Martin 
Webster, whom Chesterton had once derided as ‘the fat boy from Peckham’, the 
National Front’s directorate voted in favour of this measure. Chesterton was formally 
offered the role by Tyndall in June 1973. Having postponed his decision until the 
National Front’s next annual general meeting, however, Chesterton was unable to 
assume the role prior to his death in August 1973.
236
 Had his health not decided the 
matter, Chesterton’s willingness to rejoin the National Front may have been 
influenced by other matters relating to the party’s increasing links to neo-Nazism. In 
a brief piece of correspondence with Tyndall in May 1973, Chesterton requested 
information regarding ‘the participation of some N.F. members in an operation 
called 88’.
237
 This number referred to ‘Column 88’ a neo-Nazi group that emerged in 
the National Front’s ranks in the early 1970s, along with an array of other 
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clandestine factions that would later be implicated in right-wing terrorist activity and 
the neo-fascist subcultures of Western Europe.
238
  
Alongside his ongoing dealings with the National Front, Chesterton spent the 
final months of his life in pursuit of a unified effort to protest Britain’s membership 
of the European Economic Community.  In May 1973, he met with Don Bennett, a 
former Vice Marshall for the RAF and one-time Liberal MP who had begun 
planning an ‘umbrella organization’ to draw together various political groups 
opposed to European integration known as the Free British.
239
 In the following 
month, Chesterton raised the possibility of seeking Bennett’s direct financial support 
for the costs of operating the Candour League.  Bennett had recently donated 
generous sums to Powell to support his opposition to the Common Market and 
Chesterton appeared optimistic that Candour, being ‘the first to smell out the plot to 
engulf Britain in the EEC’, would also warrant a contribution.
240
 Chesterton further 
confided in a letter to Aidan Mackey, a friend and close supporter of the Candour-
League movement, that his motives for seeking financial support were not solely 
political: ‘in the event of funds drying up’, he wrote, ‘I would not be able to winter 




As events transpired, Chesterton’s health would deteriorate rapidly due to 
cancer a short time after this letter was written. Despite the personal and financial 
                                                             
238
 On the activity and exposure of terrorist and paramilitary factions in the British extreme 
right, see Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p. 262.  
239
 Chesterton Collection E. 28, Letter from A.K. Chesterton to Don Bennett, 16 May 1973; 
‘The Free British’, Candour, June 1973.   
240
 Chesterton Collection E. 29, Letter from A.K. Chesterton to Aidan Mackey, 23 June 
1973.   
241




troubles that dogged Chesterton’s final months he managed to maintain an active 
correspondence, both domestic and international, while continuing to oversee the 
publication of Candour. In July 1973 he sent a message to the Free British asking its 
council to consider ‘special activities likely to focus public attention on the anti-
Common Market cause’, like those employed by the LEL ‘without violence but with 
audacity and tremendous panache’. In a fitting summation of his political career up 
to that point, Chesterton’s final recommendation to the council before his death 
called on them ‘to disregard the statement of the gentleman who said that the 
problem has to be approached without emotion. If ever there was a time for 
appealing to public sentiment it is surely today, when we are faced with the loss of 
our national identity and our sovereign rights as an historic people’.
242
 By the end of 
July 1973, Chesterton had been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and, facing 
uncertain results in the event of surgery, opted to ‘let events take their course’.
243
 He 
succumbed to his illness on 16 August 1973, and was honoured the following month 




Since leaving the National Front, Chesterton had also drafted his memoirs 
and was near the completion of a follow-up to his 1965 book, The New Unhappy 
Lords. Published posthumously under the title Facing the Abyss, the volume 
represented another foray into conspiratorial analysis that focused primarily on 
Britain’s social degeneration. Chesterton’s criticism of the various youth movements 
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emerging in Britain, which he took as evidence of its growing spiritual corruption, 
included a passing reference to ‘skinheads’. This encapsulated the extent to which he 
had grown detached from the youthful undercurrents of Britain’s extreme right, as 
skinhead culture would become synonymous with the movement during the 
1980s.
245
 In private correspondence shortly before his death, Chesterton had 
confessed to a friend that his optimism regarding a British revival had begun to wane 
in light of its entry into the European common market: ‘eventually it must break-
down, but what will then be left to us, with our former Dominions pushed into the 
dollar empire and no longer interested in the British market’.
246
 Between the 
continued decline of Britain’s international prominence and the fractious 
ineffectiveness of Britain’s nationalist movement, there was ample reason for 
Chesterton to opt for a quiet retirement rather than the continued struggle against a 
malevolent global conspiracy. It appeared, however, that the thought of abandoning 
the struggle he had traced from the trenches of the First World War was more of a 
deterrent to Chesterton than accepting the mundane realities of British decline. To do 
so would have been to acknowledge defeat, an unacceptable outcome for denizens of 
the British race: ‘Victory is for the brave in heart and the tough in spirit. In these 
respects we have not the pretext that our fathers left us ill-endowed’.
247
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Chapter 4: A.K. Chesterton, anti-Semitism and racial 
nationalism. 
 
A.K. Chesterton was born into a world where racial identity and hierarchy were a 
part of everyday life. His upbringing in colonial South Africa imparted a concept of 
nationalism tied to the assumption that white Britons had established themselves, 
alongside the other European empire builders, as the progenitors of civilization. His 
understanding of British nationalism was thus defined as much by race and culture as 
it was by geography, with the colonies representing an extension of white 
civilization into the ‘dark corners’ of the world. The cultural and technological 
achievements of Empire served as evidence of British superiority as well as a 
mandate for white supremacy: the right to maintain a benevolent dominance over 
‘lesser’ races of the colonial world.  Alongside the intrinsic racial doctrines of British 
imperialism, the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries also saw the emergence of 
scientific racism: a doctrine that viewed race in terms of biological divergence in the 
human species and made specific judgements as to the consequences of race-mixing. 
These understandings of race played an integral part in shaping Chesterton’s 
activism after 1945, as he positioned himself against two correlated trends in world 
politics: the collapse of colonial race relations in the wake of Britain’s imperial 
decline and the transformation of domestic racial politics as a result of increasing 
non-white immigration to Britain. 
Although themes of race and immigration are now ubiquitous in their 
relationship to the extreme right, it is the second theme of this chapter, anti-
Semitism, which receives the greatest attention. In part, this can be accounted for by 
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the general prominence of anti-Semitism as a theme within the history and 
historiography of interwar British fascism.
1
 More specifically, however, it is 
necessitated by the persistence and ubiquity of anti-Semitism throughout 
Chesterton’s entire political career, spanning his time with the BUF until his death in 
1973. Even after this point, conspiratorial anti-Semitism represented a major part of 
Chesterton’s legacy in the extreme right. At various points during his career, 
Chesterton would describe Jewish internationalism as the greatest threat to British 
interests and an ideological antithesis to his positive concept of national sovereignty 
and transcendent patriotism. Few parts of his political ideology can be understood 
without some reference to the history of British anti-Semitism, the rise of political 
anti-Semitism in the 1930s and the origins of the ‘world Jewish conspiracy’. These 
subjects contextualize Chesterton’s own ideas within the long history of religious, 
political and racial anti-Semitism in Britain and Europe.  
The final portion of this chapter examines the nature of Chesterton’s views on 
race relations and immigration after 1945 beneath the overarching concept of an 
international Jewish conspiracy. In the wider history of the extreme right in Britain, 
Europe and the United States after 1945, racism and the politics of immigration have 
been broadly depicted as taking over the role that anti-Semitism served in interwar 
fascist movements.
2
 As Chesterton and his influence on the League of Empire 
Loyalists and the National Front demonstrate, however, anti-Semitism (particularly 
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in its conspiratorial guise) persisted into the decades after the Second World War 
when these issues began moving to the fore of nationalist and neo-fascist politics. 
The purpose of this discussion, therefore, is to examine how Chesterton sought to 
integrate his wider concept of racial nationalism within the framework of anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories and how this reflected the wider transition between 
British interwar fascism and the populist, anti-immigration parties of Britain’s 
contemporary extreme right.  
 
Colonialism, paternalism and biological racism 
 
The colonial settlements of South Africa and Rhodesia where Chesterton spent his 
early childhood were organized along strict racial lines.  Wage and employment 
disputes were a common source of racial tension on the Rand, with white miners 
threatened by the influx of cheaper labour in the form of indigenous Africans or 
imported Chinese workers. To alleviate conflicts, the mine owners turned to 
measures that either segregated black workers entirely from their European 
counterparts or implemented an industrial colour bar which restricted them to 
unskilled labour.
3
 Under this system, white workers like Chesterton’s father and 
step-father held supervisory roles overseeing administrative duties and maintaining 
machinery, while African workers were confined to the manual tasks of extracting 
and hauling ore. The colour bar was such a prominent feature of Chesterton’s 
upbringing that, when he first arrived in England aged 11, he was taken aback by the 
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‘strange sight of white men working with picks and shovels and doing a multiplicity 
of other jobs with which I had never learned to associate them’.
4
  
When he returned to the Witwatersrand as an adult after the First World War, 
Chesterton found himself in a supervisory role, similar to that once occupied by his 
father, overseeing a group of black manual labourers. The stereotypes that had been 
implanted from his childhood clearly informed his thinking as an adult: African 
workers were ‘slack’ in keeping track of administrative duties, and Chesterton 
insisted that ‘only I was able to keep them up to scratch’.
5
 When the Rand Revolt 
began in 1922, he shared the white miners’ concern that loosening the colour bar 
would be a risk to their safety: ‘As these [roles] included responsibility for operating 
some of the safety devices… as I have never been impressed by the Africans’ sense 
of responsibility and continuity of purpose, I had at first a certain sympathy with the 
White miners’.
6
 Later in life while protesting against decolonization, Chesterton 
warned that the push to remove colour bars was solely designed to secure cheaper 
labour at the expense of whites:  ‘no firm would dream of employing an African if a 
European were available for the job at the same wage or salary. What has the 
European that the African lacks? Superior skill, reliability, continuity’.
7
  
In his recollections of early childhood, Chesterton described the ease with 
which he bypassed the race and class divisions of his surroundings, making contact 
with those his socially conservative mother considered ‘common’. He described fond 
friendships with the ‘house boy’ who worked as the family’s domestic servant and 
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the Zulu policeman working on the Rand.
 8
 Even the friendly interracial dealings of 
colonial South Africa were governed by a racial hierarchy, however, which 
manifested in the basic features of day to day life. House servants were a ubiquitous 
presence in Chesterton’s childhood home where, in his wife’s recollection, ‘coloured 
labour was cheap’.
9
 African servants would also form part of his domestic 
arrangements while wintering in South Africa until the time of his death, an enduring 
reminder of how his colonial outlook on race persisted from childhood. In adulthood, 
Chesterton’s admiration for the culture and indigenous people of Africa persisted 
incongruously alongside these assumptions of racial superiority and inferiority. 
While undergoing preparation for the Abyssinian campaign as an officer in the 
Second World War, he encountered a Signals Colonel whose advice regarding the 
‘proper treatment of Africans’ drove him to protest:  
 
I admitted the irresponsibility of many Africans, and the difficulty of coping 
with many of their traits. But I also tried to express my horror at the perilous 
and pernicious doctrine which had just been preached – a doctrine all the 
more pernicious in that it was calculated to prejudice a host of young and 
inexperienced officers against men upon whose loyalty their own lives would 
depend, and upon whose faithful shoulders rested the main burden of the 




. Despite his deeply paternalistic attitude towards non-whites, Chesterton was 
unabashed in praising the loyalty and service of the colonial forces who aided 
ejecting the Italian army from British East Africa: ‘those troops who rallied to the 
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cause from beyond the frontiers of the Union’.
11
 He would also adapt his experience 
of commanding colonial soldiers into a humorous novel, Juma the Great, one of his 
only non-political works published after 1945. Based around the experiences of the 
titular character of Juma, a Baganda tribal leader turned Motor Transport soldier 
under the command of an exasperated white officer, the tone of this book was 
succinctly summarized by Chesterton’s wife as ‘affectionate, but somewhat 
paternalistic.
12
 Most of the intended humour in the book derived from Chesterton’s 
juxtaposition of Juma’s unsuccessful attempts to reconcile his emotional, tribalistic 
behaviour with the expectations of white military decorum and order. Even within its 
comedic context, this depiction reflected how Chesterton viewed racial types as 
having certain innate characteristics that were appropriate to their natural setting. 
Any attempt to circumvent or alter these natural characteristics was therefore likely 
to feed, rather than diminish, racial resentment:  
 
In his own sphere, while still unspoiled, the African is soft-spoken and acts 
with superb dignity. Most regrettably, when brought into contact with 
Western ideas… he turns himself into an ersatz European, and as the result is 





The political ramifications of Chesterton’s racial paternalism were most 
evident in his response to decolonization, as he rejected outright the possibility of a 
society not under white control. Commenting on South Africa in 1957, he warned 
that ‘The Africans, bereft of good, strong, resolute leadership, will soon lapse into 
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 He also took great pains to publicize incidents that confirmed his 
‘barbaric’ stereotype of colonial independence movements. He developed a 
gruesome fixation on the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya, describing it as ‘the most 
diabolical rebellion of our times’, whose participants ‘were conditioned to engineer 
or participate in infamies fouler than this century before had ever known’.
15
 A 
supplement issued with Candour in July 1960 gave lascivious details of violent, 
sexually depraved ‘oath taking’ conducted by Kikuyu tribespeople prior to engaging 
in violent rebellion. The intent of publishing these oaths was, according to 
Chesterton’s introduction, a warning to white Britons of ‘the kind of mentality to 
which their kith and kin in those territories may be sacrificed’.
16
 Chesterton was also 
derisive of the post-colonial states that emerged after British or European 
administrators withdrew, variously accusing the new leaders of being incompetent, 
corrupt or otherwise incapable of maintaining stable government. These attacks often 
rested on the assumption that the independent leaders (not unlike ‘Juma the Great’) 
were engaged in a futile attempt to mimic white political and social norms; ‘pseudo 
sophisticates and barbarians who have proved themselves able to emulate the White 
man only in political trickery’.
17
 It was far more considerate, in Chesterton’s view, to 
maintain the ‘merciful restraints’ of paternal white-rule than permit the ‘so-called 
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As with the other dimensions of Chesterton’s racial views, this can partly be 
traced to his having been born into a world where segregation by race was an 
accepted and legally enforced norm. Far from the racial homogeneity that defined 
most parts of English society in the early 20
th
 century, Chesterton’s early life in 
South Africa exposed him to dramatic displays of interracial conflict. In 1903, mine 
owners on the Rand imported thousands of Chinese ‘coolie’ labourers to supplant 
Bantu African and white European workers, leading to outbreaks of disorder and 
violence: 
 
Sunday after Sunday the veld beyond our house was the scene of pitched 
battles between hundreds of Africans and Chinese, with the mounted police 
again intervening to disperse the Chinese mobs. It has been my experience in 
many parts of Africa that in any tense three-cornered racial situation 
involving Europeans, Africans and Asians, there has been an affinity between 




Chesterton offered no exact explanation for this dynamic but concluded that 
‘the reason why must be sought, if not in psychology, then in chemistry’, the 
implication in either case being that conflict would inevitably arise from the 
intermingling of different races. The only mechanism capable of preventing racial 
friction in Chesterton’s view was the enforcement of social, political and industrial 
segregation by law, which he defended vigorously in South Africa, Rhodesia and the 
United States during the latter half of his political career. In Britain, these same 
notions of intrinsic racial incompatibility informed Chesterton’s campaign against 
immigration and the domestic politics of race relations. Up to a point, the racialist 
worldview that informed Chesterton’s politics could be attributed to the self-
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justifying assumptions of British imperialism that, as Hannah Arendt put it, 




Particularly after 1945, Chesterton’s political campaigns against 
desegregation and decolonization became reliant on appeals to pseudo-biological 
theories of race-mixing and miscegenation, topics which also became prominent in 
his calls for restricted immigration in Britain. While it is not possible to trace the 
scientific or biological dimensions of Chesterton’s racism to a single source of 
inspiration, the idea of race as a deterministic human trait discernible in terms of 
biology and genetics had risen to prominence before and during his adult life. The 
first serious attempts to resolve the definition of race came prior to the emergence of 
Darwinian theory and were thus lacking in the serious scientific auspices of racial 
theory in the 20
th
 century. French aristocrat Arthur Gobineau’s The Moral and 
Intellectual Diversity of Races, published in English in 1856, posited that the 
downfall of civilizations could be attributed to the gradual, deleterious effects of 
racial impurity through interbreeding.
21
 Gobineau’s ideas were adapted by a series of 
French and German scholars, such as the British-born Houston Stewart-




The impact of these ideas in Britain and the Empire was fairly limited, with 
many liberal sociologists raising objections to the arbitrary, German-centric views 
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 Other forms of biological racism emerged from within 
Britain in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, however, with the task of 
administering colonial populations serving as an impetus for more refined, 
paternalistic methods of conceptualizing race. Social Darwinism, the transference of 
Charles Darwin and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s evolutionary biological theories to 
sociology and politics, was developed by Herbert Spencer in the 1870s. Leading up 
to the interwar decades, an increased focus on the transference of human traits 
through breeding also prompted anthropologists and geneticists to develop theories 
relating to race mixing, alongside the more philosophically orientated eugenics 
movements that were concerned with improving the ‘human stock’.
24
 The influence 
of eugenics on the British Empire was relatively minor compared to the movements 
established in Europe and the United States, yet schools of scientific thought within 
Britain were slow to adapt their understanding to the political implications of heavily 
deterministic theories of physical anthropology and race-mixing. By the time 
scientific racism began to recede from the popular and academic spheres after 1933, 
therefore, it had already been incorporated within the racial ideologies of British and 
European fascism.   
Biological racism was less prominent in the BUF’s platform than in the than 
in the distinctly ‘racial fascism’ promoted by Arnold Leese’s Imperial Fascist 
League.
25
 Official BUF policy suggested that a fascist government under Mosley 
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would not seek to emulate Nazi Germany by formally restricting intermarriage. This 
did not amount to a rejection of racial theory altogether, however, as Mosley claimed 
that a unique ‘British genius’ had allowed the Empire to prevent ‘pollution’ despite 
the many different groups living within its auspices. He also suggested a willingness 
to enforce ‘racial purity’ through state measures if the need arose: 
 
It should not be necessary to secure British racial purity by act of law. It 
should only be necessary by education and propaganda to teach the British 
what racial mixtures are bad… but if legislation was ever necessary to 




While he did not display any real investment in developing the technical or 
scientific policies of the BUF in his own right, Chesterton did demonstrate the ability 
to adapt these ideas in support of his political assumptions. In economics for 
example, he became an energetic proponent of Mosley’s vision of scientifically 
attuned economic corporatism, which suited his notion of an independent, self-
sufficient Empire that stood apart from internationalist influence. Likewise, while he 
made no attempt to develop any complex theory of heritable characteristics on his 
own, Chesterton’s defences of segregation and discrimination after 1945 drew 
support and inspiration from the work of academic and amateur theorists of race. 
After 1939, the legitimacy of scientifically racialist ideas declined within both 
academic and political spheres, as it became linked to inhumane social policies and 
the persecution of Jews in Germany. Far from deterring Chesterton’s interest, 
however, the shift in social and political norms regarding race during and after the 
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Second World War served only to further his reliance on anthropological and 
biological theories as a means of legitimizing ideas that were now under heavy 
scrutiny. As part of a ‘recommended reading’ list accompanying his own New 
Unhappy Lords¸ Chesterton recommended a book by Wesley Critz George, an 
American professor of physical anthropology whose work endeavoured to 
demonstrate differences in intellectual and physical capacity between racial groups.  
Though George’s political involvement was primarily associated with anti-
segregation campaigns in the American South, his work also considered the racial 
dynamics of Rhodesia and South Africa, both of which featured prominently in the 
campaigns of the LEL.
27
  
Chesterton did not strictly ‘eschew all theory’ in his approach to race, as 
Richard Thurlow suggested, but the references to theories of heredity and biology 
provided in his work showed a distinctly weak grasp of scientific or sociological 
principles.
28
 Even with the supposedly rigorous backing of modern physical 
anthropology and genetics, the critiques of racial integration and intermarriage 
appearing in Chesterton’s explanation of the dangers of race-mixing relied on 
simplistic tropes that echoed imperialist dogma and anti-miscegenation from the 
1920s: ‘the mixing of White and Black or Coloured people results in hordes of 
unhappy half-castes who feel that they belong nowhere, whose tendency is to 
embrace the vices of both racial stocks and not to strive after the virtues’.
29 
This 
unsophisticated view of human biology manifested itself, on some occasions, as 
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sheer superstition regarding the incompatibility of different racial groups. In a 
September 1957 edition of Candour, he reported on ‘coloured’ members of the 
American Navy donating blood to a hospital in Auckland: ‘Mixed blood is a phrase 
which came into use long before blood transfusion began, and transfusion itself does 
not make the fact of mixing blood of different race groups any the more 
acceptable’.
30
 On the whole, Chesterton’s approach to the science of race could best 
be described as opportunistic: biology, genetics and anthropology were convenient 
sources of authority and support for views which were not scientifically or 
empirically sound.
 
 It is difficult to categorize Chesterton neatly as either a cultural or biological 
racist, since his definition of ‘race’ itself was often inconsistent. The most common 
example of this inconsistency was his frequent conflation of race and ethnicity, a 
tendency that the American psychologist Gordon Allport described as ‘confusing 
what is given by nature and what is acquired through learning’, resulting in ‘an 
exaggerated belief in the fixity of human characteristics’.
31
 Chesterton used the term 
race when referring to different Anglo-Saxon and European ethnicities and ascribed 
certain fixed characteristics to the English or British ‘race’. As a nationalist, and 
even more so as a British fascist, he was often inclined to invoke heroic archetypes 
of the English people, embodied by individuals of particular artistic genius or 
bravery from Elizabethan legend. Not all of his considerations of the English 
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character relied upon outright displays of individual heroism, however, as he 
described in an article for the Johannesburg Star in 1921: 
 
When all goes well [the Englishman’s] tranquillity is a stupendous thing and 
the men of other nations come to regard him as harmless, unobtrusive, self-
effacing, a person of little or no individuality… Beware of wronging his 
lover, for should you do so you will at last discover the real Englishman, 





The title and inspiration for this article was drawn from ‘The Secret People’, a 
poem published by G.K. Chesterton in 1915 that described the English character as a 
combination of humility and modest heroism. For A.K. Chesterton, this character 
played an important part in their style of benevolent colonial rule that in his mind 
defined the British Empire. In Ireland, for example, he argued that the Englishman 
fought not from a desire to ‘rule with the assurance of a despot’ but because ‘he was 
as proud of Ireland as he was of England; it was because he loved Ireland that he did 
not want to lose her’. However, the English tendency to shy away from overt 
demonstrations of pride or patriotism was not always a benefit to their reputation, as 
Chesterton noted the importance of these displays in other nations: ‘the German has 
his Kultur and his goose step, and the Portuguese his bull fights and his brave 
medals, and his other symbols of military make-believe’.
33
 The original verse of 
G.K. Chesterton’s poem emphasized the paradox between the heroic and passive 
qualities of the English people, who had triumphed over their enemies on the 
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battlefield only to be handed over to a different kind of tyranny managed by an 
implicitly alien bureaucracy:   
 
They have given us into the hand of new unhappy lords,  
Lords without anger and honour, who dare not carry their swords.  
They fight by shuffling papers; they have bright dead alien eyes;  




The words and meaning of this poem stuck with Chesterton throughout his 
political career: its opening lines appeared in the preamble to a Blackshirt article in 
1935, and another passage yielded the title for his conspiratorial manifesto, The New 
Unhappy Lords, some thirty years later.
35
 By the time A.K. Chesterton had joined 
the British Union of Fascists, he had become convinced that British survival 
depended on his people’s ability to overcome their natural tendency towards 
passivity and tolerance as described in ‘The Silent People’:  
It is argued that the defects which make Britons mighty poor revolutionaries 
represent sterling qualities in the national character… The peril of our peoples 
lies in this very toleration in which they are taught to take so large a pride. 
That we are a temperate people is not to our discredit, except that everywhere 




After leaving the BUF in 1938, Chesterton continued to muse on the 
peculiarities of ‘Englishness’ and how this distinguished his people’s behaviour even 
from other Europeans. In his memoir of the Abyssinian campaign in the Second 
World War, for example, Chesterton described his experience aboard a British 
troopship bound for South Africa and how the behaviour of those on board reflected 
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the English character. Whereas the soldiers in his company were content to pass the 
voyage with minimal activity, Chesterton speculated that, aboard a German vessel, 
‘every hour of the day would have been planned to increase our military 
efficiency’.
37
 Whether or not his assumption was correct about the Germans, 
Chesterton regarded nationality as determining the strengths and weaknesses of a 
given people. After the First World War war, he observed that as ‘a more reserved 
race’, the British soldiers had avoided being driven to the emotional and behavioural 
extremes of their enemy: ‘Very, very rarely did one find a Briton driven hysterical, 
except with excitement’.
38
 Some years later, however, he also noted the 
disadvantages posed by this laconic attitude in a life and death struggle: ‘The English 
way of life may be much more pleasant than the German, but in the grim modern 




The distinctions which Chesterton drew between different white ethnicities, 
such as the English and Germans, were ultimately of less consequence than those he 
drew on the basis of skin-colour. His general support for imperialism implied that 
other European cultures had achieved the same right to rule over their colonial 
subjects, and could be considered equivalent in their racial status to Britons. 
Chesterton was adamant, however, that the British Isles and the White dominions 
should maintain a predominantly Anglo-Irish population, to ensure the robustness of 
the British race as a whole.  In September 1957, for example, he cast suspicion on 
the large intake of ‘cosmopolitan immigrants’ arriving in Australia, the majority of 
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which were Southern Europeans rather than the usual Afro-Asian targets of his racial 
discrimination.  For the most part, however, Chesterton was tolerant towards 
Europeans and discriminatory towards those with a physical appearance that clearly 
suggested different heritage, arguing in Candour that ‘There could not be a more 
valid ground for selecting immigrants than that of race. To argue that biological 
differences which distinguish the main racial groups are as irrelevant as the colour of 




The origins of British anti-Semitism and the ‘Jewish question’. 
 
The historical background to anti-Semitism in Europe and Britain can be traced back 
to early modernity, although the earliest forms of prejudice against the Jews were 
often orientated around religion rather than race. Chesterton’s agnosticism was such 
that he held little genuine interest in the religious component of anti-Semitism, 
remarking on one occasion that ‘Nobody in his senses dislikes Jews because of what 
happened at Calvary two thousand years ago’.
41
 While Chesterton’s anti-Semitic 
outlook was self-consciously secular, the longer tradition of Christian anti-Semitism 
in Europe and Britain did have some influence upon his thinking. This was due to an 
overlap between the racial, religious and political traditions of anti-Semitism to 
which Chesterton owed many of his prejudicial and conspiratorial ideas. Certain 
aspects of Christian anti-Semitism had a particular resonance among political anti-
Semites of Chesterton’s ilk. Old Christian myths concerning sinister Jewish religious 
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practices, rituals and hidden texts, for example, found easy purchase within 
Chesterton’s otherwise agnostic vision of a global Jewish conspiracy.
42
 Racial (or 
biological) anti-Semitism emerged in the mid-19
th
 century parallel to the growth of 
racialist theory in Europe. Despite his subsequent reputation as a the ‘father of racist 
ideology’, Arthur Gobineau’s work was not anti-Semitic in its own right.
43
 It did 
provide the groundwork for other influential race-theorists such as Georges de 
Lapouge, however, who combined Gobineau’s concept of ‘Aryan’ racial purity with 
the Social Darwinian dictum of ‘survival of the fittest’. From this combination of 
pseudoscientific theory and racial myth, de Lapouge categorized the Jews not only as 
a biologically distinct race but as the ‘racial enemy’ of Aryan civilization.
44
 These 
ideas were further developed by Houston Stewart-Chamberlain and taken to their 
violent zenith in Germany by Alfred Rosenberg, whose work formed the basis for 
the racial doctrine of the Nazi state.
45
  
Biological anti-Semitism was fairly limited in its impact in Britain, gaining 
some traction in radical circles but otherwise lacking a strong theoretical or political 
base.
46
 The appeal of racial theories to more radically political anti-Semites was the 
immutability of race as a category. With religious anti-Semitism, Jews were always 
able to convert to Christianity, thus freeing themselves of the various accusations 
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levelled against Jewish beliefs and practices. When Jewishness was defined by race, 
however, anti-Semites could point to a more deep rooted issue that demanded a more 
drastic response.
47
 The broader issue of Jews and their relationship with the wider 
community, commonly referred to as the ‘Jewish question’, entered British political 
and social discourse in the late 19
th
 century. Two problems attracted particular 
interest from writers addressing the subject in the 19
th
 century: First, as the European 
world became increasingly defined by nationalism and national identity, where did 
the Jewish people fit? Second, what factors accounted for the violence and unrest 
that had historically resulted  from the interaction of Jewish minorities and the 
Gentile population? 
Considerations of the ‘Jewish question’ in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
were often construed as a legitimate form of social or philosophical inquiry, and did 
not solely emerge from an anti-Semitic fringe. From a post-1945 perspective, 
however, it is hard to accept the notion that the ‘Jewish question’ was not an 
intrinsically anti-Semitic construct. This is especially the case given that the ‘Jewish 
question’ would later give way to discussions of the ‘Jewish problem’, a term that 
would reach its full significance as an ideological underpinning for the Holocaust. 
Even when set apart from the violent, biological anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, the 
notion of a ‘Jewish question’ implied a fundamental separateness of the Jewish 
population. More troublingly, it implied the need for some form of solution to 
resolve the impasse (or ‘problem’) of a Jewish presence in European society.  
 In Britain, the ‘Jewish question’ became a matter of more widespread 
concern following a wave of migration that occurred between 1880 and 1914. In 
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1881, the Czar of Russia Alexander II was assassinated, sparking a wave of pogroms 
throughout Eastern Europe which drove Jews abroad in search of asylum. The 
majority of those seeking asylum, an estimated 2.5 million migrants, settled in the 
United States, while a comparatively small number, somewhere between 100,000-
150,000, settled in Britain. In relative terms, this represented a large increase in the 
total Jewish population, which had previously comprised an Anglo-Jewish 
community numbering only 60,000. 
48
 
The arrival of Eastern European migrants fundamentally altered the character 
of the Jewish community in Britain. These new arrivals altered the widespread 
perception of Jews within Britain and thus informed both the character and intensity 
of anti-Semitism. The distribution of Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe played an 
important part in shaping the stereotypes that drove anti-Semitism after 1881. 
Though pockets of migrants settled throughout regional areas of the country, the 
majority found residence in the East End of London. The street-level resentment of 
the Jewish minority, which arose from the supposed ‘ghettoization’ of the East End, 
was a locus point for broader concerns over the ‘alien problem’ in late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century England. Anti-Semitism in the East End also became a key part the 
BUF’s recruitment campaigns after 1934, which attempted to convert working-class 
anti-Semitism into support for fascism. The kind of prejudice which arose in 
response to Jewish migration from Eastern Europe during this period was similar to 
that levelled at migrants from Asia and Africa after 1945: new migrants were 
regarded as unwanted competition for workers, a risk to public health through the 
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transmission of disease and a generally corrosive force within British institutions.
49
 
Most importantly, Jewish migrants were perceived as uniquely incapable of 
integrating themselves within the wider fabric of British society. Densely populated 
areas that housed a distinctive Jewish populace (‘ghettos’) were taken as evidence of 
a tendency to cloister amongst themselves rather than adopt the native culture.
50
 
Organized anti-Semitism emerged in Britain falteringly at first, buoyed by the 
vague notion of defending ‘Britishness’ and British culture from an alien threat. As 
in other parts of Europe, however, the blurry definition of British identity did not 
prevent ethnocentric anti-Semitism from emerging on the fringes of British politics. 
Colin Holmes observed, in a phrase that seems pertinent to many of Chesterton’s 
views on race and nationalism, that ‘The elusive nature of such concepts did not 
deter those who took up the battle on their behalf’.
51
 Public concern over the ‘Alien 
Problem’, aliens being a general euphemism for Jewish migrants, prompted one of 
the first legislative attempts to restrict immigration to Britain in the 20
th
 century. The 
1905 Aliens Act made it illegal for migrants to enter the country without satisfying 
certain conditions relating to their health, employment prospects and past criminal 
behaviour. Although it made exceptions for those seeking asylum under threat of 
religious or political persecution, as was the case of those fleeing Russia since 1881, 
the new law was implicitly targeted at Jewish migrants.    
The passing of legislation in response to the Jewish migration also served as 
an indication that anti-Semitism was not confined to street politics or the lower 
classes, as a number of prominent intellectuals were drawn into debates over the 
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Jewish problem. Notable figures in this regard included Goldwin Smith, an Oxford 
professor of history, J.A. Hobson, a liberal economist, as well as G.K. Chesterton, 
Cecil Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, three prominent figures within England’s 
literary and journalistic sphere. Smith’s case is arguably the least relevant to a 
discussion of ideological anti-Semitism, since much of his invective against Jews 
arose from a personal feud with Benjamin Disraeli. Hobson, on the other hand, was a 
respected liberal intellectual whose anti-Semitic turn was driven by a concern over 
the role of European Jews in predatory finance. In an article for the Contemporary 
Review in January 1900, he alleged that a small group of mostly Jewish capitalists, 
‘par excellence the international financiers’, had taken control over the Rand in 
South Africa and were ‘prepared to fasten upon any other spot upon the globe, in 
order to exploit it for the attainment of large profits and quick returns’.
52
 Of 
particular relevance to A.K. Chesterton’s life was Hobson’s assertion that these 
financiers were responsible for the outbreak of the Boer War, largely through the 
manipulation of the press and the Chamber of Mines.
53
 He would present the same 
argument in The New Unhappy Lords, as part of his ongoing crusade against 
international finance in South Africa: 
 
The politics of South Africa for upwards of one hundred and fifty years have 
been bedevilled by a clash between Briton and Boer… Bitterness reached its 
peak during the turn of the century when the so-called Boer War was being 
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Since the remainder of Hobson’s work was not explicitly targeted towards 
Jews, he did not attain a reputation for deep-rooted anti-Semitic prejudice that was 
applied to later intellectual figures like Ezra Pound or T.S. Eliot. Nevertheless, his 
ostensibly analytical, investigatory approach to the influence of international finance 
was a model for what Chesterton would attempt to cultivate in his career after 1945. 
Before the sinister turn of anti-Semitism in the 1930s, even serious economic and 
political thinkers were prone to bouts of suspicion regarding the international 
manoeuvres of Jewish finance. The work of such figures in establishing the 
groundwork for attacks on  international finance provided later radicals like 
Chesterton a certain veneer of intellectual respectability, that was otherwise lacking 
in the realm of conspiracy theories.  
G.K. Chesterton was another intellectual figure whose reputation was clouded 
somewhat by anti-Semitism. Though he was never as antagonistic to the Jews as 
A.K. Chesterton at the height of the BUF, there are some obvious parallels to be 
drawn between their attitudes to Jewish identity. Neither man was noted for their 
personal hostility towards Jews: G.K. Chesterton’s friend and authorized biographer, 
Maisie Ward, described her subject as having been ‘fond of very many Jews’. 
Outside his personal relationships, however, ‘Gilbert’ appeared to have imbibed the 
vague stereotypes of a stateless Jewish race that persisted throughout British culture 




 Ward paraphrased his views on the ‘real Jewish question’ 
as presented in an address to the Jewish West-End literary society: ‘They represented 
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one of the highest of civilised types. But while all other races had local attachments, 
the Jews were universal and scattered. They could not be expected to have patriotism 
for the countries in which they made their homes: their patriotism could be only for 
their race’.
56
 As a committed Christian, G.K. Chesterton allowed for the possibility 
that the Jewish question might be resolved on theological grounds, by way of Jews 
converting to Roman Catholicism. Even if this was unrealistic, G.K. Chesterton was 
also an outspoken supporter of Zionism, believing that the establishment of a Zionist 
state or smaller, Jewish directed communities would alleviate the problems arising 
from the Jewish question. Outside of politics and theology, G.K. Chesterton’s 
literary work contained depictions and references to the character of Jewish 
financiers, with one passage in ‘The Silent People’ depicting a crippled England 
leaning for support on a lawyer and ‘a cringing Jew’.
57
  
In Ward’s sympathetic biography, such turns of phrase were attributed to 
G.K. Chesterton’s specific dislike of individual wealthy Jews rather than a prejudice 
that encompassed the people as a whole.
58
 On occasions, however, G.K. Chesterton’s 
attacks on prominent Jewish figures exceeded this explanation. Following the death 
of his brother Cecil in December 1918, G.K. Chesterton penned an open letter which 
attacked Chief Justice Rufus Isaacs, one of the figures accused of corruption in the 
Marconi scandal. Though it was intended to refute the notion that Cecil Chesterton’s 
pursuit of the scandal was driven by racial animus, the letter’s criticism of Isaacs 
                                                             
56 Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (London: Sheed and Ward, 1944), pp. 227-228.  
57
 G.K. Chesterton, Poems, p. 123.  
58
 Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton, p. 228.  
 
 269 
turned heavily on the issue of his sympathy with the ‘Jewish International’.
59
 Ian 
Ker’s more expansive and critical biography of Gilbert Chesterton concluded that, 
when viewed from a modern perspective, these recriminations of Isaacs appeared 
‘utterly anti-Semitic’.
60
 As he was rarely known to engage in such open antagonism 
towards Jews, Ker argued, G.K. Chesterton’s anti-Semitic outburst against Isaacs 
was the result of both historical context and personal grudges: a lifetime spent in a 
homogenous England with a widespread distrust of ‘foreigners’, which manifested 
more harshly in reaction to his brother’s death.
61
 
The evidence for Cecil Chesterton’s anti-Semitism, while no doubt influenced 
by the same contextual factors that affected his brother, was aired publicly by his 
role in the Marconi scandal. Despite G.K. Chesterton’s insistence to the contrary, 
there is little doubt that the spectre of a ‘Jewish International’ played some part in 
Cecil Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc’s pursuit of the case. Although it implicated a 
broad swathe of the Liberal government, three prominent Jewish figures lay at the 
heart of the scandal: Herbert Samuel (the Postmaster General), Godfrey Isaacs 
(managing director of the Marconi Company) and Godfrey’s brother Rufus Isaacs, 
who was then serving as Attorney-General. Samuel was accused of leveraging his 
position, with the assistance of Godfrey Isaacs, to supply the Marconi Corporation 
with a generous contract for the construction of a wireless telegraph system 
throughout the British Empire. Simultaneously, it was alleged that the Isaacs family 
and members of the Liberal Government had purchased shares in the American 
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Marconi Company shortly after the contract was secured in March 1912, knowing 
their value was to rise substantially.
62
   
The Eye Witness
63
 began its pursuit of the story in August 1912, shortly after 
Cecil Chesterton took over from Belloc as the journal’s editor, continuing to publish 
articles demanding Isaacs’ resignation until Chesterton was sued for libel in January 
1913. Alongside general accusations of corruption and impropriety levelled by the 
Eye Witness, there were implications of a plot carried out through the familial 
channels of Jewish internationals: ‘Samuel, the postmaster general, and his cousins 
in the City, who pulled the wires over Indian silver and Indian loan, the Amsterdam 
Jews, with whom these cousins maintained such curious and suspicious secret 
relations’.
64
 More explicit references to the race or nationality of the accused were 
forthcoming from other parts of the media, with Isaacs and Samuels ‘constantly and 
contemptuously referred to as “Hebrews” or in some other equivalent term’.
65
 Cecil 
Chesterton largely refrained from such insults, though his approach to the scandal 
was unabashedly conspiratorial and made broad allegations as to the reach of 
international finance. In a fashion that clearly influenced A.K. Chesterton’s work, his 
campaigns against corruption focused heavily on the role of a financially 
compromised media: ‘The public is still kept for the most part in ignorance of the 
whole vile machinery of how these things are negotiated, how the press is alternately 
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Outside the New Witness, Cecil Chesterton showed a similar attitude to the 
Jewish question as his brother. His History of the United States, published 
posthumously in 1919, observed that the problems arising from the Jewish migration 
arose ‘perhaps more formidably than elsewhere’ due to the large influx of new 
arrivals to America. He clarified, however, that this was ‘not because Jews, as such, 
are worse than other people: only idiots are Anti-Semites in that sense’. Like his 
brother and many others who subscribed to a deterministic view of the Jewish race, 
Cecil Chesterton based his discrimination against Jews on an ostensibly empirical 
evaluation of their history:  
 
To the nationalism of European peoples he is often consciously and almost 
always subconsciously hostile. In various ways he tends to act as a solvent of 
such nationalism. Cosmopolitan finance is one example of such a tendency. 
Another, more morally sympathetic but not much less dangerous to 





Citing the United States as a particular example of the ‘revolutionary 
idealism’ among Jews, Cecil Chesterton pointed to their prevalence among the ranks 
of Socialist and Anarchist parties in America. ‘These parties’, he further noted, ‘in 
contrast to most of the European socialist parties, have shown themselves violently 
anti-national and what we now call “Bolshevist”’.
68
 The alleged link between Jewish 
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identity and revolutionary politics would form an important part of political anti-
Semitism in interwar Britain and Europe, reaching its violent zenith with Hitler’s 
attacks on ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’. Like many anti-Semitic tropes, this idea gained 
currency in intellectual circles prior to the rise of fascism, in a fashion that did not 
always resemble openly conspiratorial paranoia. Hilaire Belloc’s The Jews, a book 
that set out to explain ‘the relation between the Jews and the nations around them’, 
introduced its chapter on Bolshevism by dismissing the scenario laid out in the 
Protocols as ‘nonsense’ and criticizing the European tendency to ascribe to Jews 
‘powers which neither he nor any other poor mortal can ever exercise’.
69
 Though he 
rejected as myth the idea that Jews had somehow played a role in every incidence of 
revolution worldwide, Belloc offered the Russian Revolution as a genuine ‘Jewish 
movement’ driven by racial instinct: ‘in the particular case of Russia, a national 
feeling stood in the way of an abstract ideal, it seemed the most natural thing in the 
world to the Jew that the national obstacle should go to the wall in order that his 
ideal of Communism might triumph’.
70
 
Belloc’s view of the ‘Jewish problem’ was preoccupied with the notion that 
the friction between Jews and Europeans arose from their inherently different 
instincts. The Jews in Russia had seized on communism, therefore, from a failure to 
understand the nature of European nationalism and private property: ‘The same thing 
in him which makes him a speculator and a nomad blinds him to, and makes him 
actually contemptuous of, the European sense of property’.
71
 Belloc acknowledged 
that the perception that Bolshevism was essentially a Jewish movement had already 
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resulted in a backlash that placed Russian Jews in peril ‘of the first magnitude’. 
Rather than see this as evidence for the danger of anti-Semitic stereotypes, however, 
Belloc encouraged readers to refrain from antagonism towards the Jews on ‘on 
account of what he [‘the Jew’] has done in Russia, but, on the contrary, to excuse 
him, especially because he is a Jew’.
72
 Like many the other anti-Semitic intellectuals 
of his time, Belloc framed his views as a considered response to a long-existing 
problem, rather than a prejudicial reaction against the Jews:  
 
We who saw the gravity of the Jewish problem long before the recognition of 
it was general, and who studied it under calmer conditions for many years, 
have a right to be heard now: now that the tide is making against these people 




As is the case with Cecil and G.K. Chesterton’s views, Belloc’s perspective 
on the Jewish problem was clearly driven by general assumptions about the nature of 
race and a specific form of anti-Semitic stereotype. Rather than suggesting a deep 
racial resentment against the Jews, Belloc’s pontifications on the Jewish problem 
now appear fatally naïve. In one sense, this naivety expressed itself through Belloc’s 
casual acceptance of conspiratorial ideas even as he dismissed the validity of a 
worldwide Jewish plot. In the case of the Russian Revolution, he readily accepted 
that the Bolshevik movement was driven by Jews and that their racial instinct, rather 
than ideology and political circumstances, was responsible for the overthrow of the 
government in 1917. The conflation of Jewish and communist interests proved to be 
among the most persistent and dangerous elements of anti-Semitic conspiracy theory 
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in the interwar period. Not only were prominent Jews tied to the revolutionary 
leadership of Russian communism, the power of Jewish international finance was 
deemed responsible for funding the Bolshevik movement. As a result, nationalist and 
fascist anti-Semites were provided with a scapegoat which encompassed both 
capitalist and socialist internationalism and could be blamed for any of the forces 
acting to undermine the nation. 
Doris Chesterton expressed the belief that her husband was drawn to anti-
Semitism under the guise of fascism, as Jews provided the ‘missing link’ between 
the evils of capitalism and communism.
74
 In chronological terms, it does appear that 
Chesterton only became openly anti-Semitic after joining the BUF, as his work prior 
to that point made no overt statements regarding the Jews.  Yet it is quite possible 
that he had already come across work linking the Jews with internationalism before 
falling under the influence of fascist anti-Semitism. As David Baker noted during an 
interview with Rosine De Bounevialle in 1978, Chesterton cited many influences for 
his conspiracy theories but was rarely specific as to when he first encountered a 
particular text.
75
 Chesterton’s memoirs implied that his mission to expose 
international finance was inspired by Cecil Chesterton and that he envisioned 
Candour as acting in the tradition of the New Witness.
76
 Neither Cecil Chesterton nor 
Belloc’s works appeared in the bibliography of the New Unhappy Lords in 1965, 
though this may simply have reflected the book’s focus on the ‘policy pattern’ of 
conspiracy rather than the deeper history of the Jewish question. Since many of the 
key events Chesterton used as evidence for the Money Power’s drive for power took 
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place after 1945, it is understandable that he directed readers to more contemporary 
works like Douglas Reed’s Far and Wide or Denis Fahey’s quasi-religious 
examinations of Judeo-Masonic conspiracy in the Soviet Union.
77
   
Putting aside the question of which specific works influenced Chesterton, it is 
evident that his work both before and after 1945 built upon a long-established 
tradition of conspiratorial anti-Semitism in Britain, Europe and the United States. By 
the time that Chesterton joined the BUF, the stereotype of Jews as an alien influence 
within British society and culture had existed for several decades. The specific 
notion of the Jews as an international force had also gained considerable traction 
amongst certain British intellectuals by the end of the First World War, while the 
advent of Russian communism in 1917 provided another facet of anti-Semitic 
stereotypes in the form of the Jewish revolutionary. This is not to suggest that anti-
Semitism was widespread enough to constitute a serious force in British politics at 
the time Chesterton joined the BUF. Colin Holmes’ authoritative study concluded 
that, despite the discrimination against Jews after 1881, ‘at no point between 1876 
and 1939 was there evidence of official governmental anti-Semitism in Britain’. 
While noting the real evidence of social, racial and religious prejudice against Jews 
in Britain, Holmes stressed the consistent failure of those who sought to harness anti-
Semitism for political advantage or to import the traditions of wider European anti-
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Jewish international finance and the Protocols conspiracy 
 
Though the idea of secretive plots had permeated anti-Semitic thought for some 
time, the early twentieth century saw the wide dissemination of popular literature 
claiming to represent evidence of a global conspiracy to bring the world under 
Jewish control. The most notorious of these works was and remains the Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion (hereafter the Protocols), a document forged by the Czarist secret 
police and distributed in the early 1900s. Many of the tropes that would later become 
ubiquitous in anti-Semitic thought and literature would appear in the Protocols, 
which purportedly derived from a meeting of Jewish ‘elders’ plotting to solidify their 
power over world affairs. The conspiracy it posited was broad enough that it could 
be adapted and invoked as proof that Jewish influence was the unifying factor behind 




Freemasonry also featured prominently in the Protocols, which described 
Masonic societies as the conduit through which Jewish plans could be transmitted 
and inflicted upon the Gentile world. The occult religious aspects of the Protocols 
provided a hint as to their connection with earlier forms of conspiratorial myth that 
had grown in connection with religious rather than racial anti-Semitism. In 1921, 
Anglo-Jewish journalist Lucien Wolf published a book critiquing references to a 
global conspiracy in the British press, tracing the concept to religious tracts 
published in the late 18
th
 century. Wolf noted that these earlier works were absent of 
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any mention of Jews and instead pointed to a ‘triple conspiracy of Philosophers, 
Freemasons, and Illuminati, who formed an actual sect aiming deliberately and 
methodically at the overthrow of the established religions and governments 
throughout Europe’. Only after the European revolutions in 1848 had the Jews been 
transplanted into the conspiracies, with the Protocols representing a convenient but 
highly dubious form of proof for their centrality in the ‘Formidable Sect’ long 
suspected of driving unrest throughout the world.
80
 Wolf’s book was followed by 
further investigations into the Protocols which identified them as the most successful 





Efforts to debunk the ‘Elders conspiracy’ culminated in legal proceedings 
carried out by a Swiss court in 1934, which ruled them to be a forgery.
82
 Long prior 
to this point and even before Wolf’s investigation, however, the Protocol conspiracy 
had taken root in Britain. An English translation was widely distributed among 
fascist and anti-Semitic circles in the interwar period, largely through the publishing 
efforts of the Britons Society, a small but fanatically anti-Jewish organization 
founded by Henry Harold Beamish in 1919.
83
  Aside from incubating many of the 
anti-Semitic and fascist ideas that Chesterton would inherit during his time in the 
BUF, the Britons’ publishing arm persisted long after Beamish’s death. Based in 
Devon, Britons Publishing was responsible for printing and distributing many of 
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Chesterton’s books and pamphlets after 1945 alongside a range of other anti-Semitic 
works that drew their inspiration from the Protocols conspiracy.
84
  
The earliest and most influential interpretation of the Protocols in British 
circles was produced by Nesta Webster, an author who promoted a vast and esoteric 
conspiracy that incorporated Masons, the Bavarian Illuminati and the Jews, among 
many other ‘secret societies’ responsible for the manipulation of world events. 
Though Webster can undoubtedly be credited with shaping Chesterton’s anti-Semitic 
ideas, it was her method of approaching world affairs that had the most profound 
influence on his work as a whole. Webster conducted her study of history and 
contemporary politics with the assumption that hidden and malevolent forces were 
responsible for both everyday events and the wholesale upheaval of human society. 
This worldview was an early example of what Richard Hofstadter described as the 
‘Paranoid Style’ in an essay concerning the American radical right in the 1960s: 
 
The distinguishing thing about the paranoid style is not that its exponents see 
conspiracies or plots here and there in history, but that they regard a ‘vast’ or 
‘gigantic’ conspiracy as the motive force in historical events. History is a 




The conspiratorial nature of Webster’s approach to history placed her work in 
stark contrast to Marxist materialist analysis or liberal empiricism, as it sought to 
explain the world almost exclusively in terms of deliberate human action rather than 
natural or economic forces. It also complemented the presumptions of nationalism 
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and fascism, which Webster identified as the ideological model for a movement to 
combat the subversion of ‘occult’ Jewry.
86
  
Certain aspects of Webster’s conspiracy theory did not transfer directly into 
A.K. Chesterton’s work, especially those with overtly religious connotations. Rosine 
De Bounevialle suggested that Chesterton was reticent to discuss or criticize 
Masonry due to the number of Candour supporters who were English Freemasons. 
Whatever the true nature of his feelings toward Webster and other theorists’ notions 
of the ‘occult’, Chesterton’s conspiracy theories were never reliant upon a single 
source of inspiration. He instead constructed the ‘Money Power’ conspiracy from a 
variety of sources that combined anti-Semitic myth with pseudo-materialist analysis 
of global politics, economics and social trends. He took considerable inspiration in 
the latter regard from A.N. Field, author of The Truth About the Slump, a book 
linking the economic depression of the 1930s to conspiracy by international finance. 
In its initial stages, Field’s investigation took an almost academic tone, which made 
no mention of the occult traditions detailed by Webster and focused on the dynamics 
of international markets and central banking. As the book progressed, however, Field 
turned to an open discussion of a Jewish conspiracy and dedicated a chapter to 
discussing the ‘Mystery of the Protocols’.
87
 Quite contrary to the stolid economic 
analysis that introduced the book, Field’s discussion of the Protocols bore 
similarities to Webster’s Secret Societies, detailing the same continuous patterns of 
conspiracy running through Freemasonry and the Bavarian Illuminati.
88
 Despite this 
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lurid explanation of the occult forces running behind the conspiracy, the response 
which Field proposed was considerably less drastic than Webster’s fascistic appeals 
to a national resurgence. He proposed a broad plan for financial reform that, as a 
starting point, recommended the work of American economist Irving Fisher. Field 
was also adamant that his exposure of the predominantly Jewish Money Power not 
be taken as an incitement for anti-Semitism, insisting that ‘[he] would gladly have 
omitted from his pages all reference to race and creed had it been in any wise 
possible for him to have done so. Nothing is further from the author’s desire than to 
inspire his readers with feelings of hatred or aversion towards Jews because they are 
Jews’. 
89
 In his later career, Chesterton would make a similar and equally 
unconvincing attempt to downplay the anti-Semitic implications of his work, 
insisting that his critiques applied only to a ‘minority’ of the Jewish population.
90
 
Objectively speaking, journalistic prudence should have disqualified the 
Protocols from Chesterton’s serious consideration, despite their popularity among 
earlier conspiratorial anti-Semites. Like Webster and Field, however, Chesterton’s 
driving belief in the existence of a conspiracy made it difficult for him to dismiss a 
document that appeared to have predicted the movements of ‘World Jewry’ so 
vividly. In 1947, he claimed to have broken a ‘self-imposed rule which hitherto I 
have always kept’ by quoting from ‘that mysterious and evil document known as the 
Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion’ by citing it in an article for London 
Tidings.
91
 Anticipating backlash from readers, Chesterton echoed Field’s assertion 
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If any reader writes to say that I have been quoting from a forgery, I shall not 
argue with him. The proof of the matter is not in my hands and in any case it 
does not really greatly interest me. To my mind there is only one relevant 




Developments in 1947 seem to have sparked in Chesterton a renewed 
fascination with this question, even prompting him to consider a book on the 
subject.
94
 It is almost certain that Chesterton was versed in the lore of the Protocols 
well prior to 1947, despite his unwillingness to make mention of them in public 
before that time. In June 1961, the BBC devoted an hour long radio program to 
discussing their authenticity, prompting an attack from Chesterton in Candour. In 
light of the BBC’s pre-existing bias regarding ‘Jewish interests’,  ‘nobody should 
have been surprised to discover the aim of the programme was not merely to present 
the Protocols as a forgery but to have them uttered as the melodramatic ravings of a 
maniac’.
95
 Putting aside his critique of the BBC’s aesthetic choices, Chesterton’s 
argument boiled down to a strange defence of the Protocols as a possible forgery that 
nevertheless gave accurate predictions of the rise of Jewish power:    
 
It is, with submission, impossible for any intelligent person, aware of what is 
happening in the world, to read or listen to the reading of the Protocols of the 
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Learned Elders of Zion without being astounded by their prophetic insight, 
their knowledge of the weaknesses in Gentile society, their proposed 




In a surprising turn, Christopher Sykes (the BBC producer responsible for the 
program) replied to Chesterton’s criticisms in a letter reprinted for Candour readers 
two weeks after the original article appeared. After politely assuring Chesterton that 
neither himself nor those directly overseeing the program were Jewish, Sykes 
reiterated his case that the Protocols were indeed a forgery, as determined by the 
ruling of the Swiss courts, and that the conspiracy it alleged was merely an anti-
Semitic variation on an age old theme: ‘Many Governments, many parities, many 
groups of men have been guilty of many of the abominations in which the “Elders” 
exulted’.
97
 Chesterton’s rejoinder was another plea on behalf of the Protocols value, 
protesting that Sykes’ program ‘never hinted at the undoubted spiritual relationship’ 
between the real Money Power conspiracy and ‘pretensions attributed to the 
“Learned Elders”’. He concluded, however, that the historicity of the work itself 
remained dubious and that ‘we [the Candour League] are the first to dub as lunatics 
those who attempt to argue our case on the basis of the authenticity of the Protocols, 
strange, disturbing and well worth reading though they be’.
98
 
Inevitably, throughout his life on the edges of British political thought, 
Chesterton came into contact with an even more marginal ‘lunatic fringe’, comprised 
of individuals whose belief in Jewish world conspiracy seemed driven by deep 
mental instability. In one memorable encounter described by Doris Chesterton, a 
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man contacted the couple at their home claiming to have evidence of a Jewish ritual 
murder plot to be carried out the same night. After being informed by the man of the 
time and place this murder was to be carried out, Chesterton replied bluntly: ‘In that 
case my dear fellow ring the police at once. Don’t waste time calling me’.
99
 However 
irrational or prejudicial his concept of the Jewish ‘Money Power’ was, Chesterton 
maintained certain standards in his approach to world affairs and was often driven to 
frustration by those who descended into ‘crankery’. He also chided members of the 
British social-credit movement for proposing that Hitler was ‘an illegitimate 
descendent of the Rothschilds’ unconsciously carrying out a Jewish plot. Such 
outlandish claims, Chesterton warned, were likely to do more harm than good in 
serving to ‘thoroughly discredit all criticism of the financial system’.
100
 It is because 
of his apparent standards of intellectual rigour that Chesterton’s treatment of the 
Protocols appears so absurd, since their exaggerated and easily falsified claims of a 
global Jewish conspiracy seemed to undermine his cause. As much as he sought to 
differentiate himself from ‘lunatic fringe’, therefore, Chesterton’s attachment to anti-
Semitic conspiracies prevented his work from disseminating to a wider audience, and 
evoked the same ‘crankery’ that he derided in other parts of the extreme right.  
From a cynical point of view, the existence of documents alleging to offer a 
peek behind the curtain of Jewish power was of use to Chesterton in attempting to 
leverage public opinion against the Jews. At a meeting of the National Front Council 
in July 1945, for example, he produced a letter that had allegedly come into his 
possession by mistake from a Jewish organization ‘calling on all Jews to vote 
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Liberal, as the Liberal Party had always made it easy for the Jews to get into this 
country and prosper’. Chesterton proposed that the letter be published in National 
Front literature as it ‘would carry great weight with the anti-Jewish’.
101
 In this 
instance, the document in question may well have been a legitimate piece of political 
advertising geared toward the interests of Jewish voters. In Chesterton’s eyes, 
however, even mundane revelations of a common interest among British Jews was 
evidence of an ever deepening conspiratorial plot. Ultimately, Chesterton was 
willing to overlook the empirical weakness of the Protocols due to his broader 
conviction that history had been subject to conspiratorial forces, and his prejudicial 





British fascism and political anti-Semitism 
 
The history of anti-Semitism in interwar Britain is closely tied with that of 
British fascism, to the point where major texts on both subjects converge on the 
same themes, individuals and organizations. It is important to note, however, that 
neither the British Union of Fascists nor its predecessors, Arnold Leese’s Imperial 
Fascist League and Rotha Linton-Orman’s British Fascisti, were founded explicitly 
as anti-Semitic organizations. The conflation of British fascism and anti-Semitism is 
partly reflective of the broader historiography of fascist and radical right wing 
movements in Europe. In practical terms, German National Socialism represented 
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the most visible, radical and destructive permutation of interwar fascism. Since Nazi 
ideology was so deeply defined by its conception of race and the Jewish problem, the 
study of fascism after 1945 thus became entwined with other questions pertaining to 
the roots of European anti-Semitism, racism, eugenics, as well as the social, political 
and moral dimensions of the Holocaust. For this reason, an important part of 
studying and defining fascism as a political phenomenon has been discerning its 
actual relationship to racism and anti-Semitism.  
The original Fascist movement in Italy was not overtly anti-Semitic, and 
attracted a considerable number of Jewish supporters. Mussolini’s regime would 
adopt discriminatory policies against Jews as the influence of Nazi Germany 
progressed throughout the 1930s, however, and Italian fascism was interwoven with 
concepts of European racial supremacy, a trait that became prominent in the invasion 
of Abysinnia in 1935.
103
 As a general rule, taxonomies of fascism have tended to 
treat biological racism and anti-Semitism as a distinguishing characteristic of 
Nazism. For some specialist scholars of Germany, as well as sceptics of generic 
fascism like A. James Gregor,  the Volkish racism and intense anti-Semitism of 
Hitler’s movement rendered it unique.
104
 Many fascist and extreme right movements 
of the interwar period, including those in Britain, were influenced by native 
traditions of anti-Semitism and did not require the example of Nazi Germany to 
pursue rhetorical or actual violence against Jews. Citing the most extreme case, 
Stanley Payne identified the Legion of the Archangel Michael as ‘possibly the only 
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other fascist movement as vehemently anti-Semitic as the German Nazis’, a trait that 
could be attributed to the strong tradition of popular anti-Semitism in Romania.
105
  
As Michael Mann observed, the ultra-nationalist roots of fascism made it 
highly prone to racial intolerance, with ethnic minorities commonly identified as a 
threat to the health of the organic  nation-state.
106
 The prevalence of racism or anti-
Semitism in the different incarnations of interwar fascism varied, however, with 
Roger Griffin emphasizing that ‘the virulence and object of fascist racism [was 
dependent] on contingent factors, especially the prior existence of a tradition of 
xenophobic obsessions and racial persecution’.
107
 Racism and anti-Semitism are 
better understood, therefore, as traits highly correlated with fascist and extreme right 
movements rather than factors integral to the definition of fascism. It is relatively 
easy to account for why anti-Semitism played some role in Britain’s interwar 
extreme right, due to the submerged but persistent tradition of Jewish stereotypes 
and conspiracies that existed in European culture at the turn of the 20
th
 century. To 
explain the outsized influence of anti-Semitism in the BUF, however, we need to 
consider the specific history of political anti-Semitism in Britain, which predated the 
emergence of British fascism by over a decade. One of the earliest and most 
prominent anti-Semitic groups to emerge prior to fascism was the British Brother’s 
League (BBL), which attracted some 45,000 members after its founding in 1902. 
Although it adopted a broadly nationalistic stance against ‘alien’ threats to British 
identity, anti-Semitism provided the bulk of the BBL’s racial animus, which was 
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There is some disagreement as to the overall significance of anti-Semitism in 
the pre-1914 or Edwardian radical right to which the BBL belonged. William 
Rubenstein’s 2005 history of the Jews in Britain cautioned against the assumption 
that ‘fringe figures from a wide diversity of otherwise contradictory political stances’ 
could be taken as representatives of a monolithic anti-Semitic radical right.
109
 
Rubenstein’s argument was a worthwhile reminder that anti-Semitism did not attain 
the same currency in British politics as it did Europe, and that no single political 
faction held a monopoly on anti-Semitic ideas. At the same time, there was a 
discernible continuity between the ‘Edwardian anti-Semitism’ of the BBL and the 
fascist anti-Semitism of parties like the BUF and the Imperial Fascist League. Of the 
three major, self-identified fascist movements in interwar Britain, the British Fascisti 
was the least anti-Semitic. The BF’s founder, Rotha Linton Orman, displayed a 
somewhat limited understanding of fascist doctrine, organizing her movement more 
along the lines of radical conservatism than revolutionary nationalism. Where race 
was concerned, therefore, Orman’s movement drew from British imperial tradition 
rather than European racial anti-Semitism, placing a greater emphasis on the 
subversive inclinations of colonial subjects rather than domestic ‘aliens’.
110
 Those 
elements of the BF’s ideology that were genuinely fascistic, insofar as they had been 
‘imported’ from Europe, owed more to Italian Fascism than German National 
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Socialism. As a consequence, the movement showed little inclination towards the 
Volkish Aryan supremacist themes which appeared in the IFL, nor the scientific 
racism that would permeate BUF policy.  
The IFL took a general stance against unwanted immigration to Britain at its 
founding in 1928, making broad assertions as to the undesirable character of 
European migrants. Explicit anti-Semitism did not appear in the party’s propaganda 
until 1930, coinciding with Leese’s enthusiastic adoption of the world Jewish 
conspiracy theory outlined in the Protocols. 
111
 Thereafter, the IFL promoted a 
violent and distinctively paranoid form of anti-Semitism, that drew freely from the 
biologically racist constructs of Nazism . Leese envisioned Britain as part of a 
‘League of Aryan Nations’, standing atop a racial hierarchy wherein Jews 
represented a unique and dangerous ‘species’. Despite his outspoken white 
supremacy and penchant for the Aryan racial imagery, Leese’s racial views were 
hardly more sophisticated than those of early racial anti-Semites, as he ‘failed to 
outline a coherent racial ideology in a systematic fashion’.
112
 This failed to dull his 
enthusiasm for public displays of anti-Semitism, including allegations that Mosley 
and the BUF had been infiltrated by Jews, denouncing them ‘Kosher Fascists’.
113
 
Accusations of this kind were largely ignored, a product of the IFL’s increasing 
marginality after 1933 and Leese’s personal notoriety. An anonymous surveillance 
report on the IFL described him as ‘a man who had a great craving for political 
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knowledge without the mental balance to make use of it’ and ‘a fanatic who would 
be a menace to any organization he joined’.
114
  
Valid though this assessment may have been, Leese was not alone in 
identifying Jews at work within the fascist movement itself. In 1939 Chesterton 
attacked Alexander Raven Thomson (‘Worm Raven’) for selling gas masks to the 
public through a BUF bookshop and expressed disbelief that other fascists had not 
identified him as a Jew.
115
 Fear of infiltration by ‘Jewish stooges’ was also a driving 
concern throughout the organization of Chesterton and Collin Brooks’ After Victory 
group and a contributing factor to the paranoia that undermined the 1945 National 
Front.
116
 In other respects, the Britons and the IFL set a precedent for how anti-
Semitism would affect other fascist and extreme right groups in Britain. The Jews 
initially served as a convenient and tangible target for propaganda, with international 
finance linking together all the various ‘enemies’ of fascism, the Empire and the 
British race. As the party floundered, however, ‘world Jewry’ became an obsession 
unto itself and an unconvincing explanation for why fascism had failed to gain 
followers. In contrast with the experience of some European fascist movements, 
where anti-Semitism became the basis of radicalization and recruitment, for British 
fascists it would become a cause of political and ideological inertia. Chesterton, 
along with the other members of the interwar extreme right alienated from Mosley, 
fell victim to this tendency in the lead-up to internment. The result was a myriad of 
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small, insular organizations that functioned, like Beamish’s organization had some 
years before, as echo-chambers for anti-Semitic rancour and conspiracy.
117
 
It was the fear of such marginalization, rather than any personal conviction, 
that led Mosley to downplay his party’s anti-Semitic stance between 1932 and 1934. 
Even during this period, BUF publications were quick to associate British Jews with 
the ‘subversive’ elements seen to be driving communist and anti-fascist groups. The 
renunciations of anti-Semitism that appeared in BUF newspapers throughout 1933 
did little to deter anti-Semites from gaining membership, nor did they coincide with 
a genuine renunciation of anti-Semitic ideas by Mosley and his followers.
118
 Indeed, 
the tight knit radicalism of the party’s ideological core made it an effective incubator 
for those who had been only vague or noncommittal in their attitude towards the 
Jews prior to encountering fascism. Chesterton was among the most striking 
examples of this dynamic: within a year of joining Mosley’s party, he went from 
showing no signs of overt anti-Semitism to being one of its most virulent and 
energetic promoters. He became instrumental not only in promoting anti-Semitic 
ideas but in promulgating the narrative that Mosley had been driven to anti-Semitism 
by the Jewish community itself: 
 
At the beginning of his [Mosley’s] campaign these views were not very 
definite one way or the other. While it is probably that he had no deeper an 
affection for Jews in the mass than any other Englishman, the last thought in 
his head was that it would prove necessary for him to adopt any attitude 
towards them, apart from refusing them admittance to the movement – a step 
made essential by the power of the Jew in an incredibly short time to gain 
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Contained within this explanation were two anti-Semitic tropes which had 
long driven British perceptions of the  ‘international Jew’: the ability to quickly 
infiltrate and acquire power through implicitly subversive means, coupled with an 
intrinsic loyalty to their own group which precluded any other ideological or 
factional commitments. Despite the negative connotations of this judgement, 
Chesterton insisted that Mosley remained aloof from racial conflict on the grounds 
that the Empire, ‘composed of many different races, castes, colours and creeds’, 
ruled out such behaviour ‘even if persecution were held to be otherwise desirable, 
which he denies’.
120
 At least within the pages of The Greater Britain, Mosley 
showed greater influence from Italian Fascism and his own New Party than Hitler’s 
distinctively anti-Semitic and racially-inflected plans for German revival. As was the 
case in the British Fascisti, the racial ideas of the early BUF reflected fairly orthodox 
British imperialism, calling for the maintenance of an existing colonial populace 
rather than any acquisition of subjects or territory. While Mosley was more explicit 
in stating that white rule would continue to be enforced in Britain’s colonies, this 
assumption did not radically distinguish the BUF’s policy from that of the other 
major political parties where race was concerned.
121
  
The BUF’s increasing anti-Semitism became evident in November 1933, 
when an issue of Blackshirt arguing that Jewish interests were conspiring to involve 
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Britain in a war with Germany.
122
 Apart from its specific concern for the prevention 
of another war, the character of the BUF’s attack on the Jews was a fairly orthodox 
reiteration of British anti-Semitism since the Marconi scandal: Jewish finance had 
exerted its control over politicians and the press in order to serve the interests of a 
‘nation within a nation’, the minority of Jews whose only loyalty lay with their own 
people.
123
 There were several aspects in which the BUF’s initial salvo against Jewish 
finance differed from its later attacks: the article took no official stance on ‘whether 
or not Germany was right in her attitude towards the Jews’, presumably in an attempt 
to stave off damaging comparisons with the Nazis. It also dismissed the importance 
of attacks made on the BUF itself by Jewish media or business interests: ‘We are not 
concerned with the treatment of the British Union of Fascists, for we have learned to 
laugh at the hatreds over which we triumph’. Finally, it offered an unconvincing 
assurance that the fascists’ criticism of the Jews was a matter of politics rather than 
prejudice: ‘We do not fight Jews on racial or religious ground. We oppose them 
because they have become an organised interest within the State pursuing a policy 
which threatens British lives and homes’.
 124
  
This defensive posture, which echoed Mosley’s assurance against ‘racial 
attacks’ in The Greater Britain, highlighted an important but perverse aspect of the 
BUF’s anti-Semitism. While its members would engage in rhetorical and in some 
instances physical attacks on Jews or those suspected of Jewish influence, their 
                                                             
122
 ‘Shall the Jews Drag Britain to War?’, Blackshirt, 4-10 November 1933. Tilles notes that 
this article was prompted by a Daily Express piece commenting on Jewish responses to Nazi 
Germany, but that the ‘BUF’s analysis took the case much further’ than its mainstream 
counterpart by invoking an international Jewish conspiracy. See: British Fascist Anti-
Semitism and Jewish Responses, 1932-1940, p. 55.  
123 On the origins of the ‘nation within a nation myth’, see Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British 
Society 1876-1939, pp. 10-35.  
124
 ‘Shall the Jews Drag Britain to War?’. 
 
 293 
ideology insisted that this antagonism was a rational, proportional response to the 
Jews’ attack on British culture and national sovereignty. For a short period after 
November 1933, the BUF held true to its ostensible neutrality on racial matters, as 
the leading article in Blackshirt the following month challenged the government’s 
failure to act on the Alien Problem but made no overt reference to Jewish migration. 
In the long term, however, both the frequency and intensity of attacks on Jews 
increased. The Olympia rally in June 1934, which Chesterton presented as the 
impetus for Mosley’s turn against the Jews, became a central part in the narrative of 
persecution used to justify the Blackshirts’ anti-Semitism. 
 
At this and every other rowdy fascist meeting the Jews have taken the lead in 
stirring up disorder. Funds for the buying of tickets for rowdies, for example, 
were traced in many instances to Jewish sources, and many Jewish faces were 
also to be seen among the mob.
125
     
 
Following this event, Chesterton alleged, Mosley had undertaken an 
‘investigation’ of Jewish influence in various commercial, political and cultural 
spheres to determine the true extent of coordinated antagonism toward British 
interests. The result was his revelation of a vast conspiracy driven by the 
overrepresentation of Jewish individuals, ‘whether in person or by proxy’ in 
positions uniquely detrimental to the national fabric:  
 
The whole capitalist racket, the whole of the national Press, the whole of the 
“British” cinema, and the whole bunch of purely parasitical occupations were 
found to be Jew-ridden. Every vitiating and demoralising factor in our 
national life was Jew-influenced where it was not Jew-controlled.
126
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Attacks on Jewish financiers, cultural figures and political activists 
subsequently became hallmarks of BUF propaganda, while the party embarked on a 
concerted effort to rally support from London’s East End, which carried its own 
tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment.
127
 By 1937, the pretence of racial neutrality had 
ceased to exist within the BUF, to the point where Chesterton made open reference 
to the physical appearance of Jews in the midst of the wider population. ‘Apotheosis 
of the Jew’, a notorious essay by Chesterton that appeared in British Union 
Quarterly, represented the height of his anti-Semitism as a member of the BUF. 
Echoing a theme that appeared in Belloc’s writing some years prior, ‘Apotheosis’ 
depicted the Jews as having the dangerous capacity to hide their true nature from 
society at large: 
  
Had he stayed to swelter in the place of his origin there would have been no 
Jewish problem… Unfortunately, his migration to more temperate zones, and 
the consequent approximation of his skin to the colour of white, has led to his 




Chesterton argued that the physical appearance of Jewish migrants reflected 
the psychological and ‘spiritual’ process of their infiltration into English society. 
Arriving in the country ‘poverty stricken and bedraggled’, the Jews had risen in 
wealth and social standing through nefarious means (‘often they invite closer 
inspection than the police are able to give them’) and subsequently adopted the 
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appearance of the native populace: ‘Now is the Jew arrived at the stage of his 
greatest menace to civilisation… Education in the social graces has made of him to 
all outward appearances except facially a typical English gentleman’.
129
 This state of 
near-perfect ‘metamorphosis’ allowed Jews to move freely throughout the political 
and social spheres while retaining their ‘race consciousness’.  
In a harsher and more explicitly racialist fashion, this part of the essay 
reiterated the sentiment of Belloc and Cecil Chesterton, who fixated on the Jews’ 
supposed inability to forgo loyalty to their own people. Unlike Belloc, who 
identified a Jewish sense of cultural superiority as the cause of friction, Chesterton 
drew from Nesta Webster’s work in attributing this superiority to a ‘collective 
neurosis’: an ‘ever-present sense of insecurity born of the knowledge that his race 
and the way of life of his race are inferior things’.
130
 These neuroses, according to 
Chesterton resulted in the decadent, subversive behaviour that appeared in every 
sphere of ‘debased’ English society: 
 
Are the films trash? Then the Jew makes a fortune out of them because it is 
his natural gift to purvey trash… Have the public manners become as 
deplorable as the public taste? Then the Jew walks the world as their perfect 
exponent. Financially, socially, politically, culturally, the Jew has brought all 




Though these displays evidently repulsed him, Chesterton’s depiction of the 
Jews contained a grudging acknowledgment of the attributes required to succeed in 
hostile circumstances. He conceded the Jews’ ‘sound business instincts which are the 
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heritage he derives from the Oriental bazaar’ or ‘his talent—and even his genius – as 
an artist’, both of which yielded considerable wealth.
132
 These advantages came with 
a cost, however, which Chesterton identified as the garish and ultimately self-
destructive displays of arrogance by the Jews at their ‘apotheosis’:  
 
Because his neurosis produces in him such high tension… he throws caution 
to the wind as he comes forth to hold his own and to keep the world a fit 
place for the habitation of parasites. Thus does he eventually show up his 
entire racket. Thus does he turn anti-Semitism from a mild disdain to a 




In the final passages of the essay, Chesterton spoke directly to the 
phenomenon of anti-Semitism. Rather than see such resentment as an irrational or 
prejudicial response, Chesterton characterized anti-Semitism as a constant, natural 
occurrence in any society where Jews had become intermingled with the wider 
population. This assumption was not radical in and of itself, since many prior 
considerations of the Jewish question in Britain had considered ‘friction’ between 
Jews and gentiles to be an objective consequence of immigration. Rather than treat 
the Jewish question in a neutral fashion, however, Chesterton placed the blame for 
anti-Semitism entirely on the Jews themselves: ‘he has turned the spark into a 
roaring fire that fortunately for the survival of the superior races will never be 
extinguished’. More threateningly, Chesterton argued that the growing anger against 
Jews (the ‘passionate and wholesome rage’) marked a resurgence of the same ‘virile 
nationalism’ that had erected barriers against Jewish power in the past. He further 
warned that an alliance was forming, under the guidance of the Blackshirts, between 
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the two major branches of anti-Semitism in Britain: the ‘men of research’ 
(intellectual or ‘rational’ anti-Semites like Chesterton) and the average citizens of 




Some of the racial invective used by Chesterton appeared to have been drawn 
from his own warped perceptions of encountering Jewish migrants in England: ‘To 
go to a swimming-pool anywhere near London or the large cities is as efficacious as 
baptism in the Jordan; one becomes positively anointed with Semitic grease’.
135
 
More commonly, however, Chesterton’s physical description of Jews fell back on 
the crude stereotypes that permeated English culture: an amalgamation of the sinister 
money-lender figure from The Merchant of Venice and the ‘shambling’ or ‘cringing’ 
figure from G.K. Chesterton’s poetry.
136
 His outrage towards the supposed 
‘arrogance’ of Jewish public figures seemed to derive in part from how it offended 
his sense of social conservatism and classical English propriety, associating Jews 
with ‘loud clothes, loud cars and loud behaviour’ and the use of self-promotion 
through the media. Yet it also seemed impossible for Jews to ever conduct 
themselves in a way of which Chesterton would approve. Where they adopted 
English customs, he accused Jews of adopting a guise for their ‘parasitical’ 
behaviour. Yet he appeared just as intolerant of Jews who made no attempt to hide 
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The implications of Chesterton’s anti-Semitism as a fascist were all the more 
troubling for what they suggested about the possible resolutions to the Jewish 
question. Since fascism did not gain any semblance of power in Britain, there is no 
way of knowing with certainty what actions would have been taken against the Jews. 
As far as BUF policy towards the Jews was concerned, Mosley was unequivocal: 
‘We shall not keep Jews here to bully them. Those who have been guilty of anti-
British conduct will be deported’.
138
 Chesterton was even less reserved in calling for 
a direct response to the Jewish problem:  
 
In all sorrow, I must advance the opinion that a race capable of so damnably 
violating the feelings of their British hosts is a rabble race, and that the sooner 
we get rid of the largest possible number of them and break their financial 
stranglehold the better will it be for the happiness, the prosperity and the 




Chesterton’s assertion (which matched Mosley’s official policy) that a large 
proportion of Jews were to be summarily deported was disturbing in and of itself. 
But what was to be done about the many Jews who, by his admission, lived ‘quietly 
and decently’? According to Mosley, the scrutiny incurred by patriotic Jews was an 
unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of their fellows’ misdeeds: ‘they can no 
more complain of suffering from the errors of Jewry as a whole, than members of 
any other nation can complain of suffering for the mistakes of the majority and the 
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blunders of its government’.
140
 Chesterton echoed this view in Blackshirt, 
acknowledging the existence of ‘intelligent, decent Jews’ willing to admit the ‘fellow 
racials’ role in feeding anti-Semitism but concluding that: ‘So long as the Jewish 
majority is pleased to link itself with either the subversive movements of the political 
“Left” or with the damnable malpractices of the capitalist “Right” the Jewish 




Under BUF policy, those Jews not deported would be allowed to remain as 
‘foreigners’ but subject to the same restrictions as all other non-British races: denied 
the full rights of citizenship and not permitted to become Members of Parliament or 
government officials.
142
 On paper, therefore, the BUF’s policy toward the Jews was 
one of mass expulsion and abrogation of rights but not one of violence or racial 
extermination.  Other non-British races were also to be classed as ‘foreigners’, with 
even those naturalized under existing laws to deported ‘unless they have proved 
themselves valuable citizens of Great Britain’. Despite Mosley’s repeated assurances 
that his policies on race would never emulate those in Nazi Germany, it was difficult 
to ignore the similar strains of racist and anti-Semitic thought within the BUF. The 
BUF’s policy on birth control and sterilization also showed influence from the 
eugenicist movement that became linked with racial policies in both the United 
States and Nazi Germany. None were to be forcefully sterilized, but the ‘unfit’ were 
to be ‘offered alternatives of segregation sufficient to prevent the production of unfit 
children, or voluntary sterilization’. While it must be granted that such concepts had 
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yet to gain their later notoriety in the wake of Hitler’s ‘racial cleansing’ programs, 
their acceptance by Mosley was a reminder that scientific racism (as opposed to 
mere xenophobia) did play a role in the ideology of British fascism.
143
 The absence 
of explicitly violent sentiment within BUF policy would hardly have been reassuring 
for those noting the similarity to laws passed in Nazi Germany; nor would it have 
comforted those encountering Chesterton’s suggestion, in the closing paragraph of 
‘Apotheosis of the Jew’, that ‘the day of great reckoning is at hand’.
144
 
As the BUF faltered from 1934 onwards, Mosley and his followers blamed 
the Jews for undermining the fascist movement in Britain through a combination of 
political manoeuvring, physical intimidation and propaganda. Chesterton was 
particularly inflamed by the corruption of the press, as it represented the corruption 
of his own profession as well as a powerful arm of Jewish power.  The most obvious 
targets for BUF propaganda in this regard were Jewish editors, owners or journalists 
who could be connected, merely by suggestion, to the vast machinations of 
‘international Jewry’. Non-Jews were not excused from accusations of corruption, 
however, as even they could be subject to a campaign of financial threats and 
intimidation. Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail, was described by 
Chesterton as a ‘great patriot’ whose support for the Blackshirts in 1934 had been 
‘repented in haste’ following such a campaign: ‘[Rothermere] celebrated his 
dropping of the Blackshirts with two leading articles full of ludicrous praise of the 
Jews – a matter of no small significance’.
145
 The same conspiracy encompassed the 
                                                             
143
 On the influence of eugenics on BUF policy, see Redvaldsen,‘“Science must be the 
Basis”’, pp. 373-375.  
144
 Chesterton, ‘Apotheosis of the Jew’, p. 54.  
145
 Chesterton, Portrait of a Leader, p. 128.  
 
 301 
British press’ treatment of international news, particularly where it cast light on the 
growing belligerence and authoritarianism of fascist states in Europe. During the 
Abyssian crisis in 1936, Chesterton identified ‘Alien propaganda’ at work on behalf 
of Emperor Haile Selassie’s government. ‘It looks as though the whole of the anti-
Fascist rampage has been taken under the greasy wing of the Jews’, he informed 
readers of Blackshirt, citing as further evidence the calls for Britain to boycott the 
upcoming Olympic games in Berlin.
146
 Rather than engage with evidence for 
violence or molestation of Jews under the Nazi regime, Chesterton’s propaganda for 
the BUF tended to dismiss public opinion on Germany altogether: ‘One must study 
the reptile Press. Screams of abuse sustained in speech after speech, in article after 
article… Every achievement of National Socialist Germany misrepresented, ignored 
or denied’.
147
 Even where he acknowledged the reports of ‘concentration camps and 
castor oil’ that emanated from Europe, Chesterton made no mention of Nazi policy 
or violence directed towards German Jews, other than to note their ‘grievance in the 
fact that the German people have decided, after many dark experiences, to enjoy 
both the sensation and the reality of owning their own country’.
148
  
BUF propaganda which aimed at inspiring support for Hitler’s regime toward 
Germany was largely futile, due to the dwindling influence of the BUF as compared 
with the anti-Nazi movements led by Anglo-Jewish communities and other elements 
within British society. Although there were pockets of support for Hitler in Britain 
outside the ranks of Mosley’s movement, the public at large was not sympathetic to 
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Nazism, nor the aggressive expansionism of German foreign policy.
149
 Furthermore, 
despite Britain absorbing a lower number of refugees than the United States, the 
country was never ambivalent towards the plight of German Jews, with large sectors 
of the non-Jewish population engaging in both symbolic and practical 
demonstrations of support.
150
 Chesterton’s response to the increasing criticism of 
Hitler’s regime relied on a combination of denial, apologia and appeals to anti-war 
sentiment, which leaned heavily on the argument that Jews were conspiring to drag 
Britain into war on their behalf. This notion was to become a key part of fascist 
propaganda in the lead up to Britain’s declaration of war, gaining currency within 
pro-Nazi circles of the extreme right as well as the general population. As Richard 
Griffiths noted, even those who were not swayed by conventional appeals to anti-
Semitism became susceptible to the notion of a ‘Jewish war of revenge’ and were 
drawn to the extremists from a general opposition to the war.
151
  
After he left Mosley’s organization in March 1938, attacks on Jewish 
‘warmongers’ within the press remained a dominant theme throughout Chesterton’s 
writing and public speaking. The escalation in violence against Jews in Europe after 
1938, marked by the outbreak of pogroms in Germany and Austria in November, 
prompted strong criticism from within Britain. Yet this failed to deter anti-Jewish 
feeling among those in the British population who, as Richard Griffiths observed, 
viewed such violence as having been brought about by the Jews themselves. Some 
figures in the anti-Semitic extreme right, such as Archibald Ramsay, went to absurd 
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lengths to rationalize the events transpiring in Europe within the framework of a 
Jewish conspiracy. At a meeting of the Nordic League in February 1939, Ramsay 
alleged that the killing of German official Ernst Von Rath (which sparked the 
Kristallnacht pogrom in November 1938) was an act of ritual murder, carried out at 
the behest of a secret Jewish enclave in London.
152
 Chesterton’s interpretation of 
events was somewhat more grounded but no less anti-Semitic. While he held Hitler 
responsible for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he maintained that the Jewish press 
was responsible for stoking tensions in Europe and hindering efforts to secure peace 
through appeasement.  
Far from discouraging expressions of anti-Semitism, Chesterton’s 
estrangement from the BUF and the prospect of coming war seemed to dangerously 
intensify his zeal against British Jews. Addressing a meeting of the Nordic League 
on 11 May 1939, he ‘suggested that using lamp-posts was the “the only way to deal 
with the Jew”’.
153
 Despite the violent implications of this statement, it drew less 
attention from both the media and the Security Service than another address given by 
Chesterton to a meeting of the Nordic League and the Militant Christian Patriots 
later the same month. Speaking to an audience of some 500 attendees, Chesterton 
attacked prominent Jews within the media for their role in facilitating a ‘slaughter of 
British youth’. His targets included Sunday Referee correspondent Geneviève 
Tabouis, the ‘Red Jewess’ whose false reporting on Hitler had ‘kept Europe in a 
panic state’, as well as Marks and Spencer chairman Israel Moses Sieff, whom he 
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accused of turning the Daily Mirror into a left-wing tabloid.
154
 A report of the 
meeting published by the Jewish Chronicle in June 1939 gave special mention to 
Chesterton’s contribution, which evoked much of the venomous anti-Semitism 
featured in ‘Apotheosis of the Jew’: ‘The wildest speech was made by A.K. 
Chesterton, who gave his delighted audience – mainly middle class – full value for 




Given the extent of his anti-Semitism during this period, compounded by his 
disillusionment with the effort to stave off another war, it is not altogether surprising 
that Chesterton’s rhetoric against the Jews took on a threatening tone. At the same 
time, his behavior gave no indication that he would be willing to undertake 
spontaneous violence against the Jews, nor endorse those who did. Doris Chesterton, 
who shared few of her husband’s prejudices or political leanings, took pains to 
describe his cordiality towards her Jewish friends. One incident she recounted from 
the 1930s served to illustrate the contradiction between Chesterton’s fiery anti-
Semitic rhetoric and his treatment of Jews on a personal basis:  
 
I remember he met up by chance with a Jew who was driven to the edge of 
insanity for fear of what might happen if Fascism came to power in England. 
K [Chesterton] took infinite pains to soothe him down and actually did 
comfort him – all but promising him that there was no quarrel with such a 
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As well as matching the official BUF line, Chesterton’s insistence that only 
some Jews were deserving of scrutiny echoed a long line of thinking on the Jewish 
question harkening back to Hobson and G.K. Chesterton. In the tradition of 
supposedly ‘empirical’ anti-Semitism, such figures had insisted that, even if the Jews 
as a whole were given to certain characteristics, only those who acted maliciously (as 
international financiers or revolutionaries) were truly at fault. As illustrated many 
times throughout history, however, prejudice and violence against Jews rarely 
confined itself to those directly involved in usury or other acts used to justify their 
persecution. Even G.K. Chesterton, far more liberal than many other anti-Semites of 
his period, proposed that Jews in England might be required to don Arabic clothing 
in order to signify their alien origins.
157
  
For fascist anti-Semites like Chesterton, some form of action against Jews 
was deemed necessary for the nation to survive and thus something to be carried out 
unilaterally, with minimal consideration of rights or due process. In his 
understanding of what would happen to Britain’s Jews under fascism, therefore, 
Chesterton suffered from the same blinkered idealism that he used to justify 
dictatorship. He assumed that, through a combination of discipline and sound 
leadership, the measures carried out to deal with the Jewish problem in Britain would 
be just. He failed to conceive of how his campaign to free Britain of international 
financiers and other ‘parasitic’ Jews derived from and fed the same ideology that fed 
their violent and indiscriminate persecution abroad, as pointedly observed by 
Leftwich in their 1948 collaboration, The Tragedy of Anti-Semitism: ‘You may take 
your beliefs wherever you choose, but [their] source is foul, it is corrupt, it is 
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contaminated. It is the wrong shape, Chesterton’.
158
 Like many others drawn into 
anti-Semitism before 1945, his views would appear both morally abhorrent and 
dangerously naïve in the wake of the Holocaust. Unlike many of that number, 
however, Chesterton could not claim to have only dealt with the Jewish question in a 
purely philosophical fashion; nor could he claim distance from the political factions 
in Britain which might have implemented similar measures as those in Germany.  
If he had any awareness of the Holocaust before 1945, Chesterton did not 
display it publicly, nor did it have any diminishing effect on his anti-Semitism 
during the war. While this apparent ambivalence toward the Jews in Europe reflects 
more harshly upon Chesterton due to both his wider prejudice against the Jews and 
his pre-1939 apologetics on behalf of Germany, it is important to note that disinterest 
or disbelief regarding the stories of Nazi atrocities filtering into Britain was not 
confined to fascists or political anti-Semites. In his study of wartime anti-Semitism, 
Tony Kushner noted the reticence among some members of the British government 
to risk ‘sensational’ reports pertaining to Jewish concentration camps.
159
 Even as 
such information became more concrete in the later years of the war, the government 
maintained a policy of not specifying Jews as the primary victims of concentration 
camps or other abuses in its propaganda, fearing that such claims would be met with 
scepticism by the public. This fear proved exaggerated, as Kushner observed, given 
the general sympathy for European Jews among the general populace, but it 
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demonstrated the inconsistency of British responses to Nazi atrocities while the war 
was still in progress. 
160
  
When the full extent of such atrocities was documented in the wake of the 
Allied victory in Europe, Chesterton’s public response was muted. An article he 
penned for the Weekly Review concerning the news reports emerging from Germany 
in June 1945 made mention of the ‘abominations’ uncovered in the Buchenwald 
concentration camp but quickly devolved into a defence of Mussolini’s political 
record and a general attack on the media, whose war time reporting he regarded as 
out of touch with ‘the sweat and toil and stark realities of life’.
161
 The only 
significant record of Chesterton’s personal reaction to the killing of Jews was 
contained in a letter from Colin Cross to David Baker in 1982, where Cross 
described meeting with Chesterton in 1960 during research for The Fascists in 
Britain.  
 
At one moment, during lunch, I saw tears running down his cheeks; the cause 
was that he was explaining that his antisemitic [sic] writings during the 1930s 




Statements made by Chesterton in other contexts suggest he acknowledged 
the existence of death camps but doubted the scale of the killings that had taken 
place. In June 1956 he made reference to Otto Strasser’s ‘exposure of the lie about 
six million Jews being done to death in gas-chambers’.
163
 A similar objection was 
raised in Candour regarding the ‘statistical absurdity’ of charges levelled against 
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Adolf Eichmann in 1960 that accused him of complicity in millions of Jewish 
deaths:  
 
The Bonn correspondent from the Times… writes of the mind boggling at this 
‘diminished total’. How much more would it boggle if the real total of all the 
Jews murdered were to be revealed! A computing machine specifically made 
for the job would be needed to undertake the gigantic labour of subtracting all 
the bogus deaths. Not that a man or regime engaged in murder is any less 





Further coverage of the affair appeared in subsequent issues, with Chesterton 
speculating on the shadowy methods through which Israel had kidnapped Eichmann 
and the propagandistic motives of the upcoming trial.
165
 He remained aloof from the 
question of Eichmann’s actual complicity in the murder of Jews, focusing instead on 
what he perceived to be a vast overreach of Jewish power through his extradition: 
 
to act illegally to secure the “full exposure of the Nazi regime’s atrocious 
crimes” brings the whole business down from considerations of justice to the 
expedition of brazen propaganda… Utterly indefensible as were the crimes 
against innocent Jews (and it is damn nonsense to suppose that none were 
committed) the fact today is that there is not the slightest danger of the same 




When the trial against Eichmann commenced in April 1961, Chesterton 
mounted a renewed attack with a leading article describing the ‘orgiastic festival’ of 
media coverage following the proceedings. Again he demurred on the question of 
Eichmann’s guilt, offering a variation of the defence’s argument that the accused 
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may have been forced, under threat of violence, to participate in the murders against 
his own judgement: ‘I do not even know what Eichmann did, if in fact he did do it, 
was repugnant to his own conscience’.
167
 The remainder of the article devolved into 
a general disparagement of ‘Jewish arrogance’ as exemplified by the prosecution, 
with Chesterton concluding that ‘the only acceptable “final solution” of the Jewish 
problem’ would be the widespread recognition of this tendency.
168
 As much as he 
lamented the ‘din’ of coverage surrounding Nazi atrocities and often paid greater 
attention to the suffering of Allied airmen in concentration camps than Jews or other 
victims, Chesterton did seem to acknowledge, at a bare minimum, that Jews had 
been systematically murdered during the war. To admit the full scale of the 
Holocaust seems to have been a step too far, however, for him to reconcile with the 
belief that ‘the horrors of the gas-chamber were instituted by a Germany gone 
berserk in war’, rather than the foreseeable product of anti-Semitism and Nazi 
ideology.
169
 Chesterton also refused to accept that the legal measures adopted 
between 1933 and 1939 were anything but the product of an earnest response to a 
malevolent Jewish element in Germany: ‘Not until the war did the German dislike of 





They [the makers of international policy] prefer to think that the German 
attitude was based on the race theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, later 
adopted by Alfred Rosenberg. In truth, however, most Germans – including 
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Chesterton was not a Holocaust denier in the literal sense, as he was able to 
acknowledge that Jews had been subject to a deliberate campaign of extermination 
by Nazi Germany. He was complicit, however, in the revisionist campaign mounted 
by numerous elements of the British extreme right after 1945, which sought to 
minimize, rationalize or otherwise diminish the extent of the Jewish genocide carried 
out by Hitler’s regime.
172
 Unlike some neo-Nazi revisionists and Holocaust deniers, 
Chesterton was not driven by a desire to rehabilitate Nazi Germany as a whole, and 
he held little regard for members of the British extreme right who went out of their 
way to defend Hitler after his ‘amok run’ in 1939: ‘It might seem strange’, he 
observed in June 1956, ‘that loyalty to Hitler should be recommended to British 
nationalists as the true measure of a man’.
173
 Unable to admit the terrible 
consequences of fascist anti-Semitism, which he had enthusiastically promoted in his 
interwar career, Chesterton reverted to a milder form of conspiratorial anti-Semitism 
to explain away the extent of Holocaust: ‘Nazi atrocities, far from being hushed up, 
have been dinned into the public ear without ceasing and in the process they have 
been quite fantastically exaggerated’.
174
 In an attempt to salve his conscience, 
Chesterton contributed to the growing body of ‘revisionist literature’ that spread 
throughout the post-war extreme right, and provided fuel for neo-fascist and neo-
Nazi subcultures throughout Britain, Europe and the United States. 
175
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Racism, anti-Semitism and conspiracy after 1945.  
 
Much as he did not consider support for fascism incompatible with loyalty to Britain, 
Chesterton saw no incompatibility between his attitude to Jews and his willingness 
to fight a war with Germany. In both cases, nationalism framed Chesterton’s views: 
his commitment to fascism was always rooted in patriotism, while his antagonism 
towards Jews rested primarily on the assumption that the Jewish race had proved 
itself hostile to Britain and her people. While he undoubtedly harbored sympathy for 
the Nazi case against the Jews, therefore, this could never suffice as a reason for 
turning against his own country. Chesterton’s later interpretation of the war kept its 
roots in anti-Semitic conspiracy but did not entertain the notion, proposed in some 
quarters of the extreme right, that the Nazis themselves represented an arm of the 
conspiracy. Instead, he focused on the role played by Jewish finance in manipulating 
the nations of Europe into another war. This had been no easy task since, as 
Chesterton explained in The New Unhappy Lords, it required convincing Hitler to 
turn his attention from East to West and persuading the wary Allied governments to 
commit their nations to another war. Despite the forces allayed against this plot, 
Chesterton argued, ‘so far as immediate objectives were concerned, International 
Finance won the day’.
176
 He made only a vague admission of Hitler’s stated intent to 
pursue a war with the West in Mein Kampf ‘many years before’, emphasizing that  
the Reich had been established as a ‘rebellion’ against International Finance and the 
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While the aftermath of the war and the Holocaust did little to alter 
Chesterton’s basic commitment to anti-Semitism, it did herald a change in his 
stylistic approach to the Jewish problem. His columns for the Weekly Review 
provided several examples of the more covert approach adopted by political anti-
Semites after 1939, as demonstrated in a column regarding ownership of the press in 
December 1943:  
 
There is nothing to prevent wealthy foreigners from stepping into buy British 
papers… Research reveals the presence on several newspaper directorates of 
men with names difficult to pronounce, names which certainly were not found 




Although coded language of this sort was not sufficient to stave off 
allegations of anti-Semitism or fascism altogether, it provided a greater legal 
standing on the occasions when Chesterton or his editors were driven to pursue libel 
action against accusations of disloyalty, incitement or ‘Jew-baiting’. In December 
1943, for example, the Weekly Review reported its successful prosecution of such a 
case against the Jewish Chronicle for allegations that it advanced ‘covert defeatism 
and anti-Semitism’.
179
 Legal technicalities aside, the Jewish Chronicle’s accusation 
of anti-Semitism can be granted in retrospect when considering the lightly veiled 
disparagement of Jews that appeared in Chesterton’s columns alone. His critique of a 
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pamphlet issued by Jewish secularist Chapman Cohen examining Christianity 
returned to some of the themes that had preoccupied anti-Semites in the BUF:  
 
there are scores of cases wherein Mr. Cohen’s kinsmen have found asylum 
here after persecution abroad, a fact which nevertheless has not prevented 
them, after mastering the barest rudiments of our language, from standing 




This passage demonstrated yet another rhetorical method for the subtle 
advancement of anti-Semitic ideas: By couching his criticism of Jewish practices in 
religious terms, Chesterton was able to avoid (or at any rate deny) association with 
racial antagonism towards Jews. Given his own lack of religiosity, this was not a 
method which Chesterton employed with great regularity. In the wider context of 
Britain’s interwar extreme right, however, Christianity was sometimes used as a 
banner for nationalist or anti-Semitic ideology, as in the case of the Militant 
Christian Patriots.
181
 In a similar vein, an early draft of the 1945 National Front’s 
policy included the following provision among its seven points:‘To ensure that what 
the late Archbishop of Canterbury [Dr. William Temple] called “the real Jewish 
problem” is recognized without rancour and an honourable, just and lasting solution 
found for it’. While it was unpopular among many of those planning the National 
Front itself, a Security Service report remarked that this phrasing was ‘a rather 
ingenous [sic] attempt to make anti-Semitism look respectable’.
182
 A more 
straightforward approach to concealing anti-Semitism was to simply avoid any 
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reference to Jews whatsoever, a method employed in Chesterton’s 1946 pamphlet 
Menace of the Money Power.  
Although the concept of a Jewish problem was tainted after the war by its 
affiliation with violent anti-Semitism in Germany, the large number of refugees 
seeking asylum from Europe after 1933 prompted a renewed interest in the solution 
of permanent Jewish resettlement in Palestine. Despite his interest in an ‘honourable, 
just and lasting solution’ to problems arising from Jewish migration, Chesterton had 
a longstanding opposition to the Zionist project in Palestine, which he perceived as 
an open attack on the British Empire by World Jewry. Following the Peel 
Commission in 1937, which recommended that the British government partition 
Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state, Chesterton took to the pages of 
Blackshirt to protest: ‘At long last Jewry has had the blind folly to come out into the 
open, boasting to the British people of its power to smash to pieces the British 
Empire’.
183
 The emergence of a violent insurgency against the British mandate in 
1945 further inflamed Chesterton’s hostility towards Zionism, while also appearing 
to turn public opinion against the Jews. ‘The British Press is to be congratulated’, he 
wrote in December 1946, ‘for putting an end to the embargo which, until recently, 
prevented the word “Jew” from appearing in any but the most favourable context’.
184
  
From a political standpoint, ‘Zionism’ provided another useful cover for 
passages which would otherwise have appeared blatantly anti-Semitic. In Truth, for 
example, Chesterton gestured openly towards a ‘Zionist conspiracy – surely the most 
tremendous in the world’s history’ that had enlisted the cooperation of  the United 
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States and Soviet Russia to facilitate mass Jewish migration to Palestine. By way of 
explaining this ‘happy accord’ between the two opposing world powers, Chesterton 
launched into a conspiratorial explanation of the Jews’ influence over the Soviet 
Union:  
 
New York financiers found the money for the Czar’s overthrow. They 
supplied Trotsky with funds. They championed the Bolshevik cause at 
Versailles. They fed the Soviet Union with loans. Is it possible that Russia 
repaid some of the debt when she furnished the Jews for the great trek of 





The actions of the Zionist insurgency leading up to 1948 also provided ample 
fodder for general attacks on ‘Jewish terrorists’.
186
 In an odd contradiction of his 
imperialist tendencies, Chesterton also turned to the plight of Palestinians (who had 
previously sought independence from the British) as a further indictment of Zionism 
and the record of world Jewry: ‘the reign of terror begun by the massacre of 300 
Arab men, women and children at Deir Yassin had made possible the Jewish 
occupation of the country, because the panic-stricken flight of 1,000,000 refugees 
enabled the Jews to seize their deserted farms’.
187
  
In a vague sense, Chesterton did entertain the idea that a permanent 
settlement for Jews might be established in a more agreeable fashion. One proposal 
of his own, inspired by Joseph Leftwich’s suggestion of a Jewish community in 
Northern Australia, involved ‘damming the Webi Shebeli and the Juba [rivers] in 
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Somaliland and turning the desert into quite a fertile land for the Jews’.
188
 He made 
no serious attempt to develop or promote such ideas, however, nor did he propose 
any other peaceful solution to the conflict in Palestine. Although spurred initially by 
concerns over British territory, Chesterton’s anti-Zionism was mainly a product of 
his anti-Semitism. The forcible establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East 
appeared to Chesterton as an overt incarnation of the world conspiracy that operated 
in more subtle forms throughout other parts of the world. After 1948, Zionism and 
the state of Israel became woven into the fabric of Chesterton’s conspiracy theories, 
representing a manifestation of Jewish power with ‘ambitions far beyond the 
creation of a Jewish State in the Levant’.
189
 Quite contrary to those anti-Semites that 
hoped Zionism would eventually resolve the problem of Jewish rootlessness, 
Chesterton saw only an additional arm of the drive for world government.
190
 
What then, did Chesterton see as the resolution to the Jewish problem after 
1945? In the absence of an overriding political organization equivalent to the BUF, it 
became even more difficult to discern what action he deemed necessary in regard to 
the Jews or the wider ‘menace’ of international finance. No doubt acutely aware of 
the greater scrutiny applied to anti-Semitism after 1945, Chesterton insisted that the 
onus arising from the conspiracy of World Jewry lay equally, if not primarily, with 
non-Jews: ‘Had we of the Gentile nations stood firm in defence of our own values… 
the Jews would have remained what they ought to be – a small sect living 
contentedly and at peace with their neighbours’. The appropriate response was 
therefore ‘to make a determined stand for our own legitimate and distinctive 
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interests’ rather than focus a movement on the persecution of the Jews.
191
 In 
Chesterton’s argument, therefore, the response to Jewish internationalism was the 
positive expression of national pride rather than the purely negative sentiment of 
racial or religious prejudice:  
 
I am what is called an anti-semite mainly because I am a nationalist – a 
nationalist in the sense that I believe every nation to have its own guiding star 
which it must follow, its own ideal pattern which it must trace, its own 
integration which it must maintain ….Whether I am right or wrong, that is my 
belief, and my further belief – no less firmly held – is that Jewry at almost 




Despite nesting his hostility toward the Jews within a positive concept of 
nationalism, theoretically separate from the destructive or authoritarian drives of 
fascism, Chesterton was still faced with how to manage anti-Semitism within the 
context of his political aims. Was it permissible, for example, to encourage or 
tolerate violence against ‘aliens’ so long as those actions sparked a resurgence in 
national pride and an influx of electoral support for nationalist parties? In 1945, 
Chesterton explained his practical objection to such actions in a meeting with League 
of Ex-Serviceman leader Jeffery Hamm: ‘to raise a riot against the Aliens in the East 
End might give the participants a little well deserved pleasure but the Englishman 
living in the country usually reacted by feeling sympathy for the Aliens and disgust 
for the people responsible for the riot’. Better, he argued, to conduct campaigns 
raising awareness of the ‘vast Alien International Finance plot’. ‘Persuade a man in 
the country that his standard of life, his customs and his Government were to be 
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dependent on a World Security Council ruled in reality by Alien International 
Finance and he would be the first to hunt down the Aliens in his area’.
193
 Chesterton 
made no attempt to explain why this spontaneous uprising against ‘Aliens’ was to be 
any more judicious than the alternative. Two years later, he revisited the subject of 
anti-Semitic violence, once again considering its undesired consequences to those 
opposing international finance:  
 
He who hopes to avert it [the Jewish plot for world power] by going into side-
streets to smash the windows of Jewish shops or to stir up racial prejudices 
not only acts against people innocent of all knowledge of the great World 
Plan, but shows himself to be a moron who behaves exactly as the plotters 




There was a practical motivation for Chesterton to tone down his language in 
order to broaden his audience and avoid the social consequences of blatant ‘Jew-
baiting’ like that practiced in the 1930s. As he demonstrated in Menace of the Money 
Power, Chesterton was capable of presenting his political ideas entirely stripped of 
any mention of the Jews while maintaining the implication of a Jewish conspiracy. 
Had he wished to abandon subtlety altogether, he could also have adopted another 
pseudonym or full anonymity for the purposes of distributing virulently anti-Semitic 
literature with relative impunity. There is good reason to believe, however, that 
Chesterton did moderate his approach to anti-Semitism after 1945 in earnest rather 
than just to avoid the social or political consequences of encouraging violence or 
other forms of persecution. He displayed a greater consideration of the innocent Jews 
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who were liable to suffer from a general wave of hostility against their race, 
something that was often conspicuously absent from the anti-Semitic propaganda in 
the 1930s. He also refrained from invoking or denigrating the physical appearance of 
Jews, having come to regret such attacks as an unfair, emotionally driven form of 
prejudice that ultimately ran counter to his ideas.
195
 Chesterton was convinced that 
the intellectually and politically honest course of action was to engage with the 
Jewish problem directly and openly. This rested on his conviction that his anti-
Semitism (if others needed to call it such) did not arise from personal prejudice. In 
childhood, he claimed to have gone through school with ‘scores of Jews’: ‘I not only 
had some among my friends but resisted the pressure of elders who tried to make me 
give them up’. He counted Jewish soldiers among his ‘comrades-in-arms’ from his 
service in both world wars and, most surprisingly of all, recalled no great contention 
with those Jews he encountered between 1918 and 1939: ‘[I] liked some of them, 
disliked none so much as I dislike some Gentiles, received kindnesses from several 
and am happy to think that I was sometimes able to do them kindnesses in return’. 
He therefore protested against the notion that his attitude towards the Jews was based 
on ‘personal prejudice’, going so far as to suggest that, ‘if personal prejudice were 
involved, my own would clearly be on the Jewish side’.
196
   
This was not an entirely convincing argument, since Chesterton made clear on 
several occasions that the problems he associated with ‘World Jewry’ could be 
traced back to their innate qualities. Furthermore,  despite his muddled conceptions 
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of culture, ethnicity and nationality, Chesterton’s own work argued that the Jews 
were best understood as a race rather than a religious grouping: 
 
the Jews derive from two main stocks—the Sephardim, who are true Semites, 
and the Ashkenazim, who come of Turco-Mongoloid stock and who 
embraced Judaism long after the birth of Christ. But when it came to the 
creation of the State of Israel no difference was recognized between the two 
stocks, and we have thus to regard World Jewry as one race, just as the 





There was a more granular distinction to be made between Chesterton’s 
concept of the Jewish race and that of other anti-Semites, particularly those who 
subscribed to the ideas associated with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Alfred 
Rosenberg and other Aryan or Nordic supremacists. The chief concern in this form 
of anti-Semitic ideology, infamously demonstrated in Germany in the lead-up to the 
Holocaust, was the ‘purge’ of Jewish blood from the racial stock.
198
 Chesterton did 
not appear to regard the biological threat of Jews amidst the wider population with 
any real seriousness, instead concerning himself with the actions of particular Jewish 
figures and the attraction of Jews by nature to certain forms of subversive or 
decadent activity. His prejudice against coloured migrants was, by contrast, deeply 
bound up with an aversion to race-mixing as a biological threat to the survival of the 
white race. The key difference, therefore, was that Chesterton was largely prejudiced 
against Jews because of their actions (or their perceived actions), whereas his 
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prejudice against coloured migrants was expressed mostly against the demographic 
and biological threat posed by their increasing numbers in Britain.  
These two forms of prejudice also developed under different circumstances 
and at different points during Chesterton’s life. His views on racial integration and 
coloured immigration can be directly tied back to the ambient racism of his 
childhood; it was only during the later stages of his life that Chesterton was driven to 
seek intellectual or theoretical justification for his understanding of white superiority 
and racial difference. With anti-Semitism, however, Chesterton developed his ideas 
as an adult under the assumption that he was making a rational judgement about the 
Jewish race and its members’ involvement in global politics. Though he appeared to 
have adopted anti-Semitic attitudes impulsively, under the heady influence of 
Mosley’s fascism, Chesterton was able to buttress his ideas against a wide range of 
anti-Semitic culture, intellectual tropes and even his family legacy. The result was a 
form of quasi-intellectual prejudice that Chesterton expressed in a noticeably 
different fashion to the colonial paternalism and biological racism which 
characterized his attitude toward migrants, minorities or colonized peoples in Africa 
and Asia. Jews represented an overarching presence within the international sphere, 
possessing many of the attributes that Hofstadter used to describe the generic 
‘enemy’ of political conspiracy theorists: ‘sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, 
sensual, luxury-loving… He wills, indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of 
history himself, or deflects the normal course of history in an evil way’.
199
 People of 
colour, by contrast, were associated with the qualities which Chesterton ascribed to 
colonized Africans: rarely evil by nature but prone to violence, sexual misconduct 
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and other ‘barbarous’ behaviours when not guided by the benevolent strictures of 
white rule. 
The interplay between anti-Semitism and Chesterton’s other racial views 
became significant during the final decades of his life, as he sought an explanation 
for the two forces threatening his assumptions about race, decolonization and 
immigration. Up until the end of the Second World War, these ideas had largely been 
supported by the policies of both domestic and colonial authorities, who maintained 
the discriminatory order overseas and enacted policies that amounted to ‘an 
undeclared immigration policy aimed at restricting non-white settlement’ in Britain 
itself.
200
 It was only after the process of decolonization begun that these norms began 
to shift, in an interconnected fashion that would serve to bolster Chesterton’s 
conspiratorial interpretation of racial disorder.  The shift to self-governance or 
independence within parts of the Empire previously under central administration, 
such as India and the Caribbean territories, resulted in more relaxed immigration 
policies; this in turn led to an increase in the number of Commonwealth subjects 
migrating from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean to settle in the United Kingdom after 
1945.
201
 For Chesterton, the influx of non-white migrants was not only a risk to the 




As the dissolution of Britain’s colonial presence grew more rapid and 
widespread in the 1950s, Chesterton endeavoured to establish a link between the 
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disestablishment of white supremacy and hegemonic aspirations of the Jews. He 
turned to various sources from overseas to support his view that, rather than an 
organic movement, the push to desegregate was part of a worldwide process being 
driven by Jewish international interests. As the United States was undergoing the 
process of integrating public schools in late 1957, for example, Candour reprinted an 
article from a U.S. anti-Semitic newsletter Common Sense arguing that ‘Jewish 
communists and their gentile stooges from New York’ were responsible for 
indoctrinating black Americans in the South into agitating against their interests for 
desegregation.
203
 In South Africa, Chesterton and other Candour contributors alleged 
that Jews were overwhelmingly represented among those supplying arms to anti-
apartheid ‘terrorist’ groups or otherwise engaged in ‘communist subversion’ .
204
 
Chesterton also warned that ‘Rothschild finance’ was mounting a simultaneous bid 
to infiltrate the ‘Afrikaner business world’: ‘we may be certain that the financial 
infiltration is not to uphold White rule but to undermine and eventually eliminate 
it’.
205
 Chesterton’s analysis of decolonization and integration in British Africa 
reflected his two, mutually supporting prejudices: Jews were depicted as an 
opportunistic and subversive minority attempting to leverage the situation and 
foment dissent among native Africans, who in turn were depicted as a dangerous, 
unruly mass, vulnerable to the lure of communism and predatory capitalism.  
The same dynamic applied to how Chesterton and his followers in the LEL 
viewed the ‘coloured invasion’ of post-war immigration to Britain, which became a 
                                                             
203
 ‘Voice of the True Negro’, Candour, 8 November 1957.  
204 ‘Terrorism’s Allies in South Africa’, Candour Interim Report, September 1963, ‘Jews 
and Apartheid’, Candour Interim Report, November 1963.  
205
 ‘S. African Problems’, Candour Interim Report, February 1964.  
 
 324 
recurring focus in Candour from late 1954. From the beginning, Chesterton was 
concerned with the deeper implications of immigration as a subset of the global 
conspiracy. He was initially sceptical of the notion that immigrants from the West 
Indies and Africa were being encouraged in order to weaken Britain’s economy: ‘the 
numbers of migrants concerned, although too large for our national health, is not 
large enough to accomplish an aim of that kind’.
206
 He posited instead that the 
‘coloured mob’ being transported to Britain was part of a worldwide scheme to 
foment revolution: 
 
Taken in conjunction with the mass migrations of West Indians to Great 
Britain, of Puerto Ricans to the United States, and (illegally) of the Chinese to 
Australia, such pacts certainly suggest that there is a deliberate world policy 
to infiltrate the White nations with people of African and Asian blood. The 
purpose, I am convinced, is the creation of an international revolutionary 




In some ways, this argument was a reformulation of the anti-Semitic tropes 
that Chesterton had leveraged during the interwar period, suggesting that Jewish 
agitators were part of a deliberate campaign to foment communism in an otherwise 
disinterested British populace.
208
 ‘Karl Marx said that as the British were too stupid 
to make their own revolution, foreigners would have to do the job for them. There is 
no question of the Blacks thus acting in the Briton’s despite’.
209
 Wider events in 
Britain throughout the late 1950s also gave credence to the idea that coloured 
migration had come to represent a new incarnation of the ‘Alien Problem’ associated 
                                                             
206
 ‘Anti-Racial Design’, Candour¸ 5 November 1954.  
207 ‘Coloured migrations’, Candour, 7-14 June 1957. 
208
 ‘The Red Flag Comes Down’, Blackshirt, 17 October 1936.  
209
 ‘Perils of Black Invasion’, Candour, 15 June 1956. 
 
 325 
with Jews in the pre-war and interwar periods. The ‘race riots’ at Notting Hill 
between August and September 1958 brought widespread attention to the problems 
that accompanied the influx of coloured migrants, despite the fact that much of the 
violence could be attributed to whites.
210
 Familiar themes emerged in the subsequent 
depiction of the migrants who, much like the Eastern European Jewish migrants after 
1880, were affiliated with crime, crowded housing conditions and the spread of 
disease.
211
 Some stereotypes were less transferrable between the two periods: 
Whereas Jews had been affiliated with the unscrupulous accumulation of wealth and 
shady business practices, African and Asian migrants were now tarred with 
accusations of idleness and depicted as a drain on the modern welfare state.
212
 
Lingering imperial ideas also affected the stereotypical depiction of migrants, with 
Candour suggesting in August 1961 that a series of disturbances in Brixton were 
evidence of ‘tribal warfare’ and other forms of foreign ‘barbarism’ having been 
imported to Britain through coloured immigration.
213
 
The widespread use of the ‘race issue’ as a campaign platform for extreme 
right parties (including the LEL, the Union Movement and the National Labour 
Party) also fed the perception that recent immigrants now found themselves in the 
same position as Jews had several decades prior. Though sceptical (if not actively 
derisive) of many of the other groups campaigning against coloured migrants, 
Chesterton argued that the same ‘smear-techniques’ employed by the media against 
anti-Semites in the 1930s were now being used ‘to make objects of ridicule, if not 
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infamous figures, of people who insist that the White man is not a Black man and 
should not be encouraged to act as though racial differences did not exist’.
214
 Unlike 
many of the younger elements within the extreme right, however, Chesterton was 
both tactically and ideologically opposed to abandoning his wider crusade against 
the international Jewish conspiracy and decolonization in favour of the immigration 
issue. In his mind, the two issues were effectively inseparable from one another, 
since the conspiratorial aims of Jewish finance could be directly traced to the failure 
of the government to effectively bar the influx of immigrants: 
 
So disastrous has been the flooding of the country by the sea of coloured 
immigrants that one wonders what economic motives have prompted its 
sponsors… The dominating motive may well have been not economic but 
political – the conspiratorial plan, everywhere being carried out, of securing 




The conspiratorial explanation satisfied two problems with the influx of non-
white migrants which, in Chesterton’s mode of thought, could not be satisfactorily 
accounted for by economic factors. First, due to the deterministic nature of his views 
on race, it was difficult for Chesterton to accept that African, West Indian and other 
populations would willingly leave their natural homes for places to which they were 
intrinsically unsuited. Though he acknowledged that some of the British 
government’s interwar policies had created economic and political conditions that 
drove migrants in search of better prospects, Chesterton was sceptical that so many 
could be induced ‘to leave their sunny lands and shiver in misery throughout the 
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 Second, he questioned why British politicians had been 
unwilling to take more strident action to reduce the ‘flood’ of migrants despite the 
clear political advantages in doing so. The mainstream impact of the ‘race issue’ in 
British politics became more obvious after the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act, which represented the first major attempt by the Conservative 
government to restrict the number of coloured migrants settling in Britain.
217
 This 
was followed by a General Election in 1964 which, in Chesterton’s eyes, seemed to 
suggest that politicians (‘to whom votes are all-important’) would be driven to a 
harder stance on immigration, if not by their own convictions, then by sheer self-
interest.
218
 That the responses to immigration continued to be so mild and practically 
ineffective, he argued, was evidence of deeper forces at work within the political 
system: ‘that the vested interests sponsoring coloured immigration had become so 




Who then was ultimately responsible for the ‘deeper forces’ behind 
immigration and racial integration? Chesterton pointed to the same culprit with 
whom he had associated the erosion of British pride and interests since the 1930s, 
Jewish internationalists, who had now been driven to abolish the concept of race in a 
backlash against German racial fascism: 
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Hitler’s Germany had to some extent been founded on a concept of race – not 
a very clear concept in its positive aspect but exceedingly clear in its negative 
aspect. It was anti-Jewish. If the Gentiles were not allowed to attach value to 
race, obviously all racial concepts had to be eradicated and – not only that – 
the races themselves had to become so inter-mixed, so “integrated”, that no 




The evidence for this Jewish campaign to abolish ‘pride of race’ lay 
throughout all parts of the world where the traditional order was being dismantled: 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, the drive to abolish the White 
Australia Policy and in Britain, the efforts to outlaw racial discrimination. Each of 
these movements had been accompanied by ‘the cry for integration everywhere on 
earth – except among the Jews’.
221
 The great injustice and irony of this conspiracy 
for racial integration, Chesterton argued, was that the Jews themselves maintained an 
integrated racial identity that could be freely expressed through Zionism, while 
supporting ‘measures [that] are intended to safeguard the one race which claims 
exclusion, and claims it not on racial grounds but on grounds of religion’.
222
 
As with many of the adjustments and additions to Chesterton’s conspiracy 
after 1945, this theory had its roots in anti-Semitic tropes from the interwar period; 
the most relevant in this case being that Jews were associated with any force working 
to undermine British ‘national pride’. The political ramifications of Chesterton’s 
argument for a Jewish hand in shaping the politics of race and immigration were 
significant therefore, in drawing an ideological link between interwar anti-Semitism 
and the anti-immigrant racial nationalism of the post-1945 extreme right. Although 
not attributable to Chesterton alone, this dual form of racial nationalism and anti-
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Semitic conspiracy would find expression within elements of the National Front 
during the 1970s, whose position on race could be described bluntly as ‘[blaming] 
the Jews for the blacks’.
223
 Chesterton’s influence could also discerned in the 
begrudging respect afforded by some members of the anti-Semitic extreme right to 
Jewish and Zionist communities for managing to maintain their homogeneity and 
sovereignty far more effectively than many white nations.
224
 
There were some advantages to the continuation of Jewish conspiracy 
theories within Britain’s extreme right, despite the demonstrated weakness of anti-
Semitism as a political platform after 1933. For one, the overarching premise of a 
global conspiracy driven by a cosmopolitan enemy was more conducive to the 
ideological assumptions of fascists and ultra-nationalists than immigration alone.
225
 
Whereas the latter presented a problem theoretically solvable through conventional 
politics, the grand nature of  a conspiracy demanded a wholesale revival of national 
values and the transcendence of politics. Hofstadter summarized this as the moral 
logic adopted by conspiracy theorists: ‘Since what is at stake is always a conflict 
between absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not a willingness to 
compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish. Nothing but complete victory 
will do’.
226
 Another factor with specific relevance to the National Front was the 
utility of conspiracy theories in supporting more virulent, politically repellent forms 
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of racism and anti-Semitism that followed in the tradition of neo-Nazism or Leese’s 
racial fascism. Chesterton himself did not view the conspiracy as validation of these 
ideas, as he made clear during the planning stages of the National Front in 1966. A 
suggestion made by a British National Party member that membership ‘should be 
confined to people of Natural British/European descent’ was immediately quashed 
by Chesterton, who argued that any effort ‘to reproduce such discredited Rosenberg 
nonsense’ would rule out the involvement of his organization.
227
 Following his 
departure from the organization, however, Chesterton’s conspiratorial anti-Semitism 
did become interwoven with the Leese tradition under the guidance of the ‘hard line’ 




As much as Chesterton’s concept of an international conspiracy proved to be 
persistent and adaptable to the shift of political circumstances after 1945, his 
uncompromising and Manichean approach to politics ultimately hindered his ability 
to make any political progress against the changing racial dynamics in Britain and 
the wider world. This was especially evident in the way he reacted to the otherwise 
promising signs of mainstream support for immigration control after the issue came 
to prominence in the 1950s. It was not enough, in the eyes of Chesterton and his 
dedicated supporters, to pursue policies that screened migrants based on their health 
or financial security.
229
 Nor was it acceptable to implement legislation that restricted 
immigration on a general basis, like the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, since 
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this would result in the exclusion of migrants from the former white dominions and 
in turn isolate them further from British influence.
230
 That these measures amounted 
to a tacit enforcement of racial discrimination mattered little to Chesterton, who 
demanded an ideological as well as practical campaign to preserve racial order. As a 
result, he was dismissive even of Enoch Powell, whose pronouncements against 
immigration heralded both controversy and an upwelling of popular support for 
directly addressing race. Rather than see Powell as the herald of a white resurgence, 
as some National Front members did to Chesterton’s chagrin, Powell appeared 




One or two dramatic speeches, perhaps a letter or two to The Times, and they 
consider their annual stint handsomely performed. But although he keeps 
quiet on race relations, the publicity attracted by his Wolverhampton speech 
has led to a ready demand for White Champion Powell to write and speak on 





While he did not abandon the cause of white Britain after leaving the National 
Front in 1971, Chesterton’s final years were, in many respects, a retreat from politics 
into the quasi-intellectual mire of global conspiracy. In the final issue of Candour 
published before his death, Chesterton warned of the potential for a respectable 
figurehead to act as a ‘safety valve’, thus releasing the pressure that might otherwise 
have driven a more revolutionary revival of white nationalism: ‘The function of a 
safety valve, let us remember, is not to bring about change but to ensure that 
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dynamism which could cause change is allowed to escape into the desert air’.
233
 This 
assessment would prove prescient in the years that followed, as the feted revival of 
Britain’s extreme right under the guise of the anti-immigrant populism was thwarted, 
not by a grand conspiracy, but by the gradual adaptation of the political 
establishment.
                                                             
233




A.K. Chesterton’s career with the extreme right lasted nearly forty years, spanning 
several continents and incorporating two of the most controversial political parties 
ever to emerge in 20
th
 century Britain. The most tangible legacy of this long and 
taxing struggle for national revival was a substantial body of written work, much of 
it produced in the decades following the dissolution of the BUF. In Richard 
Thurlow’s view, the mass of conspiratorial literature left in the wake of Chesterton’s 
death was a kind of monument to the fruitless delusions that underpinned British 
fascism as a whole: ‘This is the story of how the obsessions of an able man led him 
down the wrong track, and how acres of forest were pulped to carry the prolific 
literary output of his fantasy politics’.
1
 Chesterton’s supporters and fellow travellers 
viewed the obsessive nature of his political worldview as a patriotic virtue rather 
than a dangerous fixation. A reprint of Chesterton’s 1938 pamphlet Why I Left 
Mosley, issued by the A.K. Chesterton Trust in 2010, was introduced accordingly: 
it should not be forgotten that whilst A.K. continued to write, speak, organise 
and fight in the frontline until his death – a struggle that was fraught, painful, 
but manly – Mosley, ‘the Leader’, took himself off into exile to await “the 




Given that his preoccupations often ran contrary to both historical accuracy 
and practical politics, there is merit to the idea that Chesterton was ultimately a 
victim of his own convictions. It is entirely possible, for example, that he could have 
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pursued political activism with greater success, had he been willing to abandon anti-
Semitic conspiracies and reconcile himself to a world where Britain played a more 
minor role in international affairs. Had he acceded to his wife’s wishes and left aside 
politics altogether, Chesterton would no doubt have enjoyed a more stable and 
remunerative career as a journalist after returning from overseas in 1943. From a 
biographical standpoint, it easy to characterize Chesterton as either a tragic figure, 
led astray by misguided patriotism and utopianism, or a pathetic one, driven to 
bigoted fantasies by a lack of imagination and intellectual rigour. 
What both of these interpretations overlook is the extent to which 
Chesterton’s unwavering, single-minded approach to politics was both an intrinsic 
product of his ideology and a defining feature of his influence on the extreme right. 
Chesterton’s style of political writing mellowed somewhat after his time with the 
BUF, but he retained an affinity for military terminology and imagery until his death. 
More than acting as rhetorical flourishes, or incitements to actual paramilitarism, the 
references to battlefield tactics and soldiering that appeared throughout Chesterton’s 
work emphasized the need for discipline and commitment among British patriots. 
The political struggle for national survival was thus presented as requiring all the 
bravery and steadfastness that had been demanded of Chesterton as a teenage soldier 
in the wartime struggle for East Africa and the Western Front. The use of martial 
analogies within Chesterton’s post-war career did little to distance him from the taint 
of the BUF, and later fed into the ‘Colonel Blimp’ reputation of the League of 
Empire Loyalists. Nevertheless, it highlighted the ongoing prevalence of struggle 
and self-sacrifice as themes within the ideology of the extreme right after 1945. It 
bears noting that one of the more influential works of neo-fascist literature that 
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appeared in Britain after Chesterton’s death depicted the ‘political soldier’ as a 
model for aspiring activists.
3
 
Chesterton’s personality and intellectual disposition, the ‘ideology of 
obsession’ that Baker and Thurlow highlighted, are only part of the reason why he 
was able to persist in extreme right activism long after many of his former comrades 
had fallen away. Luck and circumstance played a role in allowing Chesterton to 
avoid some of the more dire consequences that befell British fascists after 1940, 
though it is doubtful whether internment would have deterred him from further 
political activity. Several prominent 18b detainees, including Mosley and John 
Beckett, renewed their movements after 1945, and Chesterton’s own brush with the 
authorities seemed only to cement his radical outlook on Britain’s political 
establishment. The deviation between the post-BUF experiences of Chesterton and 
William Joyce can be better explained on ideological grounds. Whatever affinity the 
two men shared for radical fascism and anti-Semitism, Chesterton was patriotic to a 
fault, viewing Joyce’s flight to Germany and transformation into ‘Lord Haw Haw’ as 
a bizarre perversion of the ideals that had underpinned the BUF.  
Although the formation of the Union Movement in 1947 provided a rallying 
point for former BUF members, there were few incentives for extreme right activists 
outside Mosley’s circle to continue their political struggle into the post-war era. J.A. 
MacNab, who worked alongside Chesterton in the BUF’s propaganda wing, left 
Britain for Spain following Joyce’s execution in 1945. Rex Tremlett, another former 
Blackshirt and a supporter of the After-Victory group, returned to his original calling 
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as a farmer when the new movement floundered. Beckett remained active the 
longest, working with the British People’s Party until 1953 when the death of his 
friend and financial patron, the Duke of Bedford, prompted him to turn to religion 
rather than politics as a source of meaning.
4
 As his wife often lamented, Chesterton 
did not lack the means or opportunity to leave politics aside and focus solely on 
literary or journalistic pursuits. In addition to his strong ideological motives, 
however, Chesterton was presented with circumstances that facilitated his lifelong 
engagement with radical politics. Partly because of the reputation he had acquired 
from the BUF, Chesterton found it difficult to maintain a satisfying career in 
journalism outside of sympathetic publications like Truth. The unexpected arrival of 
a generous and undemanding patron, R.K. Jeffery, made political activism a viable 
(if not lucrative or successful) vocation for Chesterton in the latter half of his life. 
After 1945, Chesterton established himself as a senior figure within the 
extreme right, first as the de facto head of the LEL, and eventually as the sole 
chairman of the National Front. Despite coming to hold such a position, however, 
Chesterton never came close to attaining the prominence that Mosley acquired in the 
1930s, nor did he attempt to replicate the charismatic or semi-mythical profile of the 
man he once touted as Britain’s saviour. This was a disadvantage in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, when Mosley’s return to politics easily overshadowed any 
other extreme right movement, but Chesterton’s more prosaic style of political 
leadership was more durable in the long term. Though neither he nor Mosley ever 
fully transcended their connection to interwar fascism, Chesterton was spared the 
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brunt of the anti-fascist backlash encountered by the Union Movement and the 
British People’s Party. By positioning himself as an advocate for grassroots 
patriotism rather than a would-be leader, Chesterton maintained a lower profile and 
provided a more fundamental link between the interwar and post-war eras than 
Mosley, who grew increasingly aloof from the movement he had founded as time 
progressed.  
 
‘A political oxymoron’: the problem of fascism in Britain.   
 
Stanley Payne’s description of fascism in Britain as a ‘contradiction in terms’ 
referred to the mismatch between the qualities of fascism as a violent revolutionary 
movement, and the context of interwar Britain as a stable nation-state with long 
traditions of civil society and parliamentary democracy.
5
 Even without the benefit of 
hindsight that Payne possessed, contemporary observers of the BUF were able to 
sense that the bombastic militarism and violence employed by Mosley’s party were 
ill-suited to British conditions. In 1937, the author George Orwell found it ‘doubtful 
whether a Gilbert and Sullivan heavy dragoon of Mosley’s stamp would ever be 
much more than a joke to the majority of English people’.
6
 Many interpretations of 
the BUF have concluded, in line with this assessment, that Mosley’s party was 
simply out of place in Britain. Yet the scholarship concerned with British fascism 
has also repudiated the idea that Mosley’s party was ideologically incoherent or 
simply a plagiarism of the Italian and German movements. Following the example 
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set by Robert Skidelsky’s study of Mosley, historians have been generous in their 
assessment of British fascism as a sophisticated ideological tradition paralleling the 
one that emerged in other parts of Europe.  
The experiences and intellectual processes which led Chesterton towards the 
BUF were much the same as the ones that engendered fascist movements on the 
continent. His military values and intense, transcendental nationalism had British 
roots, but were cemented by the experience of suffering, comradery and 
disillusionment associated with the front generation throughout Europe. Chesterton’s 
intellectual convictions regarding the decay of Western culture and civilization bore 
a close resemblance to the notions of Spenglarian decline and cultural despair which 
fed German fascism. Yet the icons of cultural achievement and heroism which 
Chesterton invoked as a remedy for this despair were part of a British pantheon, with 
Shakespeare as the crowning figure. Likewise, the transcendent nationalism which 
he embraced was grounded in a distinctive notion of a greater Britain spanning the 
globe at the height of its imperial flourishing. The fact that Chesterton was able to 
arrive at this worldview independently, prior to having contact with an existing 
fascist movement, lends itself to the interpretation of generic fascism put forward by 
theorists like Roger Griffin: an essentially universal ideology, not bound to any 
particular national context or institution, that coalesced around myths of national 
decline and rebirth in the early 20
th
 century.  
Interpreting Chesterton’s ideology as a variant of Griffin’s palingenetic ultra-
nationalism demonstrates the similarities between fascism in Britain and in other 
parts of Europe. To understand the limitations and contradictions of British fascism, 
however, we need to look beyond the similarities highlighted by the fascist minimum 
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and consider how the BUF diverged from the general characteristics of European 
fascism. Chesterton’s experiences with Mosley between 1933 and 1938 provide 
insight into several of the peculiarities that arose from an attempt to instigate a 
fascist revolution in a well-established democracy. From the beginning, the BUF’s 
campaigns rested upon a set of economic and political proposals that was 
uncommonly sophisticated. The Greater Britain was something of an oddity among 
the literature produced by fascist movements, many of whom disdained detailed 
policy proposals in favour of broad, emotionally resonant calls for national 
revolution.
7
 Chesterton’s writing as a BUF propagandist, represented at its fullest by 
Creed of a Fascist Revolutionary, was far more typical in its fascist sentiment, 
offering denunciations of individualism, cosmopolitan culture and parliamentary 
democracy alongside the demand for an immediate and drastic national revolution. 
Within the framework of the BUF, however, even a radical polemicist like 
Chesterton was compelled to present British fascism as an essentially reasonable, 
intellectually sound alternative to the existing order. ‘Not that the streets of Merrie 
England shall flow red with blood’, he reassured the readers of Blackshirt in 1934. 
‘Not that heads will roll in the sand’.
8
  
The programmatic nature of the BUF was understandable, given Mosley’s 
prevailing interest in economic planning and the political context of interwar Britain, 
which was naturally more suited to a fascism offering ‘peace and prosperity’ than 
one offering ‘war and expansion’.
9
 Whether genuine or merely a concession to 
political realities, the BUF’s calls for an orderly form of national revival often 
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seemed to contradict the revolutionary dynamic that set fascism apart in the first 
place. In Chesterton’s case, this contradiction was evident in the gap between words 
and actions, or propaganda and reality. On paper, the fascist revolution led by 
Mosley was to be a rebuke to decadent liberalism and a parliamentary system 
paralysed by talk. Yet as the BUF was unable to gain the street-level momentum of 
fascist parties on the continent, and proved unwilling to challenge many of the social 
and legal norms constraining it, British fascism itself amounted primarily to bluster. 
When the BUF did engage in the kind of violent action that was integral to the fascist 
campaigns in other parts of Europe, it disturbed even the professedly revolutionary 
Chesterton, who was repelled by what he saw as unnecessary and undisciplined 
brutality at the Olympia meeting. 
The brief crisis of conscience that Chesterton experienced after Olympia is 
insufficient reason to exculpate him from the wider pattern of political violence 
associated with British fascism. As discussed in Chapter 3, Chesterton’s anti-Semitic 
pronouncements after his break with Mosley in 1938 strayed on at least one occasion 
into incitement against British Jews. His continued association with the party even 
after witnessing the Defence Force in action, not to mention his enthusiastic 
participation in the campaigns in East London, made him complicit in the violence 
that inevitably accompanied BUF activity. On an ideological level, however, there is 
little to suggest that violence played any significant role in Chesterton’s concept of a 
fascist revolution. At most, he regarded the BUF’s paramilitary aspect as a practical 
necessity, as well as a product of its commitment to discipline and patriotism, values 
that set the Blackshirts apart from their anarchic, internationalist opponents. While 
this view encompassed some of the relationship between fascism and paramilitary 
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violence, Chesterton fell short of Michael Mann’s observation that ‘violence was key 
to the “radicalism” of fascism’.
10
 The radicalism of Chesterton’s fascism lay instead 
in its call for a new society capable of transcending materialism, restoring Britain’s 
cultural values and incorporating the lessons of the First World War. It bears 
reiterating that, despite his professed disdain for talk and theory, Chesterton’s 
fascism was defined almost entirely by ideas and the nebulous concept of spiritual 
revolution.  
In using Chesterton to draw broader conclusions about the nature of British 
fascism in the interwar period, we need to contend with the fact that he was but one 
aspect of a multifaceted movement. Much like its counterparts throughout Europe, 
Britain’s fascist movement contained both radical and conservative elements. Robert 
Skidelsky was among the first to note that Mosley, wielding the most direct 
influence over the BUF’s policy and direction, brought a combination of rational and 
romantic ideas to fascism. While idealistic notions of heroism and spiritual renewal 
played an important part in Mosley’s fascist program, his vision of a fascist 
revolution was premised on the idea that scientific corporatism would resolve the 
material impediments to Britain’s national revival. Some figures within the BUF 
leadership, such as Chesterton’s long-time rival Neil Frances-Hawkins, brought a 
decidedly pragmatic approach to the task of organizing the BUF as a political 
machine. Others, like William Joyce, were driven by a commitment to fascism and 
anti-Semitism that eventually overrode their commitment to Britain altogether. The 
most outwardly extreme figure within Britain’s interwar fascist movement, Arnold 
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Leese, rejected the BUF outright and compensated for his lack of political 
sophistication through sheer racist fanaticism.  
Due to his disdain for the conventions of Britain’s decadent political 
institutions, and his enthusiastic embrace of anti-Semitic conspiracies, Chesterton 
was drawn towards the more radical, idealistic circles within the BUF, occupied by 
‘real revolutionaries’ like Joyce and John Beckett.
11
 His ideology provided a good  
illustration of the sense in which British fascism was revolutionary in a manner that 
distinguished it from the radical left. Apart from the corporatist ideas he adopted 
from Mosley, Chesterton had no broad critique of capitalism akin to Marxist theory. 
Anti-Semitism provided the rationale for a more limited attack on financiers, while 
he simultaneously denounced the left’s materialism, pacifism, internationalism and 
willingness to stoke class conflict. Chesterton’s interwar ideology was revolutionary 
because it sought to abolish rather than preserve the status quo and replace Britain’s 
liberal democratic system with a corporatist one. It was also consistently anti-
conservative, attacking hypocritical Tories as often as it pilloried decadent liberals 
and the menace of bolshevism.    
The radical and utopian qualities of Chesterton’s ideology resulted in some of 
the clearest and most unadulterated expressions of fascist thought to emerge from a 
British perspective. It must be noted, however, that the pure, idealistic nature of 
Chesterton’s fascism often proved difficult to reconcile with the reality of 
establishing a popular movement in 1930s Britain. He denounced compromise as a 
symptom of liberal decadence, despite the fact that the BUF was already compelled 
to water down or obscure aspects of fascism that proved unpalatable for British 
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audiences. After the war, in an article discussing William Joyce’s flight to Germany, 
Chesterton insisted that British fascists had consciously sought to separate their 
movement from the violent, despotic nature of continental fascism: ‘ [the Mosley 
fascists] were sure that the Fascism they were to build would differ from continental 
brands as radically as the Reform Act differed from the French Revolution’.
12
 This 
echoed an early statement made by Mosley during the 1930s that likened the nature 
of British fascism to 19
th
 century liberalism, an orderly and ‘perfected’ version of a 
creed that had ‘bathed the continent in blood’.
13
  
After dismissing the BUF as grossly unsuited to British conditions, George 
Orwell raised the possibility of a more refined fascist movement emerging in the 
future that would avoid Mosley’s missteps: ‘English Fascism, when it arrives, is 
likely to be of a sedate and subtle kind (presumably, at any rate at first, it won’t be 
called Fascism)’.
14
 This was a prescient observation in one sense, as later iterations 
of the British extreme right did scrupulously avoid labelling themselves fascists. 
What Orwell overlooked, however, was that the BUF had already been shaped by 
concessions to the British character. As the mass departure of conservative 
“Rothermere fascists” in 1934 demonstrated, there was a limit to how far this process 
of moderation and adaptation could be carried before the whole concept of British 
fascism began to unravel.  For the BUF to completely abandon a violent, 
revolutionary dynamic and embrace some more ‘sedate and subtle’ form of politics 
was to acknowledge that fascism was an essentially unstable form of politics with no 
real place in Britain. It was to admit, in some sense, that the kind of economic, 
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political or cultural crises necessitating a fascist revolution had failed to manifest 
themselves.  Rather than acknowledge either of these possibilities, Mosley and his 
followers persisted with fascism until the British government intervened. 
Chesterton’s most resounding indictment of the BUF after his departure in 1938 
described what remained of the party as ‘pursuing a parody of fascism in thought and 
principle’.
15
 In actuality, however, thought and principle were the main areas in 
which the BUF could be considered a success. British fascists retained their 
ideological integrity at the cost of political progress; in Robert Paxton’s phrase, 
‘They remained pure – and insignificant’.
16
    
Two of the characteristics which defined the BUF as a fascist party, 
paramilitarism and revolutionary nationalism, proved alienating to much of British 
society. Anti-Semitism, the other quality which kept the BUF on the margins of 
British politics, was never a necessary component of fascist ideology, a fact often 
obscured by the centrality of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany and the fascist 
movements of Central Europe. Chesterton’s interwar experience provides some 
explanation as to why anti-Semitism became such a defining feature of British 
fascism, despite the damage it caused to the movement. International finance 
conspiracies provided both a rationale for fascism’s fledgling status in Britain and a 
monolithic enemy for its followers to rally against. Chesterton’s obsession with 
malevolent conspiracies was a natural consequence of the Manichean view of 
politics and history to which he subscribed, and internal enemies were a universal 
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aspect of European fascism.
17
 The BUF’s belligerent campaigns through East 
London attracted vigorous opposition and failed to replicate the party’s early success 
in attracting a mass membership. They were fruitful enough, however, to persuade 
Chesterton and other radicals that a groundswell of nationalistic, anti-Jewish 
sentiment lay just below the surface of British society, waiting to be harnessed for 
political ends.  This assumption, ill-founded though it was, would prove central to 
the reformation of Britain’s extreme right after 1940. During the brief period 
between Chesterton’s departure from the BUF and the beginning of the Second 
World War, anti-Semitism provided a degree of unity in a movement that, outside of 
Mosley, was desperately lacking in leadership. Conspiracy theories of a calculated 
Jewish campaign against Germany offered a perversely comforting explanation for 
why Britain was being drawn into another European conflict. For Chesterton, 
disillusioned with Mosley after years of loyal service, the crusade against Jewish 
money power was a continuing thread to be followed after the failure of the BUF. 
Even as he denounced Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, and prepared for the 
possibility of fighting another war, Chesterton warned against ‘that still more 
devastating and frightful thing, the menace of cosmopolitan gold’.
18
  
The outbreak of war in September 1939, followed by the start of internment 
in May 1940, did not mark the end of fascism in Britain. Instead, these events 
represented the end of an era during which fascism represented the main 
organizational and ideological rallying point for activists of the extreme right. The 
tendency to view British fascism as a monolithic, unbroken continuity spanning the 
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pre and post-war eras has been encouraged by interpretations of fascism that place 
their sole emphasis on myths and ideas. Since movements of the extreme right in 
Britain after 1945 were occupied primarily with national rebirth, it follows under 
Griffin’s interpretation that they were just another manifestation of the same fascist 
essence that propelled the BUF. It is hard to dispute the basic notion of an 
ideological and hereditary link between interwar fascism and post-war nationalism in 
Britain. Along with his obsession with decadence and national regeneration, 
Chesterton maintained an interest in specific aspects of BUF policy after returning 
from overseas in 1943. His proposed alternative for post-war Britain, presented to 
the public as an ‘Empire Economy’, was essentially a rehashing of the corporatist 
autarchy described by Mosley in The Greater Britain.  These enduring proposals for 
a nationalistic alternative to capitalism and communism tie Chesterton’s post-war 
ideology to yet another definition of generic fascism, the holistic, radically 
nationalist third-way described by Roger Eatwell.  
Both Griffin and Eatwell’s theories are useful for discerning the continuing 
prevalence of certain themes within extreme right ideology, but they cannot be used 
to encompass the entirety of the movement after 1945. The breadth and simplicity of 
Griffin’s fascist minimum, while of value in assessing fascism as an ideology, starts 
to obscure rather than enlighten when applied uncritically to the whole of the post-
war extreme right. Ideological heterogeneity and organizational complexity, the 
qualities which Griffin attributed to post-war fascism, take on a greater significance 
when viewed as more than just mutations of the fascist organism, or different 
factions arguing over the interpretation of national rebirth. This is especially the case 
when, per the suggestions of Robert Paxton and Michael Mann, we understand 
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fascism as a movement defined by as much its actions and organization as its ideas. 
Rather than viewing Chesterton and other activists as engaged in a monolithic neo-
fascist project, it is more enlightening to consider fascism as only one aspect of a 
wider political family that coalesced in Britain after the end of the Second World 
War. This family comprised several overlapping factions, including the remnants of 
the interwar fascist movement, the fringes of the conservative movement, newer 
strands of racial nationalism, and an array of other esoteric right-wing factions, some 
of which contained strains of unabashed neo-Nazism or ‘nostalgic fascism’.
19
 
Having made a case against the notion of a ubiquitous ‘British fascism’ after 1945, it 
must be acknowledged that, contrary to the protestations of ex-BUF figures like 
Chesterton, fascism did play a significant and perhaps outsized role in parts of the 
extreme right. Mosley’s Union Movement stands as the most straightforward 
example of a British neo-fascist party, in the sense that Mosley sought to recapture 
the momentum of his earlier party, albeit in the service of a radical new program 
based around pan-European identity.  
Chesterton and the After-Victory Group’s aspirations for a National Front 
party between 1943 and 1946 also qualified, in many respects, as a fascist enterprise. 
Chesterton and other ex-BUF members in the planning committee had every 
intention of harnessing a populist, grassroots nationalism and anti-Semitism to 
support their movement, and made repeated reference to a leader of military 
background emerging organically to spearhead the process of national regeneration. 
Chesterton anticipated that the aftermath of the Second World War would be a repeat 
of the years after 1918, and that a new wave of veterans would embrace nationalism 
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and anti-Semitism, just as he had in the 1930s. His fixation on ‘winning the peace’ 
and accomplishing tasks that had eluded the BUF implied that the party debuting in 
1945 was to be a fairly orthodox attempt to revive British fascism, stripped of its 
foreign overtones and the personality cult surrounding Mosley. In other respects, 
however, the After-Victory Group gave a preview of the ideological and 
organizational ambiguity that would characterize the extreme right after 1945. Collin 
Brooks, Chesterton’s closest ally in planning the National Front, spent much of the 
interwar period vacillating between conservatism and the extreme right. The party’s 
platform also incorporated conservative principles, promising to combat the growth 
of state bureaucracy and affirm the dignity of individual British citizens. Such ideas 
were hardly typical of ‘state worshipping’ interwar fascist parties, and bore closer 




Given that the 1945 National Front hardly came to fruition as a party, its 
political orientation was mostly a matter of speculation and argument among various 
members of the planning committee, rather than a definite set of policies. Even so, 
Chesterton’s proposals for mass chalking and leafleting campaigns gave a small 
insight into the direction his political activism was headed, towards the 
confrontational but mostly non-violent protest tactics of the LEL. In organizational 
terms, the After-Victory Group itself was something of a predecessor to the small, 
non-party entities which comprised much of the extreme right after 1945: an 
overlapping cluster of pressure groups, reading circles and clandestine paramilitaries 
that bore varying degrees of ideological and methodological proximity to fascism. 
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Despite the weathering of internment and the flourishing of small extreme right 
groups that took place during this period, Chesterton’s experience after 1943 brought 
much of the same failure and disillusionment he encountered with Mosley. New 
circumstances, ideas and alliances on the extreme right were accompanied by an 
array of old and new problems. The absence of a clearly appointed leader 
exacerbated the internal divisions which had beset the movement even under 
Mosley’s stewardship. Reconciling the revolutionary, anti-Semitic aspects of British 
fascism with the more conservative tendencies of the British right proved difficult, as 
illustrated by the abrupt departure of the After-Victory group’s patron, Granville 
Soames, in 1945. Chesterton’s experiences with the After-Victory Group, and later 
with the LEL, confirm Mark Pitchford’s observation that relations between 
conservatives and the extreme right became far more  circumspect after the collapse 
of interwar fascism in Britain. Ironically, just as Chesterton and other radicals were 
becoming more open to conservative ideas, the establishment circles of British 
conservatism were becoming more unified and diligent in their opposition to fascism 
and anti-Semitism.
21
 Financing and other mundane necessities of political organizing 
subsequently proved a constant struggle for Britain’s post-war extreme right, which 
was forced to rely on the generosity of aristocrats like the Duke of Bedford, eccentric 
businessmen like R.K. Jeffery, or an audience of followers endlessly harangued for 
small donations.   
Just like its predecessors, the After-Victory group was brought down by 
circumstances largely outside its control. Instead of the surge of nationalism and 
anti-Semitism which Chesterton and Brooks anticipated, the end of the war in 1945 
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brought renewed antipathy towards any group that bore a resemblance to the BUF. 
John Beckett’s British People’s Party and Mosley’s Union Movement each 
encountered fierce public opposition, while the After-Victory group’s planned 
National Front was rendered impotent by constant infighting and state infiltration. In 
some ways, Chesterton’s resignation from the National Front in 1946 represented a 
more definitive end to his involvement with fascism than his resignation from the 
BUF. That event signalled Chesterton’s disillusionment with Mosley as a heroic 
figure, rather than fascism as a whole. The failure of the first National Front, on the 
other hand, marked his disillusionment with mass politics, and the idea that a 
national revolution could be easily reignited along traditional party lines. The 
intellectual or “spiritual” remnants of fascism – cultural despair, anti-Semitic 
conspiracy and palingenetic ultra-nationalism – remained integral to Chesterton’s 
worldview after 1945, but were diluted and separated from the violent, grassroots 
populism that made fascism such a distinctively dangerous and unstable force in 
interwar politics.   
The clearest demonstration of Chesterton’s altered relationship with fascism 
after 1945 was the LEL. Reading through the issues of Candour, which consistently 
featured overt anti-Semitism, strident nationalism and vague authoritarianism, 
opponents could plausibly accuse Chesterton and his followers of harbouring fascist 
or ‘semi-fascist’ inclinations. Yet the membership, platform and tactics of the LEL 
were both consciously and unconsciously out of step with the methods and ideals of 
fascism. Chesterton opted for a selective membership, eschewing populism and 
electioneering in favour of publicity stunts and a constant stream of quasi-intellectual 
literature. What little violence did accompany LEL activities often appeared in a 
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bizarre inversion of the situation that had accompanied BUF meetings the 1930s. 
Having once protested the BUF’s right to forcefully maintain order at its meetings, 
Chesterton now defended the LEL’s right to heckle and protest without rough 
treatment. While ‘Colonel Blimpish’ stereotypes may not have been universally 
applicable among the group’s membership, which included a cadre of young 
reactionaries and budding neo-fascists, the LEL’s platform reflected Chesterton’s 
anachronistic view of British identity and world affairs. Rather than exulting in 
youth and modernity, therefore, the LEL was focused on restoring traditional British 
values and recapturing a faded sense of imperial glory. While Chesterton’s influence 
brought echoes of the fascist tradition, along with a form of conspiratorial anti-
Semitism that traced back to the early 20
th
 century, the LEL was more reactionary 
than fascist.  
Chesterton’s partial success in ‘laying the fascist ghost’ after 1953 did not 
spare his endeavours from the problems that had beset Britain’s extreme right since 
1940. Once again, most of these problems were circumstantial and stemmed from a 
lack of political space on the right which was exacerbated by the arrival of radical 
conservative groups like the Monday Club. Chesterton’s unwillingness to re-
examine aspects of the “Money Power” conspiracy also limited the LEL’s ability to 
capitalize on new developments. Anti-communism, an issue which fed the growth of 
extreme right groups in the United States, was often overlooked by Chesterton in 
favour of a broader assault on the ‘capitalist communist nexus’. However much he 
protested against the notion that the LEL was anti-American, Chesterton’s esoteric 
view of the Cold War limited his engagement with sympathetic (and wealthy) 
members of the conservative establishment. At the other end of the spectrum, a new 
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generation of neo-fascists and racial nationalists attracted to the LEL chafed against 
its elitist posture and tactical restraint. Under Chesterton’s leadership, the movement 
suffered from a similar problem to the one that beset interwar British fascism: it was 
too radical to attract mainstream support, but not dangerous or populist enough to 
pose a real challenge to the established order.  
For most of Chesterton’s post-war career, this problem was overshadowed by 
the general redundancy of extreme right politics after 1945. In Britain, as in most 
other parts of Western Europe, the decades following the Second World War were 
for the most part stable and prosperous, offering little purchase to a movement 
preoccupied with societal disintegration, grand conspiracies and the failures of the 
political centre . The crisis which lay at the centre of Chesterton’s politics after 1945, 
the collapse of the British imperial hegemony, gained little traction in Britain and 
other parts of the Anglosphere, gaining a modicum of support among the threatened 
white minorities of post-colonial Africa. It was only towards the very end of his life 
that Chesterton encountered two issues capable of reinvigorating Britain’s extreme 
right. The first, European integration, had little short term impact on the growth or 
development of the National Front during the 1970s. In the long term, however, 
Chesterton’s opposition to the Common Market proved a more enduring and fruitful 
platform for extreme right parties than the pan-European ideas put forward by 
Mosley. Although the alternatives that Chesterton proposed were fundamentally 
unrealistic, and relied more on imperial nostalgia than sound political or economic 
theories, his opposition to the Common Market tapped into deeper currents of 
nationalism and fears of bureaucratic overreach that underpin contemporary British 
arguments against the European Union.  
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The second issue, immigration, had a far more immediate effect on the 
fortunes of Britain’s extreme right and served as the basis for a general resurgence of 
right-wing parties throughout Western Europe. Public concern over immigration 
provided an ideal platform for the extreme right, since it created political space for a 
popular movement outside the mainstream consensus, along with an ostensibly 
respectable platform with no explicit ties to fascism or authoritarianism. While the 
rise of anti-immigrant sentiment was a positive development for the extreme right as 
a whole, it highlighted the fact that Chesterton occupied an awkward and 
increasingly untenable position within the extreme right family. Despite the stolid 
reputation that the LEL faction carried within the National Front upon its formation 
in 1967, Chesterton was wary of figures like Enoch Powell, whose stance on 
immigration derived from parochial racism and Little England conservatism rather 
than British nationalism. Chesterton’s outlook on immigration, the product of a 
synthesis between pseudo-biological racism and conspiratorial anti-Semitism, did 
have a discernible influence on younger members of the extreme right. In many 
respects, however, Chesterton’s political instincts put him at odds with the faction 
that would take control of the National Front after his resignation in 1971. Along 
with his general distaste for electoral politics, Chesterton was averse to the 
confrontational and intermittently violent style of racial nationalism that became 
synonymous with Britain’s extreme right during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Having spent decades attempting to transcend his affiliation with the BUF, 
Chesterton viewed tactics that invited comparisons to fascism as both 
counterproductive and contrary to the principles of the movement he was hoping to 
build. He correctly assumed that street violence, covert paramilitaries and overt 
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displays of racial hatred were a hindrance to the political fortunes of Britain’s 
extreme right, which struggled to attain the legitimate reputation or electoral success 
garnered by some of its counterparts in Western Europe after 1970. During his brief 
tenure at the head of the National Front, Chesterton maintained the cautious 
approach he had adopted with the LEL, and attempted (without complete success) to 
keep the party free of undesirable elements. At the same time, however, he rejected 
calls to moderate the policies or ideological platform of the National Front in order 
to court more conservative followers. Just months before his resignation from the 
National Front, Chesterton appealed to the readers of Candour to embrace the mantle 
of right-wing extremism: 
 
Whoever thinks that this task can be undertaken without extreme activity, 
without getting mud bespattered on hands and cuffs and without being called 
many nasty names, is a weakling, a political flaneur whose only service is to 




The combination of ideological radicalism, elitism and organizational discipline 
which Chesterton imposed on the National Front was the culmination of his efforts, 
dating back to the After-Victory Group, to marry transcendent nationalism and 
conspiratorial anti-Semitism with social conservatism and political restraint. 
Chesterton’s final attempt to unify and synthesize the post-war extreme right proved, 
much like its predecessors, to be contradictory and politically inert. On this occasion, 
however, it also provided a legitimation of younger extremists within the National 
Front like John Tyndall, who were more willing than Chesterton to harness currents 
of anti-immigrant populism and racial hatred to further the goals of the movement. 
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The combination of populist ultra-nationalism, veiled authoritarianism and 
racial violence that characterized the National Front after Chesterton’s death made 
for a party that was more authentically fascist than either the League of Empire 
Loyalists or its successor, the short lived Candour-League movement. It also made a 
virtue of the ideological and organizational heterogeneity on the extreme right, by 
temporarily obscuring the more egregiously hateful and fascistic elements of the 
party under a banner of ethnocentric populism. This style of politics proved more 
energizing for the movement’s base than Chesterton’s conservative approach, and 
briefly threatened to cement the National Front as a minor force within British 
politics. After the 1979 electoral collapse, however, the newest and most hopeful 
party of the British extreme right succumbed to the same combination of internal 
conflict, external opposition and political space that had doomed its predecessors.  A 
new generation of radicals willing to follow in Chesterton’s footsteps found 
themselves facing different circumstances but the same unpleasant choice: pursue 
moderation, and face an uphill battle against the established parties, or embrace 
extremism, and face a lifetime of marginalization, failure and disillusionment. 
 For much of his career, Chesterton was unable to choose between these two 
alternatives, and attempted to bridge the divide between respectable politics and 
radical ideology. This was not a path to political success, but it afforded him a 
unique perspective on the evolution of Britain’s extreme right, and the practical 
difficulty encountered by those seeking  a national revolution against the backdrop of 
British democracy. Chesterton’s time with the BUF captured some of the essence of 
the ‘political oxymoron’ that was British fascism between the wars. In aspiring to 
overthrow a decadent old order beset by internal squabbles and intellectual dithering, 
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Chesterton became representative of a movement beset by internal problems, whose 
greatest achievements (on the scale of European-wide fascism) were in the realm of 
culture and intellect. Much of Chesterton’s time after 1945 was spent navigating and 
seeking alliances between the different factions of the extreme right; this reflected 
the increasing diversity of the movement, as well as its political weakness, which 
was compounded by a lack of definite leaders and a clear ideological vision. Along 
with some semblance of political unity, Chesterton sought a new praxis for Britain’s 
extreme right, one that was capable of achieving national regeneration without the 
violent, revolutionary upheaval demanded by fascism. As was the case with interwar 
British fascism, however, this vision of ‘post-fascist’ British nationalism proved 






National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, London 
(TNA) 
KV2 – Records of the Security Service, Personal (PF) Files 
1235: Ian Waveney Girvan 
 1345-1350: Arthur Kenneth Chesterton 
 1365: Arnold Spencer Leese 
 3328: Horace Rex Tremlett 
KV4 – Policy (Pol F) Files 
331: Policy re study and investigation of Fascism and other right wing or 
kindred movements and activities 1933-1945 
BT 389 – Registry of Shipping and Seamen: War of 1939-1945 
CRIM 1/3973 – Central Criminal Court: Depositions, 11 September 1962 
 
University of Bath Special Collections, Bath 
(UBA) 
GB 1128 – Catalogue of the papers and correspondence of Arthur Kenneth 
Chesterton (1899-1973).  
United Kingdom Parliamentary Archives, Westminster, London 
(PA) 
BBK/C – The Beaverbrook Papers: Special Persons Correspondence 
British Library, St. Pancras, London 
(BL) 




University of Sheffield Special Collections, Sheffield 
MS 238 – John Beckett Collection 
Primary Sources 






The People’s Post 
National Front News 
Spearhead 
Combat 
Fascist Quarterly (later British Union Quarterly) 
The Patriot 
Union 
The Weekly Review 
Truth 
Extreme Right-Wing Books and Pamphlets 
Note: Some of the publications listed under this heading, such as Chesterton’s non-
political works, do not strictly qualify as literature of the extreme right but have been 
grouped here for the sake of simplicity. 
Bean, John, Many Shades of Black (Burlington: Ostara, 2011) 
Belloc, Hilaire, The Jews (London: Constable and Company, 1922) 





Chesterton, A.K. (as ‘Caius Marcius Coriolanus), No Shelter For Morrison (London: 
Dorothy Crisp, 1944)  
 
Chesterton, A.K.,  Portrait of a Leader (London: Sanctuary Press, 1937) 
 
Chesterton, A.K., Adventures in Dramatic Appreciation (London: T. Werner Laurie, 
1932) 
 
Chesterton, A.K., Creed of a Fascist Revolutionary (London: BUF Publications, 
1936) 
Chesterton, A.K., Facing the Abyss (Liss Forest: A.K. Chesterton Trust, 1976) 
Chesterton, A.K., Juma the Great (London: Carroll and Nicholson, 1947) 
 
Chesterton, A.K., Menace of the Money Power (Liss Forest: A.K. Chesterton Trust, 
2012. Originally published in London by Yeoman Press/Blackfriars, 1946) 
 
Chesterton, A.K., The New Unhappy Lords (Liss Forest: A.K. Chesterton Trust, 
2009) 
 
Chesterton, A.K., Why I Left Mosley (London: The National Socialist League, 1939) 
 
Fahey, Denis, The Mystical Body of Christ in the Modern World (Dublin: Browne 
and Nolan, 1935) 
Field, A.N., The Truth About the Slump (Nelson: A.N. Field, 1934) 
McNeile, Hugh and Rob Black, The History of the League of Empire Loyalists and 
Candour, (London: The A.K. Chesterton Trust, 2014) 
Mosley, Oswald, Fascism: 100 Question Asked and Answered (London: BUF 
Publications, 1936) 
Mosley, Oswald, My Life (London: Nelson, 1968) 
Mosley, Oswald, The Alternative (Ramsbury: Mosley Publications, 1947)   
 
Mosley, Oswald, The Greater Britain (London: BUF, 1934) 
Reed, Douglas, Far and Wide (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951) 
Stewart-Chamberlain, Houston, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century Vol. II, 
(London: John Lane, 1911) 
 
Tyndall, John, Six Principles of British Nationalism (Albion Press, 1966) 
Tyndall, John, The Eleventh Hour (Welling: Albion Press, 1998) 
 
 360 
Webster, Nesta, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (Christian Book Club of 
America, 1964) 
 








The Sunday Times 
The Times 
Secondary Sources 
Allport, W. Gordon, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1979) 
Baker, David, Ideology of Obsession (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996) 
Barber, James, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (London: Oxford University Press, 
1967) 
 
Beckett, Francis, Fascist in the Family, (London: Routledge 2016) 
 
Benewick, Robert, The Fascist Movement in Britain (London: Allen Lane, 1972) 
 
Billig, Michael, Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) 
 
Blinkhorn, Martin, Fascists and Conservatives (London: Unwan Hymin, 1990) 
Brewer, J.D., Mosley’s Men (Hampshire: Gower Publishing, 1984) 
Brown, Rupert, Prejudice: Its Social Psychology (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010) 
 
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-
1990 (London: Longman, 1993) 
 
 361 
Carlyle, Thomas, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York: 
Chelsea House, 1983) 
 
Carter, Elizabeth, The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 
Chesterton, Cecil, A History of the United States (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1919) 
 
Cohn, Norman, Warrant For Genocide (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) 
 
Copsey, Nigel and Andrzej Olechnowicz eds., Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in 
the Interwar Period (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010) 
 
Copsey, Nigel, Anti-Fascism in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) 
 
Copsey, Nigel, Contemporary British Fascism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004) 
 
Cronin, Mike ed., The Failure of British Fascism (London: Macmillan, 1996) 
Crowson, N.J. ed., Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics: The Journals of Collin 
Brooks, 1932-1940 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge for the Royal Historical 
Society, 1998) 
 
Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonization (London: Macmillan, 1998) 
De Felice, Renzo, Interpretations of Fascism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977) 
Dimitrov, Georgi, The Working Class Against Fascism (London: Martin Lawrence, 
1935) 
Donaldson, Frances, The Marconi Scandal (London: Bloomsbury, 2011) 
 
Dorril, Stephen, Blackshirt (London: Viking, 2006) 
 
Eatwell, Roger, Fascism: A History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1995) 
 
Einzig, Paul, The Economic Foundations of Fascism (London: Macmillan, 1933) 
 
Fielding, Nigel, The National Front (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) 
 





G.K. Chesterton, Poems (London: Burns and Oates, 1917) 
 
Geyer, Michael and Sheila Fitzpatrick eds., Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and 
Nazism compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
 
Goodwin, Matthew J., New British Fascism (London: Routledge, 2011) 
 
Gottlieb, Julie V., Feminine Fascism (London; I.B. Tauris, 2003) 
 
Gregor, A. James, Interpretations of Fascism (Morristown: General Learning Press, 
1974) 
Gregor, A. James, The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974) 
Gregor, A. James, The Ideology of Fascism (New York: Free Press, 1969) 
Gregor, A. James, Totalitarianism and Political Religion (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012) 
Grey, W.E., 2
nd
 City of London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War 1914-
1919 (London: Headquarters of the Regiment, 1929) 
 
Griffin, Roger ed., Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
 
Griffin, Roger ed., Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion (London: 
Routledge, 2005) 
Griffin, Roger ed., International Fascism, (London: Arnold, 1998) 
Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991) 
Griffin, Roger, Werner Loh and Andreas Umland eds, Fascism Past and Present, 
West and East (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2006) 
 
Griffiths, Richard, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British enthusiasts for Nazi 
Germany, 1933-9 (London: Constable, 1980) 
 
Griffiths, Richard, Patriotism Perverted (London: Constable and Co., 1998) 
 
Guérin, Daniel, Fascism and Big Business (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1939) 
Hainsworth, Paul, The Extreme Right in Western Europe (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008). 
 




Hamilton, Alistair, The Appeal of Fascism (London: Anthony Blond, 1971) 
Hofstadter, Richard, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 
(New York: Vintage, 1967) 
Holmes, Colin, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939 (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1979) 
 
Holmes, Colin, Searching for Lord Haw-Haw (London: Routledge, 2016) 
 
Husbands, Christopher T., Racial Exclusionism and the City (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1983) 
 
Jackson, Paul, Colin Jordan and Britain’s Neo-Nazi Movement (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2016) 
 
Jackson, Paul, ed., Post-War Anglo-American Far Right: A Special Relationship of 
Hate (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
Johnson, Robert, British Imperialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 
 
Ker, Ian, G.K. Chesterton: A Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
 
Kershaw, Ian and Moshe Lewin eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in 
Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
 
Kershaw, Ian,  Making Friends with Hitler (London: Penguin, 2012). 
 
Killingray, David, and Richard Rathbone, The Second World War in Africa (London: 
Macmillan, 1986) 
Kitchen, Martin, Fascism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976) 
 
Krikler, Jeremy, The Rand Revolt (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball, 2005) 
 
Kumar, Krishan, The Making of English National Identity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 
Kushner, Tony and Kenneth Lunn eds., Traditions of Intolerance (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989) 
 
Kushner, Tony, The Persistence of Prejudice (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1989) 
 




Laqueur, Walter, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New 
York: Edward Burlingame, 1993) 
 
Laqueur, Walter, The Changing Face of Anti-Semitism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 
 
Lebzelter, Gisela, Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-1939 (London: 
Macmillan, 1978) 
Lewis, D.S., Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society 1931-81 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 
 
Linehan, Thomas, British Fascism 1918- 1939 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000) 
 
Linehan, Thomas, East London For Mosley (London: Frank Cass, 1997) 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1959) 
Louis, Wm. Roger, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and 
Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006) 
Lunn, Kenneth and Richard C. Thurlow eds., British Fascism: Essays on the Radical 
Right in Interwar Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1980) 
 
Macklin, Graham, Very Deeply Died in Black (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007) 
 
Mandle, W.F., Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists (London: Longman, 
1968) 
 
Merkl, Peter H. and Leonard Weinberg eds., The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in 
the Nineties (London: Frank Cass, 1997) 
 
Messina, Anthony M., Race and Party Competition in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989) 
 
Miles, Robert and Annie Phizacklea, Racism and Political Action in Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1979) 
 
Mosse, George L., The Fascist Revolution (New York: Howard Fertig, 1999) 
Nolte, Ernst, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewegungen 
(Munich: Piper, 1968) 
 
Nolte, Ernst, Three Faces of Fascism (Holt: Reinhart and Winston, 1963) 
 





Orwell, George, The Road to Wigan Pier (London: Secker and Warburg, 1986) 
 
Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Vintage, 2004) 
Payne, Stanley, A History of Fascism 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995) 
 
Payne, Stanley, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1980) 
Pinto, Antonio Costa and Aristotle Kallis eds, Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship 
in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
 
Pinto, Antonio Costa ed., Rethinking the Nature of Fascism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 
 
Pitchford, Mark, The Conservative Party and the Extreme Right 1945-1975 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011) 
 
Powell, David, British Politics 1910-1931 (London: Routledge, 2004) 
 
Prost, Antoine, In the Wake of War (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992) 
 
Pugh, Martin, Hurrah for the Blackshirts! (London: Pimlico, 2006) 
 
Pugh, Martin, State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain since 1870 
(London: Hodder Education, 2008) 
 
Pugh, Martin, The Making of Modern British Politics 1867-1945 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002) 
 
Radford, Rosemary, Faith and Fratricide (New York: Seabury Press, 1974) 
 
Rees, Philip, Fascism in Britain (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979) 
 
Renton, Dave, Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and Britain in the 1940s (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Renton, Dave, Fascism: Theory and Practice (London: Pluto Press, 1999) 
 
Rich, Paul B., Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) 
 
Roberts, David D., Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism 




Roger, Eatwell, Fascism: A History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1995) 
 
Rubenstein, William D., A History of the Jews in the English Speaking World: Great 
Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 
Schofield, Camilla, Enoch Powell and the Making of Post-Colonial Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
Simkins, Peter, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2014) 
 
Simpson, A.W. Brian, In the Highest Degree Odious (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992) 
Skidelsky, Robert, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan, 1990) 
 
Skidelsky, Robert, Politicians and the Slump (London: Macmillan, 1967) 
 
Smith, Simon C., Ending Empire in the Middle East (London: Taylor and Francis, 
2013) 
Solomos, John, Race and Racism in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
Spencer, Ian R.G., British Immigration Policy Since 1939 (London: Routledge, 
1997) 
 
Stern, Fritz, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1963) 
Stevenson, John and Chris Cook, The Slump (Harlow: Pearson, 2010) 
 
Stone, Dan, Responses to Nazism in Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 
 
Strachan, Hew, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) 
 
Sykes, Alan, The Radical Right in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
 
Taylor, A.J.P., Beaverbrook (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972) 
Taylor, Stan, The National Front in English Politics (London: Macmillan, 1982) 
 
Thurlow, Richard, Fascism in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) 
Tilles, Daniel, British Fascist Anti-Semitism and Jewish Responses, 1932-1940 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2015) 
 
 367 
Walker, Martin, The National Front (London: Fontana, 1977) 
 
Ward, Maisie, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (London: Sheed and Ward, 1944) 
 
Weber, Eugen, Varieties of Fascism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1964) 
West, Rebecca, The Meaning of Treason (New York: Viking Books, 1947) 
White, Dan, Lost Comrades: Socialists of the Front Generation (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1992) 
 
Wistrich, Robert S., Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (London: Mandarin, 1992) 
Wolf, Lucien, The Myth of the Jewish Menace in World Affairs (New York: 
Macmillan, 1921) 
 
Chapters and Articles  
Allardyce, Gilbert, ‘What Fascism Isn’t: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept’, 
American Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (1979), pp. 367-388 
 
Bessel, Richard, ‘The ‘Front Generation’ and the politics of Weimar Germany’, 
Mark Roseman ed., Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation 
Formulation in Weimar Germany 1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 121-136 
 
Bosworth, R. J. B., ‘Introduction’, R.J.B. Bosworth ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 5-6 
 
Breckenridge, Keith, ‘Fighting for a White South Africa: White Working Class 
Racism and the 1922 Rand Revolt’, South African Historical Journal Vol.  57, No. 
1, pp. 228-243 
 
Cheyette, Bryan, ‘Hilaire Belloc and the “'Marconi Scandal” 1913-1914’, Kenneth 
Lunn and Tony Kushner, eds., The Politics of Marginality, (London: Frank Cass, 
1990), pp. 131-143 
 
Cheyette, Bryan, ‘Hilaire Belloc and the “'Marconi Scandal” 1913-1914’, Kenneth 
Lunn and Tony Kushner eds., The Politics of Marginality (London: Frank Cass, 
1990), pp. 131-143 
 
Copsey, Nigel, ‘“Fascism… but with an open mind.” Reflections on the 
Contemporary Far Right in (Western) Europe’, Fascism, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1-
17 
 
Cullen, Stephen, ‘The British Union of Fascists: the international dimension’, 




Cullen, Steven, ‘Political Violence: The Case of the British Union of Fascists’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1993), pp. 245-267 
 
Davis, Richard, ‘Why did the General do it? De Gaulle, Polaris and the French Veto 
of Britain’s Application to Join the Common Market’, European History Quarterly, 
Vol. 28, No. 3 (2008), pp. 373-397 
 
Drabik, Jakub, ‘British Union of Fascists’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 30, 
No. 1 (2016), pp. 1-19 
Durham, Martin, ‘Gender and the British Union of Fascists’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1992), pp. 513-529 
 
Eatwell, Roger, ‘Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism’, Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, Vol. 4, no. 2, 1992, pp. 161-194 
Edgar, David, ‘Racism, Fascism and the politics of the National Front’, Race and 
Class, Vol.19, No. 1 (1977), pp. 111-131 
 
Friedrich, Carl J., ‘The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society’, Carl J. Friedrich 
ed., Totalitarianism (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1953), pp. 52-53 
Goodwin, Matthew J., ‘Forever a false dawn? Explaining the Electoral Collapse of 
the British National Party (BNP)’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4 (2014), pp. 
887-906 
 
Gottlieb, Julie, ‘Body Fascism in Britain: Building the Blackshirt in the Interwar 
Period’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 111-136 
 
Gottlieb, Julie, ‘The Marketing of Megalomania: Celebrity, Consumption and the 
Development of Political Technology in the British Union of Fascists’, Journal of 
Contemporary History Vol. 41, No.1 (2006), pp. 35-55  
 
Grant, Jennifer, ‘The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the 
Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2009), 499-
528 
 
Griffin, Roger, ‘The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (Or Manufacture) of 
Consensus within Fascist Studies’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 1 
(2000), pp. 21-43 
 
Hillman, Nicholas, ‘“Tell me chum, in case I got it wrong. What was it we were 
fighting during the war?” The Re-emergence of British Fascism, 1945-58’, 




Hobson, J.A., ‘Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa’, Contemporary Review, 
1 January 1900 
 
Holmes, Colin ‘J.A. Hobson and the Jews’, Colin Holmes ed., Immigrants and 
Minorities in British Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 125-158 
 
Lawrence, Jon, ‘Fascist violence and public order in inter-war Britain’, Historical 
Research, Vol. 76, No. 192 (2003), pp. 238-267 
 
Lewis, George, "'Scientific Certainty': Wesley Critz George, Racial Science and 
Organised White Resistance in North Carolina, 1954-1962," Journal of American 
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2004) 
Love, Gary, ‘“What's the Big Idea?”: Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists 
and Generic Fascism’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007), pp. 
447-468 
 
Macklin, Graham, ‘“A Plague on Both Their Houses”, Fascism, Anti-Fascism and 
the Police in the 1940s’, Nigel Copsey and David Renton eds., British Fascism, the 
Labour Movement and the State (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 46-68 
 
Macklin, Graham, ‘The British Far Right’s South African Connection: A.K. 
Chesterton, Hendrik van den Bergh, and the South African Intelligence Services’, 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol.  25, No. 6 (2010), pp. 823-842 
 
Macklin, Graham, ‘Transatlantic Connections and Conspiracies: A.K. Chesterton 
and The New Unhappy Lords’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 47, No. 2 
(2012), pp. 270-290 
 
Mandle, W.F., ‘The Leadership of the British Union of Fascists’, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1966), pp. 360-383 
 
Marks, Shula, ‘Class, Culture and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899’ in 
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager and Bill Nasson (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
South Africa Vol. 2: 1885-1994, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 
102-156 
Paxton, Robert, ‘The Five Stages of Fascism’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, 
No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-23 
 
Powell, Enoch, ‘The Decline of Britain’, quoted in Frank O’Gorman, British 
Conservatism (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 214-215 
Pugh, Martin, ‘The British Union of Fascists and the Olympia Debate’, Historical 




Revaldsen, David, ‘“Science must be the Basis”. Sir Oswald Mosley’s Political 
Parties and their Policies on Health, Science and Scientific Racism 1931-1974’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2016), pp. 368-388 
 
Roberts, David D., Alexander De Grand, Mark Antliff and Thomas Linehan, 
‘Comments on Roger Griffin, “The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (Or 
Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies”, Journal of Contemporary 
History Vol. 37, No. 2 (2002), pp. 259-274 
 
Saposs, David J., ‘The Role of the Middle Class in Social Development: Fascism, 
Populism, Communism, Socialism’, Wesley Clair Mitchell ed., Economic essays in 
honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935) 
Seton-Watson, Hugh, ‘Fascism: Right and Left’, Journal of Contemporary History 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (1966), pp. 183-197 
 
Spurr, Michael, ‘“Playing for fascism”: sportsmanship, antisemitism and the British 
Union of Fascists, Patterns of Prejudice Vol. 37, No. 4 (2003), pp. 359-376 
 
Taylor, Stan, ‘The Incidence of Coloured Populations and Support for the National 
Front’, British Journal of Political Science Vol. 9, No. 2 (1979), pp. 250-255 
 
Thurlow, Richard, ‘Ideology of Obsession: On the Model of A.K. Chesterton’, 
Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 8, No. 6 (1974), pp. 23-29 
 
Thurlow, Richard, ‘The Black Knight’, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1975), 
pp. 15-19 
Thurlow, Richard, ‘The Guardian of the “Sacred Flame”: the Failed Political 
Resurrection of Sir Oswald Mosley after 1945’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 33, No. 2 (1998), pp. 241-254 
 
Thurlow, Richard, ‘The Powers of Darkness: Conspiracy Belief and Political 
Strategy’, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 12, No. 6 (1978), pp. 1-12 
 
Webber, G.C., ‘Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of 
Fascists’, Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 19, No. 4 (1984), pp. 575-606 
 
Weber, Eugen, ‘Revolution? Counterrevolution? What Revolution?’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1974), pp. 3-47 
Weber, Eugen, ‘The Men of the Archangel’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (1966), pp. 125-126 
 
White, G.D., ‘Shakespearean Fascist: A.K. Chesterton and the Politics of Cultural 
Despair’, Angel-Luis Pujante and Ton Hoenselaars (eds.),  Four Hundred Years of 




Woodbridge, Steven, ‘Fraudulent Fascism: The Attitude of Early British Fascists 
towards Mosley and the New Party’, Contemporary British History, vol. 23, no. 4 
(2009), pp. 502-505 
 
Worley, Matthew, ‘Finding Fascism: The Politics of Sir Oswald Mosley, 1929-
1932’, Nicola Kristin Karcher and Anders G. Kjostvedt eds., Movements and Ideas 
of the Extreme Right in Europe (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012), pp.79-103 
 
Theses 
Rawnsley, S.J., ‘Fascism and Fascists in Britain in the 1930s: a Case Study of 
Fascism in the North of England in a Period of Economic and Political Change’, 
PhD Diss., University of Bradford, 1983 
Baker, David L., ‘A.K. Chesterton: The Making of a British Fascist’, PhD Diss., 
University of Sheffield, 1982 
Electronic Resources 
Tether, C. Gordon, ‘Einzig, Paul (1897-1973)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31066, accessed 15 
Aug 2017]. 
